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Preface 
 
 
The Mexican southwest is known not only for having the 
greatest ecological diversity in the country, but also for its great 
cultural diversity. This region constitutes the undeniable 
indigenous face of Mexico, containing 74% of the entire country’s 
indigenous population. The Sierra Juárez, a range of tall, 
mountainous peaks tucked away to the north of the city of Oaxaca, 
is home to the Zapotecs, the “people of the clouds”. The Zapotecs 
have the single largest indigenous presence in the state of Oaxaca, 
but they are one of many indigenous peoples. For example the 
Mixe, according to their oral history, were the only indigenous 
people never conquered by the bearded Spaniard colonizers, since 
the area where they lived could not be found by explorers.  
My first conscious awareness of my Zapotec origin was that 
of living in the city of Oaxaca, speaking Spanish and listening to 
my parents and extended family speaking Zapotec and practicing 
Zapotec customs. Due to the rampant practice of discrimination 
against indigenous people and in a desire to protect his children 
and ensure their success in coping with the non-indigenous 
environment, my father prohibited the use of our native language. 
One of the many consequences was an ongoing rupture in inter-
generational communication and transference of our cultural 
heritage due to the language barrier. 
During junior high school I had my first encounter with the 
social reality of my environment when my classmate Alejandro 
shared with me that he, like students and workers in other regions, 
was seriously considering joining a group of clandestine armed 
guerrillas in order to create the conditions for the construction of a 
more just and egalitarian society. According to Alejandro, 
education was insufficient to bring about true change, and a 
clandestine armed struggle was necessary. The slogans and 
writings that armed revolutionary groups wrote on walls 
throughout Oaxaca took on a new a deeper meaning for me.   
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My awareness and resulting interest in the generalized 
environment of threatened violence increased during my high 
school studies. I arrived at my campus one day only to find it 
surrounded by federal troops bearing high-powered arms and 
opening fire on the school with students and professors holed up 
inside. The reason for the military attack was that students, angry 
at the authoritarian attitude of the private bus companies and 
decrying the imposition of higher fares as unjust and arbitrary for 
the public at large, had taken over some privately-owned city buses 
as part of their demand that public fares be lowered. It was during 
that same year of high school that I also had my first contact with 
the fields of political science and economics. That experience 
helped begin my articulation of the environment of discrimination, 
social tension, and the contrasts between extreme poverty and 
wealth, and between indigenous and non-indigenous. A few years 
later I moved to Puebla, the state to the north of Oaxaca, and lived 
with my friend Miguel, a Oaxacan immigrant laborer. Miguel was 
a night-shift employee of the U.S. transnational company, Stanley. 
Though his one-bedroom house did not even have a living room, 
he opened the doors for me to stay in his home where he lived with 
his whole family. Because of this help I was able to begin my 
university studies in economics. Conversations with Miguel about 
his clandestine fight in the labor union to improve the unjust 
working conditions and salary spurred me on in my studies. The 
following year when I moved to Mexico City to continue my 
university studies, Lindy and Dinorah, a couple from the U. S. and 
Brazil respectively, offered me hospitality and housing without 
cost. They lived in one of the poorest and most dangerous 
neighborhoods in Mexico City. I am indebted to them for their 
hospitality and support. It was through them that I met my wife, 
Ramona Ryan, to whom I am indebted for the interminable 
quantity of hours of review and editing of this doctoral thesis.  
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The hospitality and information provided by NGOs who gave 
us access to their publications and selections from their libraries in 
Mexico City and Oaxaca, (MADERAS A.C., UCIZONI-Unión de 
Comunidades Indígenas de la Zona Norte, TRANSPARENCIA 
A.C., Alianza Cívica Nacional A.C.) were essential in helping to 
lay the foundation for this research. The assistance of Marina 
Pagés and Hieke of the Internacional Service for Peace (SIPAZ) in 
San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas was invaluable. The same is 
true of visits to the Centro de Investigación Económica (CIEPAC 
A.C.), Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, 
and DESMI A.C., an organization that works with different 
communities, constructing an economy in harmony with the felt 
needs of these communities. These organizations are all located in 
San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas.  
In Oaxaca the help of Alicia Barabas of INAH (Instituto 
Nacional de Antropología e Historia) was very helpful, as was the 
help of Jorge LoFredo, a specialist in guerrilla warfare in the 
region. The encouragement and friendship of Tom Offit and 
Howard Campbell kept me going when I was feeling discouraged. 
Also the suggestions of the director of CIESAS were very helpful. 
The staff and the library holdings of the Instituto Welte greatly 
facilitated this research.  
I am especially indebted to my promoters Professors Bas de 
Gaay Fortman and Bob Goudzwaard, and the other members of my 
examination committee: Professors Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, 
Marteen Jansen, Oscar Salemink and Dr. Wil Pansters. Special 
thanks are due to Wil who went all the way to Oaxaca in the 
summer of 2005 and spent an entire day with me discussing 
comments and corrections to the manuscript. The delicious food, 
hospitality and special attention that Bas and Ina provided me 
during my two stays in the Netherlands for intensive committee 
work on this dissertation was both extremely generous and deeply 
appreciated. Many, many thanks are due to Bob and Rini for their 
hospitality, affirmation, and especially to Bob who has been my 
supporter and encourager from the beginning. Together Bas and 
 6
Bob have provided me with the guidance needed throughout this 
work.  
The Free University of Amsterdam kindly covered the cost of 
my airline ticket to and from the Netherlands during the summer of 
2005, and also the cost of the publication of this work, for which I 
am deeply appreciative. Baylor University facilitated my research 
through its excellent library staff and facilities. Finally, I thank my 
extended family for their support, and Hope Fellowship, a small 
Anabaptist community in Waco, for their support and 
encouragement. 
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada 
entered into force. One hour later a group of armed indigenous 
men and women took over towns in Chiapas, the poorest state in 
Mexico. They called themselves Zapatistas, taking their name from 
Emiliano Zapata, a revolutionary peasant leader from southern 
Mexico.1 In 1994 approximately one thousand people identified 
themselves as part of the EZLN, the Zapatista Army for National 
Liberation. They seized five cities: San Cristóbal de las Casas, 
Ocosingo, Las Margaritas and Altamirano.  
The Zapatistas declared that the NAFTA agreement 
represented a final death sentence for themselves and their 
communities and was a national and international official 
declaration of exclusion--exclusion from competitive markets due 
to their lack of means to compete with Mexican or U.S. 
corporations. It also implied the continuation of exclusion from 
participating in the national economic plan and exclusion from 
being a contributing part of society and government.    
The Zapatista uprising in 1994 began what has become a 
peaceful civil movement nationwide whose presence has inspired 
other movements and changed the political map of contemporary 
Mexico through two important initiatives. First is the emergence of 
totally autonomous governing bodies in indigenous communities in 
Chiapas--juntas de buen gobierno (councils of good government), 
and second, the launching of “la otra campaña” (the other 
campaign) calling for the organization and mobilization of civil 
                                                 
1 Zapata fought for agrarian reform on behalf of peasants. He demanded that expropriated land be returned 
to communities, and that one third of hacienda landholdings be distributed among landless peasants. His 
assassination was ordered by President Venustiano Carranza in 1919. 
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society to bring about significant changes from below. La otra 
campaña began simultaneous to the campaigns of the various 
political parties and the presidential rallies leading up to the 
presidential election of July 2006. With the tremendous impact of 
“zapatismo” (with its origin as an armed organization and later 
developing into a peaceful civil movement) on other armed groups, 
on civil society and on the image of government, it is probable that 
these two initiatives from southern Mexico are key to 
understanding contemporary Mexico.     
 
 
              Map 1 Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas and the Southeast 
                         Region of Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poverty, resistance movements, repression, and 
environmental deterioration have been persistent in southern 
Mexico. Both historically and in recent years the states of Chiapas, 
Oaxaca and Guerrero have appeared in the national census as the 
poorest states of Mexico. Furthermore, the number of armed 
groups has dramatically increased in the region in the last 30 years. 
Revolutionary groups have demanded radical social, political and 
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economic changes, yet positive changes have not taken place and 
neither the desires of the government nor those of revolutionary or 
peaceful civic movements have been fully realized.  
The most recent appearance of new armed groups occurred 
August 31, 2006 in Oaxaca (capital city of the state of the same 
name) only hours before the annual presidential address to the 
nation on September 1 by President Vicente Fox. On a highway on 
the outskirts of the city masked men wearing fatigues and carrying 
automatic weapons distributed pamphlets of their “Manifiesto a la 
Nación Número 2” (Manifesto to the Nation Number 2), signed by 
six different organizations.2 The manifesto warned the federal 
police and the military to not intervene in the three-month long 
teacher’s strike which has now grown into a civil movement.3  
This study attempts to identify deeply-rooted causes for the 
resistance of civil fronts seeking social justice and whose actions 
from the beginning are condemned and labeled variously as an 
isolated “abrupt violent uprising” (as in the case of Chiapas), or as 
being carried out by “radical groups”, “urban guerrillas”, and 
“violators of the law” (as in the cases of Guerrero and Oaxaca).  
The relevance of this point can be seen in this process of what we 
here call “enemyzation”, (the labeling of the “other” as an enemy 
of society), as this is often followed by military repression and an 
increase in the violations of human rights.  
The revolutionary movement in Chiapas, which constitutes 
the core of the present study on southern Mexico, has been 
assumed by many to result from conditions of poverty in terms of 
                                                 
2 Of these six organizations, two are known: Movimiento Revolucionario Lucio Cabañas--MRLCB, (Lucio 
Cabañas Revolutionary Movement), and Tendencia Democrática Revolucionaria-Ejército del Pueblo--
TDR-EP (Democratic Revolutionary Tendency-Army of the People). The other four organizations—El 
Colectivo Revolucionario-Francisco Javier Mina (Francisco Javier Mina Revolutionary Collective), 
Organización Insurgente 1o de Mayo (May First Insurgent Organization), Brigada de Ajusticiamiento 2 de 
Diciembre (December Second Justice-Making Brigade) and Brigadas Populares de Liberación—BPL, 
(People’s Liberation Brigades), are previously unknown. 
3 The pamphlet stated that “the revolutionary armed organizations are in a state of alert to respond strongly 
in case the national security forces intervene in the conflict. As this introduction is being finalized 
(September 2006) the city of Oaxaca, as well as the state, has become nearly paralyzed. Further discussion 
of this conflict appears in Chapter V. 
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low levels of income and/or the presence of active “radical 
groups”. In fact in Latin America in general, guerrilla activity has 
been commonly associated with conditions of poverty and the 
existence of radical groups. In order to end armed movements, 
consequently, it has been believed that poverty must first be 
mitigated. Unfortunately the main official response has been one of 
military repression combined with assistance programs and other 
government initiatives. Some official reports have suggested that 
guerrilla movements are the product of the presence of radical 
insurgent individuals acting upon Marxist ideology.4   
These arguments show initial assumptions in three areas. 
First is the assumption that without a doubt, the conditions of 
poverty are primarily linked to rebellions, although the nature of 
the link is not clear. The second assumption is that guerrilla 
activity is on the rise and that the emergence of new armed 
organizations is mainly due to the misery in which people live and 
their resulting radical decision to take up arms in order to make 
their presence known. Third, it is assumed that guerrilla 
movements recruit peasant and indigenous support in order to 
succeed, often implying that Indians and peasants are incapable of 
massive, powerful organization on their own. It has been well 
known throughout the continent that guerrilla war has depended on 
gaining support from peasants and indigenous groups for its 
success.5  
                                                 
4 Throughout Latin America a thread of commonality regarding the existence and increase in guerrilla 
activity manifests itself in the great amount of articles, reports and media attention dealing with instability 
and national security in the so-called “backyard” of the U.S. The conditions and reasons for the existence of 
revolutionary movements, on the other hand, have not been assigned the same importance. The Cuban 
revolution, for example, has been criticized by the mainstream media for having deficiencies in its results, 
while neglecting the reasons which led up to the revolution. 
5 In fact, the failure of various guerrilla movements in Latin America has been attributed to the inability of 
the guerrillas to create a strong link with broad segments of society, in order to then be able to mobilize 
From this perspective, them and develop a military structure. Revolutionaries in Latin America, inspired by 
the Cuban revolution, followed the “foco” theory proposed by Ernesto “Che” Guevara in 1960, which 
argued that guerrilla fighters can defeat a national army if the guerrilla activity becomes established with a 
focal point in the countryside and there creates the conditions to launch its military campaign. Many armed 
movements have faced failure when following the Cuban model, as they have sought to repeat the Cuban 
experience but launched their guerrilla attacks without having gained serious mobilization of the 
population. Examples commonly given of this are: Paraguay (14 of May 1959), Colombia (MOEC 1965), 
Ecuador (Revolutionary Union, 1962), The Dominican Republic (1963), Argentina (1963, 1964), Peru 
 11
In the specific case of Mexico, the first assumption is drawn 
from the evident extreme levels of poverty that can be found in any 
statistics on the economy. The second assumption is based on the 
existence, according to experts, of at least twelve and as many as 
thirty armed groups of rebellion in Mexico.6 The third assumption 
(a misconception) regarding the incapability of indigenous peoples 
can be attributed to the fact that, unfortunately, indigenous and 
peasant populations tend to appear in the analysis of revolutionary 
or resistance movements as a dependent variable. Therefore, in 
accordance with this view, the participation of these populations in 
social change has been limited to offering support to revolutionary 
fighters. Carlos Montemayor, a Mexican writer, however, views 
the EZLN and the uprising as part of a thirty-year process of 
continuous armed struggle by different groups in the poorest area 
of Mexico. According to his analysis, as long as the circumstances 
that gave rise to the rebellion persist, the current conflict will 
persist and new ones will appear. This study pursues this 
alternative perspective, searching to respond to the following basic 
unanswered questions. Is there indeed a direct correlation between 
poverty and revolts in Mexico? If extreme poverty is the main 
cause of indigenous people joining armed rebellions in the region 
as is often assumed, how can we address the issue? If poverty 
limits what people can do and achieve, how is it possible to 
overcome poverty and its effects on people’s lives?  
Regarding the indigenous movement in Mexico, it is 
important to take into account the central role of the resistance of 
indigenous peoples within the indigenous agenda and discourse. 
This is a resistance namely to a process of assimilation, 
marginalization and exclusion. This leads us to ask if the reduction 
of constraints in the lives of those who are submerged in poverty 
can free up resources and creativity, allowing the indigenous 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1965), and others. See Gerard Chaliand, Revolutions in the Third World.(New York: The Viking Press 
1977) 
6 See Jorge Lofredo,”La guerrilla mexicana: de la unidad a la ruptura”  Memoria: Revista  mensual de 
política y cultura,  February 2004, 180.  
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struggle to move beyond resistance and survival, toward the 
building up of empowered economic and political arrangements.  
In this same vein, we also ask in what way could economic 
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) be perceived as a major obstacle and threat to the 
survival of thousands of people.  
In approaching this complex reality we propose that the 
analysis be initiated by identifying a common thread which may 
link the above questions and other concerns. For the sake of clarity 
and exposition we have chosen a central leading question which 
we believe captures our main concerns and can guide our analysis. 
Our leading analytical question is the following: What have been 
the main socio-economic and political conditions for the rise of 
past and more recent rebellions in Chiapas, and to what extent 
have these rebellions been driven by the search for the protection 
of collective interests and freedom? It is this analytical question, 
which needs to be answered before we can even consider questions 
of a more normative nature, namely the crucial question: Under 
which conditions could more positive outcomes (rather than 
violent uprisings) be feasible?   
With this leading analytical question in mind, this paper as a 
first step attempts to study the region’s current socio-economic and 
political complexity. An analysis of the context of poverty, 
therefore, becomes inevitable. Additionally, the reasons behind 
armed movements and their assumed association with poverty and 
exclusion will also be studied. It is necessary to consider in depth 
the context surrounding our central question. To enable us to 
clarify the complex socio-economic and political context of 
southern Mexico we seek to answer the following sub-questions, 
which reflect the dual-nature of our leading question: 
1. What is the situation regarding poverty in the region? Is 
extreme poverty the main reason for the incidence of armed 
groups in Mexico? Why might people opt for violence? 
2. What are the roots of the Zapatista rebellion? Or, more 
explicitly, what are the specific and dynamic economic or 
 13
political factors which lie behind the Zapatista rebellion in 
southern Mexico?  
3. Do there exist socio-economic and political elements which 
could lead to or at least have an influence on a different, 
more positive outcome in the midst of latent conflicts?  
 
For the purpose of answering these sub-questions, we set forth 
the following chapter order and content: 
 Since the Chiapas uprising occurred in a region with extreme 
conditions of poverty, Chapter II explores the first and most 
common assumption about revolts--the connection between 
poverty and rebellion. This section presents a general overview of 
poverty in Mexico, with both earlier and more recent reports on 
poverty. It includes various explanations for the existence of acts 
of collective violence, exploring socio-economic and political 
conditions and issues related to ethnicity. Previous studies and 
theories are presented as complementary studies with their own 
merits, providing relevant or irrelevant contributions to our search. 
After searching for the reasons for revolutions and noting the 
dimensions of poverty, Chapter III moves further, exploring the 
possible roots of revolutionary movements in Chiapas. Past 
rebellions are briefly presented and the more recent 1994 Zapatista 
uprising is discussed. This chapter entails an analysis of the 
Zapatista rebellion and its actors in Chiapas. Four main movements 
operating in Chiapas prior to the uprising are also selected for 
analysis in connection to the rebellion: the human rights 
movement, the indigenous movement, the liberation theology 
movement and the emergence of the Zapatista army. These four 
movements are selected for their relevant presence in the region of 
the conflict and for sharing the common viewpoint that 
development or improvement (implicitly or explicitly) is a dynamic 
process of struggle, brought about by individuals and communities. 
This chapter also points to the evidence of an existing latent 
conflict rooted in economic, political, social and cultural 
dimensions of Mexican society.  
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Chapter IV presents Amartya Sen’s contribution on 
entitlement and capabilities and applies it to an understanding of 
rebellion in the region of southern Mexico. The chapter searches 
for dynamic socio-economic and political factors behind the 
uprising which perpetuate the current circumstances of 
marginalization. This chapter also makes a set of general 
statements on four communities in the region and shows evidence 
of an existing economy that strives both to remain true to the 
cultural context and to be quite effective in fulfilling the need for 
subsistence. 
Chapter V, though based on the empirical, analytical findings 
of the previous chapters, takes on a more normative nature. It 
represents an effort to articulate the vital elements (both found and 
absent) in the social and political circumstances in the region, and 
to place them within a possible economic scenario which could, in 
the long run, function to ease tensions in the region. This type of 
economic scenario is introduced not as a prescriptive option but as 
a descriptive and analytical argument of the already existing 
elements within the socio-economic, political, and cultural context 
of the region. Thus, these elements have been suggested by the 
civil movements in the region and in consequence need to be 
included, in our view, in any alternative for the region. In this line 
of thought, the argument contained in our possible scenario is 
centered on the fundamental need for the protection of human 
dignity, which is a central concept in the various discourses of civil 
movements in the region. The proposed Living Economy Scenario 
is a possible way of articulating, within one perspective, the 
principles and elements which are found or practiced to an extent 
in the region. The alternative scenario also attempts to incorporate 
socio-economic and political priorities formulated and voiced by 
social movements, including concerned professionals. This 
scenario is suggested by the evidence of an inner economy which 
seeks the expansion of local markets, preservation of social 
relationships, self-reliance, cooperation, and sustainable 
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livelihoods. It discusses the issue of exclusion, failure of 
entitlements, and development as a process of empowerment.   
Finally, Chapter VI recollects the main findings throughout 
this work, highlighting potential recurring scenarios of vicious 
cycles of violence.  It offers three final premises and indicates the 
location of the proposed Living Economy Scenario in relation to 
the main themes discussed in this research.  
 
Data Collection and the Guiding Methodology 
 
This work began to take shape with the opportunity I had in 
2000 to participate as a member of an international team of pre-
election observers organized by Global Exchange. This experience 
provided me with the opportunity of interviewing individuals, 
politicians, party members, teachers, journalists, civil organizations 
and community leaders in Mexico City and the state of Oaxaca. On 
July 2, 2000 the PRI, the official political party which had been in 
power for 70 years, lost the presidential election.  
This research has been conducted through a series of visits to 
the region as well as research in the U.S. and Holland. Field visits 
in Chiapas and Oaxaca were ongoing from 2000-2006, as well as 
the gathering of published and unpublished articles, statements, 
and books. During my time in Mexico I did research in the 
libraries of the Colegio de Mexico, Universidad Nacional de 
México (UNAM), and Universidad Metropolitana (UAM), among 
others. In Oaxaca the libraries of the Instituto Tecnológico de 
Oaxaca and the Welte Institute (a library specializing in studies 
and research pertaining to Oaxaca and the southwest region) 
provided me with extensive research materials. In the summer of 
2003 I also had the opportunity of visiting and interviewing 
individuals as well as key actors of many non-governmental 
organizations; for example, SIPAZ (which offers a permanent 
presence of peace observers in Chiapas), DESMI A.C. (an 
organization dedicated to finding economic alternatives for 240 
impoverished communities in 17 municipalities in Chiapas, 
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CIEPAC (an organization that carries out economic research and 
community action in Chiapas), and the Center for Human Rights 
Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, A.C. (a faith-based organization 
founded in 1989 by Bishop Samuel Ruiz).7 During the summer of 
2006 information was gathered through personal observations of 
social mobilization--demonstrations, marches, and sit-ins. Radio 
interviews and reports provided news of the peaceful takeovers of 
radio and television stations by women’s organizations, teacher’s 
labor unions and various civil groups. Interviews were conducted 
with striking public school teachers in Oaxaca and representatives 
of APPO (a coalition of over 300 civil organizations), as well as 
interviews with researchers in the field, such as with the directors 
of the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia and of 
CIESAS (the Center for Research and Higher Studies in Social 
Anthropology). Nevertheless, information on armed groups has 
been only partially documented. In official data information on 
armed groups is non-existent. Jorge Lofredo, a journalist and 
writer in Oaxaca who has reported on and interviewed leaders of 
armed groups, became a great help in overcoming this difficulty. 
Similar difficulties were also found in locating documented reports 
regarding economics and rebellions in the region. Traditionally 
these two fields have been viewed as separate issues.   
The leading methodology here is Amartya Sen’s entitlement 
approach. This Nobel laureate’s entitlement/capability approach 
was used in India and elsewhere for the analysis of poverty and 
famine, and has contributed to the debate and understanding of the 
meaning of economic development. In his work Development as 
Freedom, Sen explains that although freedom can be seen as the 
goal of development, freedom can also be considered a means of 
development, through the expansion of people’s basic functioning 
capability in order to reach their aspirations. Freedom is not used 
                                                 
 
7 In 1994 Samuel Ruiz became the mediator between the government and the Zapatistas. The Dialogue for 
Peace occurred from February 21 to March 2 in 1994 at the San Cristóbal Cathedral, with Ruiz as mediator 
between the EZLN and the Commissioner for Peace (Manuel Camacho). 
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here to make reference to an effective juridical system to protect 
liberties and property from other agents, including the state (HIR 
2002). Rather, freedom is defined within the context of 
development. According to Sen, development is a process of 
expanding the freedoms that people value. The expansion of 
freedoms can be seen as both a “primary end” and a “principal 
means”. Sen defines the first case as the “constitutive role” of 
freedom and the second, as “the instrumental role” of freedom. The 
constitutive role of freedom refers to the process of the expansion 
of human freedoms and includes basic capabilities to avoid 
starvation and premature death.  The instrumental role, however, 
“concerns the way different kinds of rights, opportunities, and 
entitlements contribute to the expansion of human freedom in 
general, and thus to promoting development” (1999:37). Sen 
considers the following to be instrumental freedoms: political 
freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency 
guarantees and protective security. These freedoms supplement 
and strengthen one another, contributing to the capabilities of an 
individual. This work is guided by this insight, although we are 
aware that our findings may not lead exactly to the “building 
capabilities” target or the formation of “capable” individuals as the 
only valid objective.   
This work researched documented records on rebellions and 
more specifically on the Zapatista uprising in 1994, searching for 
the root of armed rebellions within the framework of Sen’s concept 
of freedom-centered perspective. Therefore, in general terms this 
research is subscribed within the field of development, placing the 
issue of freedom at the center. To place people and freedom 
intentionally in center stage and apply Sen’s methodology 
inevitably involves the inclusion of an interdisciplinary approach 
of actors in order to articulate a perspective centered on 
capabilities, entitlements, deprivations, freedoms and constraints.  
The leaders of armed uprisings in Chiapas as well as in other 
states in Mexico have claimed to fight for more humane, freer lives 
and for a more dignifying life for the people. Their struggle claims 
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to be for the ending of poverty and the consequential building of 
the assets of the poor. We can ask, therefore, if the revolutionary 
option has survived in Mexico and also in Latin America because 
of its promising discourse for the achievement of freedom as 
defined by Sen. This paper argues that Sen’s contributions can be 
effective in clarifying these issues and reaching a broader 
understanding of the Chiapas uprising. They can also provide an 
alternative argument for the occurrence and persistence of 
uprisings.  
 
Remarks on Terminology 
 
Sen’s entitlement approach will help clarify issues of poverty 
and rebellion. By way of definition, entitlements are the 
commodities over which an individual can establish ownership and 
command, which enable her to acquire food (Sen 1999). 
Entitlements are dependent on three factors: direct ownership over 
resources, conditions of production to obtain better wages and 
market exchange conditions. Entitlement failure occurs then when 
any one of those factors fails to provide access to food for 
entitlement holders. Since the concept of entitlement failure is not 
a conclusive concept and its content is not rigidly defined by Sen, 
the use of this concept in our analysis will include the failure of 
access to satisfiers to fulfill fundamental human needs. These 
fundamental needs include freedom as well as the need for 
protection, subsistence, affection, understanding, participation and 
leisure.8  
When an entitlement analysis approach is taken, dealing with 
and defining a context becomes necessary. Since entitlements are 
the ground for claims and demands for the fulfillment of rights, the 
entitlement system cannot be analyzed in a vague context. De 
Gaay Fortman clarifies the legal, political and economic structures 
in which entitlements are legitimized. In Sen’s analysis there is an 
                                                 
8 Max-Neef, Manfred A. Human Scale Development: Conception, Application and Further Reflections. 
(New York and London: The Apex Press, 1991) 
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assumption that the hungry poor are passive even when suffering 
starvation. Yet unfulfilled claims over entitlements can be a 
potential ground for conflict escalation, with conflict understood to 
be an interactive, dynamic process that emerges in a determined 
context; a social phenomenon of human creation which can be 
prevented, transformed and overcome depending on how it is 
approached. In analyzing conflict we are faced with the need for 
unavoidable excursions into various fields of study in the social 
sciences in order to understand its roots, the actors involved, the 
dynamics of the conflict, its interaction with socio-economic and 
political structures and the possibilities for its prevention and 
transformation. Inevitable conflicts may surface as rights and 
entitlements are actively pursued for implementation by a society 
in a closed power structure. Given the presence of growing 
conflicts in the analyzed region, the impact on as well as the 
responses from entitlement holders who are facing failure of 
entitlements is central to this paper. The failure of entitlements is 
ultimately manifested as a failure of acquirement, when 
individuals cannot carry out activities that dignify and sustain their 
livelihoods due to legal, political or economic constraints. 
Entitlement systems are treated here as elements of a 
dynamic social process that obligates us to take socio-economic, 
political and cultural perspectives of analysis. Consequently, the 
political economy approach taken in this study considers not just 
the economic aspect of these processes but the relation to other 
actors and variables; such as the state, the power structure, the 
legal system, communities, civil society and human rights (basic 
entitlements).  
  Historically, the state has been the main guarantor of 
entitlements and rights. Nevertheless, the history of Mexico 
following the Spanish conquest has been one of frequent armed 
rebellions. Thus, in this text the term rebellion is used to make 
reference to the act of collectively-organized dissidents who begin 
by saying “No!” or “Enough is enough!” to the pre-established 
system of government which fails to render protection to people or 
 20
guarantee the fulfillment of their rightful claims. Furthermore, in 
the case of Chiapas, the term “rebellion”, “uprising”, “revolt” may 
appear as interchangeable terms, and those who resist submission 
and refuse to obey the legal framework of governance have 
commonly been defined as rebels. This study utilizes the term 
rebels since it has even been appropriated by the dissidents 
themselves. However, a major objective of this study is to clarify 
the identity of these so-called rebels as fellow human beings who 
seek to live in dignity and claim not to see any other option than 
the use of violence to make their voice heard. 
The concept of “revolution” used in this work is that of the 
Zapatista movement, summarized in following by Holloway: 
 
The open-ended nature of the Zapatista movement is summed up in 
the idea that it is a revolution, not a Revolution (with small letters, to 
avoid polemics with the many vanguards and safeguards of THE 
REVOLUTION). It is a revolution, because the claim to dignity in a 
society built upon negation of dignity can only be met through a 
radical transformation of society. But it is not a Revolution in the 
sense of having some grand plan, in the sense of a movement 
designed to bring about the Great Event which will change the world. 
Its claim to be revolutionary lies not in the preparation for the future 
Event but in the present inversion of perspective, in the consistent 
insistence on seeing the world in terms of that which is incompatible 
with the world as it is: human dignity (1998: 168)   
 
Consequently, the rebellion in Chiapas, which represents a 
central point of this paper, has distinguished itself by rejecting the 
idea of Revolution in its classical conception--that is the idea that a 
revolution has to have the state in the center of its objectives. Since 
the state contains political power, the destruction or reform of the 
state as part of a revolutionary move to socialism has been seen as 
an inevitable step in the theoretical construction of a true 
revolutionary process. Nevertheless, with the Zapatista movement, 
the connection between revolution and control of the state has 
collapsed (Holloway 1996). Instead, the rebels claim that their 
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struggle is not to take power for themselves but to dismantle the 
existing power structure. It will be seen later that by rejecting the 
use of people as a means to legitimize political goals, the rebels 
have adopted an immediate, central focus: namely, the construction 
of an inclusive society based on dignity. Consequently, at its end 
this study seriously considers the possibility that human dignity be 
the foundation of the construction of a possible socio-economic 
and political alternative for Chiapas and the region. It attempts to 
place on the discussion table the possibility of the practice of a 
political economy of dignity. What might the pre-requisites or 
necessary conditions be for a society to truly move toward an 
economy that uplifts the dignity of people?   
Finally, in this work ethic conflict is defined according to 
Stavenhagen as a conflict where the contender actors identify 
themselves using ethnic criteria (Stavenhagen 1995/1991). 
 
Personal Notes Regarding This Study 
 
This study reflects three inter-related areas of my personal interest. 
The first area relates to my identity as a Zapotec from southern 
Mexico. The second area is tied to my growing up in an 
environment with the ever-present reminders of political slogans 
commonly painted on walls throughout the region, a constant 
military/police presence, the violent repression of university 
students and community activists, and a subtle state of fear and 
insecurity. My awareness was also shaped by my growing interest 
in understanding my environment, and subsequently by my 
commitment to peace and justice. The third area is my experience 
of growing up in extreme poverty and living with the personal 
consequences of child labor. Jointly these three areas have 
increased my desire to search for explanations of the links between 
violence, repression and economics. My identity, background and 
personal experiences do not hamper my ability to conduct research 
and report my findings from an observing-participatory fashion 
about what has become a matter of my heart.  
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Chapter II      
 
 
Does Misery Instigate Armed Rebellions? 
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Today we say: we are here we are rebel dignity, the forgotten of the homeland. 
The flower of the word will not die. The masked face which today has a name may die, 
but the word which came from the depth of history and the earth can no longer be cut by 
the arrogance of the powerful. We were born of the night. We live in the night. We will 
die in her. But the light will be tomorrow for others, for all those who today weep at the 
night, for those who have been denied the day, for those for whom death is a gift, for 
those who are denied life. The light will be for all of them. For everyone everything. For 
us pain and anguish, for us the joy of rebellion, for us a future denied, for us the dignity 
of insurrection. For us nothing. ( Zapatista fourth declaration of the Lacandon Jungle) 
 
 
Loud knocks at 4:00 AM brought the owner of the Bios 
Pharmacy to her front door. Upon opening it, she faced the barrel 
of a gun, as men and women entered her pharmacy and took 
control of the store. It was January 1st, 1994 in San Cristóbal de las 
Casas in the state of Chiapas in southern Mexico. The coletos9 
were caught by surprise and unable to recognize the hundreds of 
men and women taking over businesses, government buildings and 
the police station of San Cristóbal. In spite of the sudden 
appearance of hundreds of armed people taking control, no deaths 
were recorded, with the exception of one drunk driver. A tourist 
guide showed his frustration in not being able to continue his tour 
program due to the fact that many armed groups had taken over 
other towns and that roads were closed, whereupon a light-skinned 
man named Marcos who was standing among the armed men 
nearby, responded: “Please excuse the inconveniences but this is a 
revolution”.10       
When the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional--EZLN 
(National Liberation Zapatista Army), came out of the jungles of 
Chiapas on New Year’s Day, 1994, it generated contradictory 
reactions from government officials, intellectuals and the media. In 
the midst of the debate over whether the armed groups of the 
EZLN had come from Central America or had been organized by 
revolutionaries who recruited peasants and indigenous people, the 
                                                 
9 The majority of inhabitants of San Cristóbal (the city with the highest rate of tourism in the state of 
Chiapas), refer to themselves as “coletos” to identify themselves as the descendants of Spaniards, and 
therefore distinct from the indigenous population. 
10 The Guardian, quoted by Carlos Tello Diaz in La rebelión de las cañadas: Origen y ascenso del EZLN     
(Mexico D.F: Ediciones Cal y Arena  2000). 
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rebels announced their first communiqué. They claimed to be an 
indigenous movement having the right to fight for fundamental 
human needs and rights, and they appealed to the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917 which protected and guaranteed a social 
contract between the state and the people of Mexico, especially 
with workers and peasants. Parallel to this, the rebels laid claim 
Article 39 of the Mexican constitution which entitles citizens with 
the right to modify or alter their government. The EZLN called for 
the removal of the current federal government, declaring it an 
illegitimate government which had emerged from electoral fraud 
and which was threatening to terminate the social contract.  
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari11 was accused by the rebels of 
being the main actor in the signing of their death sentence; i.e., the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, (NAFTA). Now over ten 
years after the rebellion, the Zapatista demands still remain unmet, 
while new armed groups continue to make their appearance. These 
events lead us to the central questions of this chapter. How can we 
understand the growth of armed movements in Mexico? More 
specifically, why do Mexican peasants and indigenous peoples and 
rebel?   
  Marxist studies have indicated that organized rebellions can 
only originate from organized workers. In Marxist thought, 
capitalistic forces inevitably transform peasants into salaried 
workers, bringing about the disappearance of the peasantry through 
the creation of a labor reserve army for the benefit of capitalists.  
These exploited workers will eventually organize, rebel and fight 
for liberation. These studies have therefore implied the existence of 
rather passive peasant and indigenous peoples, which participate 
only as consumers exploited by capitalists (Cook 1995, 
Stavenhagen 1978). Peasant and indigenous participation, is 
mainly perceived as a reaction to external forces, and reflective of 
their inability to resist the consequences of capitalistic 
transformation and pressures on their community life.  More 
                                                 
11 President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was a Harvard graduate in economics and was favored by the Clinton 
Administration to preside over the World Trade Organization. 
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recently, a similar line of reasoning can be found in other reports 
that highlight expanding globalization alone as the force 
responsible for the formation of armed movements as a means of 
resistance. 
With a growing number of revolutionary movements in 
peasant and indigenous regions (see Box 1), the limitations of 
these preceding views to fully explain such movements, and their 
lack of effectiveness in dealing with said movements becomes 
obvious. An example of this limitation is evident in the approach 
taken by the Mexican government toward the Zapatista rebellion.  
According to the state, the uprising in Chiapas was a peculiar event 
of 1994, a revolutionary movement in a particular year, led and 
organized by a handful of leaders of Marxist origin. Consequently, 
to end the conflict, the incarceration and conviction of leaders 
responsible for the rebellion was seen as vital. The reasoning 
followed that by apprehending the leaders, of the EZLN in this 
case, the movement would become headless and then disappear.  
To reach this goal, according to this perspective, it would be 
necessary to search, detect, and destroy military as well as non-
military Zapatista bases, and the 1995 military offensive reflected 
this logic.12 Critics have pointed out that this general strategy, in 
fact, does not differ notably from the strategy applied in various 
other countries in Latin America, supported in many cases by the 
United States (Blum 1995). This assessment, known as the police 
approach by its opponents, has been the ideological base of 
political and economic policies initiated due to the uprisings in 
southern Mexico.  It is argued here, therefore, that conflict 
escalation occurs due to more complex reasons than the formation 
of organized groups by violent leaders.  
                                                 
12 On February 9, 1995, the Mexican army carried out a major military offensive in an attempt to apprehend 
Marcos, (the spokesperson for the Zapatistas) and wipe out the Zapatistas.  Though unsuccessful in 
apprehending Marcos, the government revealed at this time the “true identity” of Marcos, stating that he 
was Sebastián Guillén Vicente, under 40 years of age, a former student of philosophy at the UNAM (the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico), and a communications professor at the UAM (the 
Autonomous Metropolitan University). 
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BOX 1: GUERILLA GROUPS IN MEXICO 
  
Although there is no available data on the exact number, it is calculated that there are at least 
twelve and possibly as many as thirty or more armed groups in Mexico. Some have made 
themselves known to the media or to the government, others have remained anonymous. The 
known armed movements are the following: Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, Partido 
de los Pobres, Asociación Cívica Nacional Revolucionaria, Comando Urbano Lacandones 
Patria Nueva, Frente Urbano Zapatista, Partido Revolucionario Obrero Clandestino Unión del 
Pueblo, Unión Campesina Independiente, Movimiento Veintitrés de Septiembre, Liga 
Comunista Veintitrés de Septiembre, Liga Comunista Espartaco, Frente Revolucionario del 
Pueblo, Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo, and Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación.1 
However, new groups continue to appear, increasing the number. The Comando Jaramillista 
Morelense appeared on May 25, 2004 in the state of Morelos, near Mexico City.  Even more 
recently, El Colectivo Revolucionario-Francisco Javier Mina, Organización Insurgente 1o de 
Mayo, Brigada de Ajusticiamiento 2 de Diciembre, and Brigadas Populares de Liberación—
BPL, appeared on the outskirts of the city of Oaxaca in September 2006.  
 
                 
 
 
Sources: La Jornada. 2 December 1997 and CIEPAC, available from 
 http://www.ciepac.org 
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The origins of the revolutionary Zapatista movement have 
also been linked directly to extreme conditions of poverty in the 
region. In statements, the governors of the three southern states 
(Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero) argued that the poverty map in 
the region coincided with the map of guerrilla activity. According 
to this hypothesis, increasing levels of poverty create the 
conditions for rebellion.13 Consequently the issue of poverty 
cannot be dismissed without giving it fair consideration. In the 
next section of this chapter we will look at poverty conditions in 
Mexico as one of the possible reasons for rebellions. Other 
possible reasons will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
 
A. Reports on Poverty 
 
Significant reports on poverty were done in 1984, yet due to 
the contrasting differences in their conclusions, a brief explanation 
of their methodology is included. Included in the second part are 
three additional reports, the Levy Report, the Conapo Report and 
the Human Index Report-Mexico (the first of its kind released in 
Mexico). However, it is necessary to mention certain elements 
before discussing the reports. First, the most common 
measurement of poverty across different economies has been that 
of income levels, and their comparison to one or more indicators of 
standards of income inequality, (e.g., the Lorenz curve). Second, 
this type of measurement of poverty has provided the basis for the 
implementation of a general method that has been used to measure 
poverty in various countries; a method often called “the indirect 
method”. This indirect method has focused mainly on the 
comparison of the actual existing levels of income with the level of 
income required for individuals and families to meet their basic 
                                                 
13 Canal 2, Televisa, Mexico City.  September 8, 2001. Governor José Murat of Oaxaca, Pablo Salazar of 
Chiapas and Governor Salazar Mendiguchía of Guerrero agreed that the essence of the growing guerrilla 
movement was due mainly to the existing levels of poverty and to a lesser degree, to the high level of 
political centralization and impunity.  
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needs. In other words, it measures the monetary means to fulfill 
basic needs (Sen 1981:27). This income-measuring methodology 
grew out of the need for measuring the well being of people in a 
society. Among its pioneers was economist Colin Clark, who 
worked on statistical comparisons of income levels around the 
world at the beginning of the 1900s.14   
In general, the application of this income-measuring 
methodology follows certain steps. First, it defines the “basic 
needs” of a family or an individual in a specific context. Second, 
the cost of a basket of goods that fulfills those basic needs is 
determined.  Third, the cost of the basket is calculated, which in 
turn establishes the poverty line. Fourth, the level of income 
generated by the individual or family is compared to the cost of the 
basket to determine the classification of the family as poor or not 
poor. Finally, families or individuals that fall below the poverty 
line are added together to obtain the total number of individuals or 
families in poverty (P) which is divided by the population Tp) to 
obtain a poverty rate index (pr). The formula is presented as 
follows: 
       pr=P/ Tp 
Although the first four studies presented here follow the principle 
of the indirect method, each has its own variations or adjustments 
to circumstances. Having mentioned these important elements and 
notes on methodology we now go to the reports themselves. 
The first report to be considered is a study done by CEPAL, 
whose acronym in English is ECLA, (the Economic Commission 
                                                 
14 The lack of income or the existence of money in society gained relevance as the idea of development 
spread. Indeed, the level of income took relevance over people’s identity, cultural diversity, wants, and 
aspirations of different societies.  Aspects such as cultural perspectives on economic living, consumption, 
practice of sufficiency or frugality were not differentiated. 
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of Latin America), an organism of the United Nations that has 
carried out several studies on poverty throughout Latin America.15  
The results of the CEPAL study were the following: 
 
 
 
Source: Guillermo Trejo, Contra la pobreza: por una estratégia de política social. 
 (Mexico D.F. Ediciones Cal y Arena, Centro para el Desarrollo A.C 1992). 
 
According to this study, 37% of Mexicans were below the 
poverty line; in other words almost four out of every ten people 
were poor. 1.3% lived in extreme poverty and 2.4% were classified 
as moderated poor. Therefore, this study suggested that in Mexico 
poverty reached tremendous magnitudes, and that poverty reached 
higher levels (percentage wise) among Mexicans that lived in rural 
areas. 
                                                 
15 The CEPAL’s methodology used in this study was as follows. First, the cost of a basket that 
fulfills the basic nutritional needs of the population was calculated, taking into account the predominant 
patterns of consumption as well as the availability of goods and their relative prices. This cost was set as 
the extreme poverty line.  Then, this cost was multiplied by two to obtain the estimated urban “intermediate 
or moderate” poverty line and by 1.75 to obtain the estimated rural poverty line. Moderated poverty meant 
that the income of households was more than enough to buy food included in the basket but less than 
enough to buy the non-food components of the minimum basket.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Incidence of Poverty in Mexico 
% of the population 
1984 
CEPAL 
                                            Rural                Urban               Total  
Total 
Extreme poverty           24                     8.0                     13.0 
Moderated poverty   27                    22.0                    24.0 
Total poverty                        51                    30.0                    37.0 
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 A second study was done by Boltvinik and Hernández Laos.  
These authors calculated the extreme poverty line as the cost of an 
“infra-minimun” basket of goods. The basket of goods chosen by 
this study was a basket as defined in 1983 by the Coordinación 
General del Plan Nacional de Zonas Deprimidas y Grupos 
Marginados—COPLAMAR, (General Coordination of the 
National Plan of Depressed Zones and Marginalized Groups). 
COPLAMAR was created by the federal government to develop 
policies dealing with issues of poverty. In contrast to CEPAL’s 
study, COPLAMAR’s basket was broadened to also include, 
energy and the means of food preparation, housing, health and 
education. The basket’s cost was calculated based on the national 
price index of the first quarter of 1984. The moderated poverty line 
was calculated by adding the basket defined above plus the 
monetary cost of the “normative basket of essential satisfactors” 
also defined by COPLAMAR. The data used in this study were 
adjusted to be compatible with data from the national accounts 
records. Their report was the following: 
 
Source: Guillermo Trejo, Contra la pobreza: por una estratégia de política social. (Mexico D.F. 
Ediciones Cal y Arena, Centro para el Desarrollo A.C 1992). 
 
 The results (Table 2) showed that almost six out of ten 
Mexicans were living in poverty. Of these six, nearly three were 
Table 2: Poverty Incidence in Mexico 
Percentages of Population 
1984 
Boltvinik-Hernandez Laos 
 
    Rural                     Urban             Total 
Extreme Poverty               52.9   20                  29.9 
Moderate Poverty             23.2                       29.6               28.6 
___________________________________________________ 
Total                     76.1                       49.6               58.5 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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living in extreme poverty and three in moderate poverty. This 
study revealed that if education, health and other relevant variables 
are considered as a part of the minimum basket of goods that a 
family or individual needs to function, then, the problem of 
poverty takes on greater dimensions and implications. Again, this 
study confirmed that poverty was a remarkable phenomenon in 
rural areas, and that moderate poverty was greater in urban areas. 
 The third study was done by Santiago Levy. In this study the 
extreme poverty line was calculated by adding an additional 25% 
to the cost of the basket that was defined by COPLAMAR as 
minimum, in an attempt to adjust the basket to “its real costs”. The 
results appear in column 2 of Table 3. The real cost of the basket 
identified the depth and distribution of poverty, though the 
definitions of depth and distribution were not provided. In contrast 
with the two previous studies however, Levy’s data was not 
adjusted to the data of the national accounts, and according to 
critics of the study, it consequently over-stated the levels of 
poverty. 
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Source: Santiago Levy, “Poverty Alleviation in Mexico,” The World Bank, Working Papers 
              WPS 679, Washington, (1991). 
 
 According to these results, three of every ten Mexicans lived 
in poverty in 1984. However, the majority of people suffered from 
moderated poverty. This study also confirms the high incidence of 
poverty in rural areas. These three studies, though following the 
same methodology (the indirect method or the head-count 
method), have obtained different results, leading us to make certain 
observations. First, it is expected that data on poverty may vary 
greatly depending on the criteria used to define the poverty line. 
Also, some of these reports adjusted their data to the levels of 
inflation and the “real” or “inflated” cost of a basket of goods and 
services. Similarly some of the reports adjusted their data to be 
Table 3  Incidence of Poverty in Mexico 
Percentage of Population 
1984 
Santiago Levy 
 
                                                        1                                  2 
 
       A           B                   A            B 
EXTREME POVERTY          19.5       10.1                2.6          1.2 
Rural               37.2       21.1                5.7          2.7 
Urban               10.0         4.1                0.9          0.3 
 
MODERATE POVERTY       61.7       71.1              27.8        29.2 
Rural                                        59.5       75.6              40.9        43.9 
Urban                                       62.8       68.7              21.1        21.7 
 
TOTAL POVERTY                 81.2       81.2             30.4         30.4 
Rural                                        96.7       96.7              46.6         46.6 
Urban                                       72.8       72.8              22.0         22.0 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1: Arithmetic addition 
2: Addition taking into account the distribution and depth of poverty 
A: The incidence of poverty is determined by the cost of the basket defined by 
     COPLAMAR 
B: The incidence of poverty is obtained using a basket with a minimum cost 
     calculated by the author 
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compatible with national accounts. Second, this methodology, 
though straightforward, contains many difficulties. As Sen has 
pointed out, the pr index presented in the general formula does not 
differentiate between someone that is barely below the poverty line 
and an individual who is extremely poor or living in starvation.  
Levy’s study moves in this direction, searching for an answer to 
the question of how poor are the poor. However, in general the 
limitation of the indirect method lies in the fact that it does not 
focus on measuring the severity or intensity of poverty, which is 
not, in fact the goal of the Levy’s study. The measurement of the 
degree of poverty presents greater challenges. Also, the pr index 
does not discriminate among the preferences of the individual or 
“family” regarding consumption of the basket of goods nor cultural 
circumstances. Third, using income as an economic indicator may 
potentially lead to classifying as poor an individual who chooses 
lower-income employment for reasons of stress reduction or for 
personal satisfaction.  Finally, the pr index in the introductory 
formula above, tends to be insensitive to transfers of income 
among the poor as well as transfers from the poor to the rich (Sen 
1981). Nevertheless, the methodology has made it possible to trace 
the evolution of poverty over the years.  
 
Evolution of Poverty 
 
To appreciate the evolution of poverty, this section focuses 
on two studies which use the same method as the above reports. 
First is the study done by PRONASOL (a governmental 
institution) and a study by Boltvinik and Enrique Hernández Laos. 
The results are presented in Table 4. 
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 Source: Guillermo Trejo, Contra la pobreza: por una estratégia de política social. (Mexico D.F. 
              Ediciones Cal y Arena, Centro para el Desarrollo A.C 1992). 
 
According to this report, poverty has persisted at high levels 
from 1960 to 1987. However, total poverty as a percentage of total 
population decreased from 1960 to 1981.  Also, extreme poverty 
steadily declined through the same period. Nevertheless, in 1981 
13 million people, 19% of the total population, were still identified 
as living in extreme poverty.  Additionally, moderated poverty 
increased from 1960 to 1987 (from 7.2 to 24 million). This data 
suggests that many individuals who previously lived in extreme 
poverty crossed over into moderate poverty. Mexican economists 
have explained this later tendency as a result of immigration from 
rural to urban areas, urban subsidies, the oil boom and steady 
economic growth during this period.16 In fact, it was during this 
period that the Mexican economy maintained a level of 
stabilization with fixed exchange rates and lower inflation rates 
(4.22% annually) (Soria 2000).  
                                                 
16 Between 1950 and 1980, the Mexican economy achieved a rate of economic growth above 6% annually, 
and employment and real wages grew at a constant rate until 1976. Between 1951 and 1972, inflation rates 
were kept below 5%. See Victor L. Urquidi, México en la globalizacón: condiciones y requisitos de un 
desarrollo sustentable y equitativo, informe de la sección del Club de Roma (Mexico City: FCE 1996) 
Table 4: Evolution of the Incidence of Poverty in Mexico 
1960-1987 
 
                               1960       1970     1977       1981        1987 
                              ____________________________________ 
 
Population*             36.0       50.7        63.3       71.4         81.2 
Extreme Poverty**  56.7      39.3        29.7        19.2        21.3 
Moderate Poverty    19.7      22.3        24.5        25.8        29.6 
Total Poverty**       76.4      61.5        64.2        45.0        50.9 
*   in millions 
** in percentage of total population 
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In 1982, Mexico declared that it was unable to pay its foreign 
debt, and from 1982 on we see the beginning of a growth in total 
poverty, increasing from 45% to 50% by 1987. Additional studies 
have shown that by 1990 the level of total poverty reached 63.3% 
(Soria 2000). 
A second notable report is the study by Boltvinik-Hernandez  
Laos, presented in Table 5. This second study coincided with the 
previous study, with results also indicating that total poverty 
declined from 1963 to 1981 and then increased from 1981 to 1988. 
We can say that the gains of the economy from 1960s and 1970’s 
were lost in the first years of the 1980’s. This is why economists 
refer to the decade of the 1980’s as the “lost decade” for Mexico. 
 
  
Source: Banamex: Mexico Social 1990-91. Estudios Sociales, Banamex, Mexico, 1992 and Julio 
Boltvinik, “Pobreza y pobreza extrema” in Distribución del ingreso y políticas sociales Tomo 1 
(Mexico D.F.: Juan Pablos Editor S.A. 1995) and “The Poverty in Mexico: Methodologies and 
Evolution. Salud Pública de México. México D.F.: Vol.37, No 4, (1993) 288-eoa 
 
  
 
Table 5         Evolution of the Incidence of Poverty in Mexico 
1963-1988 
 Boltvinik-Hernandez Laos 
                       1963    1968    1977    1981     1984     1988 
_______________________________________________ 
Population*     40.8     47.9     63.8    71.4       76.5      83.0 
 
Total 
 Poverty**       77.5     72.6     58.0    48.5       58.5      59.0 
 _______________________________________________ 
  *in millions 
**percentage of population 
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BOX 2.  THE DEBT CRISIS 
In 1982 Mexico was the first country in Latin America to declare bankruptcy. The crisis, however, was 
connected to previous events. During the 1960’s the U.S. experienced the longest period of economic 
growth it had known during war-time. It increased spending abroad as the Vietnam War escalated, as 
well as at home in social programs. U.S. investment increased in Europe and Latin America and in so 
doing also sustained substantial losses in gold. Inflation rates climbed from 2 % in 1968 to 4.7% at the 
beginning of 1969.  During 1969, inflation rates reached 5.3%, causing the Nixon administration to 
introduce measures to freeze prices and wages. Also in the same year the president eliminated the 
practice of exchanging dollars for gold (McEachern 2000). However, between 1969 and 1972, the 
industrialized nations generated more international currencies than in the entire history of the world until 
1969.  Ninety percent of the increase in currency came from these countries (Goudzwaard 1995).  Part of 
the reason for the U.S. monetary expansion was the seignorage advantage. This advantage consists of the 
difference between the actual cost of making the money and the value that the money possesses on the 
international exchange market. Consequently, the value of these dollars dropped, and in 1973 several oil 
producers formed the OPEC bloc and tripled their oil prices to cope with devaluated dollars and 
expensive grain prices due to crop failures around the world. Developing countries unable to print 
international currency to buy oil had to borrow. Due to an oversupply of currency they were able to 
borrow at low interest rates. This first oil shock (1974) enabled Latin American countries to depend more 
heavily on credit supported by the low interests rates offered in the international markets. In Latin 
America, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil were perceived by investors as safe and profitable clients, since 
the prices of exporting goods (such as coffee) from these countries tripled between 1975 and 1977 and 
the prices of cotton, sugar, tin and beef increased as well. Oil-exporting countries like Mexico and 
Venezuela borrowed heavily during the 70s and the beginning of the 80s to finance infrastructure 
projects in industry and education. Other countries in Latin America borrowed heavily also to finance 
their trade and budget deficits, originating both from private and public sectors. In 1978, industrialized 
countries such as the U.S. had learned from the 1973 oil shock, and immediately after the shock many 
OCDE countries, led by the United States and Great Britain, shifted their monetary policies to control 
inflation and also raised interest rates sharply. In contrast, the debt of most Latin American countries 
carried floating interest rates (following recommendations from the IMF and World Bank) which caused 
vulnerability and eventually an increasing amount of debt. Higher interest rates in dollar deposits and 
growing concern by Latin American elites about the future of the reforms undertaken, caused the owners 
of deposits to move part of their deposits out of their countries, creating tremendous capital flight from 
Latin America into bank accounts in the U.S. and other wealthy countries. The second oil shock then hit 
oil-importing countries such as Brazil, which depended heavily on oil imports and had the largest amount 
of outstanding debt. Yet commodity prices of Latin American countries did not increase this time, and 
they began running huge current account deficits. By the end of the 70s, most of the countries in Latin 
America were heavily indebted, and this time the global liquidity was tighter; the easy credit times were 
gone. Developing economies were able to refinance their debts and expand them, but at higher interest 
rates, which made interest payments higher, amounting to several percentage points of GDP for many 
countries (Franko 1999). As global liquidity became tighter, some of the banks started to demand their 
money back. The debt crisis had become undeniable.  
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However, the achievements of economic growth between 
1960 and 1970, referred to as the milagro mexicano (the Mexican 
miracle), were blurred by different studies and reports showing that 
inequality was increasing and even reaching extreme levels. Two 
official studies done during this period point out a worsening in 
equity in the Mexican economy.17 The study by the University of 
Texas concluded that Mexico was the country with the greatest 
inequality in Latin America. This was confirmed in 1975 when the 
World Bank reported that the poorest 10% of the population 
received 0.62 of total income, while the top 10% received 31% of 
total income. The World Bank report also showed that in 1963, if 
the population were divided by thirds, the top one third of the 
population received 51.41% of total income and the lowest one 
third received 11. 05%. Moreover, in 1975 these percentages 
worsened to 60.18% and 4.71% respectively. This study showed 
that in spite of the economic achievements of the Mexican 
economy, disparities kept increasing and were reaching extreme 
levels. In summary it can be said that during the period of 1960-
1980, economic expansion coexisted with a decreasing total 
poverty though accompanied by growing inequalities. Recent 
studies by Boltvinik, moreover, have shown that by 1992, total 
poverty had increased above 60% (1995).  
Graph 1 compares three recent reports on the trend of poverty 
in Mexico. The first was done by CEPAL, covering the period 
from 1968-2001. The second projection was done by the World 
Bank for the period of 1968-1996. The methodology used in the 
study was not explained. The third study, done by Hernández Laos 
and J. Boltvinik (HLB) covered the period 1968-2000. In this latter 
study, the poverty line was defined as the minimum basket of 
goods and services set by COPLAMAR.  
 
                                                 
17 Lyndon B. Johnson School for Public Affairs, University of Texas/Austin, Growth and Equity in Mexico, 
Case Studies in Development Assistance, No 5 (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, 
n. d.) p. 3 1977-1978. Also World Bank Special Study of the Mexican Economy: Major Policy Issues and 
Prospects, vol. 1 Main Report (May 30, 1979) Report No 230-ME (Washington, D C: World Bank).  
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   Source: Damián, Araceli and Julio Boltvinik ,“Evolución y características de la 
                              pobreza en México”. Comercio Exterior 53, no. 6, (June 2003) 
 
In observing the results of these studies, it is worth mention 
that though all three studies are based on different definitions of 
the poverty line, all three show that poverty declined during the 
period between 1968 and 1981 and then rose steadily until 1996. 
Secondly, the HLB and CEPAL studies indicate that poverty in 
Mexico was more acute and widespread in 1996 than in 1968. 
Lastly, this scenario reflects nearly three decades lost in the battle 
against poverty (Damián and Boltvinik, 2003).  
Graph 1  Mexico: Three Reports on the Evolution of Poverty, 1968-2002 
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Source: For 1960 to 1987 see Consejo Consultivo del Programa Nacional de 
Solidaridad: “El combate a la pobreza: lineamientos programáticos” El 
Nacional, México, 1990, p. 20. For the period of 1992 to 2004 the food-based 
extreme poverty line was used, see Poverty in Mexico: An Assessment of 
Conditions, Trends and Government Strategy. (Mexico: World Bank, 2004)  
 
 
Graph 2 contains data on the evolution of extreme poverty 
based on the conservative reports of two different periods; one a 
governmental report by PRONASOL, and the other by the World 
Bank, both of which are based on poverty as defined by minimum 
food requirements.  Graphs 1 and 2 coincide in pointing out that a) 
poverty as well as extreme poverty declined between 1968 and 
1981, b) total poverty as well as extreme poverty increased from 
1981 to 1996, and c) that the crises of 1981-1989 and 1994-1996 
represented major reversals in economic gains.  
The descending trend from the end of the 1990’s to 2002 has 
been a recent cause for optimism by the World Bank, even though 
both the World Bank and the Mexican government have 
recognized that the level of extreme and total poverty in 2002 is 
only slightly below the pre-crisis level (World Bank 2004).  
Graph 2  Mexico: Overview of Poverty Trends for Extreme
 Poverty 1960-2004
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Does Poverty Instigate Armed Rebellions? 
 
Although consensus has not been reached concerning the 
magnitude of poverty in Mexico, the different reports provide us 
with a sense of the seriousness of the situation. The high levels of 
poverty and extreme poverty have been sharply criticized not only 
by political opposition groups in Mexico, but also by radical 
groups that have challenged the political as well as the economic 
process in Mexico. The question that occupies us here is the 
possible relationship between conditions of extreme poverty and 
the increasing appearances of armed opposition groups.  The 
armed opposition has declared that the conditions of poverty and 
inequality are those created by the irresponsible actions of 
economic and political actors, and not merely caused by economic 
events. This fact suggests that an analysis of economic variables or 
processes alone is insufficient in attempting to understand 
grievances and the possible use of violent acts by subordinated 
groups. Serious consideration is here given to the idea that as long 
as armed groups perceive that poverty conditions are largely the 
consequence of the irresponsible action of actors, (who through 
their irresponsibility have eroded trust and become illegitimate 
representatives), they will continue to challenge, attack, and 
sabotage the economic and political arrangements in Mexican 
society.   
Extreme poverty and total poverty reached their lowest levels 
between 1968 and 1981, and Graph 3 shows that during this period 
the number of armed groups increased. For instance, an umbrella 
group called PROCUP appeared during the 1960’s under which 
five affiliated groups existed. The five groups consisted of the 
following:  Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo--FRAP, 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People), Liga Comunista 23 
de Septiembre (Communist League of September 23rd), Frente 
Urbano Zapatista—FUZ, (Urban Zapatista Front), Movimiento de 
Acción Revolucionaria—MAR, (Revolutionary Action 
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                Source: Built by author based on data from Centro de Investigación Económica y 
                             Política de Acción Comunitaria  (CIEPAC) A.C., available from 
                             http://www.ciepac.org and Centro de Investigaciones Históricas 
               de los Movimientos Armados, (CHIMA) A.C., reports from Proceso  
               available from http://proceso.mx.com and CEDEMA available from 
                http://usuarios.lycos.es/cedema/  
 
 
Movement), and the Partido Proletario de América, (the Proletariat 
Party of America).Many of the leaders however, were killed by 
special military units during the repression of the 1970s.18  Genaro 
Vasquez, a leader in Guerrero of the Asociación Cívica Nacional 
Revolucionaria—ACNR (National Revolutionary Civic 
Association), died in a car accident in 1972. Lucio Cabañas, a 
teacher in Guerrero and leader of the Partido de los Pobres (Party 
of the Poor), died in an ambush in 1974. Consequently, by the end 
                                                 
18 The name “23 de Septiembre” itself was chosen to honor the earliest clandestine revolutionary 
leaders who were killed, Professor Arturo Gamiz and Dr. Pablo Gomez, who died during an 
assault they launched against the “Maderas” military barracks on September 23, 1965 in the 
Northern state of  Chihuahua. The Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre was formed in 1973 by 
activists, some of whom were socialists and some of whom were militants inspired by Liberation 
Theology.  
Graph 3      Mexico: The Appearances of Armed Groups 1965-2004
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of the 1980s only two groups were known to promote guerrilla 
strategy and tactics to achieve social and political change —the 
Partido Revolucionario Obrero Clandestino—Unión del Pueblo--
PROCUP, (Clandestine Worker Revolutionary Party—Union of 
the People), and the Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre, 
(Communist League of September 23rd)19. 
With the economic crisis of 1982, the living conditions for 
the majority of Mexicans deteriorated due to the effects of the 
massive external debt. To affirm that poverty generates rebels 
would lead us to believe that the 1980’s should have been a fertile 
period for the emergence of armed groups; but in fact, armed 
groups during that period were leaderless and struggling for 
survival.  The period of 1990-2004 represents the most dynamic 
period of growth of armed groups. The number of armed groups 
rose steadily even though there was a noticeable decline in total as 
well as extreme poverty after 1996. Therefore, it is argued here 
that the increasing number of armed groups cannot be explained 
merely by the presence of poverty. In the following section we 
explore other factors that may be relevant in explaining the 
increase of violent groups. 
 
 
B. Why People Rebel:  The Relevance of Perceived 
Economic Entitlements and Unfulfilled Expectations 
  
 In the search for links between socio-economic conditions 
and conflict escalation, or more specifically socio-economic links 
to rebellions, we turn to the work of James Davis and Ted Robert 
Gurr and also recent authors that represent the school of Relative 
Deprivation (RD).  According to James Davis, revolutions occur 
only if several conditions are present. 
 
Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period 
                                                 
19 See Armando Bartra. Guerrero Bronco: Campesinos, ciudadanos y guerrilleros en la Costa Grande. 
(México D.F.: Ediciones sinfiltro, 1996) 
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of objective economic and social development is followed by 
a short period of sharp reversal. The all-important effect on 
the minds of people in a particular society is to produce,  
during the former period, an expectation of continued ability 
to satisfy needs--which continue to rise--and, during the 
latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest 
reality breaks away from anticipated realty. The actual state 
of socio-economic development is less significant than the 
expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must 
continue in the future (Davis 1972). 
 
Davis adds that political stability depends ultimately on 
people’s state of mind and mood in a society. This element, the 
state of mind of the unsatisfied, therefore, becomes the determinant 
par excellence of a revolution. In following Tocqueville’s analysis 
of the French revolution, Davies states that revolutions do not 
generally occur in impoverished societies for the simple fact that 
people that live in constant poverty usually endure it. The 
preoccupation for survival, as research shows, occupies their time 
and hunger causes them to withdraw from social life. If individuals 
withdraw, they may do so to be alone or to seek solidarity with 
their families. Davis concludes that it is not hunger that produces 
revolutionaries, but rather that the conditions in which 
revolutionaries may be produced are those in which people have 
experienced economic benefits and hold expectations for the future 
and later find that their expectations become frustrated and are not 
fulfilled. As the gap between what people expect and what they 
actually get increases, the possibility of a revolt increases. 
Therefore, Davies rejects what is known as the misery thesis--that 
poverty by itself generates revolutions. In fact, contrary to Karl 
Marx’s thesis that workers will rebel to break their chains, Davies 
argues that if people have to choose between losing their lives and 
living with chains, people will choose chains.  Model 1 (see 
Appendix) represents Davis’ proposal regarding the pre-conditions 
for a revolution, known also as the “j” curve of economic growth. 
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In 1970, Ted Robert Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel presents an 
improved version of Davies’ hypothesis. Based on the hypothesis 
of Relative Deprivation (RD), Gurr argues that collective violence 
is correlated to the discontent of members of a society. The source 
of the discontent lies in the perceived gap between what they have 
and what they should have. This gap is called relative deprivation. 
Relative deprivation opens the door to frustration and aggression 
mechanisms that lead and have in fact, preceded violent actions. In 
1972 Gurr wrote: 
  
 
My basic premise is that the necessary precondition for violent civil 
conflict is relative deprivation, defined as the actors’ perception of 
discrepancy between their value expectations and their 
environment’s apparent value capabilities. Value expectations are 
the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are 
justifiably entitled…the referents of value capabilities are to be 
found largely in the social and physical environment, they are the 
conditions that determine people’s perceived chances of getting or 
keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain. The occurrence 
of civil violence presupposes the likelihood of relative deprivation 
among substantial numbers of individuals in a society; 
concomitantly, the more severe is relative deprivation, the greater 
are the likelihood and intensity of civil violence (Gurr 1972). 
 
 In summary, Gurrs’ hypothesis proposes three patterns of 
Relative Depravation that an individual can experience when 
comparing him/herself to other points in time of his/her life (see 
Box 3 in Appendix). The first pattern is decremental deprivation, 
relating to the fact that although people’s expectations remain 
constant, their attainments or capabilities are failing to meet those 
expectations. Individuals are angry because of the loss of what 
they had at one point in time in the past.  This situation can trigger 
collective violence if material production declines; e.g., 
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deprivation from social order, or political freedom once enjoyed. 
The second pattern is progressive deprivation, also known as the 
“J-curve”, and is experienced with constant and growing 
expectations combined with falling capabilities or attainments.  In 
this case, growing expectations are derived from a continuous 
improvement in the economy or political system. However, 
capabilities begin to fall and the conditions for a revolution are set 
as people become frustrated and angry at not having what they are 
entitled to. Economic depression in a growing economy combined 
with the loss of the fulfillment of basic needs is a good example of 
this. 
The third pattern is aspirational deprivation, which describes the 
disparity between higher desires, entitlements, and constant 
attainments that become insufficient to achieve higher levels of  
aspirations. People are angry because they feel hopeless when 
trying to attain new and higher levels of expectations. 
The RD hypothesis, though widely accepted, was later 
altered by more recent findings on collective violence. For 
example, Edward Muller’s findings on racial disturbances in Iowa 
in the late 1960’s showed that feelings of relative deprivation were 
not always present in social unrest. Muller reported that the main 
reasons for violent action in the case of disturbances in Iowa, was a 
low degree of trust in political authorities such as the police, rather 
than relative deprivation sentiments. “RD does not seem to 
matter,” he concluded (Brush 1996). Clark McPhail, a sociologist 
who also reported on social unrest in U.S. cities, found that the 
perception of black minorities that they were being mistreated by 
the police was a fact that led them to protest and commit violent 
acts. The RD hypothesis, McPhail concluded, did not result 
relevant. Competing explanations for violent movements have led 
Gurr and other advocates to abandon the RD hypothesis in its 
original form (Brush 1996). In spite of this, current researchers 
tend to cite the hypothesis in a favorable way (Brush 1996). It is 
now understood that although frustration may not be the only 
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cause, it can play an important role in understanding why people 
rebel. 
This modified hypothesis has been the basis for most recent 
developments and research on social justice, social comparison, 
system justification, and social dominance (Ellemers 2002). 
Gurr’s modified hypothesis can be a useful tool for our analysis of 
the uprising in Chiapas. To some extent, the communiqués from 
the rebels in Chiapas reveal the presence of relative deprivation 
and frustration as can be appreciated in their first declaration (see 
Box 4). 
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Box 4: Lacandona Declaration 
 
TO THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO  
TO OUR MEXICAN BROTHERS AND SISTERS: 
 
We are a product of 500 years of struggle: first against slavery, then during the War of Independence against 
Spain led by insurgents, then to avoid being absorbed by North American imperialism, then to promulgate our 
constitution and expel the French empire from our soil. Later, the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz denied us the just 
application of the Reform laws and the people rebelled and leaders like Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men just like 
us. We have been denied the most elemental preparation so they can use us as cannon fodder and pillage the wealth of 
our country. They don't care that we have nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over our heads, no land, no 
work, no health care, no food nor education. Nor are we able to freely and democratically elect our political 
representatives, nor is there independence from foreigners, nor is there peace nor justice for ourselves and our children.  
But today, we say ENOUGH IS ENOUGH. We are the inheritors of the true builders of our nation. We the 
dispossessed are millions, and we thereby call upon our brothers and sisters to join this struggle as the only path, so that 
we will not die of hunger due to the insatiable ambition of a 70 year dictatorship led by a clique of traitors that 
represent the most conservative and sold-out groups. They are the same ones that opposed Hidalgo and Morelos, the 
same ones that betrayed Vicente Guerrero, the same ones that sold half our country to the foreign invader, the same 
ones that imported a European prince to rule our country, the same ones that formed the "scientific" Porfirsta 
dictatorship, the same ones that opposed the Petroleum Expropriation, the same ones that massacred the railroad 
workers in 1958 and the students in 1968, the same ones that today take everything from us, absolutely everything. 
To prevent the continuation of the above and as our last hope after having tried to utilize all legal means based on our 
Constitution, we go to our Constitution, to apply Article 39 which says: 
"National Sovereignty essentially and originally resides in the people. All political power emanates from the 
people and its purpose is to help the people. The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify 
their form of government." 
Therefore, according to our constitution, we declare the following to the Mexican federal army, the pillar of the 
Mexican dictatorship from which we suffer, monopolized by a one-party system and led by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, 
the maximum and illegitimate federal executive that today holds power. 
According to this Declaration of War, we ask that other powers of the nation advocate to restore the legitimacy and the 
stability of the nation by overthrowing the dictator. 
We also ask that international organizations and the International Red Cross watch over and regulate our battles, so that 
our efforts are carried out while still protecting our civilian population. We declare now and always that we are subject 
to the Geneva Accord, forming the EZLN as our fighting arm of our liberation struggle. We have the Mexican people 
on our side, we have the beloved tri-colored flag, highly respected by our insurgent fighters. We use black and red in 
our uniform as the symbol of our working people on strike. Our flag carries the following letters, "EZLN," Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation, and we always carry our flag into combat. 
Beforehand, we refuse any effort to disgrace our just cause by accusing us of being drug traffickers, drug guerrillas, 
thieves, or other names that might by used by our enemies. Our struggle follows the constitution, which is held in high 
regard by its call for justice and equality. 
Therefore, according to this declaration of war, we give our military forces, the EZLN, the following orders: 
First: Advance to the capital of the country, overcoming the Mexican federal army, protecting in our advance the 
civilian population and permitting the people in the liberated area the right to freely and democratically elect their 
own administrative authorities. 
Second: Respect the lives of our prisoners and turn over all wounded to the International Red Cross. 
Third: Initiate summary judgments against all soldiers of the Mexican federal army and the political police that 
have received training or have been paid by foreigners, that are accused of being traitors to our country, and 
against all those that have repressed and treated badly the civil population and robbed or stolen from or attempted 
crimes against the good of the people. 
Fourth: Form new troops with all those Mexicans that show their interest in joining our struggle, including those 
that, being enemy soldiers, turn themselves in without having fought against us, and promise to take orders from 
the General Command of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. 
Fifth: We ask for the unconditional surrender of the enemy's headquarters before we begin any combat to avoid 
any loss of lives. 
Sixth: Suspend the robbery of our natural resources in the areas controlled by the EZLN. 
To the People of Mexico: We, the men and women, full and free, are conscious that the war that we have declared is 
our last resort, but also a just one. The dictators have been applying an undeclared genocidal war against our people for 
many years. Therefore we ask for your participation, your decision to support this plan that struggles for work, land, 
housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace. We declare that we will 
not stop fighting until the basic demands of our people have been met by forming a government of our country that is 
free and democratic. 
JOIN THE INSURGENT FORCES OF THE ZAPATISTA ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. 
General Command of the EZLN, 1993 
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It is a matter of interest that the frustration expressed by the 
rebels with their condition as a marginalized group is expressed in 
a collective form. Without a doubt, the presence of feelings of 
unfairness, exclusion and injustice are present; but how do feelings 
of individual frustration take a collective form? Are collective 
frustrations a mere sum of individual frustrations? This point has 
been the most criticized weakness of the RD hypotheses. 
Runciman, a researcher on RD has argued that this shift from 
individual to collective grievances can be understood through 
“lateral solidarity” and the normative (how things ought to be) 
beliefs of a group regarding its status.  RD researchers have called 
this phenomenon “fraternal depravation” (Taylor 2002) to describe 
the attitude of subordinate groups toward the super-ordinate group, 
where the subordinate group is motivated by the desire to move 
upward in the structure of power, class or status, and then 
experiences a sense of relative deprivation or grievance (Taylor 
2002). 
In summary, it seems that entitlement or a group’s perception 
of entitlements in the sense of deserving or having rights, is the 
pre-event before experiencing relative depravation. Since unlike 
individual deprivation, fraternal deprivation generates agitation 
aimed at structural changes, the perception of violated 
entitlements, unequal inter-group status, and a sense of discontent 
can lead in a chain of events to social protest and ultimately to 
collective violence.    
 
The Limitations of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis 
 
In spite of the important work of the RD theory in conflict 
analysis, it poses some questions about whether the individual’s 
perception and perceived entitlements are strictly a psychological 
phenomenon beyond social and historical contexts. First, as the 
case of southern Mexico suggests, the creation of armed 
movements can follow an official violent act, such as military 
repression. The best example of this is the Tlatelolco repression. In 
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1968, students that formed part of a widely pro-democracy 
movement which included citizens, professors and university 
workers from the national university (UNAM) in Mexico City, 
were massacred in Tlatelolco square. The Tlatelolco massacre is 
probably the most remembered political experience of collapsing 
political expectations. The 1968 massacre has been repeatedly 
cited by founders of guerrilla groups, including the leadership of 
the EZLN, as the turning point from political militancy to warfare. 
The closing of the political structure, frustration, and bitterness 
seem to have led to underground armed resistance. It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find painted on walls throughout the 
country, Tlatelolco no se olvida ¡Hasta la Victoria¡ (Tlatelolco 
will not be forgotten, Until victory!) 
 Second, there is the question of the magnitude or type of 
aggressive response. A violent response appears to be influenced 
by a type of action that blocks economic or political entitlements.  
A reaction to a denial of an increase in wages could be radically 
different than a reaction to a historical obstruction of the 
satisfaction of fundamental human needs, as in the case of the 
Zapatistas in Chiapas.      
 Third, Berkowitz (1965) has pointed out that aggression and 
force will also depend on the external elements that function as 
traffic lights which can stimulate and give a “green light” to 
violent acts. The roots of violence, consequently, are not to be 
found only inside individuals but in the life circumstances and the 
social meaning of the frustrating experiences of the individual. 
The fourth point is that the trigger of violence has to be 
analyzed by its contextual, social, and political meaning. Violence 
as an abstract concept does not recognize actors but only causes, 
yet violent acts are carried out by actors that have motives and 
goals. In other words, violence must be understood in the light of 
social interests. If an act of violence is used to bring change, then 
we need to ask who benefits from that change, and who loses? 
(Martín-Baró 2003).  
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 Lastly, in looking back to the first Zapatista communiqué, 
beyond individual perceptions, we also find the historical elements 
of a nation, and a broad social and political context where initial 
entitlements were given and then violated. Such elements fall 
outside of the frustration-aggression analysis. Consequently, 
considering these last remarks, we turn to a perspective that is 
more comprehensive than psychological reactions to expectations 
alone. 
 
The Relevance of Resources and Power Structure 
 
Charles Tilly (1986) has insisted on the key role of the state and 
political conflict as central to understanding revolutions, pointing 
out that revolutions occur within a structure of power. Tilly gives 
priority to aspects of collective mobilization, and suggests that to 
understand revolutions, we should study the groups that are 
contending for power, the types of claims these groups are making 
to the government, the capabilities of these groups to mobilize 
resources, (money, weapons, information, support, and 
mobilization), in pushing forward their demands. A revolution is 
possible, Tilly argues, only when a contending group has the 
capacity to challenge the structure of power, and the state lacks the 
resources to respond to the demands of the contending group or to 
defeat the opposition. For Tilly the mobilization of resources by 
contending groups is vital to understanding a revolt. In 
summarizing his perspective, Tilly points out that the necessary 
pre-conditions for a revolutionary movement are the following: 
  
1. The appearance of contenders or coalitions of contenders, 
     advancing exclusively alternative claims to control over the  
     government currently exerted by the members of the polity; 
2. Commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the  
    subject population; 
3. Unwillingness or incapacity of the agents of the government to  
    suppress the alternative coalition or the commitment to its  
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    claims; 
4. Formation of coalitions between members of the polity and the  
    making of alternative claims by contenders (Tilly 1986:53). 
 
 In other writings Tilly also affirms the importance of 
grievances: “grievances are fundamental to rebellion as oxygen is 
fundamental to combustion….although grievances are not a major 
cause of the presence or absence of rebellion” (Tilly 1974). These 
grievances or elements of discontent, according to Tilly, are 
normally present in politics; however, movements without 
organization and resources are not likely to lead to a revolutionary 
process.  The author also points out that it is the capacity to 
organize and the ability to seize opportunity that enables discontent 
movements to achieve a revolutionary process.20 Collective 
violence consequently is a by-product of situations where 
contenders openly set up demands and the state resists these 
power-contenting groups (Tilly 1986). 
Tilly’s opportunity approach connects the macro context with the 
emergence of contentious groups. At the center of the analysis are 
resources and opportunity. This opportunity approach suggests that 
the revolutionary process moves from discontent through the 
availability of resources and opportunity, having reasonable 
expectations for success and with the potential for mobilization 
and radical actions. These conditional steps however cannot 
always be calculated in advance. In spite of this, it has been argued 
that the success of some revolutionary groups, such as the EZLN, 
has been due to planning. Nevertheless, in southern Mexico, other 
revolutionary movements have not been predictable. For example, 
the social movement in the state of Guerrero transformed itself into 
a guerrilla movement only after being surrounded and finding no 
                                                 
20 Charles Tilly’s analysis has been identified by experts in the field as a “General Theory of Political 
Violence”, a “Theory on Political Conflict” or a “Society-Centered” hypothesis to explain revolutions and 
is different from other hypotheses such as Skocpol ’s analysis which focuses on structural causes or state-
centered events to explain revolutionary events. See Theda Skocpol, Social Revoltuions in the Modern 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994) and Wickman-Crowley, Guerrillas & Revolution in 
Latin America. (New Jersey: Princenton University Press, 1992)  
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other alternative. As in other cases, the absence of justice, the 
impact of state repression, the failure of a mediating mechanism 
and the closed nature of the political system, created a shift from 
electoral opposition to armed opposition. On June 14, 1964, Lucio 
Cabañas, a junior high school teacher, called a meeting together 
with other teachers in the town of Atoyac. The purpose of the 
meeting was to protest against: a) the deforestation carried out by 
the Compañía Sivicultura Industrial S. de R.L which benefited 
from a government concession; b) the government’s isolation of 
the textile cooperative “El Ticui” and the closing down of their 
factory; c) the abuses of authorities toward a section of the town; 
and d) the harassment of teachers for their political views. Due to 
his ideological tendencies, Cabañas lost his teaching position on 
the same day as the meeting. Parent and civic organizations and 
students began to demonstrate on behalf of the teacher, demanding 
his reinstallation.  After a victory by the civil movement to reinstall 
the teacher, the people demonstrated for additional changes. Their 
demands were not welcomed and police opened fire against 
demonstrators, killing seven people, among them two policemen, 
and wounding dozens of others. The people of Atoyac, a town with 
sixty years of political intransigence, decided to demonstrate in the 
street, demanding justice. On May 18, 1965, Lucio Cabañas left for 
the mountains, following the example of his grandfather, the 
Zapatista Pablo Cabañas, and other men in Guerrero, such as 
Silvestre Castro, Alberto Téllez, Feliciano Randilla, Valente de la 
Cruz; and the Vidales brothers. The repression became widespread. 
A massacre in the city of Iguala resulted in the death of 23 people 
and the arrest of 280, among them civilians and political 
candidates of the Civil Association of Guerrero (ACG). After 
heated political tension, the ACG had claimed to have won the 
state elections. Its candidate, José María Suarez Tellez, was jailed 
the day after the elections.  In 1964, in an organizational meeting, 
members of the ACG proposed “la nueva ruta” (the new route), 
which meant the formation of clandestine armed groups for the 
defense of the people. Lucio Cabañas then formed the Partido de 
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los Pobres—PDLP, (Party of the Poor), and dreamed of forming a 
national front.  The political program of the PDLP can be 
summarized in the following points: 
 
1. Defeating the government of the rich and wealthy 
2. Installing a new regime 
3. Expropriation of factories and facilities for the benefit of the 
workers 
4. Enacting broad financial, judicial, educational and social 
welfare programs for the benefit of workers, women, 
children, Indians, and peasants 
5. Breaking down the U.S. colonialism of Mexico 
 
Lucio Cabañas and his rebels, however, lacked the resources to 
continue their struggle, depending instead on bank robberies and 
other illegal activities. Lucio Cabañas was killed by the army and 
his body was dragged from the sierra on December 2, 1974. 
Nevertheless, the struggle continued.  
  
The Relevance of International Political and Economic 
Structures: Capitalism and Revolutions 
 
Focusing on contender groups and the state’s capabilities to 
respond to demands gives the impression that revolutions are 
events, and as such, predictable. Theda Skocpol in her book Social 
Revolutions in the Modern World, states the following about 
Tilly’s reasoning: 
  
 Yet if what makes revolutionary situations special is 
precisely the extraordinary nature of the goal for which 
contending groups are struggling, then it naturally seems to 
follow that what needs to be explained about revolutions is 
the emergence and appeal of contenders who intend to 
achieve these special goals…the real question is when such 
contenders proliferate and/or mobilize (Skocpol 1994: 109). 
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Skocpol also points out that although Tilly rejects Gurr’s 
hypothesis of relative deprivation and frustration in explaining 
revolutions, nevertheless, discontent and grievances remain an 
important part of Tilly’s analysis. Indeed Skocpol looks beyond 
discontent and suggests that to understand revolutions we should 
first accept that revolutions and violent actions are in themselves 
very complex and difficult issues to explain. In general theorists 
face the difficulties of: 
 
a) realizing that general theoretical propositions seem to be 
more appropriate in explaining simple events one-
dimensionally, than revolutions, which are by nature 
complex and multidimensional, 
b) providing explanations for revolutions in agrarian 
situations based on revolutions that have occurred in urban 
or modern settings, becomes fruitless, unless equivalent 
factors or alternatives are used to explain non-urban 
situations, and 
c) understanding that theory-building as a deductive and 
universalizing practice makes no sense unless the 
investigator makes use of findings on human behavior and 
social processes in general, and, views the revolutionary 
process as a particular and specific type of phenomenon 
that is connected to a non-universal socio-economic 
structure. 
 
Therefore, Skocpol suggests that analysis be focused on the central 
players of the power structure, namely the state and its limitation 
as an agent conditioned by economics or class structure. Yet the 
state’s internal relationships with elites should not be reduced 
merely to an economic entity, and neither should the relationships 
between peasants and landlords, nor between states in competition 
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at an international level. At the international level Skocpol 
suggests that the following be taken into consideration: 
 
a) the economic context of capitalism as a specific social 
system of production and its coexistence with various 
interdependent and unequal zones around the world,21 
b) the international system of nation-states as interdependent 
states that interact with the economic system and remain agents 
that are more than purely economic institutions, 
c) the vision of revolution as a process, not only an event, 
and that pressure from other nation-states and/or pressure from 
elites can weaken the state or the regime, making revolutions more 
likely to occur. 
If rebellions have mainly occurred in rural settings as 
Skocpol reminds us, what is the connection between peasants and 
rebellions? Although the above discussed theories provide vital 
insights to the rebellion in southern Mexico, they leave us with 
other questions, such as the importance of the nature of the people 
that revolt. The above observations point out the undeniable 
relevance of the Mexican economy within the context of 
globalization and the political structure. The armed movements in 
southern Mexico have been mostly identified as peasant and/or 
indigenous revolutions; therefore, following Skocpol’s advice we 
limit our analysis to the role of peasants in a rural context.  
 
The Relevance of Actors in a Revolt: Markets, Population 
Growth, Dislocation, and Resistance 
 
Wolf (1999) has been recognized as a main contributor in the field 
of peasantry and revolutions. Wolf suggests that revolutions are a 
                                                 
21 Raúl Prebish and the ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), were known in Latin America 
for their insistence on the nature of capitalist development as interdependent and unequal. The structural 
school also saw the diffusion of technology as unequal and consequently also unequal the fruit of that 
diffusion in Latin American countries that struggle for development. See Raul Prebish,. “The Latin 
American Periphery in the Global System Capitalism” in Paradigms in Economic Development: Classic 
Perspective, Critiques, and Reflections (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe 1994). 
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defensive act by peasants, where participants of the revolutionary 
process want to protect traditional lifestyles against growing 
pressures. The first of these strains is population growth, second, 
commercialization and the growth of markets, and third, the 
dislocation among the elites that function as mediators between the 
community and the outside world. The first and second factors 
have an impact on the peasant way of life. Population growth has 
been associated with revolutions in the past, and it has also shown 
a reverse effect on ownership of the land. As population grows, 
land becomes scarce, and as markets increase, the land is subject to 
becoming a product for sale, another commodity flowing 
according to supply and demand. Thus, population growth 
combined with commercialization leads to ecological crisis and the 
loss of ownership of land that is usually used for subsistence 
purposes by peasants. Agrarian reform, coercive purchase, and 
over-taxed holdings have in the past caused alienation and have 
broken the links of ecological balance of peasants in Mexico, 
Algeria, and Cuba. 
Finally, commercialization and ecological crisis bring about a 
crisis of leadership and authority. As commercialization increases, 
elites become powerful, and as their power increases they become 
more vulnerable to being co-opted by even more powerful elites.  
Thus, this peasant/indigenous leadership, which previously was 
comprised of low-key, communal leaders, becomes a commercial 
power-holding elite that is mostly influenced by economic 
interests, standing in defiance of the inherited traditional leadership 
in peasant society. The conciliating traditional leadership loses an 
important element of mediation with the external world. 
Peasants, however, will not rebel unless they can rely on an 
external resource of support and if they exercise enough tactical 
control over their own resources to be able to hold onto those 
resources for self-sustenance throughout the duration of their 
struggle.  This tactical control can be achieved in two ways, 
namely, a) if peasants are “middle peasantry”, i.e., if they own or 
have a secure access to their land independent from the influence 
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of the landlord, even if the land is situated next to the landlord’s 
property, or b) peasants own their own land and are situated on the 
frontier, i.e., outside the landlords' dominion and next to the urban 
world. 
In consequence, the possibility of a rebellion based on this tactical 
control is doubled if the community is found outside of the normal 
control of the state, tripled if mountains are located next to the 
focus of rebellion, and quadrupled if the peasant society contains a 
distinct culture or language. A native language unifies and 
facilities communication among communities beyond the official 
language and the media. The importance of location is due to the 
fact that in being on the frontier between two worlds and 
experiencing strains from the economic system, the community’s 
resistance to change converts passive individuals into 
revolutionary peasants. Part of the attraction to revolts by 
peasantry is that the revolutionary discourse contains a utopian 
idea of freedom for the community, freedom from state pressure 
and freedom from whatever is being perceived as a real threat.   
The relationship between peasants and revolutions still remains a 
debate. For example, while Wolf’s analysis favors location as a 
guide to identify which peasants could become revolutionaries, 
other experts, such as Jeffery Paige in Revolutions: Social 
Movements and Export Agriculture argue that the social seed of 
revolutionary movements are the peasants that derive their income 
from wages rather than from the land, depending on the 
landholding class.22 The relationship between peasants and 
revolutions still remains a debate. For example Wolf’s analysis 
favors location as a guide to identify which peasants could become 
revolutionaries. Other experts, such as Jeffery Paige in 
Revolutions: Social Movements and Export Agriculture, argue that 
the social seed of revolutionary movements are the peasants that 
                                                 
22 See Jeffery M. Paige Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the  
 Underdeveloped World (New York: The Free Press, 1975). 
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derive their income from wages rather than from the land, 
depending on the landholding class.23  
In this ongoing fructiferous discussion it is vital to mention the 
Scott-Popkin debate. James Scott in The Moral Economy of the 
Peasant (1976) set forward his thesis that Asian peasants of the 
1930’s, in confronting the transformation of their world which was 
influenced by the market economy, were aware that their existence 
lie at the edge of scarcity. Consequently, the goal of peasants was 
not to overthrow a system of domination but to survive, and for 
this reason peasants avoided risks that threatened their basic 
subsistence and worked the system to “their minimum 
disadvantage”. Scott further stipulated that peasants tend to be 
committed to a moral economy manifested in the two principles 
which shape interpersonal relations: the principle of reciprocity 
and the right to subsistence. Therefore peasants resist domination 
and rebel on moral grounds.  
The counterargument to Scott’s thesis was advanced by 
Samuel Popkin in The Rational Peasant (1979), in which he was 
convinced of the existence of an even more powerful reason for 
peasant behavior in Asian agrarian societies. Peasants, according to 
Popkin act upon self-interest. The “rational peasant” tends, in any 
given situation, to act (including joining or supporting a rebellion) 
to improve the peasant’s individual wellbeing or the wellbeing of 
his family or at least to preserve those benefits currently held. 
From this perspective peasants do not engage in trading 
relationships guided by moral principles, but for their own benefit. 
Similarly, collective action is not seen in the light of moral 
predicaments but based on aggregated self-interest. Contrary to 
Scott’s observation of the negative effects of the market economy 
and the colonial state, in Popkin’s analysis markets are seen as 
beneficial, bringing investment opportunities and a maximization 
of benefits to peasants who always act rationally and participate in 
the markets even though they find themselves at the edge of 
                                                 
23 See Jeffery M. Paige Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the  
 Underdeveloped World (New York: The Free Press, 1975). 
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scarcity. In this sense Popkin’s thesis appears to be closely related 
to the neo-classical understanding of fair, self-regulating markets 
and progressive development. Salemink (2004) has pointed out the 
relevance of the Scott-Popkin controversy, (also known as the 
moral versus political economy debate), for its impact on 
development studies and for the way this debate has permeated 
social science research with its paradigmatic ramifications.24 We 
shall return to this issue in Chapter V.          
Although these debates and their ramifications could help us 
deepen our analysis we postpone this task for later chapters, 
continuing here with the identification of elements that concern the 
relationship between market growth, alienation of peasants from 
resources, and conflict escalation.  
 For now it is important to make two remarks. First, analysts 
have been pointing out the association between an increasing crisis 
and policies that favor the markets, in the most ecologically 
diverse region of Mexico.25 Economic policies in southern Mexico, 
although recognized as productive strategies, have in fact caused 
permanent damage to the environment. Unfortunately, many of 
these programs produce services for a small percentage of the 
population, responding to the desires of the privileged and thus 
reinforcing the already existing inequalities. Ecologist Alejandro 
Toledo (1988) has pointed out that governmental programs and 
private projects are executed without taking into account the 
intrinsic value of the environment. It is as if the demand for 
resources from the market, in demanding the extraction of a single 
resource, must necessarily maintain a very narrow focus, without 
considering the effects of that extraction on the overall, extremely 
                                                 
24 Beyond an analysis of the Scott-Popkin debate itself, or an analysis of its possible historical and 
economic limitations (since both reports were carried out within the specific context of the great depression 
in the 1930’s), Salemink has suggested an analysis of the debate in connection to the socio-political context 
in which both research reports originated. Salemink argues that both theories were, to an extent influenced 
by a particular type of social science research which was sponsored and promoted by the U.S. Government 
within the context of military intervention and analysis of insurgency in Vietnam and other developing 
countries.    
25 Southern Mexico contains the main reserve of water in Mexico, the most important tropical rainforest, 
the most complex biodiversity and ethnic diversity. Chiapas also contains the most important national 
reserves of oil, gas, and minerals.   
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complex ecological system. This focus has resulted in the 
assumption that the ecological system of a region can be valued in 
terms of the existence of a single resource, dismissing collateral 
resources as non-productive and valueless. Toledo has also pointed 
out that in the decades of 1950 to 1980, federal economic policies 
in southern Mexico aimed to solve problems created by:  a) an 
excessive demographic and economic centralization, b) the 
unbalanced and unequal distribution of economic benefits 
throughout the region, c) the profound inequalities within the urban 
areas, and d) the lack of integration of these urban centers with the 
rural areas that surround them. Consequently, the coastal areas of 
southern Mexico became the targets for agro-industrial/urban-
industrial programs combined with large infrastructure projects.  
The long-run expectations were to exploit to the maximum the 
potential of resources in the region. Through massive investment, 
an export-oriented industry was put in place in the region to extract 
minerals and oil. This ecological scenario has evolved into major 
conflicts of interests between governmental economic policies and 
indigenous communities. Indeed, the Zapatista uprising has been 
explained as having its roots in the pressure from population 
growth and the loss of land.    
Second, Wolf’s analysis correctly assumes that a violent 
revolt can occur in the form of a defense. In fact, resistance or 
defense of a culture or a way of living has been the most common 
characteristic of the indigenous discourse.  Indigenous and peasant 
groups have dedicated scarce community resources to this cause.  
This defense or resistance has not been limited to culture or a way 
of living but has included abstract elements such as identity, 
dignity, self-determination, autonomy, democracy, etc. These 
concepts have been placed at the center of their discourse, as can 
be appreciated in the declaration of Ramona, a Zapatista 
commander, in an excerpt from a letter sent to the “500 Years of 
Resistance Indian Council” in 1994. 
We talked among ourselves, we looked within ourselves and 
we saw our history: we saw that not everything had been 
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taken from us, that we had that which was most valuable, that 
which enabled us to live, that which lifted our step above 
plants and animals, that which made the stone to be under our 
feet, and we saw, brothers and sisters, that it was Dignity, 
which was all we had, and we saw that great was our shame 
at having forgotten it, and we saw that Dignity was good so 
that mankind would once again be mankind, and Dignity 
returned to dwell in our heart. . . (Giménez 2000). 
…on January 1st, 1994, we shouted, “Enough!” And from 
that moment Mexican Indians do not bend our heads down 
anymore, we look straight to power and now it is power that 
bends his head down because we have dignity. . . for the 
powerful, a dead Indian is better than a live one …Mexican 
Indians know how to resist….we will not allow human 
sacrifices to continue to be carried out by this power. We 
want to build a country with all of you (UNAM 1997). 
 
In a way these non-material demands represent a challenge to 
our way of understanding the Chiapas revolt. The following pages 
study the relationship between ethnicity and conflict using the 
analysis provided by the Identity Theory as presented by Tajfel and 
the French school of social psychology. 
 
The Relevance of Identity: The Contact Theory 
 
To better appreciate the work of Tajfel and the contributions 
of the identity theory, it is necessary to briefly review some of the 
dominant ideas on ethnic conflicts. Gordon Allport (1954) was a 
professor of psychology at Harvard University from 1930 to 1967, 
and is probably best known by his systematization of the “contact 
theory”. This theory has been the basis for different initiatives on 
desegregation in the United States; e.g., the school busing system.  
This theory and its hypothesis, also known as the “Allport-
Pettigrew contact hypothesis” (Forbes 1997), explain conflict by 
the nature of contact. According to this perspective, increased 
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contact between antagonistic ethnic groups tends to reduce 
negative stereotypes, thus improving relations. Regarding the 
subject Allport affirms that: 
 
Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of 
the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact 
between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of a 
common goal. This can be greatly enhanced if the contact is 
sanctioned by institutional support, i.e., by law, customs or 
local atmosphere, and provided it is of a sort that leads to the 
perception of common interests and common humanity 
between members of the two groups” (Forbes 1997: 22). 
 
Besides this main hypothesis, others, such as Thomas Pettigrew, a 
disciple of Allport, have contributed to the hypotheses pointing out 
that contact can go in either direction. It can contribute to an 
increasing or diminishing of hostilities depending on the conditions 
and the situation in which the contact occurs.  
 
Prejudice is lessened when the two groups a) possess equal 
status, b) seek common goals, c) are cooperatively dependent 
upon each other, and c) interact with the positive support of 
authorities, laws, or customs” (p. 275).   
 
The contributions of Allport and Pettigrew are generally accepted 
premises in the United States, where experiments and laws have 
been executed under the assumption of the contact theory.  
Nevertheless, the restrictions of the theory and its dependency 
upon the stipulated conditions raise further questions. Social 
theorists wonder whether inter-group contact can reduce prejudice 
or whether it is reduced by other factors, such as the types of 
contacts, the kinds of representatives from the disliked group, 
proximity, favorable contact, and common goals among groups 
(Cook 1962). 
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Other socio-psychological theories offer a different view on 
the existence of prejudice and hostilities that have challenged the 
contact theory. For instance, Deutsch and Sherif have argued that 
ethnic conflicts are explained by the real interest involved in the 
dispute.  The economic or political motives behind prejudice play 
an important role. If certain groups benefit from a current status of 
discrimination or oppression it is understood that these groups will 
not be interested in changing the situation. The dispute therefore, at 
its core is about economic gains.  The realistic conflict theory 
asserts that if someone has been a subject of discrimination, she/he 
more likely suffers from economic discrimination while others 
benefit from it. The question remains whether it is the material or 
economic disputes, or rather the circumstances in which the 
Indians and peasants have lived which are key to the conflict. 
 
The Relevance of the Connection between Social Identity and 
Conflict 
 
Based on group observations, Tajfel (1982) argues that 
materialistic reasons are not sufficient or necessary for ethnic 
conflicts to erupt.  Beyond competition for economic gains, non-
material gains seemed to play a key role in conflicts. The desire for 
a positive social group identity can be a source of conflict during 
the process of inter-group identification. If an individual asks 
herself/himself “Who am I?” instead of “How do I feel about 
others?” the process of self-categorization and identification has 
begun and the necessary conditions for a conflict are given. An 
explanation for this is that the process of identification with a 
group triggers a process of social comparison and competitive 
behavior among groups. Consequently, the struggle can be rooted 
in the desire to achieve a positive social identity. In other words, 
issues of self-esteem appear to be a motive for conflict. The 
struggle can take the form of a demand for respect, dignity, rights, 
identity and other non-material interests, as we can see in the case 
of Chiapas.  
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The Social Identity School offers additional findings. The 
individual’s identity is formed of two components: the personal 
identity, which consists of the uniqueness of the individual, and a 
social identity, or the group identification that the individual 
chooses. Depending on the choice made, the reaction to unfair 
experiences can be demonstrated either in individualistic protest or 
collective demonstration. The individual, therefore, holds this 
double and simultaneous identity and makes the decision of to 
what extent she/he will identify with the group. Among the 
numerous reasons for an individual to identify herself/himself with 
one group or another, we find the way in which individuals see 
themselves in their context, their cultural past and present, their 
lack of opportunities, physical or ideological similarities, and 
aspirations. Nevertheless, an objection can be made that although 
this process is based on observations, it would seem more logical 
that the individual rebel individually, not collectively.  
In order to respond collectively, social-identity researchers 
argue that perceptions held by disadvantaged groups concerning 
the inter-group relationship is decisive.  If the perception of the 
disadvantaged group is that the inter-group boundaries are 
permeable then individuals will tend to react individually. If the 
perception is that boundaries are closed, the reaction is more likely 
to be a collective one. S. C. Wright (2002) in his research on 
reactions of “doing nothing” about injustice individually or 
collectively, has found that closed boundaries established and 
preserved by a privileged group are associated with a high 
likelihood of collective protest from the disadvantaged group. 
 Consequently, subjective sources of conflicts are less likely 
to occur when groups resemble each other and contain lower 
barriers to social mobility. On the other hand, lower barriers can 
allow members of a group to see themselves as individuals 
entering and leaving social-economic roles, and as such they would 
prefer individual interactions rather than group contact (Forbes 
1997). A second variable identified by the Social Identity School is 
whether the disadvantaged group perceives that its position can 
 65
change; in other words, if the inter-group relationship is stable or 
unstable. Perceptions of instability were found to be favorable for 
disadvantaged and deprived groups to compete directly (violently 
or non-violently) and collectively with the dominant group. Third, 
a collective response also seems to depend on the perception of 
whether the inter-group relationship is legitimated or not. 
Assessment of the legitimacy of the relationship seems to precede 
feelings of collective response. Other findings also reveal that if 
the relationship between groups is perceived as legitimated, other 
variables such as inequality may be considered irrelevant (Major 
1994, Ellemers 1993). Conversely, if the difference in status of 
groups is considered illegitimate, social comparisons are triggered 
and alternative ways to seek change will increase (Ellmers 1993).   
In summary, a disadvantaged group is more likely to engage in 
violent or non-violent direct competition with a privileged group if 
the perception is that the relation of power is illegitimate, unstable 
and closed. Nevertheless, what underlies a conflict is the 
suppression of a minority group that has been ignored, or 
discriminated against by the dominant groups and the state 
(Giménez 2000).  
 
 The Latent Conflict 
 
 By way of conclusion, we can say first that conflicts arise for 
more complex and dynamic reasons than what appears at a cursory 
glance. They bear multidimensional facets that may include 
expectations of individuals, the social placement of different 
groups, issues of identity, etc. In other words, these facets extend 
beyond the area of economics, the area usually implied when a 
connection is made between rebellion and poverty, into the areas 
of society, polity, and culture. Second, we argue here that the many 
reasons for conflict here presented can be part of a single process.  
This single yet multi-faceted process can be referred to as a 
“latent-open conflict” (See Model 4). To say that there is an 
existing latent-open conflict implies, in the case of Southern 
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Mexico, that the reoccurring cyclical appearances of armed groups 
represent a clear manifestation of a deeper social symptom. As this 
multi-faceted process continues, it spirals into higher stages of 
open conflict. Marx introduced his contribution of dialectical 
conflictive social processes to explain the emergence of capitalism 
from feudalism, and its potential collapse to give place to new 
forms. His contribution can help us to more clearly understand a 
process where social contradictions coincide with conflicts of 
interest and can eventually be followed by conflict of actions and 
violent confrontations.   
In Model 4, a spiraling conflict is rooted in the society, 
culture, economy, and polity. Although arrangements within the 
society may continue to function, the latent conflict grows out of a 
context of poverty, potentially taking the form of: a) relative 
deprivation (Gurr’s model), b) discontent (Tilly’model), c) a crisis 
among peasants (Wolf’s model), or d) suppression of identity and 
systemic discrimination (Identity School).   
It seems apparent in the case of Mexico some armed groups, 
both past and present, were at one point civilian movements that 
aspired to representation in the political arena. At the beginning 
stage of the spiral, the closed nature of the system does not tolerate 
civilian opposition, evidenced by the use of repression which then 
functions as the springboard to an increase in the formation of new 
armed groups, (e.g., the Tlatelolco Massacre in 1968). This 
sequence, (political opposition-repression-armed opposition), is 
one of growing escalation. It is interesting to note that the 
communiqués from newly-formed armed groups are very 
consistent in pointing out the legitimacy of their existence due to 
massacres, the irremediable social contradictions (depravation, 
exclusion, poverty, human rights violations, impunity, etc.,) and 
the impossibility of their participation in the system to bring about 
real change through official means. However, since the state’s use 
of force to stop armed groups focuses on the achievement of 
“social order” at all costs, it fails to re-direct efforts to solve 
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grievances by correcting the underlying injustices present in early 
stages of the latent conflict.  
 
Model 4 The Spiral of Latent-Open Conflict Process 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the violent confrontations escalate, they tend to be 
accompanied by even higher levels of human rights violations.  
Consequently, persecuted political fronts that perceive they have 
no future in the political arena may develop into armed fronts. The 
increasing appearances of armed groups in Mexico, including the 
Zapatista front, can be placed along this latent-open conflict cycle.  
Consistent with the actors-oriented approach and our 
definition of conflicts as dynamic processes that lead to rebellions, 
we propose the use of a matrix constructed by De Gaay Fortman 
(2002) to visualize the complexity of the root conflict (see Model 
5).  In his matrix, De Gaay Fortman explores the nature and 
manifestations of conflicts that can escalate to violent rebellion, 
emphasizing that the matrix must be read in a dynamic way. The 
discussion on the relevance of the matrix in the case of the 
Zapatista rebellion is taken up in the following chapter.  
Economy Polity 
Culture Society 
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Model 5    The Root Conflict 
 
Conflict  
and its 
Roots in: 
Perceived                Incompatibility of  
 
(Lack of) mediating mechanisms 
Interest 
 
Society 
Socially open or closed 
 
Role of Ideology 
 
Collective prejudice 
 
Pluralism 
Power-sharing 
Quality of group leadership 
Social mobility 
Protection of minorities 
 
 
Group recognition 
& Group rights (minority 
    rights) 
Collective equality (no  
    systemic    
    discrimination) 
 
Culture 
Freedom of expression 
 
Ways of voicing dissent and  
   criticism 
 
Role of the media 
Freedom of worship 
Fundamentalism vs. tolerance 
Multi-Culturalism 
Quality of religious leadership 
 
Cultural identities 
Religious convictions 
Voice 
 
Polity 
Do people feel they own the state  
   or that the state owns them?  
Is this likely to change? 
Legitimacy 
Social contract 
Democracy 
Quality of political leadership 
Rule of law 
A fair and functioning legal system 
Access to political and 
   public goods 
Citizenship and political  
   rights 
Legal protection 
 
 
Economy 
Trends and expectations in 
   economic growth and income  
   distribution 
Employment 
Poverty and vulnerability 
Empowerment rights 
Scope for collective action 
   (from resistance to reform) 
Land reform 
Development 
Income and wealth  
   (distribution) 
Pressure on and access to  
   resources 
Economic, social and  
   cultural rights 
Entitlement system and  
   social protection 
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Further Considerations 
The contributions presented here remain vital to our 
understanding of conflicts in general. The case of southern 
Mexico, however, demands the inclusion of other elements present 
in the region. The following observations are worthy of 
consideration for further discussion. 
1. In a situation of colonialism, the use of violence by the 
dominated group to achieve liberation, self-esteem, to protect 
identity or to simply be heard, could not be necessarily the 
primary source of violence (Freire 1971), but a response to an 
initial violence established by the dominating group as it 
finds in the use of violence an effective tool to achieve goals 
(Martin-Baró).  
2. The roots of violence are connected and often highly 
influenced by external conditions beyond individuals’ 
internal perceptions.  
3. The use of violence as a tool to achieve goals is rooted in 
political, economic and social structures of power, and its 
nature needs to be explained in its context. The conflict 
cannot be solved by declaring peace, bringing international 
observers, new elections or international intervention without 
dealing with the root causes that originated the conflict 
(Galtung, 1996). 
4.  Finally, there is a need to distinguish between types of 
aggression, as suggested by Fromm (1975). There is first, the 
kind of violence used to open up space to be heard, such as 
the kind used by the Zapatistas for a few days in 1994. This 
violence was aimed at responding to the excessive abuses and 
killings, and can be labeled “defensive aggression”. Fromm 
suggests that this kind of violence is used for survival 
purposes, and stops when the threat is no longer present. 
Another type of aggression is the “evil aggression” that 
appears in specific social circumstances, and provides 
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benefits or produces pleasure for the aggressor. This latter 
type of aggression uses fear, torture and killing as a means to 
maintain dominance and control, keeping other groups in 
submission.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Model 1   Satisfaction and Revolution   
 
Source: Ivo K. Feierabend Engewood Cliffs, eds. “Toward a Theory of Revolution” in Anger, Violence and 
Politics: Theories and Research (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972). 
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Box 3    Three Patterns of Relative Deprivation  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         Source: T. R. Gurr Why Men Rebel, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
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Chapter III   
 
The Latent Conflict and the Zapatista Rebellion  
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The issues presented in our list of further considerations at 
the end of Chapter II can be, without a doubt, issues for further 
research and debate. The first part of this chapter explores the first 
of these considerations in greater depth. Two elements dominate 
the first of these considerations--the issue of colonialism and the 
topic of the primary source of violence and its use. Leaving for the 
moment the topic of the source of violence pending, we begin with 
the issue of colonialism; arguing that the role of colonialism in the 
dynamics of rebellions was not taken into account by the studies 
presented in Chapter II. Consequently, we include here the 
dehumanizing repercussions of colonialism, reviewing the case of 
previous Indian rebellions to argue the fundamental relevance of a 
history of colonialism as part of the latent conflict-open conflict 
process. 
We have contented in the previous chapter that conflict is 
rooted in culture, society, polity and the economy. The second part 
of this chapter favors culture as a key factor in explaining 
rebellions in Mexico. To lay the groundwork for our discussion we 
must first define our understanding of culture. Following the work 
of Bakhtin, we argue that culture is grounded in the practice of 
agents within; a) a space of authoring as a response to the 
continually changing economic and social context. Given that the 
changing world must be faced and responded to, reacting and 
responding to new circumstances (authorship) is consequently not 
an option26, and b) a historical and social context linked to 
economic resources, entitlements, power structures, and values 
such as respect and dignity. 
The main thesis defended in this chapter is that the 
contemporary rebellion in Chiapas is part of an ongoing, 
continuous, latent/open conflict with roots extending back to the 
colonial period. The ongoing conflict has emerged as an open 
confrontation from time to time, in a context of unbearable levels 
                                                 
26 Bakhtin, Mikhail M ed. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays  (Austin: University of Texas Press 
1981); quoted in Holland, Dorothy Lachicotte William, Identity and Agency in Cultural Worlds, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2001). 
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of humiliation, exploitation and exclusion involving issues of 
identity and dignity. To sustain our thesis, four sporadic cases of 
rebellion are studied in part (A) of the chapter with a brief analysis 
of each context. We note that rebellion can be translated into a 
struggle to restore religious, economic, and socio-political 
arrangements which are rooted in local culture and identity. This 
restoration, however, pre-supposes the recovery of autonomy in 
order to achieve restoration. Consequently we also look into the 
struggle for autonomy, recognition, and restitution--common 
themes which tend to reappear in rebellions in the region.  The 
Zapatista rebellion included in part (B) of this chapter illustrates 
the most recent case in Chiapas of cultural revitalization or 
response to hostile changes imposed on Mayan culture. This has 
taken the form of political mobilization and the involvement of 
other actors in defying imposed economic and political 
arrangements which have led to a culture of dehumanization. In 
other words, we argue that the Zapatista uprising can be 
understood as a contemporary response, (an act of authorship), a 
pulling of the brake on the changes which threaten key local 
economic and political arrangements. These arrangements have 
historically permitted the carrying out of productive and dignifying 
activities.  
 
 
A. Rebellion as a Response to the Imposition of New 
Economic and Political Arrangements 
 
         The Zapatista Rebellion was not the first uprising in reaction 
to imposed economic arrangements. The history of Chiapas offers 
multiple evidence of this. The Chiapanecos27 from Chiapa de los 
                                                 
27Though most of the current state of Chiapas was inhabited in precolumbian times by Mayan Indians who 
were distinguished by their spoken languages, (the Zoque, Tzotzil, and Chol people came from the jungle, 
the Mames from the Gulf Coast, as well as Tzeltales and Tojolabales). The true identiy of the Chiapaneco 
People is unknown, nevertheless Chiapa de los Indios ranked as the wealthiest, oldest, and most important 
town in the region in colonial times. The only other town that could compete in size and importance was 
the Spanish town known as Chiapa de los Españoles.  See Jan de Vos, “The Battle of Sumidero: A History 
of the Chiapanecan Rebellion through Spanish and Indian Testimonies (1524-34)” in Kevin Gosner and 
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Indios (currently called Chiapa de Corzo) confronted the first 
conquistadors led by Luis Marin in 1524 who had been sent by 
Hernán Cortez to pacify the rebellion of those who resisted the 
economic and political system imposed by the crown, refusing to 
pay tributes.28 The Chiapaneco people represented the strongest 
and most organized group in Chiapas by the 1530s29, and in 1532 
the Chiapaneco population rose up in arms against the Spaniards. 
However, in spite of resisting and confronting the repressive 
military troops sent to subjugate them, the Chiapaneco people were 
defeated. Chiapanecos were taken back to their village, which later 
became an encomienda under Baltazar Guerra, a young captain 
who was a newcomer from Spain. This new type of economy, 
which was based on the imposition of the encomienda and the 
practice of extraction of resources, demanded labor.30 Lacking the 
labor to exploit the mines discovered in the area, Guerra, similar to 
many other “encomenderos”, organized the indigenous population 
in groups of 200 and forced them to work in the mines. This 
subjugation, however, did not occur without resistance and 
rebellion.31 The Chiapaneco Indians were defeated and brought 
under Spanish rule within ten years after the Viceroyalty of Spain 
was established in Mexico.32  
                                                                                                                                                 
Arij Ouweneel eds. Indigenous Revolts in Chiapas and Andean Highlands. (Amsterdam: The Center for 
Latin American Research (CEDLA), 1996)  
28 Historians Jan de Vos (1999), Flores Ruiz (1973), and Pineda Vicente (1888), and Bernal Diaz del 
Castillo (1965). 
29 See a short study on rebellions in Chiapas Jan De Vos, “Tierra y libertad: panorama de cuatro rebeliones 
indígenas en  Chiapas”. En Rebeliones Indígenas en Chiapas. San Cristóbal de Las Casas Ediciones Pirata., 
Mexico, 2002)  
30 The encomienda system was established throughout Mexico. A Spanish soldier would be given land and 
indigenous communities to administer, thus forming an encomienda. It was jointly a political, religious and 
economic system, and had four goals:  to honor the conquistadors for their service to the Crown, to 
incorporate indigenous peoples  into the economy; to convert them to Christianity without cost to the 
Spanish Crown, and to fortify the military strength of Spain in the Americas. 
31 According to historical records, a year later after this event, a man named Sanguieme and 120 other 
Chiapanecos rebelled against Spanish rulers and left their village. Together with others, they formed a new 
community and broke off relations with other Chiapanecos that remained submitted to the Spanish crown.  
The rebels were persecuted and hid in a religious sanctuary. Later, vastly outnumbered and surrounded by 
Spanish soldiers, civilians and cooperating, submissive Chiapaneco Indians, they were forced to surrender.  
The rebels were publicly executed in the main square, and no further rebellions were recorded in the history 
of Chiapas by the Chiapaneco people. On the contrary, an increasing number of Chiapaneco Indians 
worked hand in hand with Spaniards to locate and dominate other peoples, such as the Lacandon Indians. 
32 Hernán Cortez, the Spanish conquistador, landed in Veracruz in 1519. He was seen by the indigenous  
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 Map 1    Territorial Division of Chiapas during the Conquest Era 
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Source: Jan de Vos, “The Battle of Sumidero: A History of the Chiapanecan Rebellion Through 
Spanish and Indian Testimonies (1524-34)” in Kevin Gosner and Arij Ouweneel eds. 
Indigenous Revolts in Chiapas and Andean Highlands. (Amsterdam: The Center for Latin 
American Research (CEDLA), 1999) 
    
 
The Lacandon Resistance to Economic and Political  
Domination 
 
In 1530, a new rebellion began that would last more than 150 
years (1530-1695), the Lacandon rebellion.33 1530 is the first 
recorded year when Lacandon Indians were spotted by Spanish 
soldiers. Then, again in 1536, Spanish soldiers had another 
incursion into the jungle; this time in search of a town near 
Lacandon territory, and to explore the Pochutla Indian region. In 
1559 Spaniards attacked the Lacandons and Pochutlas. Some were 
killed and others taken prisoner. By 1563 the Pochutla Indians that 
still remained in their territory were Christianized by Fray Pedro 
                                                                                                                                                 
  population as fulfilling the prophesy of the return of Quetzalcoaltl, the Feathered Serpent of the Mexica 
 calendar. The conquest of Tenochtitlán, the great Aztec city, took only one year. 
33 Lacandon comes from the word lacam-tun or big stone, a name given to the island that lay at the center 
of the lake where this people lived. The Lacandon People belonged to the Mayan people from the rainforest 
who spoke Chol.  
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Lorenzo and were removed to another town, Oconsingo. The 
Lacandons, however, continued in rebellion. After returning from 
exile, surviving members and others that had escaped, rebuilt their 
villages. The Lacandons founded another village in an area 
unknown to the Spaniards. The Lacandons built a new village 
(Zec-Balum or White Tiger). The new village existed for one 
hundred years in a hidden location. In 1695, three simultaneous 
military incursions were organized with three objectives: first, to 
bring under control new unexplored territory, second, to establish a 
military and commercial route between Guatemala and the Gulf of 
Mexico, and third to conquer the Lacandon and the Itzées Indians, 
inhabitants of the region. Zac-Balum was occupied by the military 
that year, as the Lacandon Indians surrended without any 
resistance. Their village was established as a mission and a 
military base consisting of three priests and thirty soldiers. The 
Lancandon Indians were “Christianized” and incorporated into the 
Roman Catholic Church and the colonial system. Suffering from 
diseases previously unknown to the Lacandons, part of the 
population died, while others were taken to reservations near the 
border of Guatemala and then later to a city known as Retalhuleu. 
At this location, the last members of the Lacandon Indians died in 
the 1750’s. 
Some remarks and observations can be made at this point 
regarding these early rebellions.34 First, these rebellions followed 
the imposition of Spanish economic and political structure, 
extending beyond the initial conquest period and occurring in 
Chiapas in a context of extreme violence and plunder. In part this 
imposition resulted in an exclusion of the indigenous population as 
legitimated right bearers and agents entitled to their territory. For 
instance, in 1493 Pope Alexander VI promulgated the Alexandrian 
Bulls, which gave divine right to the crown of Castile to dominate 
                                                 
34 These rebellions are the first two of the four discussed in this paper.  The other two are included in 
Chapter V which covers the 1994 rebellion.  
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and possess the land of the New World.35 Second, although the 
Church played the role of introducing Christianity to the Americas, 
it also worked with the army to expand the economic and political 
interests of the crown, recommending force and legitimizing the 
conquest and denying religious freedom to the dominated 
collective religious entities. To further appreciate these two points 
and their resulting complexity, we mention the case of Fray 
Bartolomé de las Casas and his perception of the dominated 
territory. As a priest Bartolomé de las Casas was an exception to 
the rule, becoming known as the defender and protector of the 
Indians. In his work, Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies, 
he described the horror and violence that Indians suffered at the 
hands of Spaniards.36  
De las Casas came to Chiapas in the 1530’s, when Chiapas 
was still known as the kingdom of Guatemala, and he was 
convinced that Mayans could be converted peacefully. In 1547 Las 
Casas had hopes of reducing abuse and violence, and persuaded 
the Crown to pass new laws for the Indies to reform the 
encomienda system. This created many enemies for him and 
consequently he had to flee for his life back to Spain. The new 
laws gained the approval of the crown and slavery was officially 
abolished; however, Weinberg points out that as debt labor and 
feudalism became entrenched, the official abolition of Indian 
                                                 
35 The church played a hegemonic role in European feudalism. Pope Rodrigo de Borga, known as 
Alexander VI, promulgated the bulls that take their name after him. These documents, especially the Bula 
iner coetera, nove universi, declared the Spanish Crown of Castile the legitimate owner of the “New 
World”.  Later the Exime devotionis and Dudum siquidem bulls, issued in September of the same year, gave 
the right and the responsibility to the Crown to Christianize the natives. See Durand Alcántara, Derecho 
Nacional, Derechos Indios y Derecho Cosuetudinario Indígena: Los triquis un Estudio del Caso.( Mexico 
City: UNP and UAM, 1998) 
36 For instance, he relates the story of Hatuey an Indian Chief that opposed the Spanish invasion.  Hatuey 
was captured and sentenced by Governor Diego Velázquez to be burned alive. Though Las Casas 
intervened on Hatuey's behalf, he was overruled by the governor. Nevertheless, Las Casas had one 
consolation: Hatuey's death gave him vivid material for his exposé of Spanish cruelty toward the Indians. In 
describing Hatuey’s death, Las Casas wrote that Hatuey was given a chance to embrace Christianity before 
being burned, so that his soul might go to heaven. The condemned chief asked if he would find the white 
man there. Told he would, he made this poignant reply: "Then I will not be a Christian, for I would not 
again go to a place where I must find men so cruel!" in Bartolomé de las Casas, The Devastation of the 
Indies: A Brief Account  (New York.Seabury Press, 1974) 
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slavery did little to alter the actual condition of the Indians. 
Additionally, the new laws established a policy of reducciones –  
 “reducing” Indian lands by centralizing the Indians in hamlets 
clustered around churches. The oligarchs quickly appropriated the 
lands which had been reduced (2000: 21). 
 These new laws promoted the reduction of Indian lands to 
ejidos or “exits”--small plots of land located on the outskirts of the 
towns. The ejido system was the surviving remnant of the capulli 
structure. As in the rest of Mesoamerica, the capulli was the oldest 
unit of economic and political structure (Durand 1998, Alonso 
1947).37  The capulli socio-political structure was lost and later 
replaced by other agrarian laws stemming from a legal system 
which nevertheless remained foreign to the indigenous population, 
as they had no concept of ownership of the land. Slowly, decisions 
over their daily social and economic activities were taken away by 
foreigners and their descendants, who acted in accordance with 
their own interests. The role of the church was geared to 
restructuring society with the building of criollo38 economic and 
political centers. Other social structures in communities were co-
opted and certain leaders emerged as village patriarchs or caciques. 
The caciques received land (ejidos) to produce food, labor, and 
agricultural products for the new Spanish centers. The separation 
of Indian populations from their land was accompanied by 
ecological degradation, As Winberg has pointed out: 
 
By the eighteen century, Indian pauperization and ecological 
degradation escalated as ever more ejidal land came under 
control of the oligarchy’s cattle ranchers. As cattle grazed in 
the fertile valleys, Mayan milpas (corn fields) were forced 
                                                 
37 Durand and Alonso explain the importance of the capulli as a socio-political institution. The capulli land 
was divided into small plots of land according to the number of families that lived in the area. A “parcela” 
(parcel) of land was given to each head of a family. The parcela could not be sold, traded or transferred to 
families in other regions.  It could be worked for life by the family and given to the descendants of the 
family. This land had to be worked in person by the owner, if in condition to do so. Land could not be 
accumulated. Zurita, Alonso de, Breve relación de los señores de la nueva España (Mexico City: Ediciones 
Chavez, 1947)     
38 The term criollo refers to the descendants of Spaniards who were born in the Americas. 
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onto the rocky mountainsides, displacing the forests. The soil 
eroded, gullies opened and streams dried up (2000).  
 
  Remarkably, the alienation from the land experienced by 
indigenous peoples in Chiapas would become a linking factor in 
the continuing Mayan rebellions throughout the following 500 
years.39 
Finally, during this colonial period, mining occupied first 
place as an economic activity. Mining, however, required labor and 
the agricultural products to maintain the Indians who were 
extracting metals (Dietz 1995).  Similar to the Lacandon Indian 
population, native populations throughout the continent40 declined 
dramatically as a consequence of killings, abuses and contact with 
European diseases for which the Indians had no immunological 
defenses.41 To put the case of the Lacandon Indians in a broader 
context, Table 6 in the appendix presents three hypotheses 
regarding the existing indigenous population of 1492, which have 
been set forth by the main experts in the field.  The table also 
shows a possible scenario of the declining population during this 
period.  
                                                 
39 The concept of ethnicity is understood as a social process. According to Oommen (1997), ethnicity is a 
product of a “process of ethnization” that began with exploration and navigation in the XVI century and has 
expanded its consequences to present times. This process was fostered by colonialism, European 
expansion, international immigration, U.S expansion and cultural homogenization. The process was 
characterized by the separation of ethnies (previously autonomous with a territory and living in agreement 
with their world views and culture) from their space, land or territory.  As indigenous peoples were 
separated from their territory, they became dispensable component of society, alienated, marginalized and 
labeled as strange, even within their own county.   In the case of Mexico specifically, the arrival of 
Christopher Columbus in the Americas and the following conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortes marked the 
beginning of the process of ethnicity, accompanied by a dramatic decrease in the population of indigenous 
people as the process of colonization continued. 
40 The predominant geographic concept taught in schools in Latin America and Europe is that North, 
Central and South America together form one American continent, unlike the concept in the United States 
where North and South America are seen as two separate continents and Central America is seen as not 
truly a part of either. 
41 With the process of declining population, known in the indigenous discourse as ethnocide, the 
accumulated knowledge of generations was also lost. For instance, Enrique Left (1998), a well-respected 
Mexican political ecologist, argues that the physical aspect of the ecological crisis and underdevelopment 
in countries such as Mexico, is found in that countries lost, in addition to people and their culture, the 
potential resources and wisdom to developed adequate economic as well socio-political structures in 
accordance with the environment, i.e., sustainable economic structures. 
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The Loss of Autonomy and a Religious Rebellion against an 
Economy of Extraction 
 
As the Lacandon Indians were disappearing in Chiapas, a 
new rebellion was about to begin in the Zendales province.  In 
1712 a general indigenous uprising was organized in Chiapas 
against colonial Spanish and ladino42 abuses as well as the church 
tax system. The socio-economic conditions surrounding this 
rebellion were reported by Juan Pedro Viqueira in 1995.43  
Between 1670 and 1707 the kingdom of Guatemala experienced a 
period of prosperity. Commerce increased and the amount of silver 
sent to Spain during this period reached its highest level in twenty 
years. Also, 1670 marked the beginning of a continuous recovery 
of population growth.44  
For the Spanish rule, population growth meant high 
economic expectations, since the economy relied mostly on Indian 
labor and trade. Their response, however, was also of concern, for 
an increasing population could mean that they were not paying 
enough to the Crown; therefore, authorities increased the tax 
contributions of Indians. Taxes were paid to the encomenderos, to 
the church or to royal citizens. A new tax system was imposed and 
Indians had to pay duties on products at market prices. It is known 
that at least until 1692, the lieutenants of royal revenue, and later 
the district magistrates, continued the practice of reporting the 
                                                 
42 The term “ladino” is used in Central America and Chiapas in referring to people who are of mixed 
(indigenous and Spanish) ethnic heritage, though the term “mestizo” is generally used in the rest of 
Mexico. 
43 Juan Pedro Viqueira is a Mexican sociologist recognized as the world’s authority on eighteenth-century 
Chiapas. See John Womack, Rebellion in Chiapas: a Historical Reader, (New York: The New Press 1999), 
also Juan Pedro Viqueira, Las Causas de una rebelión india: Chiapas 1712,(San Crisóbal de las Casas, 
Chiapas: Ediciones Pirata 2002) 
44 While the Indian population in the Caribbean region was wiped out within two generations, Chiapas, 
highland Central America and the Andean region, have together been classified as a region where the 
Indian population suffered a steady decline during the conquest but experienced a recovery during the 
colonial period.  This recovery, however, was less pronounced then the recovery of Indian populations in  
other regions in the continent such as  the region of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador (a region known as the 
viceroyalty of New Granada), Argentina and Uruguay (known as the region of the viceroyalty of the Rio de 
la Plata).  See Linda Newsom, “Indian Population Patterns in Colonial Spanish America”, Latin American 
Research Review 20, no.3 (1985): 41-74. 
 83
fixed taxes of these products to the Crown, and keeping the 
difference for themselves. This level of corruption was possible 
due to the collaboration of district magistrates and local authorities 
in Chiapas. The taxes were payable in kind to religious institutions 
and organizations, providing corn to different Spanish institutions 
and city authorities, and in time of harvest when corn was not 
needed, it was payable in money. Other Indians in remote villages, 
however, paid their duties only in money.  In order to obtain the 
necessary cash or be able to pay the tax, many extended their work 
day, traveled to distant villages for work or intensified their work 
day. Indian hatred of Spanish abuses grew. 
However, a period of crises followed the economic prosperity 
of these years, with bad harvests between 1707 and 1712, and the 
collapsing of the fragile subsistence economy. Since contributions 
had to be paid at market price, as prices tripled, contributions did 
as well. Moreover, the new bishop, Juan Bautista Alvarez de 
Toledo, started implementing his own agenda, which included the 
construction of new charity facilities--projects that required 
money. For this purpose the bishop started his inspection tour in 
1709, seeking to impose the demands of higher payments and new 
duties on the Indian population. 
Another aspect of the crisis were the political conflicts among the 
Spaniards over the control of the growing Indian population and its 
religious affairs, which were perceived as idolatrous, pagan Indian 
practices and therefore threatening to the church.45 Before 1712 
confrontations arose between Indians and church authorities over 
religious disputes, in spite of the unifying efforts of bishops in 
Chiapas. Protests against the church agenda and economic burdens 
increased. In 1712 however, appearances of the Virgin Mary in 
Santa Marta Xolotepec and later in Cancuc further heightened 
                                                 
45In 1674, Marcos Bravo de la Serna was appointed as bishop of Chiapas. His agenda included 
evangelization of the Indians, reducing the control of the Dominican Order because of their inability to 
bring Indians under the church realm, and the fight against corruption.  However, his successor, Francisco 
de la Vega, following different priorities, initiated a persecution of “idolatrous Indians”. He became a 
powerful man, exercising his power through excommunication. See Viqueira, Las Causas de una rebelión 
india: Chiapas 1712,(San Crisóbal de las Casas, Chiapas: Ediciones Pirata 2002) 
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tensions.46 The rebellion led by a girl and her family lasted three 
months, during which miracles occurred and Indians affirmed that 
God wanted an Indian church with Indian authorities. The Spanish 
repressed the rebellion using armed forces from Guatemala and 
Tabasco. Nevertheless, historians agree that the idea of self-
appointed Indian clergy was not tolerated because it challenged not 
only the colonial church, which remained at the heart of the 
empire, but also the economic and political structure of the Crown.  
 
Rebellion in 1868 and the Re-emergence of the Indigenous 
Economy Rooted in Culture 
 
More than 150 years after the rebellion of 1712, another 
rebellion took place in the Chamula region (see Map 1) in Chiapas. 
Various historical events led up to this rebellion. Following 
Mexico’s bitter struggle for independence from Spain from 1810 to 
1822, the economic and political consensus at the national level 
was undermined by disputes between the rival elites: conservatives 
and liberals. These disputes continued up to the time of the French 
invasion of Mexico (1861-67), Benito Juarez, a lawyer and 
Zapotec Indian from Oaxaca, had won election as the president of 
Mexico. After the French were expelled, Juarez was twice re-
elected: in 1867 and again in 1876. The liberals supported the 
Leyes de Reforma (reform laws), written and proposed by Juarez, 
which provided for the creation of free, secular public education 
and limited the power of the Church by divesting it of its massive 
properties.47 The conservatives strongly opposed the reform laws 
                                                 
46 In Cancuc, a 13-year-old Indian girl witnessed the appearance and heard the voice of the Virgin. The 
word spread and people from ten different villages supported her testimony. A chapel was built for the 
Virgin, according to her wishes. Spanish authorities, however, had María López, the Indian girl, and her 
father whipped and ordered the chapel to be destroyed. On August 8, at a meeting of devotees from Cancuc 
held in a neighboring town, the girl gave the sign to begin a rebellion against Spanish rule. 
47 It is worth noting that two tendencies among liberals dominated the scene. Some “conservative” liberals 
shared views similar to conservatives, such us favoring free trade and viewing private property as a means 
of individual freedom, the promotion of laws favoring extensive landholdings under individual ownership 
and the rejection of states’ regulation. Social liberalists on the other hand rejected free trade based on 
comparative exchange proposed by Adam Smith and favored protectionism (due to the fact that in practice, 
England itself, had gained economic strength through protectionism, as had Germany, France and the U.S.). 
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and struggled to retain the Catholic Church’s power, influence and 
enormous landholdings, and the army’s privileges.      
In Chiapas, struggles for the defense of economic and 
political interests occurred, with both conservatives and liberals 
using these as opportunities to recruit Indian support. Though 
Chiapas was already a state divided three ways: wealthy landlords, 
peasants, and Indians, it became even more polarized. The wealthy 
ranchers of the highlands, driven to maintain control over the 
economy and labor, sided with the conservatives. The wealthy 
ranchers of the lowland valley, anxious to own church proprieties 
and land in the valley, sided with the liberals. Both conservatives 
and liberals divided indigenous communities as they tried to gain 
support. The liberals in the lowlands encouraged Indians to refuse 
to pay church taxes and to worship as they wished. A cult appeared 
in a Tzotzil community in 1867. A recounting of the rebellion that 
followed is based on 30 years of Tzotzil research carried out by Jan 
Rus from the Harvard Project and from George Collier.  Indians 
from different communities gathered to worship magical “talking 
stones” discovered by a Chamula woman near a town called 
Tzajalhemel. With the support of Pedro Díaz Cuzcat, a fiscal who 
was initially sent to investigate the case, Tzajalhemel grew to 
become not only the religious center of the region but also the 
trade and business center within only a couple of months.   
Liberals in the lowlands were pleased when their desire to diminish 
the political control of the conservatives, represented by the elite in 
San Cristóbal, began to be realized. Nevertheless, they had not 
foreseen the negative effects the new cult would have on the 
economy of the conservatives, as by 1868 the church in San 
Cristóbal had no Indian attendance and no significant trade was 
present in town.   
                                                                                                                                                 
They also favored the state as a regulator-promoter of the social welfare of people through the promotion of 
education, health, etc. and struggled for equality and a just distribution of resources. Finally, this 
movement, also known as the Liberalismo Social Mexicano, favored collective organization and ownership 
of resources and democratic reforms. See. Jesús Reyes Heroles. El Liberalismo Mexicano III. La 
Integración de las ideas (Mexico D.F.: FCE, , 1982)        
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It did not take long before the conservative elite of San 
Cristóbal reacted and repressed the cult. On December 2, 1868, 
fifty armed men were sent to seize images of the new church and 
to arrest the leaders. This event was followed by an increase in 
taxes. In 1869 Governor Pantaleón Dominguez launched a tax 
reform.48 The new taxes were scheduled to be paid quarterly. The 
expectation regarding the Indians was that since they had 
submitted to church leaders the previous year, they would accept 
the new reforms. Yet as the government enforced the first tax 
contribution and imprisoned tax violators, confrontations arose, 
and Indians returned to their religious refuge in Tzajalhemel. As 
before, Indians experienced repression and the seizure of their 
sacred images. However, as the group of ladinos were returning to 
San Cristóbal with the seized sacred items, they were killed, and 
the killing of more ladinos followed. Governor Dominguez 
declared a war of “civilization over barbarism” and on June 21, 
1869, 300 Indians were killed in San Cristóbal. In the days 
following, Dominguez sought for and raised economic support for 
his war on barbarism.  On June 30th over 1,000 men marched to 
Chamula and executed another 300 Indians, in spite of their many 
pleas for mercy.  Army raids continued, and on July 7 another 
confrontation resulted in the death of 200 Indians and four 
Ladinos, killed in Yolonchen near San Andrés. Indians who were 
striving to be seen as loyal to the authorities participated in these 
massacres.  
Although a tax reform was implemented during this period, 
economic expectations did not play a key factor. In an atmosphere 
of political uncertainty, political groups contended for control over 
Chiapas’ political structure. In Chiapas the majority of the 
population were dominated and used in this struggle, and 
                                                 
48 Pantaleón Dominguez was appointed military Governor in 1867 by the commander of the liberal forces 
led at that time by Porfirio Díaz. Although he did not belong to any political faction (neither liberal nor 
conservative), he was recognized for his military career and his participation fighting against the French. 
Eventually Pantaleón Dominguez fought liberals and conservatives alike. See “¿Guerras de Castas según 
quién?” in Kevin Gosner and Arij Ouweneel eds. Indigenous Revolts in Chiapas and Andean Highlands. 
(Amsterdam: The Center for Latin American Research ( CEDLA), 1996) 
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rebellions broke out against the rigid religious system. This 
rebellion, similar to the rebellion in 1712, occurred over religious 
restrictions. These religious struggles later became a political 
movement. Initially religious rituals were seen as a challenge to the 
Catholic Church, the soul of the Spanish empire. These latter 
rebellions, which were manifested as religious rebellions, entailed 
higher levels of oppression as a pre-condition to the open 
rebellion. During the rebellion new sites were created as places 
for indigenous worship, and later as places to institute a new 
church. Overall, these religious locations eventually re-emerged as 
dynamic socio-cultural sites which allowed for the practice of 
economic and social principles rooted in culture and identity, and 
were beyond the control of the Spanish Crown. It was at this stage, 
that the movements were crushed (Vos 1999). This raises a 
question regarding the existing relationship between religious 
grievances, economics and rebellion. Consequently, we first 
explore this relationship below, followed by the general 
reappearing themes in rebellions in the region, and finally set 
forward an interpretative argument regarding the dynamic factors 
involved in the rebellions included in this first part of the chapter.   
Making Sense of Religious Grievances, Rebellions, and 
Economic Arrangements    
 Karl Polanyi (1957) has observed that capitalism was a 
historical anomaly.  He argued that previous economic 
arrangements were "embedded" in social relations. With the arrival 
of capitalism, however, this relationship was reversed--social 
relations were defined by economic arrangements. Polanyi’s 
contribution to economic analysis shows that in the sweep of 
human history, rules of reciprocity, redistribution and communal 
obligations were far more frequent than market arrangements. 
More recently, and in relation to rebellions, James C. Scott has 
argued in his book The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion 
and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, that peasant rebellion analysis 
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needs to shift from solely, mechanic causes (taxes, harvests, 
hunger, etc.), to factors that are connected to inherent values, 
cultural elements and community which shape peasant responses. 
Scott’s work, dedicated to studying early twentieth-century peasant 
rebellions in Burma and Vietnam, concluded that: 
Woven into the tissue of peasant behavior, then, whether in 
normal local routines or in the violence of an uprising is the 
structure of a shared moral universe, a common notion of 
what is just.  It is this moral heritage that, in peasant revolts, 
selects certain targets rather than others, certain forms rather 
than others, and that makes possible a collective (though 
rarely coordinated) action born of moral outrage . . .  
 How, then, can we understand the moral passion that is 
so obviously an integral part of the peasant revolts we have 
described? How can we grasp the peasant’s sense of social 
justice? We can begin, I believe, with two moral principles 
that seem firmly embedded in both the social patterns and 
injunctions of peasant life: the norm of reciprocity and the 
right to subsistence (italics in original). 49 
   
 Based on this perspective, Gosner (1992) has reported that 
the Mayan moral economy has historically shown a consistent 
preoccupation with local political autonomy, legitimacy, and the 
security of subsistence.  Regarding rebellion in religious terms, 
Gosner states that: 
 
. . . because community values and codes of conduct were 
articulated through myth and ritual, a defense of the moral 
economy often took the form of a defense of community 
religious practice.  For the Maya, moral economy was 
embedded in beliefs about the supernatural---about the 
interdependence of humankind and the gods, about the 
                                                 
49 In Kevin.Gosner,  Soldier of the Virgin: The Moral Economy of a Colonial Maya Rebellion  (Tucson: 
The University of Arizona Press, 1992) 
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omnipresence of spirits, about the sacred character of the 
natural world, about the potency of visions, and about the 
efficacy of ritual.  In other words, the Mayan moral economy 
extended beyond their concerns as peasants to encompass the 
cultural and spiritual preoccupation that defined their identity 
as a distinctive ethnic group (Gosner 10). 
 
  We contend, therefore that the rebellions expressed in 
religious issues obligate the reader to rethink the issue of 
sacredness and economic arrangements as cultural expressions of 
peoples’ interests and values. Only then can social and economic 
arrangements fall into place as expressions of acting upon social 
consciousness. Consequently, if conflict is understood as an action 
carried out which is based on an intentional interest to re-establish 
the sacred equilibrium and to get rid of oppressors, rather than to 
merely “defend” the community, it follows that the importance of 
the natural desire of community members to express themselves 
through social, economic or political arrangements becomes 
indispensable to understanding rebellion. It can be argued 
therefore, that since the Mayan worldview did not differentiate 
between the sacred and secular, that grievances and demands in 
the past, (e.g., the right to worship), were rooted in the deep desire 
and effort to restore equilibrium and to make sense out of their 
existence in a context of total dispossession and fragmentation50. 
This effort was expressed in a cultural renewal by proposing their 
own rituals, saints, and eventually their own economic 
arrangements, which reflected and expressed their identity. Past 
rebellions in Chiapas, therefore, can be viewed as a response to the 
effects of imposed and hostile economic arrangements that strained 
the pre-existing arrangements to the limits, and consequently, 
reduced the possibilities of continuing to be Mayan.   
 
 
                                                 
50 See Raúl Vidales. Utopía y liberación el amanecer del indio, San Jose Costa Rica: Departamento 
Ecuménico de Investigaciones, 1988. 
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General Dynamics of Rebellions in Chiapas  
 
Although the relationships between colonizers and 
indigenous peoples were not only of violent domination but also 
collaboration, simulation, etc., we highlight the oppressive side due 
two historical facts. First, that a movement of resistance against the 
conquistadors, who viewed Indians not as subjects but as “living 
objects”51 took place immediately after the conquest. Secondly, all 
known sacred Mayan records, such as the Popol Vuh, the Rabinal 
Achi, the Diálogo or “original” del baile de la conquista, from the 
Quiches; the Memorial de Sololá, de los Cakchiqueles, and the 
Ritual de los Bacabes, the Cantares de Dzitbalché and the Libros 
de Chiam Balma of the Mayas from the Yucatan Peninsula, when 
dealing with the conquest, are dominated in their narratives by 
feelings of humiliation, impotence, destruction and pillage.52 It is 
important to note that contemporary Mexican writers have 
emphasized the effects of the conquest on Mexican society at 
large, and that the trauma of the conquest is not an exclusive 
historical experience of indigenous peoples.53 Nevertheless, the 
indigenous discourse has emphasized this experience of conquest 
and colonization to articulate their reality of current economic and 
political marginalization. In accordance with indigenous discourse, 
therefore, this work highlights this facet. 
We now move to a discussion of the second part of our first 
consideration at the end of Chapter II, which is the premise that the 
initial acts of collective violence occurred as the dominant group, 
(the conquistadors), found the exercise of violence an effective tool 
to achieve socioeconomic goals. Violence used by the oppressed in 
their struggle for freedom became, therefore, a reactive response. 
Three aspects of this initial violent inflection can be named. The 
                                                 
51 Tzevtan Todorov, La conquista de América. El problema del otro (Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1987) 
52 See Mercedes del la Garza, “Visión maya de la Conquista” in Glantz Margo, La Malinche, sus padres y 
sus hijos (México D. F.: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM  1994)  
53 For example, see Octavio Paz, El laberinto de la soledad y otras obras. (New York: Penguin Books, 
1997), and Carlos Fuentes, La muerte de Artemio Cruz. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, S.A., 
1985). 
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first is a disabling aspect, evidenced in the legacy of the widely-
held belief that none of the indigenous peoples could rule 
themselves, nor that they held any entitlements as humans or 
Christians; and most of all, that none of these indigenous peoples 
had the intellectual ability to promote development or sustain an 
economic structure. The second is a violence promoting aspect, as 
the dominating ideology made clear that the use of violence was a 
necessary and effective tool to sustain an economy of subtraction, 
maintaining the economic and political benefits for the dominating 
elite, and necessary for the Christianizing protection of the 
dominated Indians. Acts of violence were portrayed as a benign 
necessity.  Finally, there was a legal-impunity aspect. As 
massacres and killings coexisted with the exercise of law, the 
colonial administration left a legacy of the belief that repression 
and law could complement and supplement each other, and failed 
to build credible institutions rooted in the culture and owned by 
the people. Consequently, research will be needed to discover if 
the roots of impunity in contemporary Mexico, and more 
specifically, in Chiapas, can be found in the seemingly peaceful 
coexistence of order and the brutal denial of human rights.    
 To help us visualize what has been said we offer an 
illustration (Model 8). We argue here, as pointed out by Oommen 
(1997), that ethnicity is a dynamic economic and political process, 
which implies a primary source of institutionalized or structural 
violence. The arrival of Christopher Columbus in 1492, the 
following conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortés in 1521, and the 
arrival of Pedro de Alvarado in Chiapas in 1524; represent the 
highlights of the process of ethnicity. This process took two forms:  
genocide and ethnocide. Ethnocide has been defined by Pierre 
Clastres as a “systematic destruction of ways of living and thinking 
of a people that are different than the ways of the perpetrators of 
the destruction”.  Ethnocide does not imply death, but rather the 
renouncing of one’s culture, language and way of living due to the 
perception that these elements of identity become ineffective and 
of little or no value. Ethnocide occurs, it is said, when people 
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arrive at the conclusion that in order to improve themselves they 
have to stop being themselves.54 Contrastingly, the process of 
genocide in the Americas caused a dramatic decrease in the 
indigenous population. Added to the loss of people and their way 
of living, 1500 years of accumulated cultural and scientific 
knowledge was also lost. After the destruction of indigenous 
environmental wisdom, the potential for further ethno-
development became limited (Leff 1998).  
Historical evidence also points to colonialism as a vital part 
of the ethnic process, affecting the economy that had arisen from 
the heart of indigenous peoples, which we here call true-to-culture 
economy. Economic exploitation, systemic discrimination and 
deprivation of human rights on a massive scale, brought about a 
disabling environment and an accumulation of injustices that were 
passed on from generation to generation. Evidence also suggests 
that the communal society was at one point confronted with a 
situation of responding to social change, and their resulting cultural 
revitalization challenged the empire by proposing an alternative 
structure.  
Confrontation presupposed a polarization between the 
governing group and the governed one, in this case, between the 
Spanish rule and indigenous people, which was characterized by 
an erosion of legitimacy and trust. The lack of legitimacy was 
based mainly on the collective evaluation of the perceived ruling 
system by those who were governed, and not on a malfunctioning 
of the government. In other words, absence of legitimacy was 
derived from the fact that people did not see or perceive at a given 
point, a reason to trust or to consent to an oppressive government. 
This crisis of legitimacy and social awareness became a green light 
to an active search for change. It has been observed that the active 
search in social groups to produce a participatory and just system 
appears to be inevitably tied to an awareness of inequalities and 
injustices in the ruling system (Castilla de Pino, 1976). This search 
                                                 
54 Quoted by Miguel Bartolomé, and, Mabel Barabas in La Plurabilidad en peligro (México D. F: Instituto 
Nacional de Antropología, 1999), p. 32. 
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process causes a latent conflict, (rooted in intergenerational 
injustices), to surface as an open conflict sparked by an 
interference with deeply held values and encouraged by an erosion 
of legitimacy, trust, and the awareness that the elite used its power 
to create unbearable conditions of existence.  
The loss of freedom to continue the practice of economics as 
a cultural expression of the people inextricably followed the loss of 
autonomy. Consequently, indigenous communities became 
actively engaged in the demand for restitution.  
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Model 8  The Dynamics of Rebellions (I) 
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General Reappearing Themes in Rebellions in Mexico and in 
the Region  
 
It is argued here that in the reappearing latent conflict of long 
duration three constant themes can be identified across rebellions 
in Mexico. The first is one of autonomy, which allows people to 
continue the exercise of economic, political, religious, and cultural 
expressions.  Autonomy however, has been historically threatened 
by regional or national socio-economic projects. The second is the 
consequent erosion of the legitimacy of rulers. The third is the 
demand from the rebels for restitution which occurs when the 
aforementioned autonomy is taken away.  
Historian Friedrich Katz (1988) has warned of the erroneous 
attempts to simply project backward the characteristics of rural 
rebellions in Mexico. Nevertheless, Katz argues for a possible link 
which has appeared as a constant from the classical Mayan period 
to the revolution of 1910: an increasing gap between the elite and 
the people. This gap has been expressed in a loss of legitimacy and 
in alienation from the cultural expectations of the people. The fall 
of the Mayan and the Teotihuacán civilizations was due to 
insurrections connected to the increasing isolation of the 
priesthood from the common people, as the priesthood practiced 
and imposed more and more complex and cosmopolitan religious 
practices. Similarly, the Aztecs experienced a loss of legitimacy as 
their subjects despised the heavy Aztec emphasis on human 
sacrifice, and many of the dominated peoples in the Aztec empire 
decided to join with the conquistador Hernán Cortez in 1520’s to 
fight against the Aztecs.  
The independence of Mexico in 1810 appears to be preceded 
by the loss of legitimacy of the crown. The Revolution of 1910 
was also precipitated by the loss of support for the Porfirio Díaz 
regime, which had adopted a foreign lifestyle and become 
disconnected from Mexican culture. The popular view was that his 
administration had benefited foreigners over Mexicans, imposing 
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greater burdens in extra taxes, and the elimination of traditional 
rights and traditional autonomy.  
Each case of insurrection also stands as a case of the removal 
of rights and autonomy of villages in favor of regional and central 
powers. All these events occurred within a context of agricultural-
economic crisis and a growth in the population which resulted in a 
need for social transformation, yet this transformation was resisted 
by the elites. However, the rebellions in Chiapas as well as in 
Oaxaca, where the Indian populations resisted assimilation and did 
not share mestizo Mexican grievances, did not coincide with 
national uprisings; i.e., the Mexican independence of 1810 and the 
revolution of 1910. Rather, these rebellions followed other aims. 
Alicia Barabas (1986) states that the ethnic resistance in the 19th 
and 20th centuries in Oaxaca, though it did not seek the removal of 
the European dominators or call for the destruction of the social 
structure, it did seek to recover lost territories, to stop the 
exploitation imposed on people by the elites and to resist being 
governed by leaders who did not represent the community’s 
interests. Barabas also argues for a comprehensive understanding 
of rebellions which have been part of a wide substratum of ethnic 
insurgence, emerging in critical moments and in periods of intense 
repression but mainly remaining latent, incubating in silence and 
underground.55  
Carlos Manso (1996) has suggested a similar approach for 
understanding the rebellions in the isthmus of Oaxaca.56 Manso 
argues that the Tehuantepec indigenous rebellion of 1660 in the 
isthmus of Oaxaca occurred in a context of political tension, when 
the Spaniards and ministers tried to reduce the level of economic 
and political autonomy of Zapotecs who held extensive routes of 
trade. Added to this was the economic burden of the imposition of 
                                                 
55 Mabel Barabas, “Rebeliones e insurrecciones indígenas en Oaxaca: la trayectoria histórica de la 
resistencia étnica”, in Etnicidad y pluralismo cultural: la dinámica étnica en Oaxaca ( México D. F., 
Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1986)  
56 Manso argues that rebellions in Oaxaca have been part of a historical continuum.  See Carlos Manso, 
“Comercio y rebelión en el obispado de Oaxaca. Tehuantepec y Nexapa, 1660-1661” in Hector Díaz-
Polanco, El Fuego de la inobediencia: autonomía y rebelión india en el obispado de Oaxaca (CIESAS-
OAXACA, 1996) 
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Spanish goods. Indians had to purchase these goods from Spanish 
officials and pay for them with indigenous products, at prices 
(buying and selling) set in advance by Spanish officials.  
This Zapotec rebellion demanded the restitution of previous 
rights--the right of political self-determination within the region for 
commerce space and control, which had been threatened or taken 
away. Manso highlights this struggle for restitution of autonomy as 
one of the constant factors in the uprisings that followed. The 
repression carried out in 1660 to control the rebellion did not 
address the core of the uprising. In 1715 Zapotecs rebelled in a 
different context but with the same demand for self-determination. 
In 1736 another revolt occurred, this time against the priest in 
Juchitán, (situated in the heart of the isthmus), with Zapotecs 
demanding the restitution of their rights to the land and of the 
livestock that belonged to the community. In the same vein, a 
major uprising took place in 1834 led by Che Gorio Melendre 
against national modernization forces, European land usurpers, 
foreign merchants, the threat of the loss of autonomy and 
entitlements to the land for the sake of centralized state power and 
capitalist development (Campbell 1994). 
Continuing today the threat to autonomy remains a key 
element to understand the ethnic identity movement and cohesion 
behind recent Zapotec struggles in the isthmus of Oaxaca. In this 
region the most recent major uprising received national attention, 
when the COCEI (a Worker-Peasant-Student Coalition of the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec) won the municipal elections of Juchitán 
in 1981, becoming the first city to be governed by a radical 
political organization since the Mexican Revolution. Regarding 
this movement Campbell states: 
 
While the strength of current Isthmus Zapotec ethnic identity was 
forged by political struggles from the colonial period into the 
twentieth century, COCEI emerged within the context of recent 
capitalist transformations in the Isthmus. Social and economic 
changes wrought by capitalist development radicalized the Isthmus 
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peasantry, divided the Juchiteco community along class lines, and 
politicized an emerging group of Zapotec activists and intellectuals. 
This leftist intelligentsia conceptualized Isthmus history as a linear 
process of ethnic resistance culminating in COCEI (Campbell 1994). 
 
Adolfo Gilly (1998), whose contributions have been 
discussed previously regarding the rebellion in Chiapas, has also 
suggested the importance of an analysis of the reappearing 
elements in the long process of rebellions in Mexico. Gilly has 
identified two constant features that have been present throughout 
time. The first feature has been the resistance to let the land be 
turned into merchandise, an issue previously discussed, and second 
has been the resistance to economic or political policies that 
threaten the autonomy of the people, which itself is rooted in the 
land. The idea of autonomy as a reason to rebel remains alive and 
vibrant in the roots of Mexican culture. The protection of 
autonomy, therefore, can explain rebellions in Mexico regardless 
of whether their conceptual classification is rural, urban, Indian, or 
Mestizo.57 Gilly concludes that the Zapatista uprising of 1994, has 
to be understood as a recurring mistake made by the elites 
regarding the rights and entitlements of people to autonomy and 
the land. For example, in the century previous to the Zapatista 
uprising, Enrique Creel was the governor of the state of 
Chihuahua. On February 25, 1905, during a period without signs of 
social unrest, he issued laws to regulate and modernize the land, 
limiting and/or canceling the rights of peasants to the land. In both 
1905 and 1994, armed uprisings followed an attempt to violate 
economic and political rights.   
We argue, therefore, that the latent conflict which resurfaced 
in 1994 has revealed persistent reasons for rebellion found also in 
                                                 
57 Furthermore, the major and national armed uprisings in the history in Mexico can be seen as the result of a slow, 
accumulated process of resistance. In fact Gilly suggests that the Mexican revolution can be seen as the product of the 
convergence of forces that struggled from the past, from below and from the top. This convergence of forces has 
defined the particular characteristics of Mexican political culture. After the Mexican Revolution a delicate equilibrium 
emerged, rooted in this political culture with a strong understanding of the legitimate right to rebel in order to protect 
this delicate equilibrium.  
 99
other contemporary urban and rural uprisings.58 In spite of the 
seriousness of the latent conflict, it may nonetheless not seem very 
threatening or urgent when it appears as an insignificant daily 
struggle. In fact, the rebellions of 1530, 1532-1695, 1712, 1868 
and 1994 which occurred in Chiapas and were recorded as violent 
rebellions are not the rule but the exception. Gosner (1996a) has 
stated that in the history of Chiapas, the daily struggle for 
recognition and the protection of rights was more common than 
were organized violent actions.59 This substantiates the belief that a 
durable solution to the conflict will be impossible without dealing 
with the persisting issues that are present not only in the Zapatista 
movement but at the roots of daily resistance in Mexico. It is 
interesting to note, that in 1994, major violent confrontations 
disappeared within days after the initial uprising, but nonetheless a 
daily struggle for recognition was once more set in motion. Also, 
in spite of the cessation of major hostilities, official and legal 
counter-insurgence acts of violence were not reduced or stopped.60 
To more clearly examine the dimensions of this daily mode 
of resistance, it is necessary to note the expansion of the Zapatista 
movement. Leyva has classified the Zapatista movement as 
existing in four stages (see Box 11).  By 1997 the Zapatista 
movement included more than seventy organizations, which had 
offered support and converged politically with the Zapatistas 
(Leyva 1999).  Leyva has called this phenomenon the Nuevo 
Movimiento Zapatista or NMZ (the New Zapatista Movement). 
                                                 
58 John Coastworth has noted that the patterns of rural resistance and rebellion as known today were 
common in urban cities throughout the Spanish empire and that the distinction between rural and urban 
rebellion only appeared in the nineteenth century in Latin America. In spite of this, urban rebellions in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries maintained an organic relation with rural uprisings. See “Patterns of 
Rural Rebellion in Latin America” in Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in Mexico. 
Princeton ( Princeton University Press, 1988).  
59 Although it is true that the history of Chiapas shows dramatic rebellions, these kinds of rebellions seem 
rare when compared to the daily struggles of resistance. See Gosner, Kevin “Historical Perspectives on 
Maya Resistance: The Tzeltal Revolt” in Indigenous Revolts in Chiapas and the Andean Highlands. 
Amsterdam (Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericana, CEDLA 1996)  
60 It is estimated that 70,000 troops, (one-third of the total Mexican Army), have been concentrated in the 
southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero. Added to this, the presence of paramilitary groups in 
Chiapas has made this state a specifically vulnerable place for recurrent violence and displacement. See 
Gilberto López y Rivas, Autonomías: democracia o contrainsurgencia (México D. F., Era, 2004) 
 100
While the EZLN at level A makes reference to a political-military 
structure, the NMZ at levels B, C and D show the expansion of the 
movement. Even though it is evident that the recognition of rights 
offers a solid alternative to reduce the likelihood of violent 
uprisings, nevertheless, the conflict in Chiapas persists today. 
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 Box 11 Civil Expansion of the Zapatista Uprising in 199461 
 
 
 
Level A 
EZLN 
 
Level B  
There are 26 organizations at this level such as:  Comités de Consulta Popular del EZLN (EZLN’s 
Committee for Popular Participation), Comités Locales y Regionales de la Convención Nacional 
Democrática or CND (Local and Regional Committees of the Democratic National Convention),  
Diócesis de San Cristóbal de las Casas (Dioceses of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico) 
DESMI A.C. (civil association);  CHILTAC A.C (civil association), Comisión Nacional de Intermediación 
(National Commission of Mediation), Assamblea Estatal Democrática del Pueblo Chiapaneco or AEDPCH 
(State Democratic Assembly of the  Chiapaneco People), Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de 
las Casas, (Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights  Center), Centro de Derechos Humanos Agustín Pro 
(Agustín Pro Human Rights Center), Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Francisco de Vitoria ( Fray 
Francisco de Vitoria Human Rights  Center and other 16 additional organizations  
 
Level C 
This level entails 39 organizations some of these are: Consejo Estatal de Organizaciones Indígenas y 
Campesinas (State Council of Indigenous and Peasant Organizations),  Alianza Cívica (Civic Coalition), 
Sindicato de Trabajadores Técnicos, Manuales y Administrativos del INAH (Workers Union of the 
Institute of Anthropology), Taller Libre de Calzado de Tepito (Shoe Makers of Tepito), Sindicato Único de 
Trabajadores Urbanos de la Ruta 100, SUTAUR 100 (Labor Union of Urban Public Transportation  
Workers in Mexico City;  Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana/ SITUAM  
(Metroplitan University Workers Union), Federación de Sindicatos Universitarios (Federation of University  
Labor Unions), Frente Auténtico de los Trabajadores FAT (Authentic Workers Front), UV y D, ENOC and  
Other 29 other organizations.27. Frente Popular Francisco Villa (Francisco Villa Popular Front) 
 
Level D 
Eight organizations are included at this level those are: Comités Internacionales de la Consulta del EZLN 
realizada en 1995 (International Committees of the  Consultation of the EZLN carried out in 1995), 
Comités Internacionales de la Convención Internacional Anti-Neoliberalismo (International Committees  
of the International Convention on Anti-Neoliberalism), Comités de “Aguascalientes” de Ultramar 
(Aguascalientes Overseas Committees), Amnesty Internacional,. Parlamento Europeo, Equipo 
Latinoamérica (European Parliament, Latin American Team); Grupos de Apoyo al Zapatismo en Londres, 
Barcelona, Noruega, Bélgica, Berlín, etc. (Zapatista Support  Groups in London, Barcelona, Norway, 
Belgium, Berlin, etc.),  Comisión Internacional de Obispos (International Commission of Bishops) 
and the Foro Intercontinental por la Humanidad y en Contra del Neoliberalismo. (Intercontinental Forum 
for  Humanity and against Neo-Liberalism) 
 
Source: Xóchitl Leyva Solano, “De las Cañadas a Europa: niveles, actores y discursos del Nuevo Movimiento Zapatista (NMZ) (1994-
1997” in Desacatos CIESAS México (Primavera 1999): 56-88  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 See Appendix for a complete version of Box 11. 
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Without diminishing the extensive contributions of research 
on indigenous and non-indigenous rebellions in Mexico from 
colonial times to contemporary Mexico, (which have been well 
documented by Friedrich Katz, John Tutino, William Taylor, John 
H. Coatsworth and others)62, we move to the analysis of the most 
recent Mayan rebellion, the Zapatista rebellion.   
 
 
B. The Zapatista Rebellion of 1994 
 
Mexican writer and historian Adolfo Gilly (1998) has pointed 
out that the belief in the right to subsistence is deeply embedded in 
indigenous communities and in all agrarian communities in 
Mexico, and that the threat to this right to subsistence has been 
present in most agrarian conflicts in Mexico. Although the 
expressions of past rebellions have varied since they have all 
emerged in different contexts, nevertheless, at the heart of the 
rebellions there has been a long-standing objection to the idea that 
land should become an article of merchandise. Along the same 
line, John Womack (1969) reported that the Mexican revolution of 
1910 was launched by people who resisted giving up their land.  
Peasants in Mexico have rebelled and continue to rebel, because of 
their refusal to surrender the essentials of a moral economy of 
subsistence, e.g., land and reciprocity, to commercial exchanges 
and the law of money imposed from outside (Scott 1976, E. P. 
Thompson 1991, Gilly 1998). Yet why is the right to the land 
relevant to peasants? And how do these rights to the land or 
entitlements affect people so as to lead to rebellion? This section 
will focus on the first question. Chapter IV will attempt to answer 
the latter question.   
In order to answer the first question, we will examine the 
Zapatista rebellion and set forth two arguments. First, we argue 
that the rebellion of 1994 reflects the result of a continuum of a 
                                                 
62 A collection of the work of these authors and others are found on Friedrich Katz, Riot, Rebellion, and 
Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in Mexico (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) 
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latent conflict that erupted as the market economy attempted to 
rearrange the legal system, favoring global interests and ending 
social agreements regarding the entitlement of the land. These 
agreements had been achieved by peasants through the greatest 
upheaval in 20th-century Latin America, the Mexican revolution of 
1910-1917, which claimed over a million lives. Secondly, we 
argue that the protection of the right to subsistence, the right to 
land, entitlements, etc., make sense only because they affect the 
daily lives of people and their possibilities of survival.  This 
happens in the following two ways:   
a) In the context of southern Mexico, the right to subsistence 
and the right to the land are the necessary conditions to 
achieving something beyond merely “owning” the land; 
namely, survival, the avoidance of high levels of child 
mortality and the premature death of adults, and the 
maintenance of identity. 
b) In conjunction with the contributions of the Social Identity 
School already discussed in the last chapter, the right to land 
is linked to the achievement of invisible human needs--
personal security, pride, self-esteem and dignity, which 
develop as people are free to work and carry out activities on 
the land.63   
 
Finally, in contrast to the moral economy analysis, which to some 
extent views rebellions as defense acts to protect harmonious pre-
conditions from disturbing new forces, we see in the case of 
Chiapas, that protection of “community values” was not the sole 
factor. Rather, the Zapatista rebellion emerged within a culture of 
resistance rooted in a fragmented past, with five hundred years of 
domination and class differentiation.   
                                                 
63 Land, identity, and dignity are integral values found in indigenous culture, with culture being understood 
as a creative, open process of rethinking both the ethnic past and community values and which in turn 
forges new cultural forms and meanings within new contexts see Howard Campbell, Zapotec Renaissance: 
Ethnic Politics and Cultural Revivalism in Southern Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1994) 
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 Consequently, we present four main social movements which 
arrived in or appeared in Chiapas before the rebellion. These 
movements took root in communities with a disturbed past and 
where colonial style socio-economic structures which continued to 
humiliate them were still in place. In the process of presenting 
these four social movements, we will begin by analyzing the socio-
economic context. In these communities, the threat of loss of the 
right to subsistence and to the land meant the loss of the sole hope 
remaining after a long process of the disabling of people’s abilities 
to carry on with their lives. Five hundred years of humiliation had 
reached unbearable and intolerable levels.64 
In Latin America in the 1960’s, human rights movements 
began and extended to regions where violations and killings were 
occurring in silence, unknown to the public at large. Due to 
changes in state-society dynamics, globalization, and the human 
rights movement in Latin America, organizations arrived in 
Chiapas, making the human rights violations involving the killings 
of peasants and indigenous people, public knowledge. A second 
movement appeared on the continent, the Indian political 
movement, with a historically-rooted self-identity. The members of 
this movement projected themselves as actors with a political and 
economic agenda. A third actor was the movement generated by 
the Catholic Church, which in the ‘60s was creating a space and 
channels to voice the long-standing conflict. The praxis of the 
Diocese of San Cristobal in 1974 was to respond to the same 
grievances that were later made public in 1994 in the first Zapatista 
communiqué. Lastly, present in Chiapas was the FLN (National 
Liberation Front), which later became the EZLN (Zapatista Army 
                                                 
64 The concept of humiliation is used here as defined by Berma Klein and Bas De Gaay Fortman as a form 
of cruelty that destroys the capacity of people to believe in themselves, to take initiative and to change their 
reality or circumstances as social agents. See Berma Klein Goldewijk and Bas De Gaay Fortman Where 
Needs Meet Rights: Economic Social and Cultural Rights in a New Perspective (Geneva: WCC 
Publications, 1999). See also “The Golden Triangle of Human Dignity: Human Security, Human 
Development and Human Rights” in Marie Muller & Bas de Gaay, eds. From Warfare to Welfare: Human 
Security in a Southern African Context. (The Netherlands: Royal Van Gorcum, 2004). For a panoramic 
view of resistance in Chiapas see García de León, Resistencia y utopía, memorial de agravios y crónica de 
revueltas y profecías acaecidas en la provincia de Chiapas durante los últimos quinientos años de su 
historia. (México D.F.: Era, 1985). 
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of National Liberation). This armed movement was organized after 
the massacre of students in 1968. The FLN and other activist 
groups, such as the Maoist and Linea Proletaria (Proletarian Line), 
emerged seeking to create the right conditions for a revolution, and 
found in the indigenous communities a people already in rebellion.  
These arriving or emerging actors made the crisis in 
government and the erosion of legitimacy and trust public 
knowledge by creating alliances. Benjamin Walter makes a 
remarkable point regarding revolutions, that although for Marx, 
revolutions acted as the train-engines of history, it could be said 
that revolutions are the way that humanity, which travels on the 
train, pulls the brake.65 This paper, therefore, argues that the actors 
of the rebellion pulled the “brake” by shouting “¡Basta!” 
(“Enough!”), in order to stop further humiliation, destruction and 
restore equilibrium. As in earlier rebellions the discourse and 
actions of the rebels were rooted in the deep desire and hope to 
restore equilibrium and to make sense of their existence in the 
midst of destruction, dispossession, oppression and exclusion. 
Thanks to other actors arriving in Chiapas, this rebellion counted 
with a growing civil representation nationally and internationally. 
These arriving actors, moved by different interests, found in 
Chiapas indigenous peoples living in resistance and latent conflict. 
In this sense external actors shared the “brake effect” even though 
there was not agreement among the revolutionary groups on the 
use of violence.  As previously stated the full implications of the 
appearance of these actors cannot be appreciated without 
understanding the economic context and the state of rebellion 
which already existed in Chiapas prior to the arrival of these 
actors. Consequently, we pause to analyze this context before 
continuing our analysis of political actors in Chiapas. 
 
The Excluded Peasants and the Economic Context  
 
                                                 
65  Benjamin Walter, Gesammelte Schriften, t. 1, vol. 3, Suhrkamp Frankfurt am Mein, (1975), 1232. 
Quoted by Adolfo Gilly in Chiapas: la razón ardiente (México, D. F.: Ediciones Era, S.A., 1997), 17. 
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Tello (2000) has reported that in Chiapas during the 1960’s 
there existed few fincas (a Central American term for the large 
landholdings of ranches and farms commonly used in Chiapas) that 
were massive landholdings.  Following the reform laws in the mid-
1800’s which greatly limited the landholdings of the Catholic 
Church; the Dominican orders lost their land and left Chiapas. At 
that time various families seized former Dominican land, greatly 
increasing the land they already owned; for example, the 
Castellanos, Dominguez, and the Alborez families. Simultaneously 
to acquiring ownership of the land, the families also acquired the 
indigenous peons who legally “came with the land”. There were 
several, well-known, powerful fincas near the jungle--las Delicias, 
el Rosario, la Codicia, Santa Rita, el Porvenir, San Antonio, 
Chapayal, Petulón, and Quetzil. The Porvenir finca had 202 
hectares of land, 5 hectares planted in corn, 30 hectares in coffee 
and 100 hectares in pasture land. The rest of the land was divided 
between land the Indians used to cultivate crops for their own use 
and forest land.  
The Indians stayed on the fincas because they had nowhere 
else to go. Nearly all had lost their land under the encomienda 
system, and the few who had retained some land had later lost it 
due to changes in the reform laws, which striped them of their 
mortgages. The Indians living and working in these fincas were 
forced to leave when the land dedicated to farming was turned into 
pasture land for cattle. These changes within Chiapas cannot be 
fully appreciated without recognizing their placement within the 
broader scale of changes occurring in the nation. Three presidential 
administrations, Ávila Camacho (1940-1946), Miguel Alemán 
(1946-1952), and Ruiz Cortinez (1952-1958), opted for an 
economic policy that we here call industrialism, which sought to 
bring development via the building of economic structure, and 
initiated the creation of institutions to channel its benefits.66  The 
                                                 
66 During this period, the IMS, (the Mexican Institute of Social Security), and the Secretary of Health were 
created.  As the process of industrialization advanced, the benefits of economic growth were sought 
through the maximizing of the use of resources, higher levels of employment, and by reaching a complete 
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national policies were designed in accordance with a competitive 
economy traveling on a speedway of development. New roads 
were built, and credit for the mechanization of agriculture was 
made available for farmers, though mainly for those who 
dominated local and state politics, that is the 2.4 % of landowners 
who owned most of the land (60%). Cattle raising took the lead as 
a new model of growth. More land was turned into pasture land 
and into the production of the most significant crop for Chiapas--
coffee. Consequently, less labor was needed, and Indians expelled 
from the fincas immigrated to the jungle and new communities 
appeared. Immigration and the building of new communities 
became possible due to land reform, which functioned as a short 
term solution to the social consequences of the economic model of 
modernization and industrialism.  Land was made available to 
Indians, peasants and others in the region of las Cañadas. Las 
Cañadas became the heart of a latent conflict in Chiapas, a seedbed 
of rebels. The logic behind the implementation of an economic 
strategy that carried with it high social costs, is evidenced in the 
conclusions of Thomas Benjamin:   
 
From the 1890s to the 1950s and beyond, the governments of 
Chiapas sought the modernization of the regional economy 
and society by means of roads and schools, developmental 
projects, and social reforms. If we accept their statements and 
promises at face value, they wanted to create a productive 
and prosperous regional economy that would in time benefit 
all social classes. If mass poverty persisted, as it did, it was 
understood to be the result of too few roads, insufficient 
federal investment, low market prices for crops—but also the 
“backwardness” of traditionalism of Indians and the 
complacency, laziness, alcoholism, and corruption of 
villagers, farm workers, peasant farmers, and ejidatarios. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
“horizontal” import substitution. The overall target was to move away from export dependency and toward 
a more integrated industrialized economy. President Cárdenas’ nationalization of the petroleum industry, 
although it scared foreign investors at the time, paved the way for industrialization.   
 108
model of modernization, although often adjusted and 
reinvigorated, was never doubted (Benjamin, 1996). 
 
The social consequences began to take a violent turn twenty 
years before 1994. Benjamin (1996) recorded the case of the 
peasants in the town of Venustiano Carranza, in the Lacandon 
jungle in Chiapas. In 1945 the residents had requested that the 
federal government provide restitution of lands they claimed had 
been stolen from them during the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz.  
 
This dictatorship, known as the porfiriato, lasted from 1876 
to 1911, interrupted by the presidency of Manuel Gonzales (1880-
1884).67 Finally in 1965, President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-
1970), gave the petitioners the entitlement of 50,000 hectares, 
though 20,000 of those were controlled by wealthy cattlemen who 
were unwilling to give up the land, even though ordered to do so 
by the government. A dam was later constructed, reducing the size 
of the ejido even further and placing extreme pressure on the 
peasant community.68 In 1976, when several hundred peasants 
“invaded” the disputed land and started farming, the Mexican army 
forced them off the land, burned their houses, jailed their leaders, 
                                                 
67 After independence, Mexico’s elites entered a period of internal conflicts and instability that 
opened the door to territorial sessions. In 1848 the U.S. invaded Mexico and the National Palace 
came under U.S. control.  Mexico was forced to give up more than 50% of its territory. Later, 
Mexico was invaded by France, and after the expulsion of the French, the country entered a 
period of reforms. At the end of the nineteenth century Mexico was ruled by a dictatorship. The 
Porfirista economic development program sought to restructure the Mexican economy, which had 
not occurred during the unstable 19th century. At the national level Díaz introduced “order” and 
discipline in the nation’s finances, seeking higher levels of wealth production based on the large 
haciendas, industries and businesses. Díaz aimed to keep the demands of organized labor under 
control (using force if necessary) and most of all to open the economy to foreign investment in 
sectors such as infrastructure, the dynamic sector and services. His economic program 
strengthened the elites and powerful landholders in Chiapas. See David Márquez Ayala, “El 
Tratado de Libre Comercio de Norteamérica, ¿Opción adecuada para México bajo su actual 
contenido” in Problemas Macroeconómicos de México: Diagnóstico y Alternativas. Tomo II. 
(México D. F.: Juan Pablos Editor, S.A. UAM, UNAM, INESER, JP., 1995) 
68 Chiapas produces currently more than half of the electrical power to the nation of Mexico. Nevertheless, 
in 1996, 64 municipalities in the state refused to pay this service due to their financial inability to do so. 
See Para Entender Chiapas: Chiapas in cifras, Centro de Información y Análisis de Chiapas, Coordinación 
de Organismos No Gubernamentales por la Paz de Chiapas, Mexico City: 1997.   
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and killed or wounded several of the “invaders”, including women 
and children. The peasants attempted a second “invasion” three 
years later and were again expelled.   
Though very few agrarian occupations had occurred in 
Chiapas during the 1950’s and 60’s, during the 1970’s, land 
occupations followed by violent expulsions, confrontations with 
pistoleros, police, or army forces, and the jailing and assassination 
of peasant leaders became very frequent throughout the Chiapas 
countryside.69 The trend of increased violent repression of rural 
“troublemakers” would reappear in the 1980’s and again in the  
1990’s (Benjamin 1996).  Among the few reports that appeared in a 
timely fashion revealing the situation of human rights violations in 
Chiapas, was the National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) 
report in 1993-94. The report classified Chiapas as number one 
violator of human rights in the country. Between 1989 and 1993, 
2290 indigenous people were jailed and only 914 were set free 
during that period (Monroy 1994).  At the root of the rebellion 
however, laid contradictory presidential decrees regarding the 
status of land at the heart of the region in conflict (see Box 5).   
                                                 
69 See Jorge Martínez Ríos, “Las Invasiones agrarias en México (o la crisis del modelo de incorporación-
participación marginal),” Revista Mexicana de Sociología, XXXIV  October-December 1972, pp. 764-765, 
quoted by Thomas Benjamín, A Rich Land a Poor People: Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas 
(Alburquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 234. 
 110
 Box 5   Presidential Decrees and the Roots of the Rebellion of 1994 
 
The violent confrontation was rooted in part in the contradictory land reforms made by the federal 
government during the 70s and 80s. These presidential decrees worked more as “pressure valves” to the increasing 
consequences of industrialism and modernization. In fact, many of them were merely political acts taken in order to 
gain support or to benefit certain companies or individuals who sided with official political affiliation.  
The first such decree was the above mentioned one by President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, who entitled ownership 
of the land to settlers in the Lacandon Jungle. These settlers were from different indigenous peoples that had requested 
the restitution of their lost land. A second decree was made public on March 6, 1972, by Luis Echeverría, the president 
of Mexico from 1970 to 1976. The Lacandon Decree, surprisingly and disconcertedly, issued 614,321 hectares of land 
to 66 Lacandon families70 that lived in the Cañada region71. This amounted to 9,307 hectares (22,988 acres) per 
Lacandon family. The presidential decree ignored the rights of 4,000 Chol and Tzetzal Indians already inhabiting that 
region. From one day to the next 37 communities were threatened with expulsion from the region, in spite of the fact 
that many of them already had legal title to the land, and others were awaiting the issue of their titles. Critics attacked 
the decree as absurd and as being politically motivated, and pointed out that the Echeverria administration sought 
political stability and consensus even among the poorest of the poor72.  His presidential plan was known as the 
Program for Financial-Investment (1970-1976), and tried to reach the poor by achieving the highest level of social 
spending in comparison to previous administrations. Other programs such as the INFONAVIT housing program for 
workers, and health programs such as the IMSS-COPLAMAR, were also attempts to reach marginalized groups. 
After the oil crisis of 1971, the Echeverria government promoted drilling in Chiapas in order to export oil. 
The administration financed its programs with international loans available to Mexico at low interest rates. The 
building of an oil industry and the sacrificing of the agricultural sector stimulated the immigration of peasants and 
indigenous people from communities in Chiapas to industrial centers. This tremendous economic activity that occurred 
in Chiapas was the pull factor of rural-to-urban migration. Between 1970 and 1975 the number of roads doubled, 
benefiting ranchers by making the cattle and milk industries prosper. By 1980, three new dams were built; one of them, 
the Chicoasén Dam, became the fifth highest hydroelectric dam in the world73. With the issuing of the Lacandon 
Decree in 1972, individuals from different communities eventually found themselves forced to choose between taking 
unstable temporary construction jobs and losing their land. This decree polarized the agrarian conflict. According to the 
decree, the Lacandon jungle belonged to the Lacandons, an indigenous people. This declaration obviously reversed the 
first decree made by Díaz Ordaz, and was followed by the appearance of the Compañía Forestal Lacandona (Cofolasa), 
the Lacandon Lumber Company. Cofolasa, though affiliated with Nafinsa, a government agency, was owned by private 
investors and politicians, and made a contract with the most recent “legitimate” owners, the Lacandons. Under this 
contract, 35,000 cubic squares of lumber were to be extracted from the jungle per year for a period of ten years. As the 
process continued, the company requested that the government remove the illegal inhabitants of the area, namely the 
Tzeltals, Tzotzils, Choles, Tojolobals and Zoques.  Many resisted and mass protest demonstrations reached the capital 
city in 1981, though with no success. Lastly, and to the detriment of the communities, President José Lopez Portillo 
(1976-1982) declared the region of the Lacandon Jungle an ecological reserve, resulting in a complete removal of more 
communities.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
70 The contemporary Lacandon People should not be confused with the Lacandon People which rebelled 
against the Spaniards from 1530-1695. The contemporary Lacandon People are Mayan descendants who 
arrived in Chiapas from the Yucatan Peninsula, while the first were believed to have arrived from outside 
the Mayan region.  
71 One hectare is equivalent to 2.47 US acres. 614, 321 hectares is the equivalent of 1,517,388 acres 
72 As Secretary of the Interior during the 1968 massacre in Tlatelolco square, Echeverría was held 
responsible by many for the bloodshed that had occurred.  When he assumed the presidency two years later, 
he implemented some populist policies to improve his image 
73 See Frank Cancian and Peter Brown, “Who is Rebelling in Chiapas?” In Whiteford, Michael and 
Whiteford, Scott. Crossing Currents: Continuity and Change in Latin America.. Upper Saddle River NJ: 
Simon & Schuster 1998 
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Industrialization and Debt 
  
The economic plan of the Lopez Portillo administration, the 
National Plan for Industrial Development, was (as its name 
indicates), geared to support the industrialization process by using 
returns from the oil industry. As Mexico was discovering great oil 
reserves, the supply was perceived as unlimited, and this 
expectation grew as exports improved, promising long-term 
stability and profits. Although strong state programs were created, 
such as the SAM (the Mexican Alimentary System), to support the 
farmers and peasants working the land, nevertheless, the 
administration faced a massive external debt which grew out of 
proportion. The collapse of oil prices in the international markets 
made it impossible to handle the already increased debt. 
Furthermore, along with the fall of oil prices, the prices of 
traditional exports declined, leaving Mexico incapable of paying 
its debt.   
The debt crisis and the following implementation of policies 
required by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) had a dual-
nature impact and a resulting consequence. First, the centers of 
dynamic industrialization entered a recession and dismissed the 
peasants they had previously hired. These peasants returned to 
their villages only to find no employment options in agriculture, as 
agriculture had become chemically intensive in order to substitute 
labor and increase production. In October of 1976 the IMF 
approved $1,200,000 dollars in aid, pressing for a reduction of 
wages, which the Fund erroneously argued had created an excess 
in demand. Therefore the Fund forced Mexico to establish wage 
ceilings which are still present in Mexico, breaking institutional 
relations between worker organizations and the state. The Fund 
also pressured for lower barriers to imports, an evaluation of 
governmental economic entities, restrictions on currency printing, 
and the establishment of higher national interest rates.  Other than 
these monetary reasons, no other reasons were recognized by IMF 
policy makers for the crisis in Mexico. In the end, neither the IMF 
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policies nor the oil exports made it possible for Mexico to correct 
its vulnerability.  
Economic growth collapsed as well as social spending and the 
social institutions established by former administrations. 
Secondly, the impact was greater due to the elimination of 
subsidies, which was requested by the IMF as a basic procedure to 
correct bankruptcy. For the minifundistas and other small 
producers, this meant the loss in 1989 of IMECAF (the Mexican 
Coffee Institute, created in 1979), which had provided subsidies in 
the cost of transportation of coffee to markets.74  
Finally, a consequence became visible in the streets-- 
demonstrations increased as social organizations demanded 
economic reforms and solutions to the worsening agrarian 
conflicts, and eventually violence erupted.75  
 
Stabilization, Liberalization, and Free Trade 
 
The Presidency of Miguel de La Madrid Hurtado (1982-
1988) initiated economic reforms to recover from the crisis. Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) continued and intensified the 
reforms initiated by President de la Madrid to achieve growth rates 
high enough to provide an acceptable level of employment and a 
low level of inflation. This 12 year period which ended in 1994, 
                                                 
74The latifundistas owned 60% of the land, and in contrast, the minifundistas owned only 1% of land in 
Chiapas. Each minifundista owned less than ten hectares of land, yet represented 50% of all landholders in 
Chiapas. 
75 As in Mexico, in Latin America there is a pattern of spontaneous outbreaks of violence following the 
implementation of austerity programs. This happened in Argentina from 1982 to 1985, and again in 1988, 
1989, and 1993, leaving 18 people dead and 230 injured that participated in demonstrations against 
government implementation of austerity plans, such as price increases, anti-inflationary programs and 
government withholding of wages due to budget cuts.  Other countries have also experienced similar 
patterns, among them Bolivia in 1983-1987, 1990, 1992, 1993; Brazil (1983-1992); Chile (1983-1985); the 
Dominican Republic (1984, 1990); Ecuador (1982-1987); El Salvador (1985-1986); Guatemala (1985); 
Nicaragua (1990); Panamá (1983, 1985); Perú (1976-1985, 1991); and Venezuela (1989, 1991). The main 
reasons for demonstrations are economic policies connected to the realization of basic needs, (currency 
devaluations, dismissals, removal of subsidies, price increases of public transportation, price increases in 
bread, milk, and gasoline, the signing of austerity programs with the IMF, privatizations, and wage 
controls). See Duncan Green, Silent Revolution: The Rise of Market Economics in Latin America (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 2003) 
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became known in Mexico as the of the practice of an economic 
doctrine known as neoliberalismo, and was characterized by a) 
commercial liberalization, b) liberalization of foreign investment, 
and c) a diminishing role of the state as promoter and regulator of 
economic growth and social welfare.76 Table 8 shows the main 
features of this economic reform. By 1993 the policies had 
produced impressive results in terms of the reduction of inflation 
(from 80.8% in 1983 to 7.1% in 1993), a fiscal deficit reduction 
(from 13% of GDP to 0.3% of GDP in 1994); and positive interest 
rates which improved savings of nationals and attracted foreign 
capital.  This positive scenario stimulated political leaders to create 
expectations among Mexicans that Mexico was not far from 
becoming part of the first world. The signing of the NAFTA 
agreement between Mexico, the United States and Canada on 
January 1st of 1994 confirmed these expectations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 The economic model followed by Mexico from 1935 to 1982, is known as the Mexican Revolutionary 
Model.  
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Table 8 Main Features of Economic Reforms 1982-1994  
Financial   Fiscal    External Sector Privatization Deregulation 
Liberalize 
credit and   
interest rates 
Balance public 
Finance Lower taxes on  trade Dis-incorporate non-strategic 
industries 
in the following 
sectors: 
telephone, 
commercial 
banking, 
mining, 
agribusiness, 
steel, 
aviation, 
food 
 
Liberalize 
freight 
transportation 
 
Create a wider 
 variety of  
 savings  
Lower tax rates 
to individuals  
and businesses     
Eliminate non-
tariff  barriers 
 
 Eliminate 
barriers to technological 
development 
Finance  public 
deficit by means  
of non-
inflationary 
resources 
Eliminate 
preferential tax 
bases in various 
sectors 
Develop free trade 
agreements  Eliminate  obsolete 
permits to establish 
and operate business 
 
 
Privatize 
commercial 
Banks 
Drastically reduce 
fiscal exemptions 
Renegotiate 
external  
Debt 
 Promote private participation 
in the provision of public 
services (electricity, 
highways, water, etc.) 
 
Allow foreign 
Competition 
Stimulate capital 
repatriations 
and strengthen tax 
collection and fiscal 
management  
 
Facilitate foreign  
investment   
Source: Mauricio Gonzales Gómez, “Crisis and Economic Change in Mexico” in Susan Kaufman Purcel 
and Luis Rubio, Mexico Under Zedillol (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, 1998), 32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115
 
Article 27  
 
The 1992 presidential decision by Carlos Salinas to rewrite 
Article 27 of the constitution became a precipitating factor in the 
Zapatista rebellion. Article 27 had emerged from the revolutionary 
period (1910-1917), and declared the right of peasants to the land. 
In short, Article 27 contained an agreement reached between the 
state and peasants, and resulted in the cessation of rebellions 
during the 1930’s. President Cárdenas has been credited for 
making Article 27 a reality through the land reform he 
implemented.77 Under the reform of Article 27, communal land 
could be sold, bought, rented or held under contract with national 
or foreign investors. The corporate character of land holding was 
canceled and any member of the community could begin the 
process to obtain an individual title and claim the land to put it on 
the market. This reform satisfied the U.S. government’s long-
standing desire for the modification of the Mexican constitution 
regarding the protection of land from foreigners.78  
Big ranchers, who had already received 7,646 certifications 
which protected their lands from 1982 to 1988, welcomed the 
reform, which represented an additional guarantee for the 
protection of their lands, as well as allowing the possibility of the 
                                                 
77 The Constitution of 1917 emerged as a common agreement among the three revolutionary movements 
during this period. The leaders of these movements, Emiliano Zapata, Francisco Villa and Venustiano 
Carranza, were the spokesmen for land reform and the inalienable right to the land by peasants. The rights 
included in Article 27 were: 1) the right of all peasant communities to receive land and water, 2) restitution 
of lands and water taken by the “haciendas” (large estates or plantations), 3) the inalienable right to free 
seizure under a prior claim, 4) distribution of land concentrated in latifundios to villages and 5) the 
protection of Mexican territory by the prohibition against a) foreigners acquiring land or water and b) 
financial corporations acquiring rural enterprises. The presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) 
represents the historical foundation of a corporative state that institutionalized political forces and emerged 
stronger after the revolutionary period. Among these were worker organizations and campesino 
organizations which joined the PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionario), the National Revolutionary Party, 
founded in 1929. These constituencies became the foundation for the PRM (Partido de la Revolución 
Mexicana), the National Party of the Revolution, later known as the PRI (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional ), the Institutional Revolutionary Party, which ruled Mexico until the year 2000. 
 
78 See Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico y los Estados Unidos en el conflict  petrolero (1917-1942) (México El 
Colegio de México, 1972) cited by Adolfo Gilly in Chiapas: la razón ardiente (Mexico D. F: Era, 1998) 
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purchase of more land from peasants. In contrast to the rather 
quick process of documentation of land by ranchers, communities 
saw little hope of obtaining title to their land, and feared losing the 
land. In Chiapas, 79 communities had already waited 20 years for 
the legalization of their lands. Other communities have waited 
even longer; for example, El Paraiso in the area of Las Margaritas, 
El Nopal in Ixtapa, and Las Delicias in Trinitaria have each waited 
40 years; Tamaulipas in Pijijiapan, 43 years; Santa Rosa 
community in Tonalá has waited 46 years; and El Letrero in 
Siltepec has waited 53 years.79 Furthermore, Gilly points out that 
the reform of Article 27 set the legal groundwork for a future 
privatization of the oil deposits of Mexico (Gilly 1998).   
In this way the reform of Article 27 reflects the search of the 
Mexican state to find its place in the global economy; bending to 
external economic pressures and ending a social contract with 
peasants, cutting deep into the heart of the agrarian economy.   
Regardless of the performance of Mexico, according to 
international economic experts in the IMF and World Bank, 
Mexico fulfilled an urgent international condition, which was to 
regain confidence in the Mexican economy. Mexicans alone felt 
that the social costs were unbearable. Income became increasingly 
concentrated in 1984 (Gonzales Gomez 1998), and without 
precedence in Mexico, inequality increased constantly parallel to 
the implementation of neoliberal economic policies from 1982 to 
1998.  Using an index of dispersion based on the inequality in pay 
among nine manufacturing sectors in Mexico, the Inequality 
Project of the University of Texas reported an impressive growth 
of inequalities in Mexico during this period, (see Graph 4).   
        
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 See Carlos Montemayor Chiapas, la Rebelión Indígena de México (Madrid: Espasa, 1998) 
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    Graph 4 
 Inequality in Mexico 1968-2000 
                Source: University of Texas Inequality Project, 1998-2004, available from  
                                 http//utip.gov.utexas.edu 
 
Following the presidential elections of 1988, Salinas claimed 
victory in spite of numerous allegations of fraud. This election 
carried the brand of de-legitimization, as did the subsequent 
constitutional reforms of his presidency. The official party that 
ruled Mexico for 70 years, the PRI, also lost ground, and the 
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elections of 2000 marked the end of a single party government. As 
a way of summarizing what we have observed up to here, Boxes 6 
and 7 of the Appendix, indicate the global and national events that 
affected Mexico and especially the communities in Chiapas.  
We now take a closer look at internal and/or external actors 
and their interactions within the context of Chiapas.  
 
Civil Organizations and Human Rights 
 
Taking into account changes in state-society relations as well 
as economic and political accommodation of the state, we analyse 
the growth of human rights mobilization in Mexico. The expansion 
of the human rights movement has been facilitated from the 
beginning by the work of Advocacy Networks, as Keck and 
Sikkink80 have labeled the process which started with the 
formation of Amnesty International (AI) in the 1960’s in Latin 
America. AI emerged as the training ground for what became an 
explosion of non-governmental organizations pressing for 
changes.81 This growth at the continental level corresponded to an 
international expansion of human right organizations.82 At the 
global level for example, the rate of growth and the number of 
nongovernmental organizations focusing on human rights have 
exceeded other types of organizations, (see Table 7). 
                                                 
80 See Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1998). Advocacy networks are those networks of activists motivated by 
core values, ideas and principles that are extended by links among actors at international level. The 
Advocacy Networks for human right have operated under the belief that individuals can make a difference 
and bring creative solutions to transform the political system of hosted countries, to change the states’ 
behavior and to promote norm implementation.   
81 See  Rafael Reygadas Robles,  Abriendo veredas: Iniciativas públicas y sociales de las redes de 
organizaciones civiles (México D.F.: Servicios Informativos Procesados  (Sipro) A.C., 1988)  
82 See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, “The indigenous Peoples and the State in Latin America: An Ongoing 
Debate.” In  Rachel Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and 
Democracy (Houndmills: Palgrave, Macmillian, 2002) 
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TABLE 7   
    Number and Percentages of  
              International Non-Governmental Social Change Organizations  
                      (by the major issue focus of their work) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Issue area            1953       1963       1973       1983       1993 
 
Human R              33            38           41           79           168 
                             30%         27%        22.4%     22.7%     26.6% 
 
World Order          8               4            12           31           48  
            7.3            2.8          6.6          8.9           7.6 
 
International         14             19           25          26            26 
Law                      12.7         13.4          13.7       7.4           4.1 
 
Peace                    11             20            14          22            59 
                             10.0         14.2          7.7         6.3           9.4 
 
Women                 10              14          16           25           61 
Rights                   9.1              9.9         8.7         7.2           9.7 
 
Environment         2                 5           10          26             90 
                            1.8              3.5         5.5         7.5            14.3 
 
Development         3                 3            7          13             34 
                             2.7              2.1        3.8        3.7              5.4 
 
Ethnic unity          10                12         18         37              29 
                             9.1                8.5        9.8       10.6           4.6 
 
Esperanto              11                18          28        41              54 
                              10                12.8       15.3    11.8           8.6 
_____________________________________________________ 
Source: Union of International Association, Yearbook of International Organizations in Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders 
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In 1981, Latin America with 220 organizations, rated as 
having the highest number of human rights non-governmental 
organizations in the developing world. Yet in Mexico particularly, 
even though human rights violations in Argentina and Chile were 
denounced by human right organizations, the massacre of students 
in 1968 by the Mexican government did not gain international 
concern. Nevertheless, in Mexico several organizations were 
operating whose vision was rooted in the Catholic Church’s social 
teachings. Among them were organizations concerned with 
development and/or social issues.83  By the mid-1980’s human 
rights awareness had spread in Mexican society, and although in 
                                                 
83 Among these organization are found: IMES 1959 (Mexican Institute of Social Studies), USEM 1960 
(Union of Mexican Business Leaders), FAT 1960 (Authentic Workers Front), el Instituto de Desarrollo 
Comunitario en Guadalajara 1963, Fundación Mexicana para el Desarrollo Rural 1963; el Centro 
Operacional de Vivienda y Poblamiento COPEVI 1965); el Centro de Desarrollo Popular 1966; Desarrollo 
Social de Mexicanos Indígenas, 1966.  
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1984 only four human rights organizations existed in Mexico, by 
1993, the year prior to the Zapatista rebellion, Mexico hosted more 
than two hundred. The globalization of human rights was a 
powerful force spreading throughout Mexico. Not surprisingly, the 
Mexican government perceived the Zapatista uprising as a greater 
challenge than that of the students of 1968 who marched in the 
streets. Consequently government officials sat down and 
negotiated with the peasant rebels in February of 1994, surrounded 
by a human chain made up of representatives of a new coalition of 
240 non-governmental organizations, called (ESPAZ) Civil Space 
for Peace. 
 By 1990 numerous human right groups were openly active in 
Chiapas.84 Although there is scarce information regarding this 
explosion of non-governmental organizations in Mexico, there 
seems to be agreement that the propelling factors of such a spread 
were the 1982 economic crisis in Mexico, and the 1985 earthquake 
in Mexico City. In both cases, it was the incapacity of the 
government to control the economy or to protect its population that 
led to civil initiatives. In the case of Mexico, the economic 
disillusion derived from the collapsing expectation of twelve years 
of economic growth did not lead directly to an armed uprising, but 
to a massive civil mobilization. From 1983 to 1996, 24 new 
organizations appeared, struggling to meet the social demands in 
such areas as persistent poverty, and the urgency for democracy. 
Surprisingly, these organizations and others already operating in 
Mexico, began the process of constructing a society with new 
proposals based on the needs of the people, avoiding models of 
                                                 
84 Among these organizations we find:  Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanas, Ameritas Watch, 
Amnistía Internacional, Centro de Derechos Humanos, Centro de Derechos Humanos del Sonocusco, 
Centro de Derechos Humanos de Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel 
Agustín, Centro de Derechos Humanos Sur Sureste, Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Chiapas, 
Comisión de Defensa los Derechos Humanos de Chiapas, Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la Costa, 
Comisión de los Derechos Humanos de la Suprema Corte, Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la Zona Sur, 
Comisión de los Derechos Humanos de SCLC, Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Tapachula, Comisión 
de los Derechos Humanos del Congreso del Estado, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Sonocusco and an 
additional 22 organizations that one way or another had already made an impact on Chiapas prior to the 
rebellion.  
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charity or public assistance.85 Massive civil organizations filled the 
vacuum left by the government’s lack of initiatives and inability to 
confront the crisis.  
 
The Indian Movement   
  
As we have discussed above, before 1994 Chiapas appeared 
to be forgotten by the federal and state governments, but 
nevertheless, powerful families were present and active. The 
violent expulsions and confrontations between pistoleros and 
indigenous communities which occurred from the 1950’s to the 
1970’s and resulted in horrendous violations of human rights could 
not alone explain the high levels of mobilization up to 1994, 
without considering the changes in the state. The changes already 
discussed above, are: the rupture of institutional relations between 
workers, peasants, and the state; the application of the neoliberal 
agenda; the reform of Article 27; and the collapsing expectations 
by civil society due to poor performance (especially in times of 
crisis) of the state-led economic growth which had not delivered 
benefits to society at large. 
  In addition to its place within a national context, we also 
place the Indian movement in Mexico within the broader context 
of indigenous mobilization in Latin America, as a movement that 
needs to be understood in light of changes in the state, and more 
specifically, changes in the citizenship regimes within the scope of 
institutional changes of the state (Yashar 2005). As Yashar argues, 
political identies are historically influenced, confined, or tied to 
institutions and succeptable to change. States can privilege certain 
political identities, but are not always successful at influencing or 
                                                 
85 Rafael Reygadas has demonstraded that from the colonial time to 1982, Mexico practiced a policy of 
public assistance, and that this paternalistic and controlling model started collapsing as the state was forced 
to reduce social assistance and social spending, following the IMF’s recuperation plan after the 1982 crisis.  
The assistance policies that dominated governmental economic policy originated in Catholic social 
teachings. These doctrines, later secularized, are recognized as the origin for the creation of social and civic 
organizations in Mexico. See Rafael Reygadas Robles Abriendo veredas: Iniciativas públicas y sociales de 
las redes de organizaciones civiles Abriendo veredas (México D. F.: Servicios Informativos Procesados, 
A.C. (Sipro), 1998) 
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shaping society evenly. In turn this unevenness of the state’s 
presence in particular regions allows for the coexistence of local 
power structures which can, when threatened, mobilize and offer 
resistance to the state. This is understood by the fact that the 
relation between state and society is dynamic and of mutual 
influence. Therefore, in the case of Mexico, the resistance and 
challenge of indigenous movements need to be seen as a response 
to changes in the State and in particular to the end of a 
corporativist form of citizenship regime which began in the 1940’s 
(Cardenismo) and ended in the 1980’s and 1990’s with the 
emergence of a neoliberal form of citizenship. Having said this, we 
focus on the process of mobilization and the key issues of the 
indigenous discourse.   
Alongside the human rights movement, international 
associations of indigenous people on the continent moved toward 
the consolidation of an indigenous network for the protection of 
indigenous rights. Thus, indigenous mobilization in Chiapas 
occurred along with continental mobilization (see Box 4 in the 
Appendix). 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1995) and Carlos Humberto Durán 
(1998) have collected the following key elements of the indigenous 
discourse.  The first element is the issue of definition and legal 
status. While specialists, scholars and bureaucrats insist on 
focusing on the needs of the indigenous population and debate over 
the definition of who is Indian, the meaning of “indigenous”, or the 
quantification of indigenous people; the right of self-definition  
stands as a central issue in the indigenous discourse. Yet the 
recognition and protection of this right is not perceived by public 
authorities as a necessary step for the building up of democracy 
and development. The second issue is land rights. Indigenous 
peoples consider this one of the fundamental conditions for 
survival; nevertheless, the issue of land as a means of survival has 
not generally been considered vital to democracy and 
development. Governments in Latin America have neglected this 
right. Land represents more than a resource or property for those 
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wanting to escape extinction. Consequently, the indigenous 
concept of land cannot be assimilated into the modernization 
discourse. It demands understanding and recognition. The third key 
issue is cultural identity. The past and current practices of 
acculturation and assimilation has been denounced by Indian 
organizations as cultural genocide or ethnocide, yet governments 
have not reoriented their approach toward indigenous peoples nor 
perceived this issue as a necessary step toward development and 
democracy. The fourth central element in the indigenous discourse 
is the issue of social organization and customary law. The survival 
of indigenous communities as social entities depends on the formal 
recognition of customary law and the traditional legal system of 
communities. This is probably one of the most controversial issues 
at both national and international levels. The recognition of 
customary law has implied the issue of collective rights and self-
determination as is set out in ILO Convention 169, the UN draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the 
Organization of American States’s draft declaration on the 
international rights of indigenous people. Currently, the indigenous 
claim for collective rights comes from the understanding that for 
many indigenous communities in Chiapas the struggle is not for 
the return to a “traditional law”, but as is argued in this text, to 
remove the cause of historical unjustices and set aright their 
legitimate power to decide over and regulate their own affairs 
(Sieder 2002). As Sieder points out, in Chiapas, to be regulated by 
tradional law has meant to be loyal to the official party (PRI), 
which promoted political affiliation, co-optation, and a preference 
for the protection of powerful political identities. As mobilization 
has grown, government intervention has occurred based on the 
argument for the protection of human rights (that is of individuals) 
and multiculturalism. In reality such interventions have become the 
means to maintain the hegemony of dominant elites. Worst of all, 
the intervention during the 1990’s for the sake of the protection of 
individual rights, ended in a systematic sabotage of efforts for 
autonomy and sef-determination. Among indigenous leaders in 
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Chiapas as well in Oaxaca the debate between the universal 
concept of human rights and particular collective human rights has 
taken a historical perspective (Diaz-Polanco 2000). The underlying 
tension of this conflict is complex. In their struggle for community 
rights, collectivities perceive that the real struggle is against the 
long-standing liberal ideology of two centuries, starting with the 
French revolution of 1789 and the birth of an ideology which gave 
preference to individual autonomy over collectivities, functioning 
hand-in-hand with the expansion of capitalism, the territorial 
expansion of empires, colonialism, and the processes of the 
foundation of political nation-states (Wallerstein 1996). It is only 
after World War II that the idea of collective rights became 
recognized, an event which facilitated the independence of 
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Regarding the case 
of Chiapas and Oaxaca, many questions still remain unanswered at 
the center of the debate. For instance, can the state be trusted with 
the application of universal rights when the state has been 
historically abusive of its power over indigenous peoples? (Sieder 
2002). Who has the authority to effectively sanction a state which, 
when under the argument of applying the universal concept of 
human rights, violates community rights and eventually human 
rights, though it is professing to protect the latter? Currently the 
debate continues as bridges between liberalism and 
communitarism have been proposed by authors such as Charles 
Taylor (1995), Will Kymlicka (1996), and Luis Villoro (1998). 
Nevertheless, in the case of Vietnam, Salemink (2006) has 
reported that emphasis on particularistic rights (indigenous rights) 
may be counter-productive under certain circumstances. 
Additionally, the debate has been enriched by yet another type of 
proposal set forth by John Rawls (1995), (Diaz-Polanco 2000).       
In Latin America the state has resisted recognizing legal 
pluralism. Instead, the states have adopted only a degree of 
tolerance toward traditions and customs of communities. 
Therefore, the civil and political participation of many villages is 
very limited. Finally, the final theme is political participation. The 
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state in Latin America emerged as a prototype of the states in the 
modern world, with a dominant ethnic group forming or 
consolidating a State and thereby subordinating other nations, the 
so called “ethnic minorities”. The Mexican State, for instance, 
declared in its Constitution that all individuals born in the Mexican 
territory were to be declared Mexican. With this label, indigenous 
peoples of socio-cultural diversity came under a political system 
which denied the right of multicultural and pluralistic societies. All 
indigenous peoples became "equal" by declaration of equality 
under the law, but only as Mexican citizens in the Constitution, 
though in fact they were excluded from the political arena. Indeed, 
the Mexican government had transferred its mono-ethnic and 
dominant nature to its Constitution. It was not until 1992 in which 
the Constitution recognized the multiculturalism of Mexico. 
Indigenous movements on the other hand, look beyond mere 
political participation, challenging the historical concept of the 
nation-state as well as the idea of citizenship which is devoid of 
rights. As Yashar has pointed out, the indigenous movement calls 
for heterogenous notions of who is a citizen, how citizenship is 
defined, and where authority is placed (Yashar 2005).  
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Human Dignity and Liberation: The Church in Chiapas 
Responds to Industrialism and Poverty 
  
In 1974 the Catholic Church organized an Indigenous Congress. 
This event was supported by the federal and state governments to 
celebrate the 500th birthday of Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, 
defender of the Indians in the 16th century. In the Indigeous 
Congress, the Bishop saw an opportunity to become a church that 
served the Indians instead of a church that is served by Indians. 
This Congress was a great event: three hundred communities were 
represented by 1,230 delegates, which included 587 Tsetzales, 330 
Tzotziles, 152 Tojolabales and 151 Choles. In preparation for the 
Congress, the Dioceses made use of its already existing 1000 
catechists in the region and organized a support group composed of 
teacher’s assistants, lawyers and students providing sessions in 
economics, history, agrarian law, etc.  In the Congress, the church 
provided a bottom-up model of decision making.  This model later 
inspired Indian organizations (Tavanti 1999, Harvey 1998). 
During the 1974 Congress, sixty priests and nuns approached 
the Indian leaders and organizers of the Congress and asked how 
people of faith could help. In answer, Chol, Tzeltal and Tojalabal 
leaders requested: “Walk with us, side with us, look at our 
suffering. If all you have to offer is an empty catechism, nothing 
will change. But if you are offering us the Word of God, then put it 
into action.” (Tavani 1999:135)  Following the Congress the role 
of the religious community leaders changed drastically. The 
Dioceses left off attempts to replace Indian culture, and embraced 
and affirmed Indian culture. Catechists became facilitators rather 
than educators. Though in 1974 these leaders were still appointed 
by the bishop, after the Congress the Diocese renounced the 
tutelage of catechists, and catechists were appointed by the 
communities. Later on, communities discussed with the Dioceses 
the need for deacons to work with catechists in the 600 
communities. Both parties agreed that the communities would 
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select the deacons and decide what kind of work they would do, 
and the Dioceses would recognize them and facilitate a training 
period for them before beginning their work. Usually the training 
consisted of three years of community service. In November of 
1975 the Diocese wrote a document affirming its commitment to 
work with the poor and for the poor and to facilitate the growth of 
an indigenous church (Ruiz 1993:6; Tavanti 1999: 135). 
Boxes 8 and 9 in the appendix present a sample of the 
grievances and accords that were reached at the Indigenous 
Congress in 1974, collected by historian John Womack. More than 
merely grievances that help to explain the uprising, at the root of 
these grievances and accords we find a cultural conflict with the 
dominating economic arrangements. Also the grievances and 
accords can be seen as the acceptable and non-acceptable 
economic practices of the market economy from the perspective of 
the communal economy. The basis for these demands, however, 
rests in the existence of rights as people and collective entities. 
Collier (1999) has rightly pointed out that these grievances were 
identical to the grievances that later appeared in the Zapatista 
demands of 1994.  
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The following premises represented the daily activities of the 
Dioceses of San Cristóbal led by Bishop Samuel Ruiz. 
 
1. The conditions of poverty and marginalization have perpetuated 
living conditions unacceptable to the will of God.  
 
The church struggle to eradicate the roots of poverty and 
marginalization was declared time after time in homilies, pastoral 
letters and courses by the Bishop and catechists, as the first 
condition toward liberation.  The conviction was that 
developmentalism emphasized growth and productivitism to the 
detriment of the poor. Liberation, and not development, therefore 
dealt with the roots of poverty. As had Gustavo Gutierrez and other 
theologians previously, Samuel Ruiz, the bishop of San Cristobal, 
insisted that poverty was a complex social phenomenon that kept 
people living in non-human conditions.  Herein lays a fundamental 
difference, argued Gutierrez and Samuel Ruiz, between the 
orientation of theology in Europe/North America and Latin 
America While the critical problem for theology in Europe and 
North America is the issue of the nonbeliever, (the condition of the 
secular individual who does not believe in God), in Latin America 
the critical issue for the church is the non-person (Smith 1990: 32).  
In the words of Gutierrez: 
 
In a continent like Latin America, the challenge does not 
come to us primarily from the non-believer, but from the 
non-person, that is to say, from the individual who is not 
recognized as such by the existing social order: the poor, 
the exploited, who are systematically deprived of being 
persons, they who scarcely know they are persons. The 
non-person questions before anything else, not our 
religious world, but our economic, social, political, and 
cultural world; and thus, a call is made for the  
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revolutionary transformation of the very bases of a 
humanizing society. Our question, therefore, is not how to 
announce God in an adult world; but how to announce him 
as a Father in a non-human world (Gutierrez 1988:79). 
 
The good news of the gospel of liberation, therefore, was to be 
preached to those that without any hope are forced to live under 
conditions far from the will of God. Moreover, the preferential 
option for the poor represented an active way of life opposed to not 
only poverty, (an action that most societies applaud), but to the 
root causes of poverty, (an action that is much less popular and 
often considered suspicious and subversive). In 1987, Samuel 
Ruiz, the bishop in Chiapas, described the poor as “those who are 
the fruit of the dysfunction of the social structure” (Tavanti, 1999). 
The causes of poverty, he argued, came from unjust, oppressive 
political and economic structures, but overall, poverty was an 
expression of sin.   
 For the Bishop, however, the preferential option for the poor 
in Chiapas was not so much of an option as a necessity (Floyd, 
1997:66). Not to opt for the poor meant to remain part of the 
oppressive social system. Poverty was seen as the fruit of 
domination, and the church had no option other than to stand with 
the oppressed and actively struggle against the structural causes of 
poverty. Consequently, Bishop Ruiz insisted that the concept of 
liberation was more adequate than that of development to describe 
the desire of the people in Chiapas (see Box 10). 
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Box 10           Development and Liberation in Chiapas 
 
It was in 1969 at the meeting of  the SODEPAX (the Committee for Society, 
Development, and Peace) that a group of theologians from Latin America who had been 
reflecting on and articulating a “Theology of Development” were invited to contribute to a 
sociological understanding of the role of the church in socioeconomic development.  The 
conference was sponsored by the World Council of Churches. Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peruvian 
priest, flying to Campine, Switzerland for the conference, in reviewing his notes for his talk to be 
delivered at the conference entitled: “The Meaning of Development”, decided to change the title 
to “Notes on the Theology of Liberation”.  He considered this a more adequate wording in the 
content of the talk, thus officially inaugurating liberation theology (Smith 1990).  Regarding the 
preference for the word liberation, Kirk points out that it was chosen for its direct contrast to the 
word “dependency”, a word made popular by Latin American economists to explain the situation 
of Latin America within the international system.  Another reason was “the long historical usage 
in the biblical and church traditions as synonymous with salvation” (Kirk 1979:26). 
Overall,  liberation theology brought about in Chiapas a  popular empowerment that 
consequently made the indigenous community to no longer see themselves as just recipients of 
benefits and concerned with their own well-being, but to perceive themselves as agents of social 
and economic change benefiting all Mexicans; Indian and non-Indian alike.86 Liberation 
Theology has been considered as both a theological movement and as a social movement.  
According to Gutierrez and others, the praxis of liberation comes first (creating a movement) and 
theology comes as a second step, as a reflection of previous praxis “after sundown”. 
This Liberation Theology approach would have a tremendous impact in Chiapas, in the midst of a 
forgotten region of Mexico.  
It was in 1968 in Medellín, Colombia that the Catholic Church officially declared its 
preferential option for the poor. Recently, in 2003, Gustavo Gutierrez again explained the 
meaning of the preferential option for the poor as the response of the church to the poorest of the 
poor and the oppressed.87   Gutierrez is known as the "father" of liberation theology even though 
liberation theologians such as Leonardo Boff, a well-respected Brazilian theologian, have made it 
clear that liberation theology has no fathers or mothers other than the people in Latin America 
who in their daily lives reflect the light of the gospel (Boff, 1986).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) The conditions of poverty are the point of departure to start the 
long walk of conversion. 
                                                 
86 Amartya Sen makes this distinction in the analysis of women’s movements and social change in 
Development as Freedom.  On one hand, the well-being of women, and the emphasis on women as agents 
of change, may be seen as separate issues; yet both complement each other. The later, however, tends to be 
an area of greater need of advancement, since the agent-aspect is often neglected.  Education, earning 
power, and literacy, contribute to the agent-aspect and can improve the living condition of women, children 
and men.     
87 Presentation given by Gustavo Gutierrez at Baylor University in Waco, Texas, October 3 and 4, 2003. 
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In Chiapas, the path of transformation for the church was to opt 
for the poor. For society the path was to stop accumulating and 
perpetuating injustices. For the poor and oppressed it was to reject 
the existence of poverty in the midst of abundant resources, and to 
overcome the power of fate, taking hold of their own destiny. For 
real conversion to occur in Chiapas, the Bishop argued, the process 
of the conquest and colonization and its consequences of 
oppression and exclusion (which in many cases in the past had 
been approved by the church), had to be stopped.   
 
3) Social change was possible due to the power of the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ. The resurrection brings hope in the midst of a 
hopeless reality. 
 
The Bishop affirmed that the resurrection of Jesus Christ meant to 
pass, as persons, as people, from death to life, to physically put 
themselves on the path toward historical resurrection.  
“The Resurrection of Christ…reaffirms our hope in a 
resurrection of humanity in history, resurrection which is 
prior, and guides us to the final resurrection. In this, 
humanity is always invited to a reconciliation of groups 
and social classes and to establish the natural order--
violated, submerged and distorted…in recognition of 
human rights and the re-establishment of a human 
community whose structures function for humanity and 
not for accumulation.” But these longings of resurrection, 
which all people share, will not be part of history if we are 
not committed to working seriously to make them a 
reality. That which necessarily carries them through is the 
acceptance of the way of the cross.88 
                                                 
88 Samuel Ruiz García, “Sistematización de los documentos de tatik Samuel, escritos del 31 de diciembre 
de 1993 a abril de 1994” Francisco Argüelles, comp. (San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas: Diócesis de San 
Cristóbal, Spring 1994) cited by Charlene Floyd The Government Shall be Upon Their Shoulders..(New 
York: The City of New York University, 1997)  Carlos Fazio, Samuel Ruiz: el caminante. (México D.F.: 
Espasa Calpe Mexicana S.A. 1994). 
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The resurrection gave hope in the struggle to bring about the 
“natural order”, an order of justice and equity. The serious 
commitment of the church and followers of Christ was to live out 
the resurrection. Christians were called to live “the way of the 
cross.”  In Chiapas this rationale produced social change and hope 
for a better future, so much so that during 1994 in the midst of the 
rebellion, the pastoral work of the church in San Cristóbal was 
blamed by the government and analysts as the main cause of the 
rebellion. 
 
4. The church’s role is to precipitate the building of the Kingdom 
of God: a church that serves the Indians and not a church that is 
served by the Indians.  
 
This belief was put into practice with the transformation of the 
church into an indigenous church based on indigenous theology. 
The Dioceses of San Cristobal, Chiapas embraced Indian social 
organization and culture and abandoned the hierarchical model of 
church. In empowering indigenous people it moved from standard 
liberation theology to an indigenous theology. As a consequence, 
the Dioceses changed its methodology in dealing with communal 
meetings. Instead of continuing with the “nopteswanej” (to make 
the other understand) approach in communal meetings limited to 
religious matters, the “Tijwanej” approach was adopted. 
“Tijwanej” has been translated by Mexican social scientist Xóchitl 
Leyva Solano, as “to bring out what is in another's heart” (Tavani 
1999). The discussions therefore, inevitably included reflections on 
the economic and social issues that affected the lives of indigenous 
communities in light of the Christian faith. The church discussed 
the causes of poverty with the people. 
Another element embraced by the theology of the church was 
the acceptance Mayan worldview within the Christian faith, even 
though these same Mayan perspectives had been seen as idolatrous 
during the conquest. Mayan people experienced more freedom to 
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be themselves and speak from their worldview. Religious 
practices, that had been silenced or hidden for hundreds of years 
for fear of repression were heard and seen in public. 
The early event that revealed the work of the church among 
Indians and communities was the 1974 Indigenous Congress in 
San Cristobal. Many analysts have pointed out that this congress 
was the landmark in the beginning of social mobilization in 
Chiapas. The congress was the result of many years of work 
following the teachings of the Catholic Church in Medellín. Bishop 
Samuel Ruiz’s diocese had 2,000 catechists, half of whom were 
Indians and spoke Indian languages. The Bishop worked with 
people in 2,708 communities and for 34 years stressed human 
dignity and the building of the kingdom of God among the 
communities. The dioceses of Chiapas covers 48% of the territory 
of Chiapas and represents 1.5 million people, distributed over 
36,821 square kilometers. The Bishop, who was later chosen to be 
the peace mediator between the Zapatista rebels and the 
government, considered that, after all of his work, the main change 
in his diocese was that the Indians had experienced a “toma de 
conciencia”.89 They had come to see themselves in a different way 
and to be fully aware that everything, including social and political 
arrangements, was not necessarily what it originally was supposed 
to be. Overall Bishop Samuel Ruiz has stated that the Indians 
learned to become the subjects of their own lives (Womack 1999). 
 
 
                                                 
89 The terms “toma de conciencia”and “concientización” refer to an awareness of political/social/economic 
reality, both from a historical perspective and in the present, and a resulting awakening to the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals, governments, organizations, corporations, etc., involving personal and 
collective engagement in action and decision making. 
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 The impact of the 1974 Indigenous Congress can be seen in 
the number of peasant organizations formed between 1974 and 
1988 (see Box 11). These organizations operated in three 
identificable regions; the eastern frontier (Las Cañadas and the 
Selva Lacandona), the north (Simojovel) and the center 
(Venustiano Carranza). All of them struggled for the land. As they 
suffered repressions and the killings of their leaders, most if not 
all, sought to make alliances with national movements. In general, 
the government denied these organizations recognition as 
legitimate peasant organizations. 
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Box 11  Peasant Organizations in Chiapas  
     Following the 1974 Indigenous Congress 
 
Name                                                                 Type 
 
La Cañada, Selva Lacandona 
Ejido Union Quiptic ta Lecubtecel (1975/1976)                                             Community Union 
(United in Our Strength) UEQTL                            
 
Ejido Unión Tierra y Libertad (1975-1976)                                                    Community Union 
(Land and Liberty) UETL   
 
Ejido Union Lucha Campesina (Peasant Struggle)                                          Community Union 
UELC (1975-1976) 
 
Union of Uniones Ejidales (1980)                                                                    Credit (150 communities) 
(1982) Unión de Crédito “Pjal Ya Kac’ Tic” 
(“We Work Together”) 
(1983) Unión de Crédito “Pajal” 
(1983) Unión de Uniones 
(1988) UU-Aric   
              Asociación Rural de Interés Colectivo 
 
North (Simojovel, Huitiupán, Sabanilla and El Bosque) 
    
Comité Central Huitihuapan (1974)                                                        Community Union to free 
(1980) Sindicato de Obreros Agrícolas                                                    imprisoned peasants 
(1982) First Regional Congress of the CIOAC 
                (Workers and Indians)                                                                              Labor and peasant 
                                                                                                                                  organization 
(1983)  Unión de Crédito del Sindicato                                                   Credit Union of a Workers  
(Achieved title certification to                                                                  Union 
16 ejidos in 1987) 
 
Central (Venustiano Carranza) 
Casa del Pueblo “Venustiano Carranza”                                                  Peasant Organization 
(1972-1975) (The Movement of the   
People’s House) 
(1980) Coordinadora Provisional de Chiapas                                        Peasant Organization  
affiliated with national 
movement 
(1982) Organización Emiliano Zapata (OCEZ)                                     Broadest and most 
                                                                                                                                combative state peasant  
organization 
          (1988) OCEZ-FNDP central zone of OCEZ  
                      OCEZ-CNPA north zone of OCEZ   
                        
Source: Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land A Poor People: Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996)                      
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The FLN and Activist Groups in Chiapas: The Armed and 
Clandestine Front 
 
The year 1969 marked the formation of a new guerrilla group 
in Mexico, Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional—FLN (National 
Liberation Forces). Unlike other guerilla groups, the FLN refused 
to rob banks or use kidnapping as a means to obtain funding. In the 
fall of 1983, the five main leaders of the FLN arrived in the jungles 
of Chiapas. Three of the leaders were indigenous, and two were 
mestizos. (The majority of Mexicans are mestizos.) These three 
leaders first made contact with the families that lived on the Tierra 
y Libertad ejido, (Land and Liberty). The families were Chol and 
Tzotzil Indians who had emigrated from other regions of Chiapas 
searching for land. In Chiapas, the main leader of the FLN, 
Germán, trained the other members in jungle guerrilla tactics.90 
Their goal was to bring about a revolution in Mexico, and Chiapas 
had been chosen as the location to build up an army. Their line of 
revolutionary thought was Marxist-Leninist, and they worked with 
peasant and indigenous communities in a discreet fashion.  
In 1984, Marcos arrived in the Lacandon jungle.  His real 
name was later revealed to be Rafael Guillén, a 25 year old from 
the northern city of Tampico, Tamaulipas. He had graduated in 
philosophy from the UNAM (National Autonomous University of 
Mexico), and later became a professor at the UAM (Autonomous 
Metropolitan University). While at the UAM he met Silvia 
Fernández, one of the national leaders of the FLN.  Marcos 
dedicated more and more of his time and energy to the FLN, and 
later left his teaching position.  He participated in the preparation 
of first aid courses in San Cristóbal, Chiapas, and in the early 
1980’s he traveled to Nicaragua to coordinate a workshop on 
communication and design for the Sandinistas, who had just 
                                                 
90 Germán is a pseudonym. A common practice among many guerrilla groups was to use pseudonyms 
instead of real names.  This was done for security purposes, to protect their identities and to shield their 
families and friends from government repression. 
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overthrown the Somoza dictatorship. This experience heightened 
his excitement about revolutionary work in Mexico. 
During October, 1984, reports Tello, indigenous people from 
Unión de Uniones, (Union of Unions) met with the leaders of the 
FLN, expressing their grievances and thanking the FLN for its 
support.  The Unión de Uniones had been formed in the fall of 
1980, at the heat of the dispute for land in the Lacandon region. It 
was an umbrella organization consisting of three affiliated groups: 
Unión de Ejidos Tierra y Libertad, (Union of Land and Liberty 
Ejidos), Unión de Ejidos Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel, (Union of Let’s 
Unite our Forces to Advance Ejidos), and Unión de Ejidos Lucha 
Campesina, (Union of Peasant Struggle Ejidos). The Unión de 
Uniones covered 12 municipios and represented the interests of 
12,000 families that were settled in 180 communities, all of which 
were located in Las Cañadas region.91 The Unión de Uniones was 
accustomed to constant struggle against government officials that 
wanted to remove them from the land, as well as wealthy ranchers 
who denied them access to water.  
 In the midst of despair and social mobilization of indigenous 
communities, the FLN, and other radical groups saw in Chiapas a 
potentially strategic region in the building of a revolutionary 
project in Mexico. Among the radical groups was: Union del 
Pueblo (Union of the People) a revolutionary group organized by 
José Maria Ortiz, a Guatemalan intellectual and Hector Zamudio, 
an economics professor from the Chapingo University (Tello 
2000). Union del Pueblo emerged in Mexico after the repressions 
of 1968 and 1971, and was Union del Pueblo was a clandestine 
organization that was divided into two subgroups. The first was a 
“foquista” group which insisted on Che Guevara’s revolutionary 
strategy of starting an armed rebellion and gaining support as the 
movement advanced; and the second consisted of Maoist 
supporters who believed in first working to create a process of 
social and political awareness or concientización previous to the 
                                                 
91 Mexican states are subdivided politically and geographically into municipios. 
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rebellion. In spite of their revolutionary ideas, the dioceses of San 
Cristobal supported the work of Union del Pueblo, and out of their 
collaboration and dialogue, Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel (United in Our 
Strength) was founded.   
Linea Proletaria (Proletarian line), another group of social 
activists, arrived in Chiapas in 1977 invited by Bishop Samuel 
Ruiz.  The group’s philosophy was Maoist and rejected Lenin’s 
revolutionary approach of destroying social and political structures 
first and constructing new structures afterwards. Instead the group 
embraced Mao’s philosophy of building first before destroying.  
The group directed its work toward political education and 
mobilization. Its vision was to build openly, in daylight, the 
conditions for a revolutionary change in Mexico. Over time, Linea 
Proletaria showed that it was a better co-worker with the dioceses 
than Union del Pueblo. The catechists, however, found themselves 
divided between a group that emphasized pastoral work and 
another that emphasized the political work. In the years that 
followed, and in the midst of polarization, repression by the state 
and the potential use violence by indigenous communities, the 
Catholic Church ended up breaking off relations with extremist 
groups, including the EZLN.92 
 In June of 1992, 15,000 Indians defined themselves as 
Zapatistas and voted to begin an armed struggle, committing their 
efforts to sustain the armed struggle by selling livestock to buy 
arms. According to Tello, the relatively easy commercialization of 
arms in Texas and California favored the flow of arms to Chiapas. 
However, it was not until January 1993 that the final plans were 
drawn when the movement could not be kept clandestine any 
longer (Tello 2000). Two years before the uprising two events took 
place in Chiapas that did not gain enough official attention to 
                                                 
92 The relationship between the Dioceses and the EZLN was made possible thanks to SLOP, an 
organization led by an elite of catechists that favored the study of historical materialism and the right to 
armed defense by the indigenous and peasant communities. At the end of the 1980’s the SLOP group and 
the FLN, which later became the EZLN, ended up dividing over the issue of the use of arms.  While SLOP 
supported the use of arms for self defense, the EZLN saw no other option than an armed uprising.  
Furthermore, the EZLN leaders, and especially Marcos, did not show respect toward the church and its 
procedures.    
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formulate a response to the unfolding crisis in Chiapas.  First, in 
1992, thousands of demonstrators from Chiapas joined the 
continental protest of indigenous people against the celebration of 
the fifth centenary of the “discovery” of the American continent in 
1492. This event, which according to Collier (2001) included 
thousands of protesters, stimulated the emergence of an indigenous 
rights movement that articulated the collective rights in Chiapas to 
international movements. Indigenous peoples in Mexico made 
claims based on documents which declared the rights of minorities 
previously ratified by Mexico. Secondly, the Xi Nich (Ants) 
massive march from Chiapas to Mexico City carried out in 1992 
similarly produced empty results. 
 
Map 2  Areas of Zapatista Uprising   January 1, 1994 
                                    Source: CIEPAC available from http://www.ciepac.org 
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Conclusions 
 
 We conclude this section by highlighting four important 
elements which appeared prior to the Zapatista uprising. First was 
the emergence of an acute economic and political disengagement 
for the peasants in Chiapas. Second was the role of the various 
civil movements in Chiapas which acted as counter balance forces 
in the face of this acute disengagement. Third was the ending of 
the existing social contract between the state and peasants. Fourth 
was the resistance to further government privatization in Chiapas. 
  We begin discussion of our first element by asserting that 
the economic process that dominated Mexico resulted in worsening 
the multidimensional process of disengagement of the peasants in 
Chiapas. As an end result people found themselves without a sense 
of economic security or dignity, and with no hopes of officially 
holding property (land). As the confrontation unfolded, no 
protection from violence seemed available; indigenous people and 
peasants were not given recognition as legitimate bearers of 
entitlements; and finally, the access to justice failed. Chapter IV 
will explore in greater depth the process of disengagement, 
especially its economic aspect. Overall, this process ruptured the 
constitutional social contract with peasants and indigenous people, 
which in turn stimulated the Zapatista uprising.  
Secondly, the Indian movement, the armed movement, the work of 
the Catholic Church, and the civil rights movements here discussed 
need to be seen as movements that were “pulling the brake” in the 
struggle against this disengagement process which extended in all 
directions. 
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Model 9   The Dynamics of Zapatista Rebellion (II) 
 
 
                              Zapatista Armed Uprising    
                           
       Absence/failure of mediating mechanisms 
 
                                           Pre-Uprising factors 
                                       
                                      •Acknowledgment that elite-actors were responsible for their situation 
       •Alliances with other groups armed and civil 
            •Erosion and crisis of legitimacy                                      
         •Disillusionment with civil organizations and demonstrations     
                         •Search for restitution                 . 
               
                                                                      
                                                        ● Constitutional rights regarding the land                                                                                   
 
 
●  Property  / land tenure                                                                          ● Access to justice:( impunity/  
                                                                                                                     unresolved claims, grievances, no 
                                                                                                         land entitling) 
                                                 ( process of disengagement) 
●  Economic security                                                        ● Recognition 
     (society and community)                                                                        (Exclusionist nature of Mexican 
                                                                                                                       State regarding rights of   
                                                                                                                       indigenous people) 
                                                                                                           
 
                                         • Disregard of true-to-culture socio-economic arrangements 
                                                                 by economic agents with power 
                                            •Disregard of existing grievances and community accords 
                                              •Disregard of customary law and ancestral practices and  
                                                              traditions linked to issues of identity 
                                                                           •Loss of autonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
Stability (low inflation) / Confidence/ Competitiveness / Economic Growth 
 
 
 
                                       Globalization: Liberalization / Privatization / Deregulation 
 
   Latent conflict  
   Ethnic Process    
 As illustrated by Model 9 the process of globalization, 
accentuated by the search for a free trade agreement with the U.S 
and Canada, is also somehow connected, and Chapter IV will 
address this connection. At the national level however, the 
possibility of the Mexican state playing a neutralizing role and 
acting on behalf of its most vulnerable citizens decreased as the 
state sought to accommodate itself to international expectations. 
On the other hand, the state took an active and leading role in 
modifying the constitution, paving the way for the NAFTA 
agreement. Of course the new economic trends could not occur in a 
vacuum. The Mexican state retreated from the market but led the 
constitutional reforms, since the new economic arrangements 
required a different legal context. Regarding the role of the state 
within a global context, Hardt and Negri (2001) have argued that 
states do not necessarily retreat, yielding to global forces. Instead, 
the nation-states tend to adjust to new roles, finding their place in 
the new emerging global dynamics of empire.93 In the case of 
Mexico, the change in the role of the state resulted in an explosion 
of civil organizations that responded to the economic crisis and 
later to the social crisis.  
From 1930 to 1982 modernization and industrialism 
dominated the economic map of Mexico, and rural Mexico was 
thought to benefit as a result of the economic dynamics of 
industrial centers. The economy was oriented to the erection of 
economic structures and growth by the exploitation and 
nationalization of natural resources. This strategy of economic 
growth which began in the 1930’s was called import substitution 
(IS) as it was geared to building the economy from inside instead 
of depending on exports, and ended in 1982 with a crisis.  
                                                 
93 The thesis that Hardt and Negri have proposed for understanding the role of the nation-states in a context 
of globalization contrasts with the common belief that the presence and role of the nation-states tends to 
disappear. Hardt and Negri allege that instead of disappearing, the nation-states integrate into a new supra-
national structure that consolidates globally; i.e., an Empire. While imperialism was concerned with 
territories, Empire is concerned with socioeconomic and political order, and global presence.     
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The economic crisis of 1982 was supposed to be corrected by 
following a plan of austerity and making sacrifices in order to 
obtain stability, reduce inflation (from 80.8% in 1983 to 7.1% in 
1994), and reestablish confidence and economic growth.  
Nevertheless, as Goudzwaard has pointed out, developing 
economies which follow western economies, have in many cases, 
(for the satisfaction of western financing institutions), adopted an 
outer-oriented economy. They have striven for growth and 
competitiveness, using labor and resources in an instrumentalistic 
way, viewing them only as the means to reach higher aims. In this 
way the inner-oriented economy (which is focused on caring for 
resources and the environment, the formation and maintenance of 
dignifying conditions of labor and local markets), becomes subject 
to the outer-economy, and eventually is sacrificed; making an 
economy of caring for labor, resources, and capital unthinkable.94 
If we consider the true-to culture economics introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter as part of the inner-oriented economy, it 
can be concluded that Mexico overlooked an internal economy that 
mattered to people in favor of the fulfillment of international 
(external) expectations, ending a pre-existing social contract in 
order to reach stability. Consequently, the Zapatista uprising can 
be understood as a movement trying to protect the important 
elements of an economy of care, (expressed in an economy rooted 
in culture and oriented mainly to the fulfillment of fundamental 
needs), from the ruthless effects of an economy oriented toward 
growth, stability and in general, external matters. From 1982-1994 
this was expressed in terms of deregulation, privatization, 
balancing public finance, renegotiation of external debt, facilitation 
of foreign investment and the development of trade agreements. 
Therefore, the two scenarios of economic performance, (i.e. 
competitiveness, reduction of deficit, low inflation, etc.), and the 
collapsing of the protection of an inner economy, raise the question 
                                                 
94 See Bob Goudzwaard, “The Culture of Economics at the Turning of the Millennium: Christian 
Perspectives” in Donald A. Hay and Alan Kreider, Christians and the Culture of Economics (University of 
Wales Press 2001), 153-165. 
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of whether a type of economic performance which is focused on 
the fulfillment of global demands can occur without the high 
probability of armed movements. Contrary to the accepted idea 
that low economic growth is a reliable indicator of potential 
intrastate conflict, the case of Chiapas gives evidence that 
economic indicators of the Mexican economy alone are not reliable 
indicators of the likelihood of the emergence of armed movements. 
Moreover, impressive economic recovery data which coexists with 
a collapsing inner economy can be a warning signal of the 
radicalization of social and political upheaval. For this reason, we 
argue that the conditions of the inner economy can tell us more 
about potential conflicts than can national economic performance.  
 Additionally, in the case of Chiapas, output-oriented 
economic policies seemed to have reached three limitations. First, 
land reform stopped when there was no more land to be 
distributed. The contradictory presidential decrees can be 
interpreted not only as incompetent performance on behalf of the 
government, but also as the limits of building legitimacy by using 
limited resources such as land. A second limitation was manifested 
when the process of privatization in Mexico encountered fierce 
opposition in Chiapas. Finally, privatization of the companies 
previously owned by the government reached its limits when there 
were no more companies to be privatized.   
The following case in point shows how international 
creditors did not act in good faith when dealing with Mexico nor 
did Mexico act on behalf of the majority of Mexicans. In his article 
entitled “Mexico Took the Bite from Its Creditors”, Norman 
Bailey, (who was the head of the economic affairs for the National 
Security Committee of the U.S. in 1982), stated that the biggest 
mistake of the Mexican government was in accepting the diagnosis 
of the Mexican crisis given by the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, who had argued that the debt crisis of 
Mexico was an issue of liquidity only and not a problem of more 
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complexity.95 Mexico did not act in accordance with the interests 
of the majorities in Mexico, declared Bailey, nor was it willing to 
become part of the alliance formed by Brazil and Argentina to 
negotiate external debt. Bailey affirms that with this decision, 
Mexico lost ten years of potential development. Although Bailey’s 
analysis did not reflect the complexity of the situation or the 
tremendous pressure in which the Mexican government found 
itself, nevertheless his declaration indicates the existence of 
possible options which the Mexican government may have had.  
Although we may never know the real possibilities that Mexico 
had when facing its powerful international creditors (backed by the 
United States), what we do know is that in the end the negotiations 
benefited the international creditors and powerful domestic actors, 
while simultaneously hurting the inner economy.   
In 1988 Mexico satisfied for the first time, one of the 
demands of international creditors--a low level of inflation. 
However, and not surprisingly, this was accompanied by high 
levels of poverty and a social crisis. Between 1983 and 1988 real 
wages dropped 7% annually (Lustig and Székely 1997), as the high 
cost of maintaining a low inflation rate brought on economic 
disadvantages. The strong desire for a low rate of inflation in spite 
of the resulting tremendous costs is still easily seen in the 
economy96.  Currently, the World Bank still defines Mexico’s lack 
of competitiveness as a situation created by Mexico’s own weak 
financial system, and low productivity in agriculture.97 We may 
ask then, how is it possible to achieve the high productivity and 
                                                 
95 See Rossana Fuentes Berán “Mexico mordió el anzuelo de los acreedores en 1982: Bailey” El 
Financiero, 20 de agosto de 1992, cited in  José Luis Calva, El Modelo liberal mexicano: costos, 
vulnerabilidad, alternativas (México D. F, 1995), 143. 
96 An example is the current situation in the auto market, which has shown low inflation throughout 2004. 
An economic study sponsored by the Mexican Legislative Chamber of Representatives found that the auto 
market showed an unprecedented growth in 2004 due to its low prices. However, 60% of the autos sold 
were imported. The study concluded that it did not make any sense for Mexico to use foreign exchange to 
subsidize imports and sacrifice national production (which had dropped 20% by the first half of the year), 
for the sake of maintaining a low inflation rate in that market. La Jornada, 1 March, 2005  
97 See Marcelo M. Giugale, “A Comprehensive Development Agenda for the New Era: Synthesis”, in 
Marcelo Giugale, Edit., Mexico: A Comprehensive Development Agenda for the New Era (Washington 
D.C: The World Bank 2000) 
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competitiveness expected by international institutions, when the 
nature of the subsistence economies in southern Mexico is one of 
low productivity and where the purpose of production is for self-
consumption, the avoidance of famine and ultimately the survival 
of communities?  Is it wise to attempt the removal of rural workers 
and place them in the market economy for the sake of 
competitiveness? Most of all, is it possible to implement economic 
policies in accordance with the global process without stimulating 
armed movements in southern Mexico?   
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    APPENDIX 
 
 
    Table 6:          Three Hypotheses on the Indigenous Population 
                                             of the Americas in 1492  
                                                (figures in millions) 
“Overstated” Thesis “Intermediate” Thesis “Understated” Thesis 
Dobyns 90 a 112 Denevan 57 Stewart 15.5 
Cook y Borah 100 Sapper 40 a 50 Rosenblat 13.3 
 Rivet 40 a 45 Kroeber 8.4 
 
 
Reduction of the Indian Population in Central Mexico 
                            (figures in millions) 
According to  Cook and 
Borah: 
1492 
1523 
1548 
1568 
1580 
1595 
1605 
25.3  
16.8   
 6.3    
 2.6    
 1.9    
 1.3    
 1.0   
According to Rosenblat 
1492 
1570 
1650 
 4.5  
 3.5   
 3.4  
Sources: Nicolás Sánchez Albornoz, et.al., La Población de América Latina (Buenos 
Aires: Ed.Paidos, 1968), 36, Angel Rosenblat, La Población indígena y el mestizaje en 
América, tomo 1, (Buenos Aires: Ed. Nova, 1954), 59-88,102.  Sherburne, F. Cook 
Woodrow Borah,  Ensayos sobre la historia de la población, México y el Caribe. (Siglo 
XXI, Mexico, 1981), 34. Available from 
http/www.puc.cl/sw_educ/historia/America/html 
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BOX 4   The Indian Movement: Declarations and International Agreements 
 
In December 1981 specialists and indigenous leaders met in Costa Rica for the International Congress on 
Ethnocide and Ethno-Development in Latin America. At the center of their pronouncements were:  the 
rights of indigenous people to land, autonomy, self-determination and the legitimacy of rebellion due to 
unrecognized collective rights. The declarations in Costa Rica have roots in many previous declarations and 
international agreements, such as:  
1) The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which affirms among 
other rights, the fundamental right of individuals to life, freedom and security; 
2) The Convention for the Prevention of and Sanctions against Genocide, which condemned acts 
of violence against ethic, religious or national groups;  
3) The Bogota Document, presented by the Organization of American States, affirming the 
fundamental economic, social and cultural rights of people, without distinction of race, religion, language, 
etc. The spirit of this document endorsed the right of individuals throughout their different stages of life, to 
be entitled to a healthy life and a dignifying status.  Additionally, this document endorsed the right to work, 
as well as the right to elementary and higher education;  
4) The 107 Resolution in 1957 by the International Labor Organization on Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations which recognized the indigenous right to the land, the habitat of indigenous people and the 
integration of indigenous peoples, although it rejected force or coercion as legitimate methods to achieve 
this integration. This integrationist approach made this declaration highly debated and led to its review in 
1990. The revised version became the most advanced document of the rights of Indian populations 
regarding land and cultural rights, and though it did not provide certainty regarding its application by the 
different countries nor a mechanism of accountability, it was rectified by 15 countries in the hemisphere, 
including Mexico; 
5) The United Nations convention against discrimination in education of 1960, which approved 
the right of minority groups to educate and be educated in their own language, to establish or maintain 
schools and have access to professional fields, such as teaching; 
6) The 1965 international resolution to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination, which was 
rectified by 27 countries; 
7) The 1966 international agreement on economic, social and cultural rights, which differed from 
other documents on human rights in that this document stated the right of all people on the planet to be self-
determinant and have the right to utilize and enjoy their natural resources and wealth;  
8) The Buenos Aires Protocol in 1967, which endorsed the Bogota document and the 1976 
Universal Declaration for the Rights of the People.  Sponsored by the Lelio Basso Foundation, this 
document affirmed respect for identity, traditions, language and culture, opposing discrimination; 
9) The 1997 NGO’s convention held in Switzerland on Discrimination against Indigenous 
Minorities in America; and  
10) The 1982 San José recommendation to the UNESCO (The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization), to make indigenous languages official, to let Indians educate their 
own people with the support of the state, to support indigenous peoples by negotiating with the member 
states, to exercise the rights to land and natural resources, the active inclusion of minorities and the need to 
extend access to the means of communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 149
 
Box 6 Main Socio-Economic Events and Their Effects in Chiapas 
 
Global:                                        National             Two Communities in Chiapas: Zinacantán and Chamula 
 
                 Population growth / demands for more land than the 
                                                                                                                           ejidos previously given  
Oil crisis 1971, 1973                    Mexican government decides to              “Dutch disease”               
                                                      promote drilling and export oil                Sacrificing of the agricultural sector  
                                                     International loans increased                         for the benefit of industry 
                   Imports of corn grow to 25%                    Decline of investment in agriculture 
   in 1980                                Increase of immigration to industrial centers 
                   Crisis 1976-77                                           Explosion of independent organizations 
 
Prices of oil declined 1982           Debt crisis                                Recession / Decline in construction jobs                                                                 
IMF recovery programs               Structural Adjustment Programs               Peasants return home / Social differentiation between those  
                      who made money and those who did not 
                                                                                      Trucking business flourishes 
                  End of the import substitution model         Conflict and confrontations arise between rich and poor 
                  of growth                                 Those who had nothing initiated marches to demand  
                                                    Neoliberalism phase begins                             assistance, land or the support to work it, but resources 
                                                    Subsidies are eliminated                                  to keep traveling to demand and demonstrate were  
                                                    IMECAFE dismantled (1988)                         exhausted 
             Repression by state government / Impunity increases 
                                  International price of coffee drops (1989)   Fertilizing methods require less labor   
                   Indigenous / Peasant system of cooperation becomes  
                       apparently unnecessary   
                   Unemployment increases. Money for fertilizers dries up 
                                                             More work required merely to obtain only food 
                                                                                                                          Women take multi-task jobs  
              Strategies of poor weaken 
                                     Disillusionment with peasant organizations’ efficacy in 
                                                                                                                                negotiating with the governrnent 
               Incomes drop and debts due to loans for coffee 
                   production skyrocket out of control 
               Banks take over lands and other collateral 
                                                       Peasants withdraw from civil credit and loan  
        organizations and join the Zapatista cause 
                                                                                               
    
   Government land reform                            Contradictory and corrupted federal initiatives to grant 
                                                                                                                              land for  the benefit of lumber companies 
              Agrarian conflicts 
  
 
                                                     Electoral Fraud                                           Fraudulent 1988 presidential elections reinforce that the  
                                                                                                                             system is based on political affiliation 
                                                                                                                         Legal assistance, education, right to the land, and access to 
                        other resources is based on  political affiliation only 
                                                     The state government issues modifications to the state 
                                                                                                                             constitution (Articles 13, 120 and 336) to deal  with  
                                                                                                                             “unruly crowds, demonstrators that disrupt public order”  
                                                                                                                          Threats against private property 
                                     Zinacatán can no longer be ruled by its indigenous,  
                                                                                                                              pluralistic, customary law; but by a magistrate   
                                                                                                                              appointed by the governor  
                                                                                        
                                     Human rights abuses 
                                         Human Rights Violations              Chiapas’ governor Patrocinio Gonzales imprisions 
   Chiapas second in nation                   2015 indigenous people between 1989 and 1992 
                   The following interim governor, Elmer Setzer, 
                       imprisions 282 in 1993 
                   Amnesty International denounces levels of impunity 
                                                                                                                          Loss of legitimacy  
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(Box 6 continued)                   
 
Pre-NAFTA reforms                   Reform of Article 27 of the               Land to no longer be granted, nor protected from 
                                                     Constitution                                                     market forces 
 
                 Ejidos previously given were subject to market forces 
                      People wait years to obtain legal possession of the land 
                          or simply give up 
                                      Failure of entitlement to the communal land  
                                                                                                           End of right to subsistence 
People join the Zapatista movement 
                                                                                                                                  
                                       
NAFTA agreement signed           Zapatista uprising Militarization / Repression 
       1994 crisis  Human rights violations 
Displacement of communities 
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The following assumptions are consistent with IMF principles. According to the IMF, the economic problems of 
Mexico resided in: 
--a balance of payments problem stemming from an “excessive demand” in the midst of few goods and 
services, encouraging the growth of imports and consequently, a trade deficit 
--an excessive demand that triggered high prices for the few goods available 
--high inflation impacting the balance of payments since domestic prices may be higher than international 
prices and imports result attractive to national consumers, creating a deficit 
--the erosion of currency value due to inflation; for example, in the event that inflation forces domestic prices 
for shoes to increase, in order to stay competitive with international prices, a devaluation was required to 
lower shoe prices and correct “price distortions” 
--over-valuation of domestic currency encourages capital flight, since due to economic uncertainty,  peso 
holders will seek the conversion of pesos to dollars and take the money out of the country 
--uncertainty and instability exacerbates foreign investors’ lack of confidence 
--inflation benefits investors that play the financial arena well, but hits the lower classes hardest 
 
Since 1982, the Mexican economy has rested on economic policies contained in the “letters of intent” signed before the 
IMF and World Bank during the 1980's. The economic policies were designed to achieve: 
a) promotion and protection of free markets, deemed vital for development and a healthy economy 
b) the reduction of public expenditure necessary for the sake of improved financial status 
c) elimination of food and transportation subsidies, indispensable for reduction in the budget deficit 
d) a cutback in the size of government, selling publicly owned companies that tend to be inefficient and 
placing them on the market to foster competition 
e) an economy open to foreign investment and protection as well as guaranties of confidence to capital flows 
from outside 
f) reduction of the money supply 
g) the establishment of a fixed and simple exchange rate to facilitate the flow of foreign currency 
h) a decrease in government intervention 
i) an aggressive privatization process of all sectors of the economy, including the most dynamic and vital 
ones 
J) that all of the above will move the economy toward a single and integrated global economy where 
merchandise will flow freely across borders and 
k) competition will eventually benefit everyone, and 
l) becoming internationally competitive is a goal that surpasses local 
companies’ goals for achieving self-sufficiency 
 
In 1982, when Mexico declared bankruptcy, the IMF’s consistent warning was that defaulting would 
eliminate Mexico’s ability to borrow in the future, and that Mexico’s lack of responsibility to its international 
agreements would be followed by a deeper crisis.  The IMF pressed for the reduction of demand, and of imports, 
devaluation, export promotion and eventually the creation of a trade surplus to pay the debt.  However, these policies 
left Mexico with a recession, high inflation and low international reserves. 
Economists in Mexico expressed their puzzlement that economic policies, such as those that fostered 
production in order to increase the supply of a few goods to match high demands, were not considered.  Instead, the 
Fund pressured to cut consumer spending by having high interest rates limit credit and discourage capital flight, to 
lower government spending and increase government revenue through raising prices for consumers of government 
utilities. 
These policies were followed until 1994, when the Mexican economy experienced a second crisis.  The 1994 
crisis can be explained as a continuation of the crisis of 1982, since the Mexican economy was experiencing the same 
organic problems.  Economic analysts have pointed out that since 1982, the economy has evidenced the following 
problems: 
 
a) That the economic model implemented since 1982 did not create an endogenous sustainability, levels of 
 productivity, internal savings nor adjustments for the external sector.  Economic policies were aimed at reducing 
inflation and correcting a distortion of prices.  These policies, however, were not accompanied by complementary 
policies that would foster the national industry’s ability to compete against foreign companies nor lower interest 
rates for credit to modernize or expand the national industry. 
         
b) The foreign investment that entered the economy during this period (1982-1994) was mainly speculative capital 
          that did not enter the production sector, and consequently the expected benefit for the modernization of the 
           national industry did not occur. 
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(Continued) 
 
c) The process of privatization came to an end in 1994, and no more state-owned companies could be sold. 
 
The economy did not show significant growth approaching 1994. The manufacturing sector showed negative 
figures along with a negative current balance and a higher level of external indebtedness. The status of the economy did 
not offer guaranties for repayments of government assets, or attractive conditions for investment. External capital 
stopped flowing in and consequently speculative earnings stopped. This was followed by massive capital flight, in 
search of low-risk markets, and internally, an increase of dollar-indexed government assets by domestic holders.  The 
government did not have policies in place regarding the regulation of foreign capital, in part because the Mexican 
government was more concerned about credibility with international institutions than with the wellbeing of the 
Mexican people.  Simply speaking, Mexico was selling its house to pay the credit card, refusing to address the 
underlying causes and the fragility of the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Huerta, Arturo “La Crisis del neoliberalismo mexicano” in Problemas del Desarrollo: Revista  
             Latinoamericana de Economía Mexico (April-June 1995). 
             John Saxe- Fernandez, “Plan de choque y la dialéctica entre macrorregionalización y 
             microrregionalizacón” en Problemas del desarrollo: Revista Latinoamericana de Economía Mexico (July- 
            September 1995) 
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Box 8   Grievances in Chiapas 
 
. . . The peasant, the Indian, works hard, and is always exploited, selling his products cheap and buying things high, so 
we leave our money and our work with the merchant. 
. . . For us, merchants and monopolists are "A GREAT PLAGUE." 
. . . Exploitation in commerce goes from little things to big and expensive things.  We are always at a disadvantage. 
. . . "Intermediaries" snatch our products, in markets and on the road, and pay what they want. 
. . . The pig dealers trick us, for example, stuffing their pigs with grain [like "watering the stock," to put false weight on 
them]. . . 
. . . And when we buy products or sell them, often they trick us with weights and measures. 
. . . We know there are very powerful gentlemen who take advantage and are getting very rich from stealing or paying 
very low prices for products of high price. 
. . . Here we want to DENOUNCE the coffee dealers, the timber dealers in Los Altos (and in the jungle), the cattle 
dealers. For example, with timber, they trick us, and because the community does not know how to defend itself or 
know its rights, they exploit it. They bribe the ejido commissioners. Before, for a mahogany tree that costs $10,000 
[pesos] or more they paid us $25 or $50. Now they do not pay us anything anymore, and they haul timber out day and 
night in big trucks. 
. . . The buyers and sellers set prices at their whim. So, for example, the corn we sell at 50 centavos, we buy at 3 pesos. 
. . . The sale of liquor and beer is a great source of exploitation……. 
. . . The loans in money are at high interest. For example, loans at 100% interest in seven months. 
 
Some of Grievances related to Education 
. . . It is a very bad system of education. Even the teaching is bad. 
. . . What they teach is of no use for the improvement of the community. 
. . . They only teach how to read and write, which the children soon forget, but they learn nothing about how to make a 
living. 
. . . It is an education that prepares the children for exploitation. 
. . . Those who finish the sixth year know nothing; they become exploiters following the example of their teachers. 
. . . The school is against our customs, and makes people leave. 
. . . It does not teach anything about improvement of the land, agriculture, care of animals, agrarian law, or medicine. 
. . . There is a lack of schools. 
. . . Schooling is incomplete. For example, there is a school that has been going for 38 years, and no one has finished 
the primary grades. 
. . . We see that schooling only really serves the ladinos. 
. . . Most of the teachers and INI agents give a bad example….. 
. . . . . Ladino teachers . . . think they are superior. 
 . . There is a group of Tzeltal teachers who work on their own private initiative. The government does not support 
them. They are good, but they need training. They have asked for positions in INI, but are not given them . . . 
 
Some Grievances related to Health 
. . . We suffer many diseases and epidemics. 
. . . There are many zones where there is a lot of tuberculosis, intestinal diseases, hemorrhages, rheumatism. 
. . . The reasons why we suffer this are: malnutrition and poverty; lack of land; lack of knowledge about domestic 
hygiene, water, food; lack of shelter; rain. 
. . . Our living conditions are conditions of disease. 
. . . The vaccination campaigns do not get to us. Or when they do, instead of giving us the prescribed triple vaccination, 
they give us only one shot. 
. . . The lack of roads means that many vaccinations or medicines never get here. 
. . . Only in some places are there big clinics. In most places there are none. 
. . . For example, there is not a single hospital in the entire Chol zone, or in Tila, Sabanilla, Tumbalá. Because of the 
isolation in which we live, only those who have money can get out to be cured; the others have to die from their 
disease. 
. . . Where there are health centers, neither the doctors nor the nurses know how to go into the country. We want there 
to be more doctors, but for them to see people in their homes. 
. . . In the health centers we suffer discrimination; it is that they do not know how to speak our language. 
. . . Over the radio they tell us about hygiene and health, but our conditions do not improve just because of what the 
radio says.. . . . . Indians have more trust in Indian medicine than in ladino medicine. 
. .  
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Box 9   1974 Community Accords in Chiapas 
 
Accords: Land 
The Land Belongs to Those Who Work It. 
1. We all want to solve the problems of land, but we are divided, each for himself, and so we feel we have 
no strength. We are looking to organize each group so that it will have strength, because union makes 
strength. 
2. We demand that the communal lands taken away from our fathers be returned to us. 
3. That the employees of the Agrarian Department effectively resolve pending administrative questions. We 
demand an end to extortion by engineers and zone chiefs and forestry officers. 
4. That the problem of the Tulijá Dam be justly resolved, and that they take us into account. 
5. That the minimum wage be paid to Indians who work on fincas and in cities, and that they receive all the 
benefits that the law provides. 
6. That taxes not be imposed on sterile land. That taxes be fair. 
7. We demand that to settle our problems the government not send in the army, that problems be settled 
with the community, not with the army. 
 
Accords: Commerce 
Equality and Justice in Prices 
1. We want an Indian Market, that is, that we ourselves be the ones who buy and sell, that this be organized 
in each municipality, starting with hamlets, colonies, and settlements, concentrating produce in our 
warehouses, so that among ourselves, Tzeltals, Tzotzils, Tojolabals, and Chols, we can sell each other our 
various products. 
2. We want to organize ourselves into cooperatives for selling and producing, to defend ourselves from 
monopolizers and so that profits do not leave the community. 
3. We demand that INMECAFE (the federal coffee-purchasing agency) not sell itself out to monopolizers, 
that it buy (from us) at guaranteed prices through the representative elected by the community. 
 
Accords: Education 
To Renew the Education of Our Children 
1. We want Indian teachers to be trained who will teach in our language and our custom, and that they also 
teach Spanish. We do not want teachers who do not know our language and customs. 
2. We want teachers who will respect the communities and their customs. We want them to teach us our 
rights as citizens. We want the community to be taught its rights. 
We want them to commit themselves to the service of the community. 
3. We want our communities themselves to organize themselves better, that there be a committee 
independent of the teachers, elected by the community, to watch over the teacher’s work. 
4. Education and teaching are very necessary, but they should help to improve our human conditions and 
respond to the needs of the community, in land and animals, social integration, cultivation, tailoring, 
bricklaying.  
5. That there be an Indian newspaper in our four languages (Chol, Tzotzil, Tzetzal, Tojolabal).  That the 
paper be the Indians’ and that it serve for our own communication. 
 
Accords: Health 
Health is Life 
1. We need to organize our community so that we can take care of our health. 
2. We want the old medicine not to be lost. It is necessary to know the medicinal plants in order to use them 
for the good of us all. 
3. We ask that there be clinics in the big Indian villages and that they serve the smaller communities with 
Indian nurses who know both medicines, that of pills, and that of plants.  
4. In many of our zones there is tuberculosis. We ask for an effective campaign against tuberculosis. 
5. That there be education in health to prevent diseases, and for hygiene, so that the two medicines are not 
mixed up.         (Womack 1999) 
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Chapter IV    
 
The Political Economy of Exclusion and  
Failure of Acquirement in the Mexican Context 
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Following the Great Depression of the 1930s and the period 
of World War II, poverty became a measured global condition 
through the use of income levels and per capita income. This 
approach to poverty and development, although it holds merits in 
its own right, focuses on individuals whose income is not 
sufficiently adequate to fulfill their basic human needs in relation 
to conventional patterns of behavior, and in so doing this approach 
is restricted and limited. Following this reasoning, poverty is 
determined by earnings below a set income level only (Sen 1981). 
Sen, however, has proposed going beyond narrow views of 
development and the lineal association of development and levels 
of income, since the reason for obtaining wealth is in order to 
thereby obtain something else, viz., freedom. According to Sen, 
human beings are diverse by essence and we cannot draw a line of 
poverty that can be applied indiscriminately around the world, 
ignoring the characteristics and personal circumstances of different 
societies. Therefore, Sen has proposed the capability approach, 
which defines development as the process of the expansion of the 
freedoms that people value.  Poverty is viewed as the lack of 
capabilities of people to achieve the freedoms they value the most.   
 
What capability perspective does in poverty analysis is to enhance the 
understanding of the nature and causes of poverty and deprivation by 
shifting primary attention away from means (and one particular mean 
that is usually given exclusive attention, viz., income) to ends that 
people have reason to pursue, and, correspondingly, to the freedoms to 
be able to satisfy these ends (1999:90). 
 
Moreover, this method analyzes the restrictions on reaching 
sufficient entitlement that enable humans to achieve basic 
functions in a society. Regarding these conceptions of 
development and freedom, Sen remarks that the: 
…enhancement of human freedom is both the main object      
 and primary means of development…. The ends and means 
 of development call for placing the perspective of freedom at 
 the center of the stage. The people have to be seen, in this  
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 perspective, as being actively involved--given the 
 opportunity--in shaping their own destiny, 
 and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning 
 development programs. The state and the society have  
 extensive roles in strengthening and safeguarding human 
 capabilities. This is a supporting role, rather than one of  
 ready-made delivery. The freedom-centered perspective on 
 the ends and the means of development has some claim to 
 our attention (1999:53). 
 
If the expansion of peoples’ capabilities can actually lead to 
better living conditions for the poor and the enjoyment of more 
freedoms, then poverty becomes a restriction, an experienced 
deprivation, an obstacle that keeps people from reaching their 
aspirations in life. Without denying the importance of income 
analysis, Sen proposes a departure from viewing poverty as only a 
matter of income flow. In Sen’s broader understanding, poverty 
consists of the lack of freedom, a loss of people’s entitlement to 
live lives that they have reason to value. In consequence, 
development mainly implies the removal of constraints in order to 
achieve higher levels of freedom. 
 The achievement of economic development is usually 
associated with a better quality of life, reduction of poverty, low 
mortality rates, expansion of life expectancy, etc. The capabilities 
approach however, insists that these indicators can be achieved 
through the expansion of people’s capabilities. This expansion of 
capabilities allows individuals to reach alternative functioning 
combinations, and thereby indirectly move toward economic 
development. For instance, child mortality has been shown to be 
correlated to the mother’s access to education.  In others words, 
living better and longer lives does not have to be left pending until 
economic growth is reached and spreads its benefits to society, but 
rather, instead of being only a final consequence of economic 
development, the expansion of people’s capabilities is also a 
means of reaching economic development. This is in agreement 
with Sen’s notion of economic development as a friendly process, 
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instead of a process of blood, sweat and tears which only 
industrialized countries can overcome.  
Another important contribution of Sen has been in the area of 
understanding famines and hunger. Based on individual 
entitlements, Sen’s analysis states that famines, (contrary to the 
commonly held belief that famines are caused exclusively by the 
lack of food or its distribution), are related to entitlement failures.  
Entitlements are defined by Sen as the commodities over which 
one can establish ownership which enable an individual to have 
access to food (Sen 1999). Three factors together make up what 
Sen calls the basket of entitlements. The first is the endowment or 
the ownership of the person over productive resources, (labor, 
land, other resources), that have a price on the market. The second 
factor is the condition of production possibilities available thanks 
to changes in technology or knowledge, which are geared to 
reaching higher levels of food production or higher wages. The 
majority of humanity however, earns wages in order to buy food. 
Thirdly, the exchange conditions and prices for the exchanged 
goods in a given economy can determine whether or not the holder 
of an entitlement can made a successful transaction, (e.g., labor 
for food). During a crisis, as expected, markets and their 
mechanisms of exchange can be altered drastically and can cause a 
failure in the ability of individuals to obtain necessary goods. 
Entitlement failure can be followed by starvation in a poor 
country, where the entitlement system is geared to obtaining vital 
goods for survival. For instance, unemployment, the prices of non-
food goods, and the level of wages play a vital role and can 
determine the ability of laborers and workers to obtain food. 
Therefore, Sen concludes that starvation can occur without a 
decline in the production of food and surprisingly in the mists of 
greater food availability, as occurred in Bangladesh in 1973. 
 Sen makes an important distinction between commodities or 
goods, and capabilities. To clarify this distinction, he provides the 
following illustration. An owner of a bicycle, (a mode of 
transportation), has the capability of getting around and also of 
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sometimes finding pleasure through the use of his/her bicycle. 
However, if the owner happens to be a severely disabled person, 
owning a bicycle will not make a difference in her/his level of 
freedom. Amartya Sen states that while commodity ownership can 
bring satisfaction to the possessor, it does not provide any 
information about what the individual can do, about his/her 
capability or ability to achieve or acquire. Sen concludes that the 
essence of the standard of living does not reside in commodity 
ownership, or in the characteristics of the commodity, but rather in 
the ability of people to achieve, to alter or improve society or to 
live better lives. This freedom to acquire, and not the mere act of 
achieving in owning or obtaining goods, is fundamental to Sen’s 
proposal. Consequently, the GDP studies of any country can 
measure commodities, but they fail to take into account the 
standard of living, the overall well-being of people, levels of 
mortality, undernourishment, etc. Development should consist, Sen 
concludes, of enhancing capabilities rather than merely increasing 
commodities. 
 Having briefly defined Sen’s methodology, we now turn to 
the region in rebellion from the perspective of entitlements.  First, 
we take a closer look at the region through the lenses of 
marginalization and human development (A). Second, we focus 
specifically on communities in the region and analyze the system of 
entitlements during the period between 1982 and 1994 (B).  In the 
final section we will search for the reasons for acquirement failure 
and possible links to the uprising of 1994 in Chiapas (C).   
  
 
A. Marginalization and Human Development 
  
In Mexico the Indices de marginación 2000, published by 
CONAPO (National Population Institute) defines marginalization 
as a structural phenomenon that springs from historical patterns of 
development and reveals itself in two aspects. The first is the 
difficulty of spreading technical progress in all the productive 
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areas of the economy, and in excluding social groups from the 
process and the benefits of development. The second aspect is 
multidimensional in nature. On one hand it represents a precarious 
structural system of opportunities for citizens, families and 
communities, exposing them to deprivations, risks and 
vulnerability beyond their personal, family or community control 
(Conapo 2001). Additionally, the intensity and characteristics vary 
dependant on demographic and geographic particulars of the 
region. Understanding the context and differences, the study 
argues, can help to determine region-specific alternatives and 
prioritize policies. Since poverty, a complex phenomenon, is not 
only influenced by income but also by other variables such as 
health, geographical circumstances, physical limitations, cultural 
differences, exclusion of markets and their benefits, etc., Conapo 
has developed an index of marginalization based on the kind of un-
freedoms or restrictions that Mexicans experience. It identifies 
nine types of exclusions, and evaluates their intensity by measuring 
the population percentage that does not participate in the 
fulfillment of basic needs. Table 9 presents a summary of concepts 
and chosen indicators.
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Table 9   Measuring Marginality 
Concept of  
Marginalization 
Socio-economic 
 Dimensions 
Forms of 
Exclusion 
Tool to measure 
the Intensity of 
Exclusion 
Index of 
Marginalization 
 
 
 
1. Education 
 
a) Illiterate 
   population  
 
 
 
b) Percentage of   
    population  
    without  
    elementary  
    school 
 
Percentage of the 
population aged 
15 or above who 
are illiterate 
 
Percentage of the 
population aged 
15 or above 
without elemen-
tary education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A multiple 
structural 
phenomenon that 
evaluates the  
dimensions and 
intensity of the 
forms of 
exclusion from 
the process of 
development and 
enjoyment of its 
benefits 
2. Housing a) Houses without 
    potable water 
 
 
 
 
b) Houses without 
    plumbing 
 
 
 
c) Houses with  
   dirt floor 
 
 
d) Houses without 
   electricity 
 
 
 
e) houses with 
    some level of  
   over-crowding 
 
-Percentage of 
  the population 
  living without  
  potable water 
 
-Percentage of  
  population living 
  without 
  plumbing 
 
-Percentage of  
 population with 
 dirt floors 
 
-Percentage of  
  population living 
  without  
  electricity 
 
-Percentage of  
  population living 
  with some level 
  of overcrowding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 Overall Intensity 
     of Socio-  
    Economic 
   Marginalization
 3. Income a) Population that receives two 
minimum wages 
-Percentage of  
  population 
  receiving two  
  minimum wages 
 
 
 4. Population     Distribution 
a) Localities with 
less than 5000 
inhabitants 
-Percentage of the 
  population living 
  in towns with 
  less than 5000 
  inhabitants 
 
 
Source: Consejo Nacional de Población, Indices de Marginación 2000 (México: CONAPO, 2001) 
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The lack of access to education represents a barrier for 
people to be able to reach what they value most in life, and more 
importantly, to have the basis to articulate their own perspectives 
about their environment, culture and their own needs. Therefore, 
the absence of opportunity to obtain education necessarily becomes 
a form of exclusion.98 The novelty of this procedure is that the 
marginalization index, whose calculations are based on these nine 
indicators, allows for a differentiation of regions, states and 
municipios99 according to the intensity of depravation of these nine 
basic needs. 
                                                 
98 Two indexes are used to reveal the level of exclusion in the area of education. The first is the illiteracy 
index, which measures the percentage of the illiterate population 15 years or older; the second measures the 
percentage of the population without elementary education. The methodology used in this study is briefly 
explained here by the following:  according to the 2000 census, which offered data distributed already by 
states regions and counties, the study focused on the illiteracy condition. The illiteracy population is 
understood as the section of the population that is unable to read or write a message or note. To evaluate the 
illiteracy condition in general two indexes are used.  First, the illiteracy index is calculated by the following 
formula: 
   I= (Pi/P15-NE)x100 
Pi represents the population that is illiterate; P15, the population 15 years and older; and NE, the population 
15 years and older with unspecified illiteracy condition. A second index, similar to the previous one, is 
used to measure the population with incomplete elementary school education.   
 
99 Mexican states are subdivided politically and geographically into municipios. 
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Map 2   Mexico: Levels of Marginality 2000 
 
Source: Consejo Nacional de Población, Indices de marginación 2000 (México: CONAPO, 2001) 
 
 
In Map 2, the marginalization index reveals that the states 
with very high marginalization levels in the year 2000 were the 
states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Veracruz and Hidalgo; in 
which 20% of the total population lived. This means that a total of 
19.6 million people that resided in these five states experienced 
high levels of deprivation. A majority of people in the region, 61%, 
lived in disperse and isolated towns of less than 5,000 inhabitants. 
Regarding wages, the study showed that 76% of the employed 
population made less than two Mexican minimum wages or 
between $4-$7 U.S. dollars. In general, the three southern states of 
Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero showed similar figures, while the 
state of Guerrero contained the highest percentage (35%) of people 
living without sanitation services or a toilet. It is also interesting to 
note that only four states showed very low indexes of 
marginalization, and among them, the Federal District, (the capital 
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of Mexico, more commonly known as Mexico City), showed the 
lowest index. 
To appreciate indigenous living conditions in Mexico, the 
study took a survey of municipios. These municipios were divided 
by a) indigenous municipios where 70% of inhabitants 5 years and 
older spoke an indigenous language, b) predominantly indigenous 
where 40 to 70% of the population five years and older spoke an 
indigenous language, c) with a strong indigenous presence where 
10 to 40% percent of inhabitants spoke an indigenous language and 
d) other municipios where less than 10% spoke an indigenous 
language. These results are reflected in Table 10. According to this 
data, 812 municipios (346+186+280), fell within the classification 
of a, b or c. Of these, 346 were indigenous municipios, of which 
209 had very high levels of marginalization and 133 had high 
levels of marginalization. Only four of these municipios showed 
moderate levels of marginalization.   
 Looking at these facts from a national perspective, we can 
observe that of the 386 municipios classified as municipios with 
very high levels of marginalization in 2000 in Mexico, 309 
(209+57+43) or 80% were indigenous, predominantly indigenous 
or had a strong indigenous presence. Also, of the 906 municipios 
classified as having a high level of marginalization, 698 (77%) 
were municipios with some degree of indigenous population. 
Graph 5 shows the levels of marginality of municipios which have 
an indigenous presence. In Mexico to be part of indigenous 
communities is to live in marginalization. The intensity of 
marginalization decreases as the percentage of the indigenous 
population represented in these municipios decreases. For 
example, while the 209 (60%) municipios of the 346 indigenous 
communities were classified with very high marginalization, only 
43 (15%) of the 280 municipios with strong indigenous presence 
were classified under very high marginalization, and only 77 
(4.7%) of 1630 municipios that contained less than 10% of 
indigenous population were classified under very high levels of 
marginalization (see Table 10). 
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Table 10 
Municipios with Indigenous Presence 
and Levels of Marginalization 2000 
 
 
Municipios                               Total            Very High            High               Medium           Low             Other 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total                                            2 443             386                     906                 486                 417              ---- 
 
Indigenous                                   346                209 (60%)           133                    4                     - 
 
Predominantly Indigenous          186                 57  (31%)            106                   18                    3 
 
With SIP                                      280                 43  (15%)            150                   62                  20 
   
Others                                       1 630                 77  (4.7%)           517                 402                394 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on Indice de marginación 2000 
 
 
 
Graph 5  Total Number of Municipios with High and Very High Levels 
                     of Marginalization 
 
Source: Elaborated by author based on Indice de marginación 2000 
 
                                                                                                    
                          Non-Indigenous                                           Indigenous 
 
 
540
560
580
600
620
640
660
680
700
720
 
 Intensity   of    marginalization
Number of Municipalities
 166
 
In terms of numbers, we can say that 10 million people (386 
communities), located mostly in southern Mexico experienced high 
or very high levels of marginalization. Additionally, another 8 
million experienced a moderate level of marginalization. It can be 
concluded that in 2000, 18 million Mexicans lived under varying 
levels of precarious conditions or were deprived of the means and 
opportunities to function and achieve their goals in life. It is not 
surprising to find that the majority of these municipios with a high 
or very high level of marginalization (1,292) are found in southern 
Mexico (see Table 9). Oaxaca has an unusually high number of 
municipios—458; Puebla has 153, Veracruz 146, Chiapas 109 and 
Guerrero 67. 
 
Table 11          Municipios by States,  
According to High and Very High  
 Levels of Marginalization, 2000 
 
                      Total                Very High         High 
                    
           1,292                    386                906 
 
Oaxaca              458                   182                 276 
Puebla               153                     35                 118 
Veracruz           146                     49                   97 
Chiapas             109                     44                   65 
Guerrero             67                      30                   37 
Others               359                      46                 313 
____________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated by author, based on Indice de marginación 2000 
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Graph 6:  Share of Population in (Income) Poverty in Southern States 
                  (Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero) in Relation to the National Level 
                                                       
           Population in poverty      
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Sources:  Graph based on CEPAL calculations for national levels and World Bank calculation of poverty in 
southern states. See Damián, Araceli and Julio Boltvinik ,“Evolución y características de la pobreza en 
México”. Comercio Exterior, 53, no 6, (June 2003), and Quentin Wodon, Gladis López-Acevedo, “Poverty 
in Mexico’s Southern States” (World Bank 2004) available from 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/ECADocbyUnid/541D538865DA825A85256DC5007A7BC
8?Opendocument   
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Graph 7      Marginalization Index and State Ranking 
                               for Southern States 
 
         Source: Elaborated by author, based on Indice de marginación 2000 
 
Graph 6 reports on the share of total poverty of the southern states.  
It is important to remember that poverty is a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon and not just the absence of income. Graph 7 reveals 
that Chiapas is the state with the highest level of marginality, with 
Guerrero and Oaxaca ranked as second and third respectively. In 
the case of Chiapas, the illiteracy rate was 50%. Also, 23% of the 
population 15 years and older did not finish elementary school; one 
in five of the people in this state lived without sewage or a toilet, 
12 in 100 people lived without electricity and one in four did not 
have drinking water. The study also revealed that four out of ten 
residents had dirt floors and almost 2 out of every 3 live in 
inadequate housing. Additionally, 76% of those who make up the 
active labor force were receiving income equivalent to two 
minimum wages.100 Sixty percent of the population lived in towns 
                                                 
100 The minimum wage for Chiapas and Oaxaca in 2000 was $32.70 (pesos). The exchange rate was $9.49 
(pesos) per U.S. dollar.  
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that were dispersed and isolated with less than 5000 habitants. The 
situation in the state of Chiapas did not vary much from that of 
Oaxaca and Guerrero. In fact, the population in these three states 
alone represented 55% of the total population that lived in extreme 
poverty in 2000.101 
 The 2002 Human Development Index Report of Mexico 
(HIRM), the first of its kind in Mexico, shed light on the 
conditions of the region by pointing out existing inequalities in 
human development in Mexico. The Report incorporates Sen’s 
concept of freedom, which differs from its common use, going 
beyond that of individual liberties which need to be protected from 
interference by the state or other actors, including governments. 
According to the HIRM, individual freedom without the means to 
fulfill basic human aspirations, such as living a healthy life or 
avoiding premature death, makes little sense. Human development 
therefore, focuses on the enabling conditions in which people live. 
The report argues that there are three fundamental capabilities that 
individuals need to hold in order to wholly fulfill their aspirations. 
The first is the capability of living a healthy and long life; the 
second is the acquisition of knowledge valued by the individual 
and society; and third is the possibility of obtaining the necessary 
resources to enjoy a respectable standard of living. Consequently, 
the subject of study lies in opportunities, and the indicators chosen 
in the study to measure development are: life expectancy, literacy 
rates and school enrollment, and the per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). 
This report relies on indexes from previous Human 
Development World Reports, ranking from high (HDI of 0.800-1), 
to medium (HDI of 0.500-0.799) and low (HDI of below 0.499).   
 
                                                 
101 Quentin Wodon, Gladis Lopez-Acevedo, “Poverty in Mexico’s Southern States” (World Bank 2004). 
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                  Graph 8: Level of Human Development of Southern States 
 
Source: Elaborated by author and based on the Informe sobre el desarrollo humano México 2002 
(PNUD, 2003) 
 
Graph 8 shows that of the 32 states that exist in Mexico, Chiapas 
ranked as the state with the lowest human development level. It 
had the lowest rate of life expectancy, and rate of literacy among 
those 15 years and older, the lowest overall educational level as 
well as the lowest GDP per capita. Graph 8 also reflects a drastic 
picture of inequality within Mexico102. Mexico City, which is not a 
state but rather a federal district, displays a high HDI (0.891), 
similar to human indexes held by countries such as Hong Kong, 
Spain, and Italy, while Chiapas has a very low human index 
similar to El Salvador or Algeria. The HIRM additionally shows 
that through the years, not much change can be seen in the region. 
Neither NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), nor 
                                                 
102 See also INEGI, Chiapas perfil sociodemográfico. Censo general de población y vivienda 2000. México 
D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geográfica e informática. 
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the dynamic economic growth in the 1990s, have caused a 
significant positive impact in the region. In the World Bank’s 
opinion, NAFTA did not reach southern Mexico because states 
such as Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero were not “ready” to reap the 
benefits of free trade. These states, according to the Bank, suffer 
from insufficient infrastructure and access to telecommunication 
services, social instability and poor governance.103 Yet in 
disagreement with this conclusion we argue that this so called lack 
of “readiness” or marginality and inequality do not reflect the total 
picture. If human development focuses on the enabling conditions 
in which people live, the question then is how these conditions are 
expressed in the daily hardships of the marginalized communities. 
In the following section we offer analytical statements 
regarding the socio-economic and political situation of three 
communities in Oaxaca and one in Chiapas, applying the 
entitlements and capabilities approach. The three communities in 
Oaxaca are Tlacochahuaya (Tlaco), Guelavia (Guela) and Santa 
Ana, and the comminity in Chiapas is Zinancantan.104 We have 
chosen 1993 for two reasons, first because of its proximity to the 
uprising of 1994 in Chiapas, and second, because Oaxaca remains, 
according to the Human Development Report as the state with the 
least change in the last 10 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Gerardo Esquivel, Daniel Lederman, Miguel Messmacher, Renata Villoro, Why NAFTA Did Not Reach 
the South. (World Bank Group, 2003) 
104 Due to the limitations of this research, a warning is pertinent regarding these remarks, though many 
similarities can be found between indigenous communities in Oaxaca and Chiapas (such as the socio-
economic circumstances highlighted here), many differences can be found in other aspects (language, 
environment, history, etc.). Therefore these remarks should be taken only as approximations to the real 
circumstances in the region. 
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B. Entitlements and Capabilities in Community Life in  
 Southern Mexico105  
Extended Entitlement System 
 
In most indigenous communities in southern Mexico, 
individuals tend to participate in the system of cooperation, even 
though cooperation may result in conflicts, competition and even 
exploitation (Cohen 1999). We can presume in some sense that 
Zapotecs in the valley of Oaxaca make economic decisions in ways 
similar to individuals that live in Mexico City or other regions; yet 
this comparison cannot be presumed to be identical. Although 
some similarities can be found, a peasant is in a situation of greater 
inequality with his/her surroundings, and also has experienced a 
long-standing condition of deprivation.  Individuals in any society 
seem to hold a particular view of the market economy and shape 
by cultural values (Cohen 1999). Choices indeed, seem to be tied 
to or limited by culture and values.  
Cooperation appears to be rooted in communal identity and 
not produced by the uncertainty of the context, including that of 
the market. Rather, cooperative behavior, (though not exclusive of 
indigenous villages), is passed from parents to children as a part of 
reality and the successes of cooperation reinforce the value of this 
daily practice. Cooperation tends to occur on three levels: within 
the household or family members, between households, and within 
the community as a whole. 
Cooperation assumes that the individual be a person of 
character. As elsewhere in Mexico, cooperation requires reciprocal 
aid at different points in time, cooperation is not really free--it 
comes at a cost, namely the willingness and the sacrifice involved 
in helping others. Cooperation in these communities, however, 
                                                 
105 The empirical data found in this section is from a study carried out by Sanchez Gomez (1995), as well 
as more recently documented reports on these towns and region. 
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tends to go beyond calculated costs and benefits, becoming an 
explicit commitment to the communal life. 
Decision-making in an intentional system of cooperation is 
determined in part by individual conditions but also by collective 
values, such as the common good, the environment, and survival. 
Cooperation may become an option for the wealthy, and yet 
cooperation tends to be chosen even in the midst of wealth; not 
because it is the only option but because cooperation is perceived 
as a social investment that can provide help in times of necessity. 
Cooperation, as well as other reciprocal transactions, also 
appears to be part of the spirituality of the people. For example, in 
Santa Ana, a village in the valley of Oaxaca, the Zapotecs seem to 
combine together promises to the saints, requests for miracles, and 
making your needs known to others in the community. One of the 
villagers explained: 
“I can go like this (walks up to the altar in the church) to the 
saint to ask for a car or a yunta or whatever I want to have. I 
take an offering and tell the image that I want to buy this. I 
might get a figure of what I want and put it in the church that 
is full of Milagros. We call them Milagros (“miracles”)--
they are small figures. If one has a desire, you bring the 
figure to the altar and leave it there to be guarded and then 
wait to get it. You have asked and so you have to wait. In the 
United States you work, you don’t need to ask, you don’t 
need to wait. Here too we work hard, but it isn’t the same, 
you make very little. You have to work hard here, and the 
saints, they help us. (Cohen 1999) 
A case can be made therefore that the entitlement system in 
such communities may not be limited to one’s direct established 
ownership of several commodities, but involves extended 
ownership of commodities, (e.g., communal land and cooperation), 
which are enhanced by cultural practices and values. More 
specifically, among the people of this community, the entitlement 
system features a prominent dependent relationship of exchange 
 174
with others to maintain relationships and eventually assure 
survival.  
Relations intentionally based on principles of reciprocity 
imply obligations among members of the community which are 
fulfilled at different points in time during the life of individuals.106 
We shall refer to this as an extended entitlement system.  
The expectation that with the arrival of competition, 
cooperation will decline and eventually disappear does not seem 
likely to come true among indigenous communities. In spite of an 
increasing number of men emigrating to the U.S. and increasing 
hardships for those that stay, cooperation as a practice to maintain 
identity survives. Nevertheless, this does not reflect the 
conclusions of studies of peasant economy in rural Mexico, 
(mostly Marxist analysis), which contain the expectation of an 
eventual disappearance of indigenous economic life due to the 
inevitable destruction of cooperation (Cook 1995). The theoretical 
assumption behind this expectation is that capitalism everywhere 
takes a homogenous form, and the social class contradictions of the 
economic system create enormous labor reserves in the 
“periphery” which eventually will be absorbed by capital forces at 
low wages. From this perspective economies of subsistence are 
assimilated by the forces of capitalism, and the communities’ 
surpluses and profitable economic activities end up in the hands of 
capitalists which do not live in the community. However, surveys 
such as the one carried out by Scott Cook and Leigh Binford in the 
valley of Oaxaca, have shown that small household industries can 
take on a variety of different forms. Peasants with capital, for 
example, participate in the accumulation of capital themselves.  
They also exploit others and play an active economic role, 
becoming like the great capitalists unknown to people of the 
                                                 
106 Similar to these observations, Jacqueline Vel has found the practice of reciprocity in Lawonda, Sumba 
(Eastern –Indonesia). She observed that within the system of reciprocity, actual transactions implied not 
only an item or service to be transferred, but transactions were used to create or maintain a social 
relationship. Reciprocity creates in this sense, a system of obligations or mutual indebtedness but also a 
sense of wealth and security and survival in the long run. See Vel, Jaqueline. The Uma-economy: 
Indigenous economics and development work in Lawonda, Sumba (Eastern-Indonesia)  (The Netherlands: 
Grafisch bedrijf, 1994)       
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communities. In other words, peasants and indigenous individuals 
are active economic agents, and within the community cooperation 
tends to remain a way of preserving their identity. 
Now we move to a discussion of other specific economic 
issues. Household economic activities in the valley of Oaxaca, in 
general, take two forms. The first is the production of merchandise 
for consumption without the intention of accumulating capital, and 
second, agricultural activities. Agricultural practices continue for 
the simple reason that even though the land does not promise to 
become a reliable economic activity, it provides the necessary 
means of subsistence. This doesn’t exclude the fact that some of 
the production will reach markets, see Graph 9 for 1960 and Graph 
10 for 1993. 
 
Graph 9 1960: Destination of Crops in Three Communities 
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Graph 10  1993: Destination of Crops in Three Communities 
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Source: Sanches Goméz Marta, “Actividades económicas y estratégicas de reproducción en tres 
comunidades hablantes de  zapoteco en los valles de Oaxaca” in Globalización y deterioro 
ambiental y reorganización social en el campo (México: UNAM, 1995)174 
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It was also found that the majority of the plots of land 
measure less than one hectare, and only 3-5% of the land in each of 
the communities measured three hectares or more.107 Another 
important fact to take into account is that the majority of this land 
is seasonal. The crops raised for self-consumption are corn, beans 
and squash. Among the crops for both self-consumption and the 
market are: garlic, peppers, tomato, alfalfa, cumin, flowers, onions, 
garbanzo, figs and wheat. Of these three communities, 
Tlacochahuaya contained the highest percentage of irrigated land 
(32%), and had the greatest diversity of products and the best land. 
This can explain the differences in the above table. Nevertheless, a 
general tendency can be seen when contrasting these two graphs--
all three communities have diminished or lost the commercial 
feature of their crops and the land has been concentrated for the 
production of vital crops for self-consumption. Consequently, we 
set forward our firs remark that is that marginalization creates 
vulnerability in the extended entitlement systems of communities. 
There is evidence also that starvation has been avoided by the 
practice of direct production of food and an accentuated practice 
of cooperation. Furthermore, the expansion of capitalism, which 
was expected to eventually weaken, destroy or transform the 
economy of these communities, has not stopped communities from 
adapting themselves to changes and preserving ancestral 
economic practices. 
                                                 
107 The majority of the land holdings by indigenous or peasant communities are know as ejidos. Ejidos are 
the fruit of the process of the Mexican Revolution. They were created through Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution, which was influenced mainly by the revolutionary leaders Emiliano Zapata and Ricardo 
Flores Magón. The lands owned by the haciendas (Spanish plantations), were expropriated and given in the 
form of indigenous “communities” and ejidos. In Mexico there are 28,058 ejidos and communal lands. 
Surprisingly, 54% of all land holding in Mexico is held in this form. The ejido and communal land was 
given in a fixed amount of hectares. As expected, population growth has caused the land to be subdivided 
into ever smaller pieces as an increasing amount of offspring claim their right to be entitled to the use of 
land.    
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House Capabilities 
 
But what is the impact of the benefits of these crops for the 
families in these communities? One way to discover this is to see 
how much these communities were self-reliant in the most basic 
product of their diet--corn. 
 
Graph 11 1960: Percentages of Families that Bought Corn  
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 Graph 12 1993: Percentages of Families that Bought Corn  
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From Graph 12 it can be observed that higher percentages of 
families from Guelavía and Santa Ana were buying corn than those 
from Tlaco. These are the two villages that also have land of lower 
quality. According to the data of 1993, a total 80% of the families 
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in Santa Ana were buying corn in 1993 for less than six months or 
more. The existence of cheap corn from the U.S., the lack of credit 
and food security, and other factors such as falling or unstable 
prices for food in commercial food production, have greatly 
reduced incentives for corn production and have forced people to 
live in subsistence production.108 However, since an obvious 
reason for decreased production of corn or production in general 
could be simply explained by the scarcity of labor, we must also 
focus on labor conditions. 
                                                 
108  Oxfam International, an international organization operating in 100 countries, strives for sustainable 
development and poverty reduction. The International Food Policy Institute is a nonprofit organization that 
identifies and analyzes policies for sustainability and meeting the food needs of the developing world. Both 
organizations have reported that the 10 billion dollars that U. S. farmers receive in subsidies, makes 
possible the export of cheap corn to Mexico. Both organizations have pointed out the direct relationship 
between U.S. domestic agricultural policies and rural misery in Mexico. See “U.S. Corn Subsidies Said to 
Damage Mexico”, New York Times  27 August (2003) available from 
http//www.mindfully.org/WTO/2003/US-Corn-Subsidies27aug03.htm 
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Graph 13 1960 Labor Force Used in Crops 
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 Graph 14 1993: Labor Force Used in Crops 
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First, according to the data on the labor force, family 
members by 1993 were increasingly involved in agricultural 
activities. Also, noticeable is the disappearance of farm workers or 
paid farmhands. Finally, it is interesting to note that a new way of 
providing labor was present in 1993. Called manovuelta by the 
villagers, this method entails an exchange of labor based on 
cooperation that involves no monetary exchange. In trying to 
explain these patterns, we can speculate that due to the low income 
level of families and the increasing emigration of labor, the cost of 
labor has become both scarce, and consequently, expensive.  What 
has been found, however, is that the family members involved in 
agricultural matters are those that have stayed behind, keeping the 
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communities alive. Surprisingly, at least in these communities, 
women are now the main source of labor, due to the emigration of 
the men. Therefore, the possibility of capability expansion for 
women has become more restricted, as women have become both 
the heads of households and mother-farmers. Additionally, child 
labor has become more valuable and even indispensable. This in 
turn has made access to education less and less feasible and the 
children have become more susceptible to joining the flow of 
emigration as they grow older. In other words, our second remark 
is that what we here call household capabilities (to differentiate 
them from the institutional opportunities available for these 
families), were reduced during this period. Emigration became an 
alternative to these restricted household capabilities. For a more 
complete perspective, we need to include migration patterns in our 
research. 
 
Emigration 
 
Development that has come through the market, such as the 
growth of industry, creation of jobs, access to education, higher 
levels of income, health care, etc., has not reached the 
marginalized and voiceless people within the communities. The 
need for money to work the land, to pay bills, and for housing 
seems to be the main push-effect for the emigration of young 
adults in these communities. It has been observed that labor flows 
to the city of Oaxaca, (capital of the state of Oaxaca), Mexico City 
and to the United States. Unfortunately economic development 
only creates jobs at certain points on the map, and these dynamic 
centers of economic activity demand a labor force of working age, 
which can come from any region. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
find communities in Oaxaca sustained by women in the absence of 
the men of the community; although some men may emigrate only 
seasonally. 
Consequently, farm workers hired by women who were 
themselves left behind, can increasingly be found carrying out the 
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responsibilities of the absent members of the community.  
Surprisingly, in so doing, communal traditions such as reciprocal 
dependency among members of the community tend to take 
another form. Nevertheless, income flowing into the community 
from the absent member(s), keeps the household active and 
participating in the community. As a result of this, women have 
been holding cargos and responsibilities occupied in the past 
exclusively by men. The presence of women in the economy of the 
communities is a common factor among the villages in the 
different regions. 
Against all odds, migration has not destroyed community 
life. Villagers assume that community life can be practiced 
regardless of where the members of the community might be 
residing. Therefore, an individual who resides in the United States 
and offers housing and help to new immigrants from the village to 
get established, is in fact doing community work. Since cash is 
usually the main obstacle for the immigrant to travel to the United 
States, the money is often obtained in the form of a personal loan.  
Loans, as well as other types of support that make the trip possible, 
are also considered part of guelaguetza (sharing).   
In places like Santa Ana, an arrangement called mediería 
solves the problem of land that is idle due to the emigration of the 
whole family. Mediería consists of a deal between two families, 
the family that stays behind in the village and the absent family.  
The family that remains provides labor by working the land, and 
the absent family provides money and land. Eventually, the 
benefits are divided half-and-half between the two households.  In 
this way community life survives and adapts to the phenomenon of 
migration. It is interesting to take into account the economic 
structure inside communities such as Santa Ana del Valle. The 
economy of Santa Ana combines agriculture, the production of 
woven articles, (rugs, blankets and tapestries), and now emigration. 
Weaving production and migration, however, seem to have taken 
priority over agriculture. 
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Although in Santa Ana the land is held as private property 
and can be sold, there is a commitment among villagers not to sell 
the land to outsiders. Sixty-two percent of the land is used for 
agriculture. This land however, is seasonal land, depending mainly 
on the rainy season, as there is no irrigated land, and consists 
mainly of small plots; 26% of the plots are about 2 hectares, 16% 
are one hectare, and 20% are less than one hectare (Sanchez, 166).  
In other words, Santa Ana’s land is seasonal and consists of small 
plots of low quality. These characteristics are common to all 
peasant landholdings in southern Mexico. 
In three Zapotec towns, (San Jerónimo Tlacochahuaya, San 
Juan Guelavía, and Santa Ana del Valle), it was first observed that 
emigration was an increasing trend. In Guelavía for example, (see 
Graph 16), 31% of the households experience the departure of 1-2 
members, and 7% of the households lost 3-4 members. In contrast 
to the 1960 (Graph 15) data only 26 % of the households had 
experienced the departure of 1-2 members, in that year no 
household reported the loss of 3-4 members. In the 1970s at the 
end of the economic boom for Mexico, however, emigration levels 
reached their lowest and then increased again in the 1980s, a 
tendency which coincides with the debt crisis and the structural 
adjustments programs required by the International Monetary 
Fund.  
 Communal economies such as Santa Ana’s have skillfully 
become economies based on agriculture, handicrafts and 
emigration. Being able to retain the land, to seek markets for hand 
crafted goods, to receive money from its emigrants and cultural 
practices such as mediería, have contributed to the survival of this 
community and cultural life. 
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Graph 15 1960: Migration Patterns in Three Communities 
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  Graph 16 1993: Migration Patterns in Three Communities  
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At the beginning of 1980s, urban centers experienced high 
levels of unemployment due in part to the debt crisis. Mexico City 
was then slowly substituted by the United States as the main 
reception center of immigrants. Graph 17 indicates the destination 
of migrants from these three towns. The new destination, however, 
became more difficult and implied more risks and higher costs. 
Obviously more money was required to get there, and crossing an 
international border without a visa was more dangerous. Statistics 
given by human rights organizations operating on the border show 
that around 350 people per year die trying to cross the U.S.-
Mexican border without a visa. This situation can explain why the  
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Graph 17 Destination of Migrants from Three Communities (percentages) 
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majority of emigrants from indigenous communities are young, 
single men that have more chance of surviving the border crossing.  
Mexican writer Carlos Fuentes calls the border a bleeding wound, 
affirming that deep in the Mexican consciousness, the memory of 
the U.S. invasion of Mexico in 1848 and the loss of more than 50% 
of its territory remain vivid. But is migration a magical, best 
solution? 
Many households depend on funds sent by emigrants, but 
these remittances arrive sporadically. Children and women work 
the land and take care of the household, which restricts the 
children’s freedom to go to school. Consequently, emigration 
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might contribute to the suppression of what the World Bank has 
denominated human capital, (e.g., women, children and their 
health), and social capital, (e.g., social relations). 
More research needs to be done to determine possible links 
between an increasing level of emigration (remittances of migrants 
represent the largest source of income for the entire Mexican 
economy) and the overall living conditions of children, especially, 
those with an emigrant parent. Circulatory migration has affected 
women and children in another significant way. Women are 
increasingly infected with the HIV virus carried by men who have 
been exposed to it in the U.S. Mexican health officials believe that 
of the 16,000 cases of AIDS in rural areas of Mexico, at least 30% 
became infected by men who, feeling marginalized by the barriers 
of culture and language in the U.S., sought female partnership.109 
All of the above suggests a continuing deterioration of the already 
delicate economic entitlement condition. We conclude here that 
instead of expanding household capability conditions, emigration 
may reduce them, further widening the social gender gap by 
demanding more from women while reducing their freedom, thus 
making them more vulnerable; although ironically, the amount or 
quality of commodities they own may increase. Currently, 
emigration is a major trend in marginalized rural communities in 
the valley of Oaxaca. Gijón Cruz, Alicia Sylvia and Martha W. 
Rees have shown in their rigorous empirical work that although 
emigration and remittances in the valley of Oaxaca tend to bring 
about certain positive effects by making it possible to build 
adequate housing, obtain food, buy commodities, and pay school 
fees, remittances nevertheless also produce negative effects. These 
negative effects include a widening inequality, the promotion of 
external economic dependency, unproductive consumption, and a 
pressure toward social disintegration.110  
                                                 
109 Available from http://www.libertadlatina.org/Latin_America_HIV_p9.htm 
110 Gijón Cruz, Alicia Sylvia, Martha W. Rees, and Rafael G. Reyes Morales. “Impacto de remesas 
internacionales en el ingreso y calidad de vida de las familias de los migrantes en el valle de Tlacolula, 
Oaxaca”. Ciudades  47: (2000) 34-42. 
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Indigenous Communities as Part of the Mainstream Economy 
 
Communities try to regulate the demands from the macro 
economy and the production for community consumption, and 
thereby to enhance their entitlement position. Each community 
appears to function within the limits of ecological systems that 
sustain the village. An example of this was revealed with the 
introduction of single-crop farming in the past, which produced 
negative ecological consequences that the whole community had to 
face. This was the case of the Chatino peasant economy in 
Santiago Yaitepec in the state of Oaxaca, where the introduction of 
coffee created great expectations in 1950 (Lopez 1991). The use of 
the land to satisfy the demand for coffee created social conflicts 
inside the community. Land for coffee meant less land for food 
production. Inequalities between the members of the community 
grew. Additionally, conflicts deteriorated the socio-religious 
mechanisms which regulated the accumulation of wealth, and the 
Chatino people became more dependent on the production of 
coffee and emigration. 
Coffee was introduced in different regions of the state of 
Oaxaca at the same time. The Sierra Juárez region was previously 
considered self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs. The region’s self-
sufficiency was due in large part to the weekly markets that 
integrated the tierra fría vertical climate zone which produced 
wheat and potatoes and other products with the tierra templada 
zone which provided beans and sugar. Moreover, several towns 
produced artesanías (handcrafted goods), e.g., ixtle fiber products, 
pottery, leather goods, and wooden saddles. The markets 
previously operated on a system of barter. Coffee, ocote (pitch 
pine) and salt functioned as mediums of exchange. Up to the 
1930s, coffee production was limited.  
In the mid-1930s a new kind of wholesale buyer entered the 
area, Spaniard traders, offering cash and credit in advance to 
muleteers who would carry manufactured goods and re-sell them 
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in the markets. Storage houses in the valley were created for 
coffee, as coffee prices rose steadily between 1938 and 1954.  
Land use for staple crop production decreased as more and more 
peasants began unofficially expanding their plots of land for coffee 
production and became cash oriented for market transactions.  
Disposable income allowed coffee producers and traders the 
consumption of manufactured goods, making handcrafted products 
unattractive. The tierra templada economy became a maize 
supplier to the increasing number of coffee producers. However, 
peasants lacking the ability to compete with coffee production or 
without access to land for coffee production became laborers.  
Bartering declined, and cash eventually replaced ocote and salt.  
As prices increased, coffee traders replaced the muleteers with 
trucks. A single truck could replace 33 mules or 80 donkeys, and 
8-18 men, and reduced the trip to the city of Oaxaca from 7 to 3 
days using only 3 or 4 men (Clark 2000). 
Yet, in the mid-1950s the prices for coffee dropped, creating 
a reservoir of surplus labor which was ready to emigrate.  
Increasing population growth and a decrease in the production 
necessary to sustain the household led to the inter-zone market 
economy being replaced by markets which were more integrated 
and oriented toward the outside, i.e., to the national economy. 
Modernization with a greater class differentiation became one of 
the social characteristics of the Sierra Norte.     
In the example of the Sierra Norte we can see that the 
mainstream economy relates to the economy of communities in a 
direct way. People in the communities have vivid memories of 
these different periods of crises. Periods of hyperinflation, 
inaccessible prices of food, transportation and clothing are 
mentioned. Emigration trends suggest that households are unable 
to maintain a level of income to cope with the high level of 
inflation. When interviewed, members of different communities 
expressed similar reasons for the deterioration of living conditions, 
namely: the size of plots of land, the lack of irrigation systems, the 
high cost of producing corn, the availability of cheap corn 
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imported from the U.S., and the lack of credit and government 
support in general.  
The trend of high levels of emigration also suggests the direct 
impact of declining government expenditures on agriculture. In 
1983, .074% of the GDP was invested in agriculture, and by 1993 
this had dropped to only .033%. (Durán Alcantara 1998). Indeed, 
in the 1980s and 1990s, Mexico experienced a government 
withdrawal from agriculture, forestry and fishery activities. This 
was mainly due to the debt crisis and structural adjustment 
programs. While the U.S, Canada and Europe experienced disputes 
regarding subsidies to the agriculture sector, Mexico was shifting 
to the manufacturing and trading sectors. At the national level, 
federal and private financing aid to work the land became scarce 
(Calva 1995). 
What can be stated here is that the entitlement systems also 
depend on institutional capability assets, which can be identified 
by the existence of credits, public assets,(e.g., government 
support), physical assets, (e.g., land, and irrigation systems), 
national policies and the allocation of resources. In conclusion, it 
can be said that indigenous economic practices, though internally 
oriented, appear to be dynamicly and directly connected to the 
mainstream economy, and as such, subject to transformation and 
the adoption of an entitlement system which is dependant on 
institutional capabilities and access to markets. In addition to these 
considerations we look at the importance of agriculture and other 
commercial activities to see if the impact of these activities 
benefits these communities. 
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Graph 18 1960: Commercial Activities in Three Communities 
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Graph 19 1993: Commercial Activities in Three Communities 
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Graph 19 reveals that revenues from agricultural products 
declined and effectively disappeared from two of the communities. 
This suggests that though agricultural activities can be important 
for the subsistence of families, it has nonetheless become less and 
less attractive as a commercial endeavor. Santa Ana, with the worst 
conditions of land, has moved to the production of hand crafted 
goods, (mainly tapestries). The most extreme scenario is the one 
presented by Guelavía, as data has suggested that this town is 
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highly dependant on the cash sent by its migrant workers who live 
in the U.S., in other states in Mexico, and in Mexico City.  
 Some remarks are worth reviewing from the observations 
made up to this point. First, the constant importance of agriculture 
for self-consumption remains the most prominent feature of these 
three communities. Although agriculture is important for survival 
and to avoid starvation, remarkably, it is disappearing as a 
possibility for commercialization. In contrast to this pattern, 
emigration has increased in importance and attractiveness for these 
communities, especially the ones with no possibility of handcraft 
production and access to markets. Guelavía is an example of the 
latter case, due to the lack of water and the loss of a source of raw 
material, (the reeds that grew in the valley which in the past were 
used to make baskets). In addition to the delicate and risky 
economic position in which Santa Ana finds itself, it is important 
to notice that the majority of commercial transactions are through 
middlemen; for instance 60% of the sales carried out by the 
villagers of Santa Ana were done through intermediaries. The need 
to depend on intermediaries limited the earnings from the sale of 
agricultural products and handcrafts. This leads us to conclude that 
although communities seem to be connected to mainstream 
markets in terms of transformation and the shaping of entitlement 
system the sets of entitlements deteriorate not because of the 
imperfect nature of markets, but due to a lack of full access to 
markets. Fair access to markets stands out as a key factor above 
and beyond market functions. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
economic policies which place a priority on the market as the 
mechanism to promote economic development have not succeeded.     
 
Economic Development Projects  
 
Clearly the partial conclusions that we have drawn up to this 
point suggest the difficulty in attempting a clear-cut separation 
between economics and worldview. Some studies, however, differ 
from this observation. For instance, Whitecotton (1977) in his 
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analysis of the Zapotec culture in Oaxaca affirms that peasant 
economics differs from capitalist economics in degree rather than 
in kind. His argument is that capital, credit, savings and 
investments are concepts that are found in all societies. Even 
though it cannot be denied that these concepts are found in these 
Zapotec communities, Whitecotton’s analysis seems to imply the 
existence of several evolutionary stages. The standard assumption 
is that economies can be classified according to their similarity and 
approximation to the economies of the west. Rostow’s oft-quoted 
evolutionary classification of economies and societies as 
traditional, mature, take-off and mass consumption, appears in 
many studies as an operating assumption.111 Here we see the need 
for thinking of development as a process that rises up worldview 
and what the people values the most, rather than separated it from 
daily living. In this sense, economic development, by any 
definition, has to be true-to-culture (Van der Walt 1997). 
Production for instance can occur, (as it does in the valley of 
Oaxaca), not only as a response to the demand of the markets but 
also for its use value, its exchange value, (where no money is 
involved), and its source of sustainability. Yet in these 
communities development has generally been understood as the 
owning of a single commodity or having access to a single service, 
(e.g., a cement floor, electricity, potable water, road construction). 
Within communities, however, electrification and other services, 
though beneficial, have in general brought an increasing cost to 
everyone, augmenting the pressure to obtain cash in economies 
where cash was not previously needed as a primary item of 
exchange. In consequence, increasing numbers of community 
members face inevitable pressure to go outside the community to 
work for cash. A survey done in 1984 revealed that in the Mixtec 
region of Oaxaca, wages from the labor force outside of the region 
represented 64% of the total income of families that depend on 
seasonal employment, and of that total, 56% came from the United 
                                                 
111 See Rostow W.W., “The Five Stages of Economic Growth” In Kanh, Rajani Paradigmas in Economic 
    Development: Classic Perspectives Critiques, and Reflection (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe 1994) 
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States. Unfortunately, in spite of the numerous development 
projects carried out, poverty and marginalization have been 
persistent in the Mixtec area as in others. 
In his work on economic development in a village in rural 
Oaxaca, Jeffrey H. Cohen observed that as the community of Santa 
Ana engaged in commercial and governmental projects, it 
experienced an increasing dependency on the outside. In the 
Zapotec village of Santa Ana, the state government has sought to 
make deals with certain people in the region who have strong 
economic interests in building highways and communication 
projects. Members of the community that had immediate access to 
resources and wealth and supported these government projects 
were immediately recognized by the government as community 
representatives. Therefore, as projects were executed in 
collaboration with wealthy members, those members became the 
recipients of the main benefits, and consequently the inequalities 
worsened (Cohen 1990). To observe only the struggles, 
deprivations and limitations of these communities, however, does 
not provide a complete scenario regarding the identity of these 
communities. Their accumulated wisdom is a contribution that 
these communities give to society. 
 
Nature and Social Security 
 
In spite of the fact that indigenous communities are 
themselves subject at times to attitudes and actions of indifference, 
destruction and domination toward nature, the inclusiveness of 
nature has been present in the discourse and way of life of 
indigenous communities. Mother-children images evoke a 
relationship that contains what King and Woodyard have called 
relational power, (1999) which calls for a relation of respect, 
affirmation and interdependency.  
 Many economic policies in southern Mexico, though 
recognized as productive strategies, have in fact caused permanent 
damage to the environment. Unfortunately, many of these 
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programs produce services for a small percentage of the 
population, and as a consequence these programs respond to the 
desires of the privileged, reinforcing the already existing 
inequalities. Ecologist Alejandro Toledo (1988) has pointed out 
that governmental programs and private projects are executed 
without taking into account the self-standing value of the 
environment. Toledo also laments that the demand in the resource 
market focuses on a partial view of the environment, requiring the 
extraction of a single resource from a very complex ecological 
system without considering the effects of that extraction on the eco 
system. This single resource view has resulted in the assumption 
that the ecological system of a region can be valued in terms of the 
existence of a single resource, dismissing collateral resources as 
non-productive and valueless. Toledo has also pointed out that in 
the decades of 1950-1980, federal economic policies in southern 
Mexico aimed to solve problems created by:  
a) an excessive demographic and economic centralization, 
b) the unbalanced and unequal distribution of economic 
    benefits throughout the region, 
c) the profound inequalities within the urban areas, and  
d) the lack of integration of these urban centers with the rural 
    areas that surround them. 
Consequently, the coastal areas of southern Mexico became the 
targets for agro-industrial/urban-industrial programs combined 
with large infrastructure projects. The long-run expectations were 
the maximum exploitation of the resources in the region. An 
export-oriented industry through massive investment was installed 
in the region to extract minerals and oil. This relational power and 
the accumulated indigenous wisdom of living with nature do not 
stand in isolation; economists as well as environmental 
organizations have also made urgent appeals for an alternative 
view of nature.  
An inside account of community living in Oaxaca was given by 
Marcelino Dominguez, a Mixe Indian. In an essay about the power 
of community, he begins by pointing out that the only education he 
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has received, was given and shaped by community living 
(Dominguez 1998). He affirms that education is formed through 
work with the community, responsibility toward others and 
individual character formation, it cannot be an individualistic or 
intellectual training alone. 
Dominguez relates how Spaniards in the 1400’s could not 
conquer the Mixes. 
“We were the exception, therefore the community structure was never 
disrupted from outside.  The social structure of the community has 
functioned through history as a shield from economic structures and 
ideological impositions from outside. It has functioned also as a shield of 
resistance from the effects of colonialism and the dominant class.” 
(Dominguez 1998) 
Dominguez points out that there are six elements that laid the 
foundations of power in the community. His list includes 
traditional elements that can be found in all the indigenous peoples 
of Oaxaca. The first element is land. The land belongs to the 
community and any member of the community can work it.  
However, the land cannot be sold or given to anyone; it is for 
growing food to feed families. The “comunero” or the member of 
the community that holds the right over the land maintains this 
privilege as long as he does not break this agreement regarding the 
land. 
The second foundation is the indigenous language, as 
language keeps history alive, sustaining culture. Kajpn janaanip 
translates as communal desires, Ja’ay janaanip as collective 
decisions, and kajpx Muuky as total agreement. Dominguez 
explains that these concepts are put into practice daily in solving 
problems and conflicts in the community. 
Third, the asamblea, (assembly), is the group of members of 
the community fifteen years and older, and the consejo comunal, is 
the communal council that is made up of teachers, elders, women 
and people of good character. The communal council meets one 
day before the community meeting and discusses possible 
solutions, making suggestions and setting forth guidelines. The 
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final decisions, nevertheless, are made the following day when the 
whole community gathers. 
The fourth foundation is cargos, (positions of public office), 
which involve everything from being a member of the community 
police to being town mayor. There are ten community positions 
that precede reaching the highest office. Every candidate must 
begin at the lowest rung as a town police officer, and then must 
wait from months to years before slowly moving up to higher 
offices. In spite of this, 80% of the comuneros become presidente 
municipal, (head of the municipio). The attitude of a public servant 
is to function as a true servant of the community. It is never 
considered a position of power and individual career achievement. 
Fifth, tequio is a word that describes a common element in 
the majority of the communities in southern Mexico. A tequio is a 
required amount of days of work given freely to the improvement 
or care of the community. In the Mixe community, fifteen days per 
year are given to the community by each head of family. The 
tequio system has been the way communities have solved such 
problems as the need for building roads and schools, the lack of 
housing, dealing with natural disasters, and taking care of the 
environment. In many ways, the tequio has been the indigenous 
response to meet the indifference and deficiencies of state and 
federal governmental assistance to the communities.   
Finally, la fiesta, (party) is the way the community celebrates 
living together and simultaneously serves as a leveling of 
economic differences. A comunero takes over the expenses of a 
communal celebration fiesta six times in his or her life. Besides 
food, the comunero provides free room and board for visitors 
during the religious celebration. In this way, accumulated wealth is 
channeled back to the community. 
An additional element is guelaguetza, (sharing); an element 
of community living found among Zapotec villages. Guelaguetza 
represents an economic exchange of labor among family members 
or friends. It is an exchange of assistance to a second party in need.  
For example, family members generally exchange labor with each 
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other during planting and harvesting. Guelaguetza works as an 
equal exchange of labor or resources that occurs as both parties 
schedule it. 
It can be pointed out that the economic principles in standard 
economics, (such as utility satisfaction, the supremacy of the 
individual, the goodness of ambition), though broadly accepted and 
unquestioned in other settings, do not foster a language of mutual 
understanding between national economic planners and the 
members of the communities when common goals are sought.  
However, essential elements of indigenous communities, if 
understood, could be expanded and implemented in other areas to 
help people in need within the larger society. For example, a 
system of tequio could bring people together to carry out such 
difficult tasks as, the creation or preservation of water systems, 
preventive health care, and the protection of the environment on a 
large scale. All this could potentially be done at a low cost with 
free labor or even with modest financial contributions from the 
community. On the other hand, the disappearance of communal 
living can raise infrastructure and social costs for society. For 
centuries, these communities have offered a lower cost of social 
security for families within the principles of community living. 
 
The Cargo System  
 
The cargo system has been a subject of study for 
ethnographers of Mesoamerica during the last fifty years, and 
southern Mexico has been the main region of study. These studies 
have revealed to the world communities that do not fit the 
stereotypes of downtrodden, victimized and passive individuals. 
The cargo system can be defined as civil-religious offices that are 
occupied by men of the community for a period of a year. It does 
not include any salary, but on the contrary requires the sponsorship 
of various religious celebrations, which implies large amounts of 
money. The men selected serve their office for a year and then go 
back to their daily work in the community. Although the cargo 
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system is more often linked to religious activities only, such as the 
celebrations of saints and patrons of the villages, the men that 
serve in the cargo system can have previously served in civil 
offices or in religious posts.  
Among the most important studies in Chiapas in the area of 
cargos is the one carried out by the Harvard Chiapas Report. In his 
study on the Zinancantán township in Chiapas, Frank Cancian 
(1965), who was part of this project, reported on the important role 
of the cargo system within the economy and the political system of 
the village. John Chance (1998) has reevaluated the contributions 
of ethnographers of Mesoamerica regarding the cargo system, 
(e.g., Eric Wolf, De Walt, William Taylor, Waldemar Smith and 
Frank Canacian among others) and states that the civil cargo 
system hierarchy in Mesoamerica emerged in the 16th century as a 
response to Spanish pressure for an imposed European-derived 
model of towns in indigenous communities.112 The cargo system as 
it is known today did not appear, argues Chance, until the late 18th 
century when the cofradías,113 (the main financing source to pay 
for religious fiestas), were expropriated by the Spanish church, and 
fiestas were prohibited.  
The early cargo system, therefore, appeared as a symbol of 
autonomy and identity; and in its early civil form was more 
concerned with representation toward the rest of society. It was not 
until the 19th century when the early civil cargo system evolved 
into a civil-religious system. This shift was also a result of pressure 
from the government and church in the form of attacks and 
infiltration. The new civil-religious cargo system rested financially 
on private individuals and less on corporate religious institutions, 
which at that time were under scrutiny by the government.  
Consequently, the old political polarizing structures of nobles and 
                                                 
112 See John K Chance, “Changes in Twentieth-Century Mesoamerican Cargo Systems” in Whitterford 
Michael B., edit. Crossing Currents: Continuity and Change in Latin America. (Upper Saddle River: 
Prentice Hall, 1998), Frank Cancian, Economics and Prestige in a Mayan Community: the Religious Cargo 
System in Zinacantan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965). Evon Voght, , The Zinacantecos of 
Mexico: A Modern Maya Way of Life (Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1990) 
113 The cofradías were religious sodalities formed to finance religious celebrations in honor of saints and 
patrons. The cofradías were the center for religious offices in colonial times.    
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commoners within the communities which had been promoted by 
Europeans collapsed. This change allowed communities to focus 
more attention inward (with the practice of local rituals) than 
outward.  
Religious cargos, a third form of the cargo system, appeared 
in the 20th century. Cargos that are exclusively religious in nature 
have now become common in southern Mexico. This religious 
nature seems to be a response to a separation between the religious 
and civil cargo-holders, due to government discomfort with the 
idea of autonomy in the communities. This governmental concern 
has grown into an active opposition by incorporating local 
community leaders into high political positions in the regional 
government structure. This has led to a number of communities 
becoming dependent and submissive. Nevertheless, many have 
survived; transforming and redefining themselves through this 
most recent form of the cargo system, which once again 
emphasizes internal life and identity.   
The debate regarding the role and effect of the cargo system 
has been a subject of debate among scholars in the field. However, 
two major tendencies can be extrapolated. The first, known as the 
stratifying interpretation of the cargo system, states that cargos 
reinforce and reaffirm community values as well as those of 
individuals (Cancian 1965).  In this way the cargo system, tend to 
reinforce the important values of the Mayans; the value of manual 
work and community service. 
The second approach, known as the leveling perspective, 
affirms that the cargo system tends to function as a leveling 
economic mechanism. The hosting of major fiestas by a household 
gives prestige and honor to the office holder of the cargo; and as 
that household spends its accumulated wealth, it gives back to the 
community, allowing wealth to be leveled to some degree. It is 
argued then that this tendency reduces conflict and stimulates 
community integration.    
In both of the above perspectives, the relevance of the cargo 
system reveals the sense of social equilibrium. Model 10 reflects 
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the dynamics of the cargo system and community integration as 
observed by Cancian in Chiapas. Accumulation of wealth as well 
as population growth, appear to threaten participation and 
integration, two vital aspects of the identity and survival of the 
community.   
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Model 10    Representation of the Role of the Cargo System 
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1998). See also Frank Cancian“Who is rebelling in Chiapas?” in Whitterford Michael B., 
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Prentice Hall, 1998) 
 
We close this section with three final remarks. First, it is 
evident that our findings regarding the entitlement system appear 
embedded in an economy that is based on principles of reciprocity. 
The contributions of Karl Polanyi in his classic book The Great 
Transformation become relevant at this point. Polanyi points out 
the distinction between economic systems which are based on 
three different principles: those of reciprocity, redistribution, and 
markets. An economic system which is guided by the principle of 
reciprocity promotes a system of obligations and mutual 
indebtedness, assuring in this way, the preservation of social 
relations. An economic system based on the principle of 
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redistribution is one in which the total product of labor is brought 
and delivered to a central authority, which eventually distributes all 
goods to producers and non-producers alike. Finally, an economic 
system guided by market principles is a system in which products 
are exchanged and arranged according to the will of markets. 
Anonymity and impersonality dominate the interaction of 
exchange in these arrangements, where products are eventually 
bought and sold under the regulations of a price system.  
 The economy found in indigenous communities bears the 
characteristics of the first type of economic system; that is, an 
economic system guided by the principle of reciprocity. 
Consequently, our future discussion will be based on this 
understanding--that indigenous economy, (what has been identified 
as true-to-culture economics in our previous chapter), orients its 
production, consumption and redistribution of goods and services 
by the principle of reciprocity and cooperation. We shall return to 
this important issue in our next chapter. 
Secondly, our findings on community living in southern 
Mexico also describe an economy which responds to the needs and 
cultural identity of the people in the particular context of 
Mesoamerica. This type of reciprocity-based economy, though 
previously doomed to disappear due to the advance of the market-
led economy, remains in fact a living economy, and has been 
designed and set in motion by people equipped with cultural, 
economic, ecological and political understanding of their context. 
Consequently, to appreciate this economy an understanding of the 
cultural context is required.  
Finally, this living economy should not be viewed as an 
isolated phenomenon but rather as a historical development which 
has been shaped by economic interaction with other types of 
economic systems through negotiations, simulation and even 
rebellions.   
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C. Acquirement Failure 
 
Here we retake our analysis of conflict to argue that in 
attempting to correct the problem of the crisis in 1982, the 
economic route which was taken (at least until 1994), was one of 
competitiveness. The imposition of the IMF and World Bank 
solutions had a double impact in terms of the capabilities of 
communities in southern Mexico, especially in Chiapas. Using 
Amartya Sen’s methodology and in agreement with the CONAPO 
Report and the UN Human Development Report, we infer that the 
reduction of subsidies for products such as coffee, (though to the 
IMF experts it seemed at the time to be an effective measure to 
correct a distortion of real coffee prices in the markets), in fact 
exacerbated institutional sources of entitlements. These sources of 
entitlements which were aimed at supporting commercial 
agricultural activities, (e.g., subsidies, credit, seeds, irrigation, 
technical assistance), entered a stage of crisis and become 
unattainable. Nevertheless, the reforms did not all have equal 
impact, since those with more land and with more access to credit 
and irrigation experienced greater benefits. In this way, the reforms 
mainly reduced the opportunities of the poor who depended on 
access to smaller plots of land for their subsistence.  
 In addition to the failure of institutional sources of 
entitlements, household entitlement sources (represented by assets, 
education, safety, savings, etc.) aimed at directly sustaining the 
wellbeing of families were also crippled, forcing the poor to 
concentrate all of their energy, time and cash as well as all of the 
labor of each household on survival, political demonstrations or 
emigration. It was obvious that the process of erosion of 
capabilities disabled strategies of the peasants to cope with 
extreme poverty. The failure of capabilities obligated peasants to 
search for work solely to obtain food.  
The effects of the economic process, however, were felt 
nationwide, not only in southern Mexico. In terms of health, the 
ISSTE (the Institute for Public Health) reported an increase in 
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children of one year or younger who were suffering from 
malnutrition. By 1993 Chiapas emerged as the state with the 
highest malnutrition rate; 66.74% of its population was suffering 
from malnutrition, and 88.6% of its children suffered from chronic 
malnutrition (Chiapas en Cifras 1997). In the area of education, the 
national graduation rate also declined at all educational levels, and 
the rate of school drop outs grew by 3% annually. Acts of crime 
also increased and in Mexico City nearly tripled between 1981 and 
1987 (Lustig and Szekely 1997). 
The collapse of grain prices revealed the high vulnerability of 
an economy where agrarian workers depend on a single export. 
Chiapas, as the main national exporter of coffee was an easy target. 
The high interest rates, the collapsing of guaranteed international 
prices for coffee and cacao (which dropped 70% between 1984 and 
1992), reduced the income of small farmers. The small farmers 
were mainly indigenous and represented 65% of the coffee 
producers in Mexico. An additional or alternative economic 
activity which provided economic security for peasants in the 
region of the rebellion in Chiapas was livestock. Two factors 
eroded this latter economic alternative. First, in 1992 the livestock 
industry entered a period of crisis due to infected livestock, and 
trade was therefore suspended. Second, President Salinas issued a 
decree to stop the deforestation of the Lacandon Jungle, in 
preparation for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. As an 
increasing number of cattle demanded more and more pasture land, 
livestock activities became seen as hostile to the environment. The 
expansion and inefficiency of the cattle industry was indeed 
reducing the amount of forest at the rate of one hectare of forest 
being felled per livestock animal. Adding to this, cheap prices of 
meat imported from Guatemala ended any hope of recovery (Tello 
2000). Peasants in Chiapas felt totally disengaged from economic 
benefits, in part because of the effects of a single product export 
vulnerability combined with strangulating internal economic 
events.   
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We now recall what we have stated in Chapter III (see 
Models 8 and 9) regarding the dynamics of rebellions. As part of 
the process of disengagement, our next illustration (Model 11) 
integrates what has been said up to this point regarding 
institutional and household sources of entitlements. The elements 
included in the process of disengagement constitute the acute 
multi-dimensional disabling environment that people experienced 
before the rebellion. These elements, which appeared for a variety 
of reasons, became part of the social, economic and political reality 
of communities prior to the uprising. It was this acute disabling 
environment which made the announcement of an economic 
agreement with the U.S. and Canada ( implying the formal 
imposition of a market-led economy over the reciprocity-based 
economy, the ending of the protection of communal land, the 
supremacy of competition over cooperation, etc.) the equivalent of 
an economic death sentence. A second modification in this model 
is what we have called true-to-culture socioeconomic and political 
arrangements, which now appears more complex than Model 9 in 
our previous chapter, due to our findings on community living. In 
Model 11 we see that the disregarding of these complex cultural, 
economic, political and religious aspects, and the devastating 
impact of the removal of the constitutional entitlement to 
communal land, deserve greater attention in order to understand 
the Chiapas uprising.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 205
 
Model 11  Dynamics of the Zapatista Rebellion (III) 
 
                                 (Zapatista Armed Uprising) 
                                                       OPEN CONFLICT 
  Failure of mediating mechanisms 
 
                                     Trigger  factors 
                                        •Acknowledgment that elite-actors were responsible for their situation 
• Alliances with other groups, armed or clandestine 
                 (after the 1968 repression) 
           •   Erosion and crisis of legitimacy                                      
                  • Disillusionment with civil organizations  
                         •   Fruitless civil demonstrations     
                                    . 
                                                    
                                      The process of disengagement             
                                        ● Constitutional rights regarding the land                                                                                               
 
 
      ●  Property tenure                                    Humiliation                    ● Access to justice: 
                                                                       ●(Impunity/unresolved claims 
                                                                                                          grievances, no land entitling)     
● Economic means to continue to function   
    ●   Economic security                                                           ● Recognition and validity to claims 
         ● Entitlement Sources (institutional, household)                   (Exclusionist nature of Mexican State                                            
                                                                                              Protecting rights of indigenous people)  
                        ● Access to housing, education, income, communications      
                                        ● Human security (lack of protection) 
                                                    ●Human Development                                            
                                                               
 
                             
                             - A disregard of true-to-culture socio-economic and political arrangements: 
                                   - Cooperation/equality mechanism/ equilibrium/ participation/values 
                                    - Worldview of the land/ Ecological limits/ reciprocity/communal 
                                        security by entitlements/ecological wisdom/tequio system 
                                      - Customary law and ancestral uses and traditions linked to issues of  
                                       -  identity, language, survival. 
 
                   
 
                                Dynamics of Enrichment and Impoverishment & Entitlement Failure                      
                                                                     
                            Competitiveness / Economic Growth Stability (low inflation) / Confidence 
                               
                           Globalization of Capital: Liberalization / Privatization / Deregulation      
                                   
                                                                      Latent Conflict 
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We argue that that the current expansion of capital, known as 
globalization, is connected to the process of disengagement (see 
illustration in model 11). In addition to the fact that the rebels in 
Chiapas historically experienced market exclusion and 
displacement, we argue that the intensity of the application of 
competition as a road to economic improvement favored the actors 
with assets and access to the markets, leaving behind those without 
assets and access. At the international level the exclusionist nature 
of globalization resides in the generally restricted markets and the 
deteriorating terms of trade for Mexican exports. At the national 
level unqualified labor might be excluded from higher wages as 
competition is implanted and qualified labor is chosen over 
unqualified workers. Lustig and Székely (1997) have reported that 
in the case of Mexico during the 1980’s, income grew for those 
who were qualified and that the uneducated became excluded. 
To comprehend the dynamics of the exclusionist nature of the 
current international economic process, Goudzwaard (2003) has 
identified two complementary yet contradictory dynamics: the 
dynamics of enrichment and the dynamics of impoverishment. 
Within these two dynamics we find three forms of exclusion (see 
Model 12). First is property-exclusion. Export-oriented countries 
(represented by the right circle) are excluded from the monopoly 
and creation of international currency held by wealthy countries 
(represented by the left circle). Devaluations and indebtedness, 
which hurt the majority of export-oriented countries, can both be 
explained by having their roots in this type of exclusion. These 
newly created currencies in the form of speculative capital are 
attracted to high levels of profit in developing countries, and can 
also easily leave if the markets present too great a risk. Capital 
flight in Mexico (in 1982 and again in 1994) is a good example in 
this respect. 
Second, entry-exclusion restricts the entrance of exports from 
developing countries, although ironically, wealthy countries have 
pushed for these same economies to increase their exports. As the 
markets become limited due to the increasing number of 
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developing countries exporting similar goods, prices for exported 
goods tend to fall.114 In Chiapas the intensification of the use of 
land or the acquisition of more land in order to increase exports 
can be understood as the result of this entry–exclusion process. 
The third form, scarcity-exclusion, has two facets.  First, after 
international currency is created by wealthy countries and flows in 
the form of international direct investment, the majority of this 
flow stays in the markets of industrialized countries (80%), due to 
the high level of profits, while developing countries capture less 
than 20% of the total flow. Economies such as the Mexican market 
therefore, have to strive to attract productive foreign investment in 
the hopes of building skillful labor, building structure, etc.  
Second, as these investments expand in the recipient countries, 
new forms of scarcity are introduced through marketing. The 
disillusionment resides, however, in the fact that the real scarcities 
remain unchanged. The scarcities remain intact while the main 
actors--multinational companies, reap the benefits.  
                                                 
114 For export-oriented countries, the terms of trade tend to fall, i.e., the amount of exports to be produced tends to 
increase (due to their low prices) in order to maintain the capacity to buy other goods in the international market. 
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Model 12  Three Forms of Exclusion 
    Dynamics of Enrichment              Dynamics of Impoverishment 
   Money               Property Exclusion           Debt     
  
      
Rising                                              Entry exclusion                                         Export- 
Expectation                                                                                                          orientation 
                                                                                         
New Scarcities 
                                             
                                             Scarcity exclusion                                  Existing Scarcities 
                               
Source: Goudzwaard, Bob. Enrichment, Empoverishment and the Power of Exclusion 
             Contributions to the CLAI Consultation, Buenos Aires (April-May, 2003)  
 
Since most of the current conflicts are found in developing 
countries, a possible path for research could therefore be the field 
of economic exclusion related to conflicts. Are there conflicts, 
(such as the Zapatista uprising), that suggest a relationship between 
levels and types of exclusion and armed movements? What we do 
know, however, is that the effects of excluding people from the 
benefits of markets have been denounced by both civil society and 
the indigenous movement. Civil organizations in Mexico have 
called for discussions and public consultations on different aspects 
of the economic and social process tied to exclusion.  Among them 
is the Mexican Network of Action to Free Trade (RMALC), a 
Mexican organization which in collaboration with the Centro de 
Estudios Sobre Transnacionalización, Economía y Sociedad 
(CETES-Chile), Common Frontiers (Canada), Development Gap-
Alliance for Responsible Trade (USA); Instituto Brasileiro de 
 209
Analise Social e Econômica (IBASE-Brazil) and the Réseau 
Québécois sur L’Intégration Continentale (RQIC-Québec), have 
made the unfairness of free trade public knowledge in Mexico. 
This civil movement has involved students and worker 
organizations across the continent, building economic and social 
alternatives to the current situation in the Americas.115 Different 
publications produced by this movement warn that the issue on the 
table is not free trade vs. protection, or integration vs. isolation, but 
the determination of the rules of the game and the question, “Who 
would benefit from agreements?” Insistence on the human element 
as the center of any economic plan, and the inclusion of people in 
national decision-making, have both been central to this 
movement. 
The general principles of this proposal are the following:  
a) Trade and investment are not and must not be an end in 
themselves but rather tools to achieve development and 
sustainability with justice.   
b) Citizens of the Americas are called not just to approve the 
economic trend but to participate, evaluate and implement the 
agreements that would affect their lives, and build 
alternatives toward that end if necessary. 
c) The main goals of these alternatives should be the 
fostering of sustainable national projects, the social wellbeing 
of people and the reduction of inequalities at all levels. 
   
The indigenous discourse, has also denounced the exclusionist 
nature of the economic process in Chiapas. The response of this 
indigenous movement to an exclusionist process has been one of a 
struggle for rights. The challenge therefore is to identify the 
connection between rights and economics. We will explore the 
existence of a fundamental connection based on the sources of 
entitlements by De Gaay Fortman.  De Gaay Fortman suggests that 
entitlements can be rooted in ownership, contracts, or tenure, (side 
                                                 
115 Alternativas para las Américas: hacia la construcción de un acuerdo hemisférico de los pueblos 
   (Mexico, D.F: REMALC, 1999) 
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A of Model 13).  Complementing this argument and according to 
our case in southern Mexico, we suggest also that communal rights 
(side B), flow from the community, giving to members of the 
community the rights to the land, access to all benefits and full 
participation in community living. Based on these entitlements, a 
holder can make daily claims.  Due to external factors current 
entitlement positions may be affected. Consequently, these claims 
may fail and not be concretized. Therefore, the process of 
entitlement results in failure of acquirement. Additionally, side C 
in our illustration, describes the flow of entitlements based on 
arrangements made by the State. In the case of Mexico these rights 
include secular education for all Mexicans and the right to the land, 
both of which are rooted in the Mexican Constitution. The exercise 
of these rights guaranteed by the state leads to entitlements, and 
capacity building. In turn, these capabilities allow people to 
execute laborious and diverse activities, which stimulate creativity 
and build a sense of pride and honor into the daily lives of people. 
In such a context, vulnerable people are protected from major 
disruptions in their already daily hardships. Nevertheless, the 
process is subject to failure. As claims become unfulfilled or 
unrealized, people are unable to carry out activities, (working the 
land for example), and consequently, the process ends in 
acquirement failure.  
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 Model 13  Rights and Acquirement Failure  
            (A)                     (B)                                     (C) 
       Private Law           Institutions                             State       
  (property,  contracts, etc.)   (communities,  associations)     
                                                                                            
                                                                          
         
 
 
         
             Education & Health 
    Entitlements                                                   Capacities 
 
                                                                Environment:                                          
                                                - Economy                        
                                                - Polity                                       Capacities 
                                                                             -Society  
 
 
 
 
        Claims                                                   Activities 
     
                             
     
        Acquirement  
              (Failure)    
 
Source: Source: Bas de Gaay Fortman, “Safe Water” in J.W. de Visser and C. Mbazira eds., Water 
Delivery: Public or Private? (Utrecht: Institute of Constitutional and Administrative Law and Community 
Law Centre, 2006)   
 
 
Acquirement failure therefore is a dynamic process. It has as 
a context a productivity oriented economy which tries to move 
peasants from a subsistence economy to a more productive sector, 
yet without protecting their entitlements or providing any other 
mechanism for protection. In this way, a subsistence peasant 
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becomes a subsistence worker, and a process of marginalization is 
generated (De Gaay Fortman 1999). The result is workers 
displaced by the economic process. On one hand this economic 
process sabotages the subsistence economy, and on the other, it 
promotes large scale economic growth, (overlooking entitlement 
systems) and is accompanied by more insecurity, and 
marginalization. Acquirement failure is the result of the operating 
economic policies and a massive exclusionist process that denies 
the fulfillment of rights and entitlements, even as a greater number 
of the population fails to obtain the material means to live the kind 
of lives they want to live.  
It is worthy of notice that historically it is the state (side C) 
which grants entitlement and capacities based on rights. Designed 
economic policies and the law of the land, therefore, can be 
associated mainly with the state. Although it is obvious that the 
state claims that the issued policies are aimed at providing 
protection and security, opposite results may be produced. For 
instance, in the case of the communities in Chiapas, during the 
period of economic adjustments already discussed, economic 
policies led to the disabling of the legal structures which protected 
and honored the rights and entitlements provided by the 
community systems. As we have seen, most indigenous 
organizations struggled for the protection or regularization of their 
access to the land. Since the state did not respond in time to protect 
the rights to the land, (or did not respond at all), indigenous 
organizations acted to protect their entitlements based on rights. 
The Zapatista uprising can therefore be seen as a movement that 
found no other alternative than to try to protect entitlements from 
below.  
It is important to point out that sources of entitlements are not 
necessarily independent and separate from each other. For 
instance, as we have seen in our remarks, communities also 
contributed to the character of the children and non-formal 
education. Although private contracts, communities and the state’s 
legal intentions are aimed at yielding entitlements, entitlement 
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failure persists as rights and entitlements are ignored and not 
included in the development goals.  
Therefore, entitlements and claims (household or 
institutional) that are not concretized or do not result in laborious 
activities or work, (which in general are sources of self-worth and 
dignity), lead to acquirement failure. Consequently, in addition to 
providing the material means to live, the fulfillment of rights, 
entitlements and claims, promote a sense of worth and dignity in 
the process.  
In the same vein, regarding the case of southern Mexico, it 
can be inferred that economic events such as emigration cannot be 
fully understood without taking into account the process of 
acquirement failure. As we have seen in the case of some 
communities in the valley of Oaxaca, the dangerous and risky act 
of emigrating can be assimilated and perceived as an extension of 
community living beyond the borders of the village. Nevertheless, 
emigrating to Mexico City or the U.S. reflects the incapacity of the 
local economy to provide individuals as well as the community 
with the material means to pursue their interests in life.    
       Additionally, the entitlement systems and rights appear 
tenuous given that the economy of Mexico depends on the 
conditions of external markets in order to sell its primary products, 
which tend to deteriorate in comparison to the prices of 
manufactured products. For instance, in 1992 and 1993 the federal 
government sought, (due to the NAFTA agreement), to replace the 
basic crops of Chiapaneco households, (corn, coffee and beans) 
with alternative crops that could more easily be commercialized 
and were more competitive.116 The process therefore involved a 
shift of crops, and an increasing vulnerability and dependency of 
Chiapaneco farm workers on global regulations and international 
price fluctuations.    
                                                 
116 A study published by the Center of Information and Analysis in Chiapas has shown strong evidence of 
the non-desirable effects of the implementation of the free trade agreement in agriculture practices in 
Chiapas. See Adolfo Ocampo Guzmán, La economía Chiapaneca ante el Tratado de Libre Comercio, (San 
Cristóbal de Las Casas, Chiapas, México: Centro de Información y Análisis, A.C. 1999)  
 214
 
Exclusion, Entitlement Failure, and the Process of 
Disengagement  
 
The exclusionist nature of both globalization and entitlement 
failure constitute parts of a single process. It is the dynamics of 
accumulation and enrichment which pressures for expansion of 
more markets and a double share for powerful actors. The process, 
however, does not occur in a vacuum. As powerful players in the 
market demand greater security to ensure capital flow, 
investments, etc., through modernization reforms, this in turn 
necessitates legislative support and thus the legal framework is 
adapted to the needs of the markets. Then, a further step is taken; 
the aspects of the legal system which provide for the protection of 
entitlements tend to be modified or ended. For instance, recently in 
the Mexican market powerful foreign investing groups have 
obtained an overwhelming, though legal, presence in the financial 
arena, (most of the banking system is owned by foreign investors), 
as well as in the markets. Parallel to this, the majority of Mexican 
companies have been marginalized, losing markets, and 
consequently lowering wages and being unable to provide the 
benefits for their workers which are required by law. In the end, 
powerful players reap immense fortunes while increasing numbers 
of workers and greater proportions of the population are forced to 
deal with unemployment and low wages.117  
In addition to the worsening of an existing disengagement 
process, the failure of entitlement to the land, rights to health, 
pensions, etc., can fuel a latent conflict already present, which has 
been the case in Chiapas. This occurs because at the heart of this 
process of enrichment and impoverishment, political power is at 
                                                 
117 The most important financial corporations in Mexico are Santander- Serfin, HSBC, Scotiabank-Inverlat, 
Banorte, BBVA-Bancomer and Citigroup Banamex, which are mostly foreign-owned financial entities. The 
impressive increase of  30% in benefits per quarter , has to do with the freedom of being able to charge 
credit card holders an average of 40% interest rates (double or triple the interest rates these groups are able 
to charge in their countries of origin) while paying to savers an average of 2% interest. La Jornada, 26 
April, 2006. 
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work. This power is obtained by the deliberate action of some 
actors who strive to increase their wealth and prevent others from 
doing the same. Political power is used to alter the rules of the 
game in order to allow a legal paradise for some actors, which 
results in entitlement failure for others. Consequently, although it 
is true that globalization stimulates new ways of inclusion, (e.g., 
the communication field); it is necessary to recognize that its 
exclusionist nature has a great impact on the vulnerable and 
disengaged population. The pressure exerted by globalization 
pushes a great proportion of the population to failure of 
entitlements and consequently to a failure of acquirement. 
Exclusion and the internal failure of acquirement can consequently 
explain in part the dynamics of the process of disengagement, 
which is by definition a multi-dimensional phenomenon.  
 
Five Dimensions of Poverty 
 
The process of disengagement rooted in the implementation 
of economic policies in Chiapas, reflects to some extent, the World 
Development Report 2000/2001 “Attacking Poverty”, which was 
based on the study Voices of the Poor, a survey of 60,000 men and 
women living in poverty in 60 countries.118 The Development 
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) has provided 
guidelines to help reduce poverty in 2001. According to the Voices 
of the Poor Report, poverty entails several aspects, such as 
powerlessness, voicelessness, vulnerability and fear. The study 
suggests that the dimensions of poverty are made up of five closely 
related aspects (Model 14).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 See World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001) 
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Model 14 Five Dimensions of Poverty 
 
 
 
 
                                                       Gender 
  
 
 
                                                     Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the DAC report, since the different dimensions are 
linked, reducing poverty becomes a multidimensional task. 
Therefore, poverty reduction entails the following: 
  
• Economic: The poor benefit from the economy which enables them to earn a 
living by using the means of production and natural resources.  
• Political-legal: The poor must have a voice in political decision-making, a decent 
socioeconomic legal status, economic rights and access to the public domain.  
• Public wellbeing: People must have adequate access to health care, education, 
clean water and food. 
• Socio-cultural: This includes respect for human dignity and equality, social 
acceptance and effective networks. 
PROTECTIVE 
Security 
Vulnerability 
ECONOMIC 
Consumption 
Income 
Assets 
POLITICAL 
Rights 
Influence 
Freedoms 
HUMAN 
Health 
Education 
Nutrition 
SOCIOCULTURAL 
Status  
Dignity 
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• Protective: Personal security and legal certainty and protection from 
disasters.119  
This multidimensional and simultaneous approach to the issue of 
poverty recommended by the DAC report helps to understand why 
one-sided solutions to poverty are most likely to fail. This is 
probably the case of the many single-sided anti-poverty programs 
launched by the Mexican government, such as Solidaridad 
(solidarity), which has ended up functioning as a political tool of 
the state rather than a real option to alleviate poverty. In the case of 
Chiapas therefore, poverty reduction in the area of economics will 
need to address the issue of economic security through access to 
markets, acquirement of material means and capabilities. Likewise, 
an anti-poverty program will need to take action in the area of 
protection, assuring personal security from violence.  Additionally, 
in the political arena, voice, recognition and the validity of 
indigenous entities will represent a challenging task in poverty 
reduction. Furthermore, in the socio-cultural field the issues of 
respect and equality will have to be included in the struggle against 
poverty as well. Finally, the strategy to abate poverty must target 
the extreme conditions of deprivation in terms of health, education, 
housing, etc. Overall, if the struggle against poverty is chosen as a 
strategy to reduce armed movements, the protection of entitlements 
will need to be urgently prioritized.  
A fourth and last item to be explained is the failure of 
mediating mechanisms to solve the conflict illustrated in Model 11. 
To view the implications of this process, we recall our matrix of 
the roots of conflicts from Chapter II, suggested by economist De 
Gaay Fortman. Model 15 below presents a modified version of this 
previous matrix. It includes the roots of the conflict and possible 
mechanisms that could have been useful in disabling the conflict. 
                                                 
119 “Pro-Poor Growth in the Netherlands’ Bilateral Partner Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Analysis of Poverty Reduction Strategies”, (The Hague: 2003)    
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Model 15     From Roots of Conflict to Armed Confrontation 
TENDENCY 
TOWARD 
CONFLICT 
AND ITS 
ROOTS IN: 
Perceptions of 
indigenous and 
peasants groups  
Tools for potential 
mediating mechanisms: 
Recognition, Human 
protection, Dialogue, 
Responding to fundamental 
needs, Validating; Promoting 
trust, Accountability, 
Transparency, Creation of new 
permanent institutions. 
 
In the case of 
conflicting actions  
and the open 
escalation of 
armed conflict  
 
 
 
CULTURE 
 
Being disregarded 
Resentment and fear  
Identity devaluation     
Obligated silence and 
suppression   
Dominance  by  elites 
Intergenerational sense 
of injustice 
Racism                              
Customary law and Indian 
traditions                             
Traditional methods of 
conflict resolution                      
Ethnic diversity, diversity of 
interests 
Zero tolerance of racism and 
discriminatory practices 
Promotion of culture of peace 
Active opposition to the use of 
violence 
 
Total disregard of 
cultural arrangements 
rooted in religion and 
worldview and linked 
to identity and 
subsistence 
Failure of rights to 
subsistence 
Blockage of  
community activities 
rooted in the land  
 
SOCIETY 
 
Disengagement from 
social institutions 
Closed society                   
Media blindness to 
diverse groups 
Marginality of  Indian 
languages  
Pressure and forced 
accommodation                
Social mobility 
 
Tolerance 
 
Dialogue with community 
leaders 
 
 
Negligence of state 
toward the poor and 
unprotected.   
Civil, moderate and 
armed groups, filling in 
the vacuum left by the 
state 
Afflicted groups reach 
unbearable levels of 
humiliation 
 
POLITY 
 
Illegitimacy  
Disengagement from 
political structures  
People’s sense of being 
owned by the state 
Lack of accountability 
Democracy for the rich 
and powerful 
Impunity under the law 
Lack of human security 
Political process through   
traditions   
Transparency 
Social contract 
Political representation & 
participation in policy making  
Dialogue on presidential 
decrees 
Process for solving claims 
Governing crises 
High levels of 
repression and impunity 
Increasing human rights 
violations and impunity 
Military presence 
Loss of trust 
Presence of 
paramilitary groups 
 
ECONOMY 
 
Disengagement from 
full participation and 
benefits 
Deprivation   
Favoring competition    
over cooperation 
Work of independent 
organizations that sought 
credit and support to work the 
land.  
Protection of guaranteed 
prices, subsidies and 
conditions 
 
Lack of material means 
to live with dignity 
Dismantling of 
institutional and 
household capabilities 
Failure of the right to 
subsistence 
Food insecurity 
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Although variables in Model 15 may appear to be a 
complicated scenario and therefore a difficult situation to 
approach, Galtung (1996) has suggested a simplifying process to 
understand the existence of a conflict. According to Galtung, we 
need to focus on three areas in our attempt to understand the nature 
of a conflict. First we need to distinguish elements of the conflict 
that are due to structures which usually ignore or disregard the 
needs of the population. Second we need to identify the cultural 
elements that promote and legitimize the use of violence. Lastly 
we need to focus on the actors because of their inability to 
approach conflicts without violence. Our task is therefore to 
concentrate on the economic, political and public structures that 
bear responsibility toward the society yet neglect their duties.  
We close this chapter with a final argument that includes 
elements of analysis already discussed up to this point. We argue 
that in the case of Mexico, the concept of development already 
used in economic literature needs to be reassessed.  
The roots of the concept of development can be found in the 
notion of progress at the end of the 18th century, when the idea of 
progress and perfectionism from western civilization became 
understood as the goal of human civilization. Yet the concept of 
progress implied technological and scientific advances, and was 
therefore not an inevitable and inherent virtue of all societies, but a 
positive value and characteristic of western civilization 
(Castoriadis 1980). It was not until after World War II that the 
concept of development became widely known. During the Cold 
War period concepts such as development, modernization, 
underdevelopment and the third world were constructed. It was 
during this period that the U.S and the Soviet Union tried to 
influence other regions of the world through their two models of 
progress, their two ways of reorganizing society. The advancement 
of what is now commonly known as development and progress 
was legitimized as a strategy in the rivalry between these two 
powers. 
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Bretton Woods and the birth of the IMF, the World Bank and 
the Food and Agricultural Organization in 1945 provided the 
framework of “technical assistance” to, (as President Truman put 
it), the “underdeveloped areas” of the world.  Underdevelopment 
compressed the great cultural, political and social diversity of the 
globe. The path officially stated for these societies was "production 
and productivity" in order to achieve “prosperity and peace”.  In 
this respect Sachs argues that the idea of defining the world as an 
economic arena was completely new.  
A new world-view had found its succinct definition: The 
degree of civilization in a country could be measured by the 
level of its production. There was no longer any reason to 
limit the domain of development to resources only. From 
now on, people and whole societies could, or even should, be 
seen as the objects of development (Sachs 1990: 157-58). 
For the purpose of this work consequently, this concept, 
which can be distinguished as “productivity-prosperity-peace” 
development, needs to be replaced with a concept derived from the 
situation of Chiapas itself. This concept of development could be 
the basis on which to construct sound economic policies for the 
region. The following items suggest the required elements of this 
concept of development. 
                                                   
a. Inclusion of mediation mechanism and consensus                     
b. Capability oriented 
c. Prioritize engagement process/multidimensional approach 
d. Affirmation of people’s initiatives/promotion of self-confidence 
e. Dominance free 
f. Protective of rights and entitlements 
g. Rooted in culture/respect 
 
It is not difficult to notice that all of these needed elements assume 
both an active participation of people, and the state as an active 
guarantor of a sustainable peace process.  
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Our concept of development provides room for a process for 
empowerment, confidence and respect of the people.  The idea of 
development needs to be engaged in the daily lives of people; 
overcoming disengagement, acquirement failure and the effects of 
exclusion. The dignity of people can serve as a clear guide in our 
search for a suitable process of development in the region; not only 
in the area of economics but also in the area of protection, politics, 
culture and the application of the law. The following is a useful 
example. As we have seen previously, entitlements and rights can 
flow not only from the heart of a community, but also from the 
state, which in turn can interfere with the community. What should 
occur when the institutional law which flows from the Mexican 
state overrides customary law, laying the groundwork for a new 
conflict? In such a case both systems of law could meet and agree 
on a common desire and goal that can benefit the people and honor 
their dignity. The macro economy is distinctly yet another 
challenge. What elements are needed in order for the macro 
economy to nurture an inner economy that empowers people and 
promotes their dignity? In our search for a possible answer, we 
begin by asking ourselves what this type of economy would look 
like at a local level. Following the Zapatista revolt a series of 
proposals and negotiations have unfolded. Our main focus is the 
initiatives of the people and their contributions toward the building 
of an economy of dignity.  
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Chapter V 
 
Toward a Political Economy of Dignity: The 
Search for an Alternative to Exclusion and 
Acquirement Failure 
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In noting the reasons for and the dynamics of rebellions in Chiapas 
in Chapter II, we studied different theoretical approaches of the 
roots of rebellions. We concluded that the existence of a conflict 
entails multidimensional facets (economic, social, political and 
cultural), which clearly go far beyond a single economic reason 
such as poverty. The reoccurring cyclical appearances of armed 
groups have been signs of this ongoing, below-the-surface conflict. 
Chapter III led us to an understanding of the effects of colonialism, 
the effects of disregarding true-to-culture economics, the  
importance of intergenerational injustices, and the loss of 
legitimacy leading to the Chiapas uprising. We also underlined the 
existence of a process of multiple disengagement, the alliances of 
civil and armed groups, disillusionment, and acknowledgment by 
the oppressed population of the irresponsibility of powerful groups 
whose actions created conditions of oppression for the many.  
In studying the economic factors behind the rebellion we 
noted that the orientation of the Mexican economy was historically 
toward higher levels of production, industrialization, and 
modernization. In the 1930’s when the export-oriented economy 
failed due to the greatly decreased demand for Mexican goods 
from the United States during the Great Depression, Mexican 
economic advisors placed their bets on import substitution. Later 
when national oil reserves were discovered, the decisions of 
Mexican policy makers to accept offered foreign loans were based 
on their expectations of the extraction of petroleum, in order to 
advance in the race toward development. However, it was not until 
the debt crisis of 1982 that the economy was rigorously oriented 
toward fulfilling the expectations of financing institutions, and by 
so doing, sacrificing or sabotaging the foundations of the local 
economy, which were expressed in a variety of economic 
arrangements and entitlement systems.  
Due to certain economic practices mainly carried out in some 
communities in southern Mexico, we observed a true-to-culture 
profile and particular economic arrangements oriented toward 
internal sustainability. We then made a distinction between this 
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type of economic practices within the inner-oriented economy and 
those of the outer-oriented economy. 
The first type of economics is distinguished by its orientation 
toward the growth of local markets for the improvement, quality 
and preservation of and care for the land, human, social, and 
cultural capital. The inner-oriented economy we argued was 
mainly focused on these goals not necessarily as a means to reach 
higher levels of national output production, but as legitimate 
targets in themselves. The outer-oriented economy, on the other 
hand, was distinguished by its interest in reaching continually 
higher levels of production through innovations in 
competitiveness, efficiency and productivity. Between 1982 and 
1994, through the adoption of radical economic policies, we 
argued that Mexico demonstrated the most drastic characteristics 
of an outer-oriented economy driven by the desire for external 
restoration of confidence, stability, and attractiveness to foreign 
investment.   
We then suggested that the Zapatista uprising could be 
understood as an attempt to save the ultimate means of protection 
of a inner-oriented economy, (expressed in economic 
arrangements that are rooted in the culture), an economy that was 
serving human needs, and if preserved and expanded, could serve 
human needs not just in Chiapas but in the region and in other 
indigenous regions, protecting them from the effects of an outer-
oriented economy focused mainly on achieving good standing 
externally. We concluded also that from 1982-1994 aggressive 
economic policies were implemented toward the rapid 
improvement of the international image of Mexico. This process 
was facilitated through legal as well as social and political 
modifications of structure. As a result, a process of deregulation, 
privatization, balanced public finance, re-negotiation of external 
debt, facilitation for foreign investment and the development of 
trade agreements was possible.    
Through our search in Chapter IV we also gained a general 
view of the high levels of marginalization and low human 
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development levels in the southern states of Mexico. Nevertheless, 
through valuable observations we found evidence of economic 
arrangements which confirmed the existence of a fragile 
entitlement system, and at the same time clear signs of a vigorous 
economy guided by principles of reciprocity and cooperation. The 
economic practices with an orientation toward the survival of the 
community brought us to conclude the existence of a dynamic 
living economy. Consequently, in light of the Zapatista rebellion, 
we argued that below the surface of the rebellion lay a repressed 
living economy expressed in an acute condition of disengagement, 
whose center was marked by an unbearable sense of humiliation 
by the people involved. Two sources of stress that have aggravated 
this scenario were then suggested: the effects of an enduring 
exclusion and the manifestation of a failure of entitlements. This 
multiple social, political and economic disarticulation was 
expressed in the abating access to justice, security, economic 
means, and the lack of access to communal land and human rights, 
creating in the hearts and minds of the rebels a sense of being 
sentenced to death unless other actions were taken. We suggested 
therefore that the uprising and the Zapatista movement which 
followed could also be interpreted as a response from a movement 
that found no other alternative than to try to protect core and 
ultimate entitlements and rights from below. Consequently, the 
dynamics of the rebellion as it moved upwards from a latent 
conflict to an open conflict must be understood by the acuteness of 
the process of disengagement combined with a disregard of the 
true-to-culture economy, the pre-uprising elements, and finally the 
failure of mediating mechanisms. Although it can be argued that 
the condition of multiple deprivations prior to the Zapatista 
uprising was unique in that it preceded a major armed rebellion, 
the continuing, persistent levels of deprivation, marginalization 
and low human development in the region have been confirmed by 
more recent studies (Conapo Report and the 2004 Human 
Development Report).  
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This scenario leads us unavoidably to confront the issues of 
deterioration of entitlements, exclusion, the process of 
disengagement, and in general, a living economy which struggles 
to flourish in the midst of globalization.  
We suggest that we begin our search under section A by first 
identifying three internal common links among the main findings 
on the dynamics of the Zapatista rebellion. We propose that 
recognition be our first internal common link and area of analysis 
to which other elements can be subscribed. Recognition is 
presented in our first section A.1 as a connecting link to the issues 
of the disregarded living economy, the exclusion of indigenous 
peoples from the project of the nation, the lack of access to justice 
and additionally, the issue of equality before the law. Our proposed 
second theme in section A.2 is the protection of rights and 
entitlements. Here we subscribe the issues of protection of the 
struggle for rights to the land and property tenure, which are linked 
to rebellions, and in general, we attempt to identify related, 
standing demands to be included in our alternative scenario. Our 
third proposed theme presented in section A.3, is human security. 
Under this topic we discuss the lack of protection, the issue of 
impunity, violence and the violation of human rights. In section B 
we address central issues concerning the building of sustainable 
livelihoods and capacities and the fundamental areas to be 
considered for an alternative economic scenario. We analyze in 
section B.1 the issue of capacities and sustainability as pre-
requisites to achieve the removal of constraints that people 
experience to the emergence of sustainable livelihoods. In the same 
vein, section B.2 explores the topic of regaining cultural control.  
Section C recapitulates our main issues and identifies two 
existing elements which may function as stepping stones toward an 
alternative re-arranged scenario. Finally, section D attempts to 
articulate the general search (expressed in different ways) by the 
people in the region for an alternative scenario which corresponds 
to their needs and vision. This section attempts to draw such a 
scenario based on existing proposals emerging from the region as 
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well as existing economic practices and key elements within the 
indigenous struggle. It sets forward an argument for an alternative 
socio-economic and political framework for the region that could 
incorporate key demands or grievances that stand at the root of the 
conflict. Our social, economic and political findings on the 
Zapatista uprising fall within a wide range of subjects, and obligate 
us to articulate them within the framework of political economy. 
Therefore, our plea for an alternative re-arranged economic 
process and structure entails topics within the field of political 
economy. This approach will allow us to deal with issues of 
production, distribution, wealth, power structures, growth, etc.  
 
 
A. Main Findings of the Zapatista Rebellion    
 
A.1 The Struggle for Recognition 
 
A lack of recognition has historically been the plight of 
indigenous peoples. Though recognition is a process that has 
achieved some successes, it has remained a major pending issue. In 
practice recognition is an act of inclusion of these actors within the 
national project of Mexico. Inclusion begins as the government 
recognizes that the extreme situation of multi-dimensional 
disengagement of indigenous peoples, as in the case of Chiapas, is 
a result of the historical exclusion of indigenous people and 
peasants from the national project. Recognition is a vital part of the 
struggle within the broader process of restitution.  
Second, recognition and inclusion can also bring about 
affirmation, a fundamental human need for our sense of 
belongingness and confidence. To return the responsibility for 
development to the hands of indigenous people is, in fact, to honor, 
affirm and recognize the ability and capacity of the people to build 
enduring livelihoods. This implies that these livelihoods rest in the 
already-existing, strategic wisdom of indigenous peoples. The 
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transition from resisting exclusion to the designing of a livelihood 
starts, therefore, with recognition.  
The third benefit of recognition is the reduction of social 
inequality as inclusion takes root and previously resource-deprived 
groups obtain access to their resources. In a recently tested study, 
Besançon has demonstrated that countries seeking a reduction in 
intra-state violence need to move beyond income equality to a full 
inclusion of discriminated groups of people into the political 
process and distribution of public goods.120   
Finally, recognition identifies indigenous peoples as right-
bearers and consequently as deserving recipients of the protection 
afforded by the law under the Constitution. In contrast, the denial 
that indigenous peoples and peasant communities are agents with 
legitimated rights, will feed a condition of constant struggle. Under 
the present circumstances as in the past, based on the principle of 
dignity, indigenous and peasant groups will continue to exercise 
their right to conflict in order to be recognized. As Rawls has 
pointed out, the legitimacy of this right rests on the assurance that 
by keeping a sense of justice alive, the few will not be subjugated 
by the many. If this right to conflict is lost due to suppression, it 
will result in the creation of a deep and unbearable internal 
contradiction in the society (Rawls 2003).  
Furthermore, we should not be surprised by the perception of 
indigenous peoples that the current juridical process is exclusionist 
and, to a certain extent, illegitimate. The effects of the exclusion of 
indigenous peoples in the consolidation of the Mexican state are 
still present. The indigenous perception echoes in Foucault’s work, 
where he affirms that juridical structures need to be understood by 
their origin. These structures, he argues, originated in the West and 
were built and designed under royal pressure in which the central 
figure was the crown. In essence the legal system was a tool of 
domination; created to make the dynamics of the relationship of 
                                                 
120 Marie Besançon,. "Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions and Genocides." Journal 
    of Peace Research 42, no. 4 (2005): 393-415. 
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domination operate effectively: it was a commissioned work to be 
carried out.121 
                                                 
121 Michael Foucault, Genealogía del Racismo (La Plata, Argentina: Editorial Altamira, 1996) 
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Recognition and the Likelihood of Armed Rebellions 
 
Although guerrilla groups have been and continue to be 
active in the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas, and in spite of similar 
ethno-political activism and socio-economic conditions between 
these two states, Chiapas has suffered, up to this time, the greatest 
polarization of its peasantry and society. This raises the question of 
what reasons might exist that would cause a common latent conflict 
in Chiapas to surface mainly as an armed movement after a 
prolonged and unfruitful peaceful struggle, whereas in Oaxaca, 
guerrilla groups have not been successful in gaining much support 
and the struggle in Oaxaca has been mostly unarmed. The 
following observations can help us answer this question. 
The Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), with 30 years of 
underground guerrilla experience, is the product of fusions of 
various guerilla movements.122 The EPR has operated in different 
parts of the country and is now known to operate in the state of 
Oaxaca. The strategy of this revolutionary group is to call for a 
prolonged popular war. The EPR defines its goal as an armed 
struggle to create the necessary social and political conditions to 
establish a socialist government in Mexico. The EPR has 
assimilated the ideology of Peru’s Shining Path, with which it has 
been in contact in the past, and has attempted to gain popular 
support, hoping to effectively convert the frustration and 
desperation of peasants into a violent action in the state of Oaxaca.  
Its efforts however, have borne no fruit. For instance, when this 
                                                 
122 The formation of the EPR was the product of fusions of different guerilla movements, 
such as the Partido Democrático Popular Revolucionario (PDPR), Comando Francisco 
Villa  (CFV), Comando Morelos  (CM), Comandos Armados Mexicanos (CAM), Brigada 
Vicente Guerrero (BVG), Brigada Genaro Vázques  (BGV), Brigada Obrera de 
Autodefensa (BOA); Brigada 18 de Mayo (B18MAYO), Brigada Campesina de 
Ajusticiamiento (BCA), Organización Obrera Ricardo Flores Magón  (OORFM), 
Organización Revolucionario del Pueblo (ORP), Partido Revolucionario Obrero 
Clandestino-Unión del Pueblo  (PROCUP), and Partido de los Pobres (PDLP). See Jorge 
Fernández Menéndez, El Otro Poder: Las redes de narcotráfico, la política y la violencia 
en México (Mexico City: Nuevo Siglo Aguilar, 2001) 
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group tried to take over “La Crucecita” and Tlaxiaco on the coast 
of Oaxaca, the group engaged in a confrontation with the police 
and army, and members of the EPR were abandoned by the people 
who had initially supported them (Fernández Menéndez  2001).  
The reason for this reluctance to join a guerrilla movement in 
Oaxaca on the part of peasants has not been due to a lack of 
guerrilla presence or lack of opportunity and must be sought 
elsewhere.   
It is argued here that there are three main differences that 
could explain the lack of success of armed groups in Oaxaca. The 
first is the presence of an ongoing process, although limited, of the 
recognition of the political rights of indigenous communities. This 
process has been achieved through a strong presence of ethno-
political activity in Oaxaca, and has achieved a modification of the 
state’s Constitution. From 1986 to 1992 the state of Oaxaca 
engaged in a discussion with experts and the Oaxacan society 
concerning the recognition of the pluralistic and multi-ethnic 
features of the state of Oaxaca. (Oaxaca contains 16 of the 56 
indigenous peoples of Mexico.) Prior to the recognition of the 
multi-ethnic nature of Mexican society by the federal government 
in 1992, the government of the state of Oaxaca had already 
recognized the multi-ethnic and pluralistic society of its state, 
modifying Article XVI of the state’s Constitution in 1990.123 A key 
message of the modified article expresses the wish to recognize 
and respect in its entirety the dignity of the Indian groups of the 
state. A resulting benefit is that in the 570 municipalities in 
Oaxaca, indigenous people have had more participation in the 
majority of the municipalities, unlike the current situation of Indian 
villages in Chiapas. This has been labeled a “deconstruction 
process” of the 500 years of exclusion and the practice of internal 
colonialism (Recondo 2001). 
Secondly, indigenous peoples and peasants in the valley of 
Oaxaca have surprisingly described government agrarian reform as 
                                                 
123 See Ley de Derechos de los Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas. (Oaxaca, Oax.,: Secretaría de Asuntos 
Indígenas, Gobierno Constitucional del Estado de Oaxaca, 2001)  
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a positive experience. Unlike the Tojolabals, Tzeltals and Tzotzils 
in Chiapas, both during and after colonialism the Zapotecs in 
Oaxaca have been able to hold their lands longer and have used 
Spanish and colonial laws to achieve this. In fact, most of the 
historical conflicts over land in Oaxaca have occurred among 
indigenous peoples and not between indigenous peoples and the 
state (Lynn 2002). In consequence, persistent land conflict, as seen 
in Chiapas, has not been translated recently into a violent rebellion 
in the state of Oaxaca. A fundamental reason for this, we argue, is 
that by 1994 Oaxaca had a legal system that at least officially 
embraced and affirmed the rights of and respect for cultural 
identity, diversity, and autonomous indigenous collectivities in 
Oaxaca. State constitutional reforms have fallen short of the 
demands of multiple civil organizations throughout the state. Yet 
this first step has awakened a sense of restitution and dignity on 
one hand, and imbued the state, (that is until the recent conflict), 
with a certain level of legitimacy, in spite of the existence of 
growing rural and urban conflicts.124  
The 2006 conflict in Oaxaca is a topic that itself is deserving 
of research and cannot be fairly addressed in this study due to our 
limitations. However, it is important to briefly introduce some of 
the relevant facts. The conflict began with a state-wide public 
teachers strike in May 2006. The labor union of 77,000 teachers 
demanded fair wages and increased state funding for education, 
including school breakfasts for children, shoes, clothing and school 
supplies for the most deprived, in addition to other demands. On 
June 14 a massive repression was ordered by the governor against 
the striking teachers who were camping in the streets of the central 
downtown area of Oaxaca. As a consequence of the unjustified and 
excessive use of force, the strike grew into a state-wide civil 
movement, with many organizations and civic groups uniting 
                                                 
124 In 2005, 400 agrarian conflicts were detected in the state of Oaxaca by the state government.  Out of 
these 400 conflicts, 31 were classified as high risk conflicts, 38 of medium risk and 331 as “ordinary 
conflicts”.  This classification was made based on the level of complexity and risk of violence. See 
Noticias, November 20, 2005. 
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under the umbrella of the newly-created Asamblea Popular de los 
Pueblos de Oaxaca--APPO, (Popular Assembly of the People of 
Oaxaca). The killing of demonstrators and the imprisonment of 
activists and teachers followed, deepening the conflict in a state 
which already contained multiple unresolved conflicts and 
evidenced much discontent over the repression directed against 
leaders of civil organizations.125 An unexpected civil solidarity and 
mobilization supporting the movement has emerged. Currently the 
movement contains hundreds of civil organizations, including 
indigenous, student, and women’s organizations. Interestingly, 
among the most notable of the organized events launched by this 
movement have been the creation of street markets and the 
attempts to restore traditional economic arrangements and the 
Guelaguetza.126 
 Third, although legal embracement has not been 
accompanied by a desired degree of economic empowerment, the 
political achievements in juridical terms have been a proof of the 
tremendous ethno-political work of indigenous and peasant 
organizations in Oaxaca. Such political work has functioned as a 
mediating mechanism which has neutralized or inhibited, in one 
way or another, an uprising similar to the one in the neighboring 
                                                 
125 Among the various affected organizations are: Consejo Indígena Popular de Oaxaca, whose leader left 
in exile; Coordinadora Oaxaqueña Magonista Popular Antineoliberal, with seven of its leaders detained; 
Movimiento Ciudadano Juquileño, with 69 detained leaders;  Frente Popular Revolucionario, with 5 
detained leaders; CODEP, whose leader was detained during a peaceful demonstration next to the Supreme 
Justice Committee; Organización  Indígena de Derechos Humanos de Oaxaca, whose leader was detained 
as he was attending a nonexistent meeting “organized” by government officials. Other organizations with 
similar experiences are the Comité de Defensa Ciudadana, Ayuntamiento Popular de San Blas Atempa, 
Frente Amplio de Lucha Popular, CROCUT, and CODEMI. Additionally, citizens and organizations have 
voiced many grievances over the numerous remodeling projects of symbolic and historic sites around the 
city of Oaxaca, which are being carried out in spite of overwhelming opposition by civil organizations and 
the public in general. 
126 The annual indigenous festivities of the Guelaguetza (sharing) had been organized for centuries by the 
common people as free and open to the public and having indigenous leadership. More recently 
government officials have transformed the Guelaguetza into commercial tourist-centered festivities that are 
organized and tightly controlled by the government in conjunction with hotel chains, airlines and other 
powerful economic actors in Oaxaca. In the desire to restore its true meaning to the festivities, the APPO 
and the teacher’s union organized a Guelaguetza of folk music and folk dancing in a stadium that was again 
free-of-charge and open to the public. 
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state of Chiapas.127 This scenario suggests that recognition plays a 
vital role in the understanding of why armed movements can either 
succeed or be disabled. In the meantime, the high social, political, 
and economic costs of dealing with a neglected condition (which 
springs from the lack of recognition in Chiapas) will have to be 
paid. Unrecognized sectors of society will continue demanding 
recognition and dedicating resources and creativity to protest the 
current situation. In turn the state will continue increasing 
expenditures on the policing and militarization of the region for 
security reasons. 
The effects of a lack of recognition will continue to 
deteriorate what the United Nations has described as human 
capital (the knowledge, capacity, skills and adaptive strategies of 
people), and social capital (government structures, decision-
making power, community institutions, culture and the 
participatory process)128. Furthermore, moving in the direction of 
recognizing indigenous legitimacy and coming to terms with the 
historical, latent conflict in Mexico appear to be fundamental steps 
to reinforcing and consolidating a foundation for the building of 
democracy in Mexico. The latent conflict represents one of the 
most important tests for the Mexican democratic process--namely 
the treatment of the weakest and most vulnerable portion of the 
Mexican population.   
                                                 
127 In the 1980s Oaxaca experienced a second wave of ethno-political organizations, among which we have 
identified the following: Organización de de Defensa de los Recursos Naturales  y Desarrollo Social de la 
Sierra Juárez (Odresanil), Comité Coordinador para la Defensa de los Recursos Naturales Humanos y 
Culturales de la Región Mixe (Codremi), Asamblea de Autoridades Zapotecas , Unión de Comunidades 
Indígenas de la Zona Norte del Istmo (Ucizoni); Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Costa “Cien Años 
de Soledad” (UCI), Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Istmo (UCIRI), la Asamblea de 
Autoridades Zapotecas y Chinantecas de la Sierra (Asazchis), Servicios del Pueblo Mixe (SER), Unión de 
Organizaciones de la Sierra Juaréz de Oaxaca (UNOSJO), Consejo Regional Chinanteco, Mazateco, 
Cuicateco (Corechimac), Organización Indígena para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Oaxaca 
(OIDHO),  Unión de Comunidades Indígenas del Istmo de Tehuantepec, A.C. (Ucitat). See Jorge 
Hernández  Díaz,  “Las Organizaciones indígenas en Oaxaca” in  Bartolomé Miguel and Barabas Alicia, 
Autonomías étnicas y estados nacionales, México D.F: CONACULTA, 1998.   
128 The concept of social capital has been attributed to the works of Pierre Bourdieu and became propagated 
by the work of James Coleman in the 1980s. In the 1990’s the World Bank made it a subject of research.  
See http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm. Human capital is defined as people and 
their ability to be economically productive. Education, training, and health can help increase human capital. 
See http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/modules/glossary.htm1  
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Recognition and the Inner-Oriented Economy  
 
 We retake our findings on the nature of the outer-oriented 
and inner-oriented economies discussed previously. As we have 
already explained, this latter type of economic process, (directed 
toward caring and nurturing, but with a de-emphasis on a 
continuing expansion of material production or the size of the 
economy), faces a choice. Similar to the outer-oriented economy, 
the inner-oriented economy also requires outlets in order to export, 
sell, invest, and continue existing. A second distinction, therefore, 
can be made in the analysis of these types of economies based on 
the distinct route each chooses to pursue development. The 
orientation of the economy in any given way will be determined by 
whether the poor are agents of development or are subordinated to 
the economic agenda of other more powerful actors. As can be 
seen, the inner economy grows toward the expansion of local and 
regional economic arrangements, aiming for the protection of 
nature and in general the creation of an economy that serves the 
common good. In contrast, the outer-oriented economy directs all 
energies toward increasing levels of production, or more 
specifically, the level of exports.  
Different paths of development will naturally lead to 
different outcomes. De Gaay Fortman (2002) has identified two 
different routes which can determine the type of outcome. The first 
route is dominated by guidelines of the “pro-poor growth” (PPG) 
initiative launched by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). This initiative views economic growth as 
the fundamental condition in order to reduce poverty and generate 
opportunity. Consequently, in spite of the fact that in the phrase 
“pro-poor growth”, the word order is first “pro-poor” and second 
“growth”, growth nevertheless stands as the first aim. On this route 
the economy is oriented toward higher rates of growth with the 
desire of improving the living conditions of the poor. This 
economic process, though increasing productivity and generating 
income for the poor, neglects vital issues such as the improvement 
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of redistribution of the benefits of growth and an active protection 
of the poor.129 In contrast to this orientation of the economy, a 
second alternative can be pursued: the design of economic policies 
aimed to protect and improve the livelihoods of the poor, a process 
which De Gaay Fortman labels growth pro-poor or what we will 
call Growth by the Poor (GBP). This entails growth that does not 
contribute to a worsening of the income distribution or in the 
poverty head account and is carried out mainly by the poor. 
Growth of this nature can create assets for the poor as they 
themselves are the main recipients of the increasing benefits of 
growth in terms of education and health. Additionally, this type of 
growth facilitates transformation by the dynamic expansion of 
peoples’ initiatives to improve their daily lives.130 
In the case of Mexico it is worth noting that the struggle for 
recognition and restitution of autonomy, which comes from the 
most marginalized sector of the population, reveals an even deeper 
point of tension. This tension is centered on the difference between 
a Mesoamerican internally-oriented, growth by the poor economy, 
directed to protect daily livelihoods, participation, protection of 
entitlements and the expansion of sustainable home markets based 
on participation and in harmony with communal cultural values, 
and an externally-oriented, pro-poor  economy, oriented toward 
the increasing of exports, the size of foreign investment, and 
                                                 
129 According to De Gaay Fortman, protection implies that law understood as an active “ process of finding 
and deciding in an orderly manner what is right” is at work “ensuring an orderly protection of interest and 
orderly settlement of disputes arising out of conflicting interest…thus, law regulates and delimits power” 
See Bas De Gaay Fortman, Power and Protection, Productivism and the Poor. (The Hague: Institute of 
Social Studies, 2002)  
130 We can see some evidence of the outcomes of a Pro-Poor Growth initiative. As Pro-Poor Growth 
policies take effect and the economy is fixed on increasing levels of productivity and efficiency, (e.g., in 
energy), unpleasant outcomes for the poor increase. As this production-oriented economy carries out mega-
projects such increasing number of dams in Chiapas, peasants are removed from their habitat without 
compensations, and frequently suffer from lack of access to water, (even when mega-projects are built with 
hopes of improving access to water in the area). As De Gaay Fortman has pointed out, two effects of a 
productivistic mindset in agriculture are further examples. One is the removal of peasants from an economy 
of subsistence, who move to jobs in the industrial sector while having no socio-economic protection, 
feeding the process of marginalization. In addition, the promotion of increasing productivity in large-scale 
activities, such as in the coffee industry, does not necessarily imply a promotion of guaranteed prices and 
access to markets. Consequently, it is possible for productivity to result in the surplus of a single, unsold 
product due to barriers created in wealthier countries.  
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mainly the material growth size of the economy by the means of 
private accumulation, higher productivity and competition. In 
other words, using Polany’s distinction of economic systems 
introduced in the preceding chapter, the problems of recognition, 
autonomy and restitution are evidence of a profound contention 
between two economic systems, one mainly oriented by markets 
and market values and the other mainly oriented by reciprocity, 
cooperation and guided by community values.  
The interpretation of the Mexican economy as a series of 
arrangements that spring from two different types of economies 
implies the existence of points of contradiction. We see the inner-
economy in tension with but also complementing the outer 
economy, having a variety of distinct forms yet all bearing a 
particularly Mexican expression of “doing business”. However, the 
points of tension can offer valuable evidence to support the 
existence of two economies pulling toward different poles. 
Guillermo Bonfil Batalla described in his well known book, 
Mexico profundo: una civilización negada (Profound Mexico: a 
Denied Civilization), the conflict between two projects of 
civilization in Mexico. On one hand, the profound Mexico, based 
on Mesoamerican cultural heritage, has been perceived as an 
obstacle to development, an opposite process to a better life, 
progress and the advancement promised by the westernized 
imagined Mexico. Bonfil Batalla argues that the imagined Mexico 
has been a project advanced by elite, powerful actors whose 
ideology can be traced to its roots in European colonizers and their 
western culture.131 Although this interpretation of the complex 
cultural scenario may run the risk of reducing Mexican cultural 
space to a binomial of indigenous versus non-indigenous, 
Mesoamerican versus European, we are interested in the 
distinction between two major economic trends that though they 
contradict each other, also overlap and complement each other.  
                                                 
131 See Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo,  México profundo: una civilización negada  (México D.F., Grijalbo, 
1989) 
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The work of Nestor García Canclini from the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico has helped us to understand 
that the most fruitful analyses of Latin American social reality are 
those that focus on the interwoven nature of new social 
configurations. This entails new ways that actors are finding to be 
with the others and new ways of doing with the others, in the midst 
of new social and political arrangements. According to García 
Canclini, these analyses are highly beneficial because they 
highlight the new spaces for new actors--spaces for intermediation 
and negotiation of the existing diversity in the Latin American 
culture.132 Unfruitful analyses on the other hand, view identities 
and cultural projects as existing in isolation while engaged in a 
fierce, unceasing battle against each other; e.g., identity versus 
globalization.  
From the economic point of view, it can be said that the 
contemporary economy found in Mexico is a specific expression of 
these new ways of being and doing in the midst of globalization. 
Furthermore, to claim that an economic expression grows out of 
isolation is unrealistic. For instance, as we have noticed in our last 
chapter, the economic practices of indigenous communities, in 
many ways are the result of previous or current interactions with 
economic processes, and the result of creative responses and 
answers to crises.  
The inner-economy, an economic mosaic consisting of a 
variety of practices, shows contrasting characteristics when 
compared to the outer economy. The inner-economy is more 
explicit and evident in the indigenous communities and their 
economic initiatives although it is spread across the economic 
space. This living economy, in spite of the impression given by 
economic reports of being a powerless economic arrangement, has 
taken on mixed forms and remained vigorous in southern Mexico, 
sustaining life through adaptation and subsistence, even though it 
remains unrecognized and devalued and thus prevented from 
                                                 
132 See Nestor García Canclini, Nestor. La globalización imaginada (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 2000) 
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blossoming. The outer economy, on the other hand is expressed 
more clearly in the existence of the dominating market economy, 
free trade and alliances by global actors. This type of economy 
tends to dominate all aspects of society, exhausting existing local 
mechanisms for the sake of expansion. The cultural spaces, (spaces 
of social interaction, creativity, communications, etc.), seem to 
have no other choice than to orient themselves to the expectations 
of the market economy. The outer-oriented economy, 
consequently, has grown to become a fast-moving economy 
promoted by public authorities as well as private initiative, creating 
the impression in Mexican society that there is no other alternative. 
 
A.2 Protection of Rights and Entitlements: The Main 
Grievances and Demands at the Center of the Latent  
Conflict  
 
As in the case of recognition, the protection of both 
entitlements and rights also needs to be understood as an active 
process. The nature of this struggle speaks against the common 
idea of accepting economic growth alone as the fundamental 
condition to end poverty, inequality or exclusion in society. The 
process of the defense of rights as a vital strategy to reduce 
poverty, inequality and exclusion has been made evident in 
different moments of Mexican history, and can be defined as a 
struggle against legality (Klein and De Gaay Fortman 1999).133 
We understand legality as the set of regulations known and 
familiar to society as acceptable, and built upon a particular 
interpretation or enforcement of the legal framework by powerful 
actors in society.  Yet, in spite of legality, or at times pretended 
legality, the application of rules remains incongruent with the 
societal need for social justice. Consequently, the actions of people 
                                                 
133 It is important to notice that indigenous peoples in Mexico have acted based on the existing, lawful, 
social contract spelled out in the Mexican Constitution regarding the protection of communal land. 
However, their struggle has also been centered on the issue of the historical exclusion of indigenous 
peoples from the project of a nation and state in Mexico.  
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who are guided by what they perceive to be right and just, 
challenge and go beyond the existing official laws. For instance, 
two, well-known, elected governors in Chiapas, General Absalón 
Castellanos and Patrocinio Gonzales Garrido, ruled in favor of the 
powerful elites while operating within the legal framework. At 
points where the legal system proved to be a restraint to their 
power and desires, they were able to introduce modifications to the 
legal system in order to achieve their goals. It is also known that an 
impressive number of peasant and civil organizations jointly 
mobilized under a simple claim of “what was right”. In the midst 
of a legally repressive system that allowed the arrests, 
disappearances and murders of community leaders, one of the 
goals of this mobilization was to protect the lives of those leaders 
and families involved in this struggle. Another goal was to defend 
the land, which was necessary due to a modification in the 
Constitution. For this reason also, the struggle for protection of 
rights became an extremely fierce battle against legality. As Klein 
and De Gaay Fortman have pointed out, the struggle for dignity, 
perceived at the grassroots level as legitimized, is a revolt against 
legality. Consequently, in southern Mexico, the struggle for control 
of the decision making that affects the life of people, which is 
necessary in order to protect a wide range of fundamental needs, 
(for example subsistence, language, culture), has gained greater 
urgency and importance than respecting legal limitations. 
Therefore, although the struggle in Chiapas acted within the law by 
defending rights to the communal land which was protected by the 
Mexican Constitution, its continuing struggle reveals a deeper 
demand: the honoring of the moral right to be included in the 
project of the nation; that is, to be recognized within the legal 
framework of the Mexican nation.       
The reappearing three constant themes of the latent conflict 
of long duration discussed in Chapter III, (autonomy, erosion of 
the legitimacy of rulers and the cry for restitution), point to the fact 
that rebellions tend to seek the reestablishment of previous and 
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familiar entitlements and conditions, in addition to on a deeper 
level, struggles for inclusion.     
 
 
A.3 Main Issues Related to Human Security 
 
The concept of human security was first presented in the 
works of the Pakistani founder of the United Nations Development 
Reports (UNDR), Mahbub ul Haq, who proposed that instead of 
the traditional understanding of security as the protection of 
territory or national boundaries, (a concern attributed to nation-
states), security be centered on people. Human security therefore 
views security from the perspective of people, entailing protection 
from threat, disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, 
political repression, and environmental hazards. For example, the 
2006 Elgar Companion to Development Studies states that since 
1994 there has been a tendency to use the concept of human 
security in a more comprehensive manner within different levels, 
(e.g., from individual to collective security or from local to 
national or global security).134 However, human security cannot be 
precisely defined or measured with exact indicators. Nevertheless, 
at a national level seven categories of human security have been 
identified: namely, economic security, food security, health 
security, environmental security, personal security, community 
security, health security, and political security. Our treatment of 
this concept in this section as well as at the end of the chapter 
includes only some of these aspects which become evident in our 
case.  
The 1994 UNDR defines the two aspects of human security: 
it first means protection from chronic threats such as disease, 
hunger and repression; and second, it means protection from 
unexpected hurtful events in people’s daily lives. Human security 
                                                 
134Clark, David Alexander, ed. The Elgar Companion to Development Studies. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward  
    Elgar Publishing, 2006). See also Georg Frerks and Berma Klein Goldewijk eds. Human Security and  
    International Insecurity. (The Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2006). 
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is not a mechanism of defensiveness but an integrative concept, 
with its meaning emerging from the people within the dynamics of 
solidarity. It cannot be imposed on society by force nor exercised 
in a military fashion.135 As is true of the inner-oriented economy, 
security is an inner matter which emerges from the people and 
other actors involved, finding its own expressions according to its 
context. Inner security grows from the participation of civil 
society, creating an environment of confidence and freedom from 
fear. All of this is contrary to the outer type of security, which is 
often evaluated by the size and might of an army in relation to 
other external threatening military forces. 
In the spirit of the 1994 report, the 2002 report re-took the 
issue of human security, specifying that in order to protect human 
dignity and achieve development, it is vital to expand and promote 
a democratic process, given that the democratic process can 
enhance personal security and peace. Human security is also 
required for the nation-states to succeed in their governing roles in 
society. Consequently, development is inhibited in countries where 
the military, the police and other related groups dominate 
democratic institutions or are not accountable or transparent in 
their activities.136 Three years later the 2005 report concluded that 
human security appears to be the most challenging and most 
difficult obstacle to development. Worldwide data suggests that 
humanity cannot enjoy security without having development, nor 
enjoy development without security.137 As Sabina Alkire from the 
Commission on Human Security has stated: 
 
The objective of human security is to the safeguard the vital 
core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, 
without impeding long-term human fulfillment…the term 
“vital core” is not meant to be precise, it suggests a minimal 
                                                 
135 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), Human Development Report 1994 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994)   
136 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
137 UNDP, Human Development Report 2005 ( New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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or basic or fundamental set of junctions related to survival, 
livelihood and dignity.138 
 
Human security is an unavoidable issue when it has been 
strongly voiced by social movements, human rights organizations, 
religious organizations etc. Consequently, human security is 
included as a requirement for an alternative economic scenario in 
which the protection of human dignity is sought (see Model 16). 
We turn now to the first dimension of human security, namely, 
security from violence, threats and fears. Human security ensures 
protection from disrupting and hurtful events; while violent 
conflicts and their consequences disable efforts for the protection 
of human life. Human security is a process which requires 
intentional and arduous work on behalf of the government and civil 
society. The acute levels of marginality and low human 
development in the region suggest that human security cannot be 
totally separated from situations of high vulnerability, such as 
deprivation or food insecurity. In the south of Mexico, fear and 
economic insecurity tend to coexist. For instance, looking at the 
conditions prior to the open conflict in Chiapas, it can be argued 
that the conflict itself revealed a deeper reality in Chiapas: that of 
the existence of an acute state of human insecurity in terms of 
food, health, community, political repression and fear of abrupt 
hurtful changes, to the degree that lives could not continue 
normally. Therefore, in light of the process of disengagement 
presented in our last chapter, human insecurity can be seen as a 
reason for these multiple deprivations as well as a product of it. 
Human insecurity helps us understand why people cannot fulfill 
basic needs, and as the process continues, insecurity grows. 
Whether we see insecurity as a cause or a product, in the end, 
human insecurity remains an inseparable companion to low levels 
                                                 
138 Alkire, S. “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security” CRISE Working Paper 2, (Queen Elizabeth 
House, University of Oxford, 2003).  Cited in Gasper Des, “ Securing Humanity: Situating Human Security 
as a Concept and Discourse” Journal of Human Development  6, no. 2 (July 2005): 221-245.   
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of human development, marginalization, and the failure of 
entitlement.  
What indicators could be used to evaluate human security in 
a particular situation? A possible way is to see human security as 
the people within a society see it--that is by detecting its absence 
rather than its presence. Graph 18 shows the results of an opinion 
poll in Chiapas published by a non-governmental organization in 
1999. CIEPAC A.C. (Center for Economic and Political Research 
of Community Action) carried out a survey in which the leading 
question asked of participants was: “What worries me the most?” 
 
Graph 18 
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            Source: La Estrategia de guerra en Chiapas (San Cristóbal de la Casas, Chiapas, México: 
                                CIEPAC Project Counseling Service, 1999).   
 
The results of the survey showed that the three major topics 
of concern were the possession of arms in the hands of private 
groups or the army, harassment from the army, and the increasing 
divisions and confrontations between communities and the 
government. The other issues of fear, fraud and the loss of 
electrical power were of less concern. This survey reveals that fear 
itself is not the primary concern, but rather the growing 
generalization of the use of arms as a mean to protect rights and 
interests by paramilitaries, guerrilla groups, gunmen and the army. 
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The survey results suggest that the construction of human security 
requires a process of disarmament, demilitarization and the 
creation of mechanisms to nonviolently mediate divisions and 
confrontations. To understand the nature of concerns in Chiapas 
that were revealed in this survey, we need to briefly review some 
antecedents. In 1995, a year after the initial Zapatista uprising, two 
divergent processes began to take place. The EZLN began peace 
talks with the administration of President Ernesto Zedillo, which 
led to the signing of the San Andrés Peace Accords in 1996. 
Simultaneously, paramilitary groups, groups of gunmen and secret 
armed groups grew, contending with the EZLN’s size and 
influence. The most widely known paramilitary organization is 
“Paz y Justicia” (Peace and Justice), created in 1995. In 1999 an 
additional 14 armed groups were identified (see Graph 4).  Of all 
of the groups included in Graph 4, the most active has been “Paz y 
Justicia”, which has been responsible for the majority of the 
aggressions, followed by the MIRA group, and the paramilitary of 
Chenalhó.139 
This brings us to the question of who the paramilitaries are 
and how they have come into existence. Two anthropologists, 
Aubry Andrés and Angélica Inda, have documented the existence 
of 246 different paramilitary groups in seventeen sites within one 
region of Chiapas. In their majority, those who join these groups 
are young, frustrated men from families without land or means of 
subsistence. For them becoming a paramilitary has meant the 
economic security of a salary, plus the benefits obtained through 
the pillage of livestock, crops and other goods. On top of this, 
weapons offered them a place in society, with status, visibility and 
power which had never been gained by their families, (who had 
sought significance in ownership of a piece of land yet never 
attained it).140 
                                                 
139 Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, A.C. La guerra en Chiapas: ¿Incidente en 
la historia? (San Cristóbal de la Casas, Chiapas: 2000). 
140 La Jornada, 23 December, 1997. 
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Along with the increasing number of paramilitaries, the army 
has intensified its presence in the three poorest states of the 
south,141 and the personnel within the Mexican army have reached 
high levels of specialization.142 It is necessary to address the 
question of whether the army is responsible for violations of 
human rights in Chiapas. According to human rights organizations 
in Chiapas, the violators of human rights most frequently 
intimidate and make threats against the physical wellbeing of 
people, take away civil liberties, and make illegal detentions. 
Military actions also include executions, death threats, 
disappearances, intimidations, inflicting wounds, torture, sexual 
abuse, break-ins, evictions and displacement. Among the worst 
violators of personal security, four are especially notorious—the 
army, the state police, the paramilitaries and PRI militants. Almost 
40% of these violations were carried out by the army, 30% by the 
state police, 28% by the paramilitaries and the rest by extreme 
militants of the PRI, the official political party.143   
The Acteal Massacre is probably the most oustanding 
example of the links between the paramilitary groups and the 
Mexican military. It also stands as evidence of those who suffer 
from the violence and the power of impunity. On December 22, 
1997, 45 people who were attending a prayer meeting for peace in 
a Catholic chapel were surrounded by paramilitary forces in the 
pacifist Tzotzil community of Acteal.  During a period of several 
hours, this armed group, with the apparent consent of local 
Mexican army units stationed nearby, shot to death those who 
                                                 
141 As we have pointed out, the states of Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero have been the recipients of 1/3 of 
the armed forces in Mexico. These three states contain 15% of all military zones and highly- trained 
military officers, (graduates of the School of the Americas in the United States) have been stationed there. 
See G. Castro and E. Ledesma, Siempre cerca, siempre lejos: las fuerzas armadas en México  Mexico: 
(Global Exchange, CIEPAC, CENCOS, 2000) 
142 In 2001 specialized groups grew rampantly in the Mexican army. These groups received training from  
U.S. special forces from Fort Braggs and also from highly-specialized Guatemalan groups known as 
Kaibiles (accused of human rights violations during the civil war which lasted 30 years in Guatemala), who 
trained state and federal army forces to counter attack subversive groups and armed guerilla groups. 
Overall an impressive growth and process of specialization took place between 1994 and 2000. La Jornada, 
21June, 2001.      
143 Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, A.C. La guerra en Chiapas: ¿Incidente en 
la historia? (San Cristóbal de la Casas, Chiapas: 2000)  
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remained inside, and attempted to kill all those who tried to 
escape. Those murdered on that day included 15 children, 21 
women (four of them pregnant) and 9 men. Some of the Catholic 
peace activists survived. The peace groups professed support for 
the goals of the EZLN; almost certainly the reason for the attack on 
the prayer meeting, (though the activists did distance themselves 
from the EZLN's methods). The killing raised much controversy 
over who organized and ordered the paramilitary attack. Was the 
attack centrally organized by the political establishment, possibly 
including either the governor of Chiapas, Julio César Ruiz, or by 
the Mexican president, or by both? Was it organized by the army 
without the knowledge of the political leadership? In either case, 
those in charge of security were discharged of any responsibility 
and those who carried out the killings have been set free.   
In February 2005, several human rights organizations, among 
them the Red Nacional de Organismos “Todos los derechos para 
todos” (National Network of Organizations “All Rights for All”), 
the human rights organizations of Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez, Fray 
Francisco de Vitoria, and the Mexican Commission for the 
Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, issued a joint document 
to the Inter-American Human Rights commission, placing 
responsibility for the extrajudicial executions and disappearances 
and the rape of women committed by paramilitary groups during 
the presidential administrations of Salinas de Gortari and Zedillo. 
Both presidential administrations have actively supported the 
formation of paramilitary groups as a strategy to control the 
rebellion. It also blamed the current administration of President 
Vicente Fox for supporting the paramilitary groups with its 
silence.144 
                                                 
144 La Jornada, February 10, 2005.  
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   Graph 4  Gunmen and Paramilitary Groups in Chiapas 
          
          Source: CIEPAC. A.C. available from http://www.ciepac.org 
 
 
 
Although other states in the region do not share Chiapas’ 
intensely armed environment, Oaxaca and Guerrero do share with 
Chiapas a similar pattern of impunity to collective killings 
involving armed groups. These killings have occurred under 
circumstances that involve gunmen, unidentified armed squads, 
and paramilitaries. For instance, in Oaxaca on May 31 of 2002, 26 
peasants were killed with sophisticated and powerful weapons at a 
site known as Agua Fría. During the search for reasons, the 
administration of Governor José Murat blamed the federal 
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government for the lack of assistance to maintain security. Similar 
to the massacre in Chiapas, the massacre of Agua Fría remains 
without clarification. In the neighboring state of Guerrero in June 
of 1995, 17 peasants who were traveling to a town for a 
demonstration affiliated with a peasant organization known as 
OCSS (Peasant Organization of the Southern Sierra), were 
massacred by police forces. The National Commission on Human 
Rights (CNDH) confirmed the massacre, finding 20 state 
government officials responsible for the massacre and guilty of 
obscuring evidence, including Guerrero’s secretary of sate and the 
state attorney general. Nevertheless, the case has remained 
closed.145 
In addition to the issue of impunity, there are further areas of 
security concerns in the state of Oaxaca. There are currently 500 
latent conflicts throughout the state, and Oaxaca is currently 
ranked first place in cases of violence against women. Not 
surprisingly, Oaxaca has been called “a time bomb” by the local 
Mexican League for the Defense of Human Rights.146  
In summary, the intensification of armed forces in the south 
has been justified for reasons of social order and stability, but 
mainly, for security reasons. Nevertheless, human rights reports 
suggest that the type of security extended by the federal and state 
government, has not properly addressed the real needs of the 
people in the southern states, namely, the need to be protected. On 
the contrary, while this strategy claims the achievement of national 
security, it sacrifices human security conditions which are 
fundamental to development. The issue of human security should 
not be seen as alien to the topic of development, but rather as a 
prerequisite for the construction of a safe environment which 
                                                 
 
146 See Noticias, 13 November, 2005. Also,  “la Liga Mexicana por la Defensa de los 
Derechos Humanos” Noticias, 2 March, 2005 available from 
www.prodigyweb.net.mx/ligamexicana/noticias/oaxacabombadetiempo.htm 
146Carlos Montemayor, “Aguas Blancas,” La Jornada, 28  June, 2001. 
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promotes confidence and the emergence of empowered 
livelihoods.      
 
 
B. Human Development and the Building of Sustainable  
 Livelihoods and Capacities 
 
B.1 Capacities and Sustainability 
 
If by development we understand the removal of constraints 
to the emergence of sustainable and empowered livelihoods, then 
we need to recognize the capacities needed for the community to 
regain control over their own livelihoods. The well-known 
Mexican ethno-ecologist, Victor M. Toledo, has argued in his work 
that the ecological crisis as we know it can be defined as 
humanity’s loss of control over processes that affect humanity 
itself and its environment. True sustainability at a community level 
implies that communities will follow a process in order to recover 
five types of capacities for self-management, to have a say in 
factors that may have an impact on the community’s life and its 
environment.  
1.  Toledo sets forth the first capacity as one of control over 
the community’s surroundings by the recognition of the state 
regarding the community’s habitat, the existing resources within its 
habitat, and its limits (territorial control).  
2. The second capacity is control over the protection, care of 
and sustentation of the community’s habitat through intentional 
plans, record of assets, and research (ecological control). 
3 .The third capacity is the community’s practice of 
determining and deciding cultural matters, such as the use and 
protection of language, mode of dress, the practice of traditions, 
knowledge, and in general, its cultural life (cultural control). 
4. Fourth, the community needs the capacity to determine its 
social life, which includes education, food, housing, health and 
leisure. Parallel to this, the people in the community need to gain 
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control over economic issues of the community, such as the ability 
to regulate commercial exchange and interaction with local as well 
as regional, national and international markets (socioeconomic 
control). 
6. Sixth, the community cannot avoid the step of recovery of 
political power, in order to sustain its political/economic/social 
institutions, the application of law and norms of living.  
These dimensions, Toledo argues, are complementary to each 
other, each requiring the others in order to be feasible. For 
instance, there cannot be a defense of cultural practices in the 
midst of destruction of the ecological habitat.        
It is clear then that the issue of sustainability requires more 
than official assistance: it requires a process of empowerment in 
concrete ways, through the building of capacities (see Model 17). 
 
   Model 17   Objectives of Sustainable Community Development  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  Source: Victor Toledo, La Paz en Chiapas (Mexico: UNAM-Quinto Sol, 2000).  
 
After the Zapatista rebellion, the concept of autonomy 
reemerged, dominating indigenous debate among various 
organizations. Three events help explain the staging of the 
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autonomy discourse as central to the growing debate on regaining 
power for the present and future generations of indigenous peoples 
in Mexico. The first influential event was the implementation in 
1987 of an autonomous region in Nicaragua by the Sandinista 
government. The second factor was the higher level of 
mobilization and organization, which indigenous people had 
reached by 1992, the year in which many governments in Latin 
America celebrated the 500th anniversary of the arrival of 
Europeans in the Americas, while many indigenous organizations 
decried the European invasion of 1492. The third influential factor 
was the growing struggle of the Indian population for recognition 
within the Constitution to more accurately express the 
multicultural character of the Mexican nation.147       
Currently, the perspective of autonomy has become divided 
into two dominant perspectives as regards the type of autonomy to 
be sought. The first of these perspectives, comunalismo, aims for 
territorial, cultural, social, political and economic control at the 
local community level. This position has been supported by 
government officials and government-affiliated indigenous 
organizations. The second proposal, known as regionalismo, is a 
struggle to gain control beyond the community level. It envisions 
empowerment at a regional level as one of the most effective ways 
to protect economic, political and cultural rights. The regional 
position insists on the inevitability that the community, in its 
search for more autonomy, will become a political entity strong 
                                                 
147 The issue of autonomy and its appearance in the Mexican political arena after the Nicaraguan experience 
is fully discussed by Castellanos and Lopez y Rivas. See Alicia Castellanos and López y Rivas. 
“Autonomías y movimiento indígena en México: debates y desafíos” in Alteridades 7, no. 13, 1997. 
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enough to face economic shocks, economic crises, and economic 
policies and treaties that may threaten the region/municipality/ 
community.148 We now examine some of the reasons behind the 
desire for the pursuit of autonomy.     
                                                 
148 See Diaz-Polanco, Hectór. La Rebelión Zapatista y la Autonomía. (México D.F.: Siglo veintiuno 
editores, 1997). 
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B.2 Regaining Control 
 
An important source of human dignity is the capacity of 
people to stand on their own feet and make their own decisions 
regarding lifestyle and the values they will or will not adopt. 
Gillermo Bonfil Batalla (1991) has insisted on the importance of 
the community’s ability to make decisions concerning its own 
cultural elements in order to have a level of control over the 
cultural process. Culture is a social phenomenon, and Bonfil 
argues that social capacity entails control over material elements, 
organizational elements, knowledge, and the symbolic or 
emotional elements connected to culture. Table 10 identifies four 
cultural scenarios that a community can face depending on its 
social capacity.  
                                        
             Table 10 Alternatives for Cultural Scenarios 
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Source: Bonfil, Batalla Guillermo, Pensar nuestra cultura (Mexico: Alianza Editorial, 1991) 
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The first option is when the cultural elements are the 
community’s own and decisions are also their own. This desirable 
combination reflects the level of social capacity of the community, 
yielding the possibility of attaining an autonomous culture. To 
experience an autonomous culture means to hold the capacity to 
produce, use and reproduce chosen cultural elements, e.g., 
traditional medical knowledge. The second alternative, where the 
cultural elements are the community’s own but the decisions are 
out of its control (foreign), would constitute an alienated culture. 
Under this situation, other people make the decisions concerning a 
community’s cultural elements; e.g., communal land, language, 
and ancient celebrations. The third option, appropriated culture, is 
an acceptance of foreign cultural elements as the community’s own 
cultural practices. This acceptance is a result of the community’s 
own decisions. However, due to the fact that the cultural elements 
are foreign, people lack the capacity to produce them or reproduce 
them, even though the social agents can decide whether they want 
to use them or not; e.g., Christmas celebrations, technology, etc. 
The fourth alternative reflects the situation of an imposed culture, 
which emerges when neither cultural elements nor decisions are 
under the control of the people. Nevertheless, under this scenario 
the cultural elements still become part of the culture of the people, 
e.g., industrialized food, commercial music, pop drinks, etc.  
In spite of possible weaknesses in Bonfil’s description of a 
complex social phenomenon, two remarks can be made at this 
point. First, we want to highlight the driving argument behind this 
analysis: that apparently empowerment is highly connected to the 
desirable scenario of appropriation of cultural elements and the 
capacity to make decisions over them. Secondly, it appears that 
empowerment is not merely an object to be possessed, but that it 
exists in the exercise of acts, in the practice of the capacity or 
capability of people to choose the kind of lives they want to live. In 
conclusion we can affirm that to protect and honor human dignity, 
it is necessary to struggle for a less alienated and more autonomous 
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culture as a way of refusing to live in a powerless and alienated 
condition.   
 
 
C. Toward a Political Economy of Dignity and the Search  
 for an Alternative Economic Scenario for Chiapas and  
 Southern Mexico 
  
We now take a further step and begin the search for a 
possible path to overcome the current tendency of the persistent 
disengagement process, aggravated by exclusion, which leads to 
entitlement failure in southern Mexico. First, we set forward a 
fundamental condition for any possible alternative--the protection 
of human dignity. This fundamental condition is consistent with 
the type of economic system found in peasant and indigenous 
communities, oriented by the principles of reciprocity and 
cooperation which serve to maintain both social relations and 
survival. Next we define our notion of sustainable livelihoods. In 
summarizing what we have found so far, we attempt to identify the 
links among the specific areas already identified, (namely, 
recognition, protection of entitlements, human security and human 
development), in order to see how these areas might be in turn 
connected to human dignity. Finally, we identify two additional 
stepping stones which will lead us to the formulation of a possible 
scenario of development for Chiapas.   
As we have pointed out earlier, at the center of the process of 
disengagement in Chiapas an unbearable sense of humiliation was 
afflicted on people. Therefore, in order to introduce our first key 
concept we start our search with the issue of humiliation. 
Previously, we have partially defined human dignity as the 
opposite of an act of humiliation, which cruelly destroys the 
capacity of people to believe in themselves and act with confidence 
to modify their own circumstances. In applying this definition to 
economics, we can say that human dignity requires the respect of 
the right of individuals as well as groups to take initiatives and 
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play an active role in the process of decision making when those 
decisions will bring about economic and political outcomes that 
will affect their lives (Martinez 2000). To deny this right, 
inevitably degrades the decision-making process to an instrumental 
practice, reducing the value of people’s lives to an inferior status, 
subject to manipulation. Therefore, human dignity from this 
perspective requires the removal of structural constraints in 
people’s daily lives in order to become both decision makers, and 
the constructors of a socio-economic process that uplifts human 
self-reliance.  
From a more practical perspective we can say that dignity is 
deeply connected to the human need to achieve, to succeed in 
putting into motion a set of daily activities to build and maintain 
sustainable livelihoods which uplift human dignity. A sustainable 
livelihood beyond mere survival can be defined as the tangible way 
that capabilities, entitlements, and security can make it possible for 
people to live with dignity and reach higher levels of human 
development; that is, to experience greater freedom to live the lives 
people value most. The notion of economic development therefore, 
can be defined as a positive change that yields control of the 
decisions that affect their lives into people’s hands, both in terms 
of an inner security and an emerging inner economy which can 
sustain human life. The protection and honoring of human dignity, 
we suggest, should guide the type of development needed. In 
consequence, development honors human dignity. It is through 
empowerment and the removal of constraints and unfreedoms that 
development maintains people at the center of the process, 
enhancing capabilities, self-reliance and the flourishing of 
enduring livelihoods.149 Three aspects characterize the 
sustainability here envisioned. 
1. The adjective sustainable is used to describe a livelihood 
that first reveals itself to be an economic arrangement which 
                                                 
149 Helmore and Singh point out that sustainability of livelihoods must be resilient to be able to cope with 
and recover from shocks and stresses. See Helmore, Kristin and Singh, Sustainable Livelihoods: Building 
on the Wealth of the Poor (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc. 2001) 
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sustains life in agreement with the cultural and ecological 
environment. For instance, as we have observed earlier, 
participation, cooperation and reciprocity have played important 
roles in the economics of indigenous communities. A sustainable 
livelihood, therefore, should include these organic economic 
principles, which have proved to be enabling for subsistence and 
survival.  
2. Second, a sustainable livelihood is one which has the 
capacity of enduring economic, population or ecological crises. 
The debt crises of 1982 or 1994, and the austerity programs that 
followed the crises are examples of the types of crisis a sustainable 
livelihood could endure. As we have seen, the collapse of coffee, 
meat and other prices had a tremendous impact on household 
economies in Chiapas and contributed to a worsening of the 
scenario previous to the uprising. The effects of population growth, 
systematic acquirement failure, exclusion, etc., are examples of 
other hostile environments where sustainable livelihoods can 
endure.         
3. Finally, a sustainable livelihood achieves a place in society 
with recognition of rights and protection. It matures thanks to a 
friendly environment, serving people by satisfying human needs, 
counterbalancing the acute disengagement process observed in 
Chiapas prior the uprising.  
We turn now to our discussion of the concrete and inevitable 
areas relating to the uplifting of human dignity. The preservation 
and protection of human dignity is an active process, not realized 
without the diligent effort of people or other agents. 
In summary Model 16 illustrates four previously explored 
areas, (recognition, protection of entitlements, human security and 
human development), placing at the center the issue of human 
dignity. These four elements are areas in which efforts, energy and 
creativity can be directed to assure that people are recognized as 
deserving entities before the law, that their rights and entitlements 
are protected, that their lives are protected from violence, and that 
they achieve a level of human development. This type of re-
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arrangement of what we consider to be the main variables in the 
socio-economic and political arenas also implies a feasible way to 
address the main issues of the conflict in Chiapas and to overcome 
the likelihood of future armed conflicts in the region. For instance, 
human dignity requires recognition, which includes individual and 
collective rights within the juridical framework, enabling people to 
actively participate in decision making and the formation of 
policies that affect their lives. Not surprisingly, recognition is at 
the center of the current struggle of indigenous peoples in Mexico. 
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Model 16 The Protection of Human Dignity  
 
         I. Recognition 
 (non-exclusion/ political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions) 
                                             
                                                                                                                         
            
      III. Human Security                     Human Dignity             II. Assurance of Rights and                                                
(protection from violence, fears)                                                                          Entitlements 
                                                                                                             (grievances at the core of the latent                      
                                                                                                                    conflict and daily resistance)            
                           
                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                         
             IV. Social and Economic (Human) Development                                                        
         (through the recovery of the community’s capacity, empowerment, etc.) 
 
 
   
However, recognition is the beginning of a process and does 
not imply that the other three goals will be placed on hold until 
recognition is obtained. Indeed, all four elements seem in fact to be 
prerequisites of each other. For instance, human security implies 
protection of people from disruptive violence and fears. Yet can 
this be achieved without the recognition of the rights of the 
people? (For the protection of human life from killings assumes the 
recognition of human rights and the value of human life). Not 
surprisingly, unrecognized or excluded groups having unequal 
footing before the law tend to be subjects of discrimination and 
violence. 
Human development, on the other hand, moves beyond the 
goal of survival to the process of the realization of human 
achievements. Yet the pursuit of aspirations is not sustainable if 
the protection of human life, property and rights is not present. The 
protection of entitlements, as we have argued in our last chapter, is 
fundamental for human development. The work necessary to bring 
to fruition these four interlinked elements is greatly challenging, 
but nevertheless we argue that they have the ability to make the 
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process of empowerment and sustainable peace a feasible and 
durable alternative. The foundation of this proposed socio-
economic and political re-arranging is active civil participation, yet 
this alternative scenario is of a dual nature, also requiring active 
governmental participation.  
 
Two Additional Historical Stepping Stones 
 
Under the theme of human development we have so far discussed 
the necessary elements or stepping stones to be considered in a 
possible alternative of development; namely, the role of capacities, 
cultural control, and the protection of human dignity. Two 
additional stepping stones can strengthen the foundation being laid 
for a possible alternative scenario.  
We argue that the grassroots perspective taken by the 
indigenous movement indicates the search for an alternative 
economic re-arrangement that responds to the nature of the 
indigenous struggle. We base the feasibility of an alternative 
scenario on two promising events which point in that direction. 
First we look at the San Andrés Accords, signed on February 16, 
1996 by the Zapatistas and the federal government. These peace 
accords consist of four documents: a statement of agreement and 
acceptance regarding the joint agreements, Document 1, Document 
2 and Document 3.2. Although the signing of this agreement could 
have been interpreted as a peace agreement for a cessation of 
hostilities between a guerrilla group and the government, it was in 
fact an agreement of a deeper nature. The Accords stated a clear 
commitment on behalf of the government to eliminate the causes 
of the rebellion, with the federal government committing to take 
significant steps in the fields of culture, rights and democracy. 
Though the government indicated complete agreement to the 
Accords and originally fully endorsed them, it later unilaterally 
modified the Accords, and continuing to the present (2006) still 
does not honor them. It is not surprising that the debate regarding 
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the Accords remains at the center of the indigenous discourse and 
also at the center of Mexico’s political agenda.  
Due to the limited focus here and the extended range of 
implications of the San Andrés Accords, we have selected two 
elements as key in sustaining an alternative economic scenario. 
The first is the possibility of a new legal framework between the 
indigenous peoples and the government. The second key element is 
the promising economic practice of the Economía Solidaria, which 
has emerged in the midst of the conflict. Instead of basing an 
alternative economic scenario solely on economic arguments, we 
choose these two elements which have already begun to take root 
in Chiapas.  
 
The First Stepping Stone: A New Legal Framework 
 
Though the government expected a rather quick and easy 
flow in the negotiations of the San Andrés Accords, the 
government representatives found themselves facing a situation 
without precedent. The rebels were determined not to accept any 
political or economic benefit from the government, rejecting any 
possibility of co-opting the movement. The rebels insisted on a 
single and simple principle set forward by the Zapatistas: the 
defense of their dignity (Lopez y Rivas 2004). In the box which 
follows (Box 12) we turn to the text itself, highlighting important 
elements of the proposed new relationship between indigenous 
people and the Mexican government. This new relationship, (as it 
appears in these documents), rests upon a new legal framework 
which is yet to be constructed. 
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Box 12   Key Elements of the San Andrés Accords for a New Legal Framework 
 
The Foundations 
a) Recognition of indigenous demands in the national Political Constitution in which such rights should 
be embodied as legitimate rights. The government commits itself to the recognition and support of 
indigenous peoples in their efforts to become key players in decisions affecting their lives, and reaffirms 
their condition as Mexicans with full exercise of the rights they have rightfully earned for their role in the 
building of Mexico. This includes political, jurisdictional, social, economic and cultural rights. The 
Mexican government recognizes indigenous people as new subjects of law, including their right for self-
determination and eliminating the restricted capabilities of indigenous peoples.  
b) Broadening political participation and representation. The state should promote legal and legislative 
changes to broaden local and national political participation and representation of indigenous peoples. It 
includes the recognition of the political, economic, social and cultural rights of indigenous people. 
c) Guaranteeing full access to justice. The Mexican state should ensure total access of Indian peoples to 
the judicial system of the Mexican state. This process must be done with a spirit of respect for the cultural 
characteristics of Indian nations and peoples as well as with the recognition of differences and internal 
procedures within the communities.  
d) Promoting the cultural manifestation of indigenous people. The state should promote and coordinate 
cultural policies aimed at broadening the spaces of indigenous peoples for the production, recreation and 
dissemination of their cultures.  
e) Ensuring education and training.  The state should provide access of indigenous peoples to education, 
science and technology. 
f) Guaranteeing satisfaction of basic needs. The state should guarantee conditions for indigenous people to 
allow them to take care of their nutrition, health care and housing needs. 
g) Promoting production and employment. The state should promote the economic base of indigenous 
people with specific development strategies agreed upon with them, based on their capabilities and 
leadership. 
h) Protecting indigenous migrants.  The state should promote specific social policies to protect indigenous 
migrants both within the national territory and beyond its borders. 
 
The principles that should govern the actions of the Mexican state are the following: 
 
1. Pluralism. The dealings between the peoples and cultures that make up Mexican society should be based 
on respect for their differences, under the assumption of their fundamental equality. The state should 
promote a pluralistic approach in society to combat discrimination. The actions of the state should be 
carried out without making a distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples.  
2. Sustainability. It is essential and urgent to ensure the continuance of nature and culture in the terms used 
by indigenous people, as fined in article 13.2 of convention 169 of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO). The state in conjunction with indigenous people should promote the sustainability of indigenous 
towns and communities through settlement mechanisms aimed at rehabilitating damaged indigenous 
territories in the spirit of convention 169 of the ILO.   
 3. Comprehensiveness. The state should promote comprehensive and concurrent actions by the 
institutions and levels of government  
4. Participation.  The state should encourage institutional actions promoting the participation of 
indigenous peoples and communities and respecting their forms of internal organization, in order to attain 
the goal of strengthening their capacity to be decisive players in their own development. This should 
include the transformation of institutions and be shaped by indigenous peoples in conjunction with the 
Mexican government.   
5. Free determination. The state shall respect the exercise of free determination of indigenous peoples in 
each of the spheres and levels in which they will enforce and practice their separated autonomy without 
detriment to national sovereignty and within the new regulatory framework for indigenous people. 
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Besides the foundations and principles displayed in Box 12, 
the San Andrés Accords specifically point out that this new legal 
framework includes constitutional amendments; i.e., Articles 4 and 
115 and the consequent amendments at the state level. It also 
includes recognition of indigenous communities in the national 
legislation as public law entities, their right for association between 
municipalities to achieve coordination of common actions, and the 
commitment of the Mexican state to transfer natural resources to 
indigenous communities so that they themselves administer the 
public funds allocated to them.     
 
The Second Stepping Stone: The Economics of Solidarity 
 
If the conditions for sustainability seem complex and difficult 
to build in the midst of globalization, is there a possible 
alternative? For approximately thirty years, seventeen 
municipalities in the state of Chiapas have chosen regional 
alternative economic practices that could respond to the specific 
circumstances and needs of indigenous people over those of main 
stream economics (see Map 4). Economía Solidaria (the 
Economics of Solidarity) offers a doable alternative for the 
practice of economics.  
In 1969 DESMI A.C. (Civil Association for Economic and 
Social Development of Mexican Indigenous People) was formally 
organized. This was one year after the Medellín Conference and 
the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre of students and workers in Mexico 
City. DESMI had actually been in operation in Chiapas since 1968 
as an agency which provided assistance to communities. Its 
philosophy, which led to its consolidation stage, was described in 
one of its meetings in the following words: “To make life bearable 
so that there will not be so much suffering” (DESMI A.C. 2001). 
During this phase resources and decisions were external factors to 
the communities. In 1974 the association moved to the 
construction of models around the organization of production, 
labor and the means of production. The association became more 
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organizational, carrying out projects to provide health, education 
and other services.  
In 1978 the predominant economic practices that surrounded 
the life of indigenous and peasant communities were challenged 
and the search for alternative routes started. DESMI, in 
conjunction with the communities, become convinced that it was 
possible to build an alternative economy based on common 
support, and human relations with groups in other regions within 
the country and beyond the Mexican borders. It then became clear 
that in order to obtain living conditions of dignity, only one path 
could be taken: the empowerment of people as social subjects of 
their own history and development.  
From 1990 to 1999, various groups emerged which carried 
out development projects, and many communities became involved 
in social, economic and political change based on human relations 
and reciprocity, seeking holistic and sustainable alternatives. The 
result of all of this process was the building of an economy of 
solidarity. 
The desire for constructing an economy of solidarity was 
inspired by the pedagogical ideas of Paulo Freire, who emphasized 
mutual learning through dialogue, and building upon already-
existing knowledge (individual or collective) of the people which 
in turn connects them to their own history, context and culture. 
From this perspective, individuals and collectivities then transform 
what is familiar to them and in the process can transform 
themselves. The application of Freire’s principles became obvious 
in the practices of the economy of solidarity. The learning process 
has been and continues to be, built on the already existing 
knowledge of the economics of the people--the knowledge of 
carpenters, bread makers, coffee planters, handcrafters, and others.  
As the communities became key players in the economic 
process, DESMI took a facilitator role in the work in these regions 
(see Map 4). 
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    MAP 4  DESMI  A.C.   ZONE WORK 
  
         (some projects and joint collaboration with other communities) 
 
 
Source: DESMI A.C. available from http:/www.laneta.org/desmiac/MAPAZON2.PDF. 
 
Comparing the economics of solidarity with mainstream 
economics we can observe contrasting differences (see Table 10). 
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Table 10 Economics of Solidarity and Neo-Liberal Economics     
 
 Indicators Neo-Liberal Economics Solidarity Economics 
1. The Role of Work 
 
Productivity a) to meet needs 
b) self-realization of the 
person 
2. Organization of  
    Labor 
Of hierarchical nature-- 
the owners are the bosses  
a) democratic 
b) contributes to the 
    collectivity 
c) decisions made in 
    community public 
     meetings 
d) according to culture 
3. Technology  Labor substitution  As a tool for work 
4. Land a)merchandise 
b)individual property 
c)an enterprise  
a) to sustain life 
b) collective or individual 
    property for the 
    collective use  
5. Production  For the market a) self-consumption 
b) exchange 
c)  market 
6. Price of Products Determined by supply and 
demand 
According to the amount of 
work and prices of other  
products  
 
7. The market 
 
Controlled by large 
companies and international 
banks 
Controlled by producers 
and consumers according to 
real needs 
8. Money Power and merchandise  Means of exchange 
9. Relations                             Domination  Cooperation and 
construction of power 
10. Space  Competition Free 
 
 
Source: DESMI  A.C., Si  une come, que coman todos, (San Cristóbal, Chiapas DESMI, 2001): 97-98. 
 
 
The bases that sustain the practice of the economy of solidarity are: 
a) the collective work of men and women, 
b) the availability of revolving loans provided only to 
previously evaluated collective projects, 
c) the philosophy that learning is a long-term goal, 
d) exchange between collectivities, 
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e) recognition of existing wisdom among indigenous people, 
f) the priority of development of capabilities and potential 
ability for creativity, affirmation, 
g) relationships among communities, mutual support based on 
human relationships, equal distribution of resources and 
economic benefits, 
h) a common struggle for justice expressed in a search for 
autonomy,  
i) the priority of protection of rights of communities and each 
individual, and 
j) faith in compromise, in hope and in love for one another.  
 
Nevertheless, as in any other social initiative, the economics of 
solidarity has encountered difficulties and new challenges, among 
which are: to learn how to address issues of community corruption, 
to build trust and confidence regarding abilities and knowledge 
among various communities and to live out decision-making as 
community.    
Lacking endorsement and funding from public authorities, 
Economía Solidaria has functioned since its beginning as a model 
open to the international system. In its early stages DESMI 
functioned as a connector between the community and the main 
donor, who at that time was Catholic Relief Services. The task of 
DESMI was to receive the donations, cash the checks and transfer 
money to the beneficiaries. Currently DESMI has changed its role 
and the donors have become diversified; e.g., OXFAM (England), 
Entraide et Fraternité and Broedelijk Delen (Belgium) and 
Desarrollo y Paz (Canada), as well as NGO’s in Mexico and 
outside of Mexico. The financial tool used to initiate projects has 
been a fund which is loaned, then paid back, and then re-loaned to 
another party. Nevertheless, the protection of the dignity of people 
has at times met with difficulties when dealing with donors. Often 
donors hold expectations tied to their donations, such as 
quantitative results according to their own cultural standards and 
industrial criteria. Yet the communities expect donors to show 
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respect and appreciation for other non-quantitative results achieved 
in their work, such as the developing of organizational networks, 
and the building of relations and trust. Eventually a relation of trust 
has developed between donors and the communities struggling to 
build sustainable livelihoods.  
The Economía Solidaria initiative, which is found at the heart 
of conflict in Chiapas, does not stand alone in Mexico. Other 
indigenous initiatives have also emerged based on community 
organization and guided by the principle of sustainability. These 
initiatives, reported by Toledo, have experienced fair success in 
claims of rights and entitlements and also in dealing with the 
international economic process. Table 11 lists the name of the 
organizations or programs, the number of communities and people 
involved, and if available, their location and activities. 
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Table 11  Sustainable Indigenous Initiatives in Mexico   
Organization/ 
Indigenous 
Peoples  
Number of 
Commun-
ities 
involved 
State  Work and Achievements Support  
Ejidos 
Productores 
Forestales de la 
Zona Maya. 
50 
communities  
8,000 
families 
Quintana 
Roo 
20 years of struggle for autonomy  
Protection of forests 
Production of natural products 
Ownership of a company 
 
Consejo 
Regional de 
Xpujil  
75 
communities 
Campeche Sustainable uses of the forest 
Production of natural products 
Promoting  economies of subsistence 
Ecotourism 
Apiculture 
Supported 
by the 
World 
Bank, 
Mexican 
Govern-
ment and 
Canada 
Indígenas de la 
Sierra Madre de 
Motozintla 
(ISMAM) 
 
 
 
Unión de 
Comunidades 
Indígenas de la 
Región del 
Istmo (UCIRI)  
ISMAN 
156 
communities  
1,800 
producers 
 
 
UCIRI 
49 
communities 
2,500 
Mixes, 
Zapotecs, 
Mixtecs  
      
Chiapas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oaxaca 
(Isthmus) 
ISMAN Exports organic coffee to Europe, the U.S and 
Japan, diversifies its production and protects the forest, 
sources of water, produces honey and promotes 
ecotourism 
 
 
 
UCIRI exports organic coffee to Europe (Germany, 
Switzerland), and has achieved innovated ecological 
strategies for the production of coffee and other crops  
Runs health, nutrition, education and research projects 
within their communities 
 
Cooperativa  
Sanzekan 
Tineme 
 100 
communities 
 
Guerrero Sustainable production of palm trees which produce 
leaves used for handcrafts and products for subsistence 
Creation of reserve areas 
Reforestation  
Fair trade  
 
Yum Balan  40  
communities 
Yucatán Created feasible alternative tourist projects instead of  
destructive mega-projects in the area 
Ecotourism 
 
Chontales  Tabasco Protection of water deposits (the most important 
deposits in the country)  
ODRENASIJ 
 
 13 
communities 
Oaxaca 
(Sierra 
Juárez) 
Protection of forests 
To return control of forests from private companies to 
the communities in the sierra 
Creation of natural reserves/ecotourism 
 
Chinantecos 90,000 
people 
Oaxaca 
(Chinantla) 
Control over cultural issues 
Control over own resources 
Protection of the tropical forest 
Production of vanilla, coffee, palm trees, trees used for 
medicinal purposes, herbs and other natural products  
 
Tosepan 
Titataniske 
(United We 
58,000 
families  
Puebla 
(sierra) 
Organic coffee grown under shade of pepper trees and 
avocado trees 
Recycling of coffee plants to be used for household 
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Will Overcome) production of mushrooms  
Compost Production  
Consejo de 
Pueblos Nahua  
 Guerrero 
(Alto Balsas 
region) 
Stopped the construction of a major hydroelectric dam 
in a tropical forest  
Promotion of sustainable development projects 
 
Zoque 
communities  
Oaxaca 
(Chimalapa 
region) 
Protection of the Chimalapa region with one of the 
most important permanently green jungles in the 
country (more than half a million hectares) 
Brought together ecological organizations, Mexican 
and foreign scientists in their efforts for sustainability  
Indigenous communities  have launched an initiative to 
create the first peasant ecological reserve in the country 
 
San Juan 
Parangicutiro 
More than 
1,200 people 
Michoacán 
(Meseta 
Purhépecha) 
Has created one of the most impressive projects at an 
international level related to community management 
of a forest and its resources 
Production and processing of products derived from the 
forest 
National and international trade 
Production of avocados, fruit, corn, products derived 
from livestock 
Protects water sources and forests 
Ecotourism, environmental education 
 
 
Tepoztlán 
community  
Morelos 
(Tepoztlán) 
In 1995 achieved the protection of ecological reserves, 
water sources and communal land from a mega-tourist 
project planning to build golf areas and hotels 
 
Nahua 
communities  
Jalisco 
(Sierra 
Manantlán) 
Protection of 345,000 hectares in cooperation with the 
University of Guadalajara 
Human Rights committees 
Solidarity actions with the rebels in Chiapas 
 
Yaqui fishing 
community   
Sonora Creation of a low-scale model of a successful 
cooperative 
Achieved successful negotiations with the government, 
gaining control over water deposits in the region 
 
O’odham 
peoples   
Sonora 
(dessert/ 
border 
region) 
Succeeded in exercising their right to have control over 
their habitat, which was later declared a biosphere 
reserve by the United Nations and later named 
“Protected Reserve” by the government in 1993 
 
Nahua peoples   Huasteca region 
Trained people from 57 communities on how to start 
local projects in agro-ecology   
Seri peoples  Sonora  
The last nomadic Indian people of Mexico are involved 
in a process of cultural revitalization, rescuing their 
knowledge regarding nature 
Ecotourism 
Control over resources 
 
 
 
Data based on Victor Toledo, La Paz en Chiapas, (Mexico: UNAM-Quinto Sol, 2000) 
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A common factor among these grassroots organizations is the 
achievement of certain levels of control, power and autonomy. 
These initiatives, as well as the economics of solidarity, confirm 
what we have stated earlier; that is, the existence of a broader type 
of economics that is present in Mexico, the inner-economy, which 
has sprung from community living and consequently has 
contrasting tendencies and goals in comparison to the surrounding 
mainstream economics.  
 
 
D. The Political Economics of Dignity: The Search for an 
Alternative Scenario 
 
We have attempted in this chapter the identification of 
different expressions of the socio-economic and political struggle 
or (what we can call a common search) within the region for an 
alternative scenario. The key elements that can be drawn from our 
analysis up to this point are human dignity, recognition, human 
security, human development, rights, capacities, and control. We 
have argued in this chapter that the alternative scenario suggested 
by the people in the struggle for a different social and political 
reality in the region must include recognition, the protection of 
rights, human security, and human development. In addition, the 
dynamics of such an alternative scenario need to be consistent with 
the expressed voice of the people in the region. Our suggested 
picture of what an alternative scenario could look like is illustrated 
by Model 20, referred to as the Living Economy Scenario (LES). 
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Model 20  Dynamics of the Living Economy Scenario 
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The Economic Process 
 
 Model 20 can be viewed as an image of the top of a tree in a 
forest. This is an organic unit of a living-economy that is cultivated 
by the people and honored by the state. The state, actively involved 
in the process, fosters and protects the embryonic initiatives, 
assuring financial availability by focusing on institutional 
capabilities in the region (credits, and non-conventional banking 
systems), in order to protect the existing entitlement system in 
rural communities. 
At the center the dignity of people functions as an expanding 
force as people mobilize, working together with organizations and 
other actors. This expansion, as we have suggested in southern 
Mexico, moves toward a) recognition, b) the assurance of rights, c) 
demanding security, and d) seeking an adequate social and 
economic (human) development. Initiatives become intertwined, 
moving toward inner-growth. The protection of dignity becomes 
the means to transform the structure while dignity itself remains 
the guiding goal. In a similar way, the protection of entitlements 
becomes the tool for transformation of structure and processes and 
the goal of development. Following the same direction, human 
development, (improvements in health, education, etc.), becomes 
an immediate benefit as well as a tool to attain even higher levels 
of human development. Finally, as people become caretakers of 
human life and dignity, their organization and mobilization could 
become a system of checks and balances of governmental 
initiatives.  
The LES is a people-centered scenario, taking into account 
capacities, capabilities (household and institutional), cultural 
control, and traditional and non-traditional resources, all of which 
are enhanced as the process expands. Countable resources are 
those which can be measured, such as financial gains, land, 
physical capital, ecological resources, and human capital. 
Alongside these resources we have found guiding and non-
countable community resources: cooperation, manovuelta, 
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guelaguetza, mediería, reciprocity, tequio, relational power with 
nature, indigenous and peasant intergenerational wisdom, 
asamblea, the cargo system, and in addition, solidarity, 
organizational and creative skills. These resources and also the 
regulating principles are usually abundant and available for 
potential growth. Nevertheless, these elements tend to be dismissed 
as possible resources for achieving development. Though invisible 
to the eye of many planners, they remain as enduring resources; 
since contrary to the nature of countable and limited resources 
these resources carry the potential for a multiplying effect in the 
survival of generations of people. These resources can help us to 
understand the survival of indigenous people. The respected 
Chilean economist Max-Neef has called resources of these types, 
non-conventional resources, and has identified two distinct 
characteristics. First, these resources can only be lost or wasted 
when they are not used. Second, contrary to conventional 
economic resources which are scarce, these non-conventional 
resources are plentiful and carry a great capacity to bring about 
transformation and to produce deep social changes.150 As this 
process continues, sustainable livelihoods develop, becoming 
evident (second circle), and the transformation of processes and 
structures (third circle) also becomes a reality. Finally, the fruits 
and benefits contribute to society, sustaining other livelihoods in a 
non-conflictive manner. This type of economy, based on human 
relations and cooperation, reduces the likelihood of conflict by 
promoting non-violent solutions and by encouraging ways of living 
that are not harmful to people or the environment. 
 
Why the LES Represents a Feasible and Better Alternative 
  
Currently Mexican federal social spending remains low (9% 
of the GDP as compared to Colombia-16%, Costa Rica-17%, 
                                                 
150 See Max-Neef, Manfred A. Human Scale Development: Conception, Application and Further 
Reflections (New York and London: The Apex Press, 1991)  
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Brazil-21%, and Uruguay 23%.151 Increases in social expenditures 
can be carried out under the guidance of the Human Development 
Index, as proposed by the United Nations Human Development 
Report of Mexico in 2002. According to this report, already 
discussed in Chapter IV, a tremendous difference and outcome 
could be projected in Mexico if federal spending were to target 
areas detected by the Human Development Index as those of 
greatest need. Furthermore, substantial environmental changes 
could be achieved if economic policies and current social programs 
were designed according to international agreements already 
signed by Mexico. Examples of these are the convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the United Nations 
(1981), the Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1981), the 
Treaty on Racial Discrimination (1966, 1975), the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(1980, 1981); the Convention for the Elimination against Torture 
(1985, 1986), the Agreement for the Protection of the Rights of 
Children (1990) and the United Nations Millennium Declaration to 
eradicate poverty, and promote human dignity and equality (2000).  
In another area, Observation 6 from Chapter IV pointed out 
the excessive economic centralization in the south of Mexico, and 
the lack of integration between the rural areas and the urban 
centers. This situation could be alleviated by a reconfiguration of 
power, growing out of the strength of civil organizations and 
commitment on the part of the federal government. Not pursuing 
this alternative path will likely mean the continuance of unfruitful 
practices, mainly carried out by the federal government. The 
unfruitfulness of the current path, and its disconnection from the 
nature of rebellions, is in itself the immediate if not the most 
important reason to move toward the adoption of an alternative 
approach. An additional reason is that current federal assistance 
programs remain ineffective in reducing poverty in a meaningful 
fashion or in reversing the process of marginalization or inequality. 
                                                 
151 CEPAL, Panorama Social de América Latina 2000-2001, (Santiago de Chile, 2001). 
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According to a recent joint report by the World Bank and the 
Mexican government, the federal and state assistance programs in 
the southern states in Mexico have been disconnected from 
investments in human capital or other key strategic sectors and 
have contributed to a reduction of only 2% in the poverty rate in 
the region. This has left a large income difference between non-
indigenous and indigenous populations which still remains at 60% 
in Chiapas and Guerrero, and 50% in Oaxaca.152 
 Unfortunately, as in the past, trade continues to take priority 
over the improvement of human living conditions. For instance, 
resources have been directed toward an ambitious market 
integration of Mexico with Central America through the Panama-
Puebla Plan, which seeks to integrate the nine southern states of 
Mexico with the seven countries of Central America. The Panama-
Puebla agreement has been resisted by numerous indigenous, 
peasant and civil organizations, and yet in spite of a lack of civil 
support, the agreement has been favored by the Fox administration.  
This commercial agreement has been supported with financial 
resources directed toward its implementation to a much greater 
degree than the support given to programs for the improvement of 
human living conditions.153   
                                                 
152 See Banco Mundial, Estrategia de desarrollo de los estados del sur de México (México, D. F.; 2003) 
Several of the most important programs are listed in following. Progresa- Programa para Educación, Salud 
y Alimentacion (Program for Education, Health and Nutrition), also know as the CONTIGO (With You) 
Program, was founded in 1997. The CONTIGO program consists of cash transfers and vouchers to support 
families with schooled children and provides assistance with health and nutrition issues. In 1998 FISM-
Fondo para la Infraestructura Social y Municipal (Social Infrastructure and Municipal Fund) was created as 
a decentralized program to target poor areas which had been detected by an index of well-being. Finally, 
PROCAMPO was implemented in 1994 after the inauguration of NAFTA. To note the impact of assistance 
programs, levels of poverty and contrasting differences see Tania Carrasco and Shelton H. Davis, 
Indigenous Peoples in the State of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca (Mexico City: The World Bank, 2003)   
153 Social Watch is an international network of citizen organizations fighting to eradicate poverty and 
combat its causes. In its 2005 Report, several Mexican organizations stated that the fundamental 
discrepancies between the current federal strategy and the human development assessment, resides in the 
lack of understanding of poverty as a multidimensional phenomena, which entails denial of rights and 
deprivation. Consequently, programs such as “Oportunidades” (Opportunities), aimed to improve human 
capital, “Empleo Temporal” (Temporary Employment”) aimed to create employment, “Tu Casa” (Your 
Home), aimed to improve housing, and “Arranque Parejo en la Vida” (Equal Start in Life”), a program to 
support women with high- increases of resources. A general tendency has been a reduction of resources for 
these programs in favor risk pregnancies, have not reached the south nor made a difference in terms of the 
creation of trade zones. See “Social Watch Report 2005: Roars and Whispers , Gender and Poverty: 
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  The persistent strategy for the creation of jobs has proven to 
have little or no impact on rural populations. Rural poverty has 
been insulated from these kinds of strategies. A possible reason for 
this can be the great percentage of indigenous peoples in southern 
Mexico (80%) who depend on the land for their livelihoods. As 
stated in previous chapters, indigenous peoples first seek strategies 
rather than jobs to deal with economic hardships; that is, they tend 
to do work to sustain their livelihoods instead of finding a job. 
Federal resources and programs that are job-oriented could be 
changed to promote livelihoods, taking advantage of the existing 
wealth of the know-how of rural populations in the construction of 
their own livelihoods.  
 The economics of solidarity and the indigenous initiatives in 
other regions of Mexico indicate that instead of looking toward 
Europe, the United States or Asia as models to follow, a feasible 
internal economic alternative is worth examination and 
consideration. Although it can be argued that the living economy 
scenario cannot be proven to be a fully consistently working model 
in practice, we still insist on the relevance of the guiding principles 
for the development of a healthier economy than what currently 
exists. The principles presented by Economía Solidaria and other 
initiatives carry implications that are complex, yet nevertheless 
promising.   
 
Guiding Principles and Implications of the Living Economy 
Scenario 
 
 There are three guiding principles in the LES. One of the 
most important is the principle of A) self-reliance, which 
emphasizes that not all things produced should be for the market 
(exchange value) but rather that the daily food satisfaction of the 
community (use value) should first be sought. Self-reliance can in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Promises vs. Action” available from 
http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informeImpreso/tablaDeContenidos2005.htm  
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fact provide the foundation for solid negotiation and interaction 
with the market in an effective way. On a greater scale it may 
imply that the struggle for self-sufficiency or food security must 
take priority over free trade. This explains why in the illustrated 
scenario in Model 20, economic agreements are found outside of 
the expanding circle. According to Sherry M. Stephenson, Chief of 
the Trade Division of the American States, free trade functions 
primarily as a political tool. Given that the U.S is interested in free 
trade in order to place more economies on the continent under its 
influence, trade functions more as a tool to achieve constitutional 
changes in countries than merely for commerce. Trade has become 
a political agenda in foreign policy.154 It is not surprising therefore, 
that in the midst of more than forty trade agreements in the 
hemisphere, which have a variety of implications for the 
committed countries, civil society in Mexico has called for 
discussions on: sustainable national projects, the social wellbeing 
of people, the reduction of inequalities at all levels, the exclusion 
of basic foodstuffs from international agreements, the protection of 
people that work the land and the rights of the indigenous 
communities that depend on their lands for their livelihoods. 
The second LES principle is, B) the priority of economic 
security and the health of the living economy in terms of the 
satisfaction of fundamental human needs. This principle implies 
the need for reassessment of the priorities of economic goals 
before increasing the size of the economy and assuming that 
benefits will automatically be derived from growth in terms of 
wellbeing of the people. This reassessment entails two 
considerations. First, the wellbeing of the majorities and 
communities must be placed above economic expansion. In other 
words, human development should take priority over economic 
growth. It has been assumed traditionally that economic expansion 
leads, without question, to an improvement in the quality of life. 
Ranis and Stewart in an international study covering 35 to 76 
                                                 
154 “New Trade Strategies in the Americas” at the Free Trade in the Americas Conference at Baylor 
University, in Waco, Texas, October 6-7, 2005. 
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developing countries have proven that contrary to this assumption, 
in fact in Latin America it is human development that firmly leads 
the economy to a virtuous cycle of growth and higher levels of 
human development.155 Reasons for this are multiple. First, the 
economic flow that comes from expanding the GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) and hopefully reaching human development 
depends mainly on the distribution of income and quality of the 
economic structure in order to translate the benefits of growth to an 
improvement in living conditions. The connections that should 
facilitate a flowing down of the benefits are in fact not automatic 
and very unstable. On the other hand, direct improvement in the 
area of health, for instance, can have a multidimensional effect as 
people are able to work and pursue their interests. If improvement 
in health is accompanied by improvement in education, the impact 
in productivity can be even more significant as both factors 
produce a reciprocal reinforcement and have a multiplying effect. 
Good health enables people to carry out productive activities, 
including attending school, and in turn, education improves the 
likelihood of building effective institutions to sustain the level of 
health already attained, and so on. Other benefits derived from an 
improvement in education relate directly to central life and death 
issues. As Sen (2000) has pointed out, pregnant mothers with 
access to education are able to provide better care for themselves 
and their babies, altering in this way, infant mortality rates. 
Eventually, education affects the quality of jobs or livelihoods. 
Improvement in the quality of life of workers impacts production, 
and consequently exports, in a positive way. This also increases the 
likelihood of a more effective distribution of income through better 
salaries and improved benefits. In spite of these optimistic 
observations, income distribution and quality of investment in a 
given economy remain the most unpredictable and challenging 
issues whether growth is sought to bring about human 
development or vice-versa. 
                                                 
155 Ranis, Gustav and Stewart Frances, “Economic Growth and Human Development in Latin America”, 
Cepal Review 75 (December 2002). 
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Our second consideration regards foreign policy and foreign 
trade, which lay outside the expanding circle (see Model 20). It is 
indeed possible to articulate human security and economic security 
as a priority and goal in the designing of foreign policy. As 
economic agreements become politicized, it is vital for Mexico to 
protect its own interests in terms of the wellbeing of people in its 
territory. Some countries, such as Canada, have taken this step.156 
Moreover, we argue that foreign investment and imports can be 
controlled in accordance with human development priorities. The 
external deficit (debt), though it is not currently producing a crisis 
as in the past, still remains the most vulnerable economic issue in 
the economy. The current administration achieved a reduction in 
the amount of the external debt between 2000 and 2005, yet for 
every dollar that was reduced, seven dollars have been paid in 
interest to service the debt. These transfers to international banks 
reinforce the loss of and exhaustion of resources. In 2005, 96% of 
the debt was paid with oil revenues, increasing the costs of 
petroleum extraction and ecological deterioration in the south.157  
After 20 years of financial reforms, the financial structure of 
Mexico represents the Achilles tendon of the Mexican economy.158 
This vulnerability resides in the fact that, though traditionally 
foreign investment has financed the external deficit of Mexico; the 
limited credit on behalf of the many foreign-owned commercial 
banks has frustrated the expected desirable stability and health of 
the economy.  
The current outer-oriented economy is geared toward the 
accumulation of international reserves which exist only in numbers 
and are unavailable for use even in the case of a national 
emergency. In contrast, since the orientation of the living economy 
alternative is toward the consolidation of home markets, it focuses 
                                                 
156 The Document “Freedom from Fear: The Foreign Policy of Canada Toward Human Security” states five 
priorities in Canada’s foreign policy--the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, support of peace 
operations, conflict prevention, governing and accountability and public security.  Available from 
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca.   
157 La Jornada, 20 July, 2005. 
158 La Jornada, 15 November, 2005. 
 282
on the protection of the economy of the most vulnerable population 
to economic crisis, promoting the practice of solidarity and non-
monetary resources. In consequence it also creates monetary 
alternative financing sources for investment and improving 
conditions to negotiate external debts and deficits.   
The third guiding principle is C), building upon existing 
resources. This principle, unlike those that pursue development by 
implanting new economic arrangements in the Mexican economy, 
gives preference to the flourishing of local initiatives. As in the 
case of physical implants where a body may reject an implanted 
organ detected as foreign, social implants involve high risks and 
the possibility of mismatching. In agreement with indigenous 
discourse, our suggested scenario also implies that existing 
resources deserve recognition and represent a good economic 
foundation for new initiatives. This principle is not unsupported, as 
this has long been suggested by organizations at the hemispheric 
level.159 
 
Benefits and Fruits of the Living Economy Scenario 
 
 As we have argued before, the living economy struggles for 
survival through different initiatives from below and is expressed 
in hybrid forms of economic arrangements. In order to determine 
what type of fruits and benefits should be planned and sought in a 
living economy, we need to assess existing needs and find 
adequate means to satisfy those needs. Max-Neef has insisted on a 
clear understanding of the difference between needs and satisfiers, 
                                                 
159 In September 1993, four months before the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, representatives of NGO's with 
extensive experience working with civil organizations in ten Latin American countries met in Oaxaca for a 
four-day workshop on social and economic issues. The group debated publicly the conditions of 
agriculture. The dialog called for agricultural policies based on already existing resources. Economic 
policies, according to the group, must emphasis the contributions of small-scale agricultural producers. 
Among the organizations represented were: DESCO-Peru, CECADE-Costa Rica, IBASE-Brazil, 
PUEBLO-Mexico, The Development Institute-Dominican Republic; FASE-Brazil, POSCAE-Honduras, 
CRIES-Nicaragua, CEDEA-Argentina, RMALC-Mexico, RECHIP-Chile; FUNDE-El Salvador, CEDLA-
Bolivia, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade “We Have an Alternative: Plan for Economic Recovery 
and Sustainable Development”, Social Action Centre-Jamaica, PET-Chile and The Development GAP-
United States. Available from http://www. Developmentgap.or/Oaxaca.html. 
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affirming the existence of rather limited fundamental human needs: 
the need for subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, 
participation, leisure, creation and freedom. Although it has 
traditionally been understood that needs vary according to location 
and culture, in actuality, needs belong to a dynamic but finite 
system. What varies among cultures are the ways that these needs 
are satisfied. Satisfiers which respond to a sole need are singular 
satisfiers; i.e., food and shelter are satisfiers for the need of 
subsistence. Synergic satisfiers may fulfill a variety of needs 
simultaneously; breastfeeding for instance can satisfy the need for 
protection, subsistence, affection and identity. Violator satisfiers 
are those which claim to fulfill the need for protection, but in fact 
impede the fulfillment of that need and/or other needs. For 
example, the arms race claims to fulfill the need for protection but 
impedes the fulfillment of the need for subsistence, affection, 
participation and freedom. Pseudo-satisfiers are those which give 
the false sensation of satisfying a need, for although these satisfiers 
do not impair the fulfillment of the targeted need, neither do they 
accomplish their purpose. An example of this is an obsessive 
productivity with a bias to efficiency, which aims to fulfill the need 
for subsistence but falls short of the fulfillment of the targeted 
need. Finally, inhibiting satisfiers are those that over-satisfy one 
need and as a result inhibit other fundamental needs. Paternalism, 
for instance, though it responds to the need for protection, inhibits 
understanding, participation, freedom and identity.  
We argue here that the satisfiers have to be identified by 
those who experience their lack and who can consequently play a 
key role in the design of satisfiers. In the case of southern Mexico, 
satisfiers have to be constructed by those who, longing for the 
satisfaction of those needs have considered the use of force and 
violence. Otherwise, well-intentioned satisfiers designed by a third 
party can easily become inhibitors to other needs. For example, 
this problem is evident in monolingual education programs which 
emphasize written and mechanistic thinking provided in the 
official language by governmental institutions, yet inhibit the 
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needs of children and families for social acceptance of indigenous 
languages as valid or the need for the exercise of oral history 
traditions among indigenous communities. In Chiapas in fact, this 
has been one of the grievances of the rebels and the indigenous 
movement. Furthermore, the attempted exercise of autonomy may 
actually result in a monitored or conditioned autonomy, 
experienced through a paternalistic relationship between the 
communities and the federal government, and consequently, also 
failing to respond to the initial need. 
In essence, assistance programs directed at impoverished 
regions in Mexico resemble pseudo satisfiers in that they inhibit 
the satisfaction of the need for subsistence and other needs, such as 
creativity, understanding, participation and creativity. In addition, 
the militarization of the region functions as a violator satisfier in 
pretending to respond to the need for protection and human 
security while in actuality inhibiting the need for freedom from 
fear, and protection from violence. 
The living economy scenario, therefore, suggests the 
possibility of  producing not only adequate but synergic satisfiers 
that can operate as means while also remaining long-term goals as 
the process expands. For instance, attaining access to justice also 
responds to the needs for protection, understanding, participation, 
and subsistence. An adequate property land tenure system will also 
meet the needs for subsistence, identity and participation. Not 
accepting injustices can assure the needs for protection and 
freedom. The protection of rights additionally meets needs for 
protection and identity, and access to health encompasses needs for 
protection, participation, and subsistence. Food security allows for 
meeting the needs of protection, participation, and subsistence, and 
the reduction of emigration will further respond to the need for 
freedom, participation, and identity. 
By way of illustration, we highlight two real cases for 
consideration regarding the feasibility of an alternative, people-
centered process. First is the experience of the unarmed Zapotec 
movement in Juchitán, Oaxaca. The emergence of a coalition of 
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students, workers, intellectuals and residents of Juchitán (COCEI) 
in 1964 has been well documented by Campbell (1994). The 
COCEI movement consolidated a 150 year struggle for autonomy 
at a regional and municipal level by the Zapotec people in the 
isthmus of Oaxaca. The COCEI movement successfully resisted a 
process of cultural, economic and political disarticulation created 
by the capitalist process which had been promoted by federal and 
state governments. The COCEI also brought about new 
organizational forms capable of mobilizing 10,000 people at a 
time. Combined with a cultural movement which included the 
emergence of writers, painters and sculptors, the COCEI reached 
levels of regional autonomy, elevating Zapotec to the official 
municipal language, and raising Zapotec identity. For the rural 
population the movement meant the protection of their agrarian 
livelihoods, land tenure changes and alterations in the class 
structure. In subsequent elections the government of Juchitán has 
alternated between the COCEI and other political parties, and 
often, due to municipal dependence on funding from the federal 
government, the COCEI has experienced repression. To a certain 
extent the popular government has achieved a reorientation of their 
local economy, moving away from large scale, mechanized 
agrarian production models, and instead supporting existing 
economic human resources, (such as skilled workers, craftsmen 
and businesswomen), in Juchitán and the region. Contradictions 
and setbacks, nevertheless, have been present within the 
movement. In 1994 Campbell stated the following: 
 
In the political arena, the Juchiteco goal of local sovereignty 
and freedom from arbitrary Oaxaca and Mexico City 
authorities has not been achieved, despite COCEI electoral 
victories, because the Mexican government can cut off 
funding to COCEI administrations or send in the troops at 
any moment. Likewise, COCEI’s “Juchiteco democracy” has 
not given equal rights to Zapotec women. . .despite 
ideological pronouncements to the contrary. Additionally, 
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Zapotec conflicts with other Isthmus ethnic groups continue 
to be an obstacle to COCEI expansion (Campbell 1994).   
    
Of the various setbacks and difficulties that progressive Mexican 
grassroots movements experience, gender equality remains one of 
the most difficult challenges.  
The second (and more recent) case for consideration is that of 
the Tlalpan delegación.160 Seven of the eight towns which are part 
of this political division, are identified in the CONAPO report and 
the INEGI government statistics as having high marginalization 
indexes. In addition to experiencing extreme poverty, these towns 
faced land tenure irregularities and internal conflicts between the 
original inhabitants and the new settlers whose arrival was a result 
of the housing crisis in Mexico City. The original inhabitants are 
indigenous people with traditional values, who have elected their 
governing bodies based on traditional practices and customs. This 
case is an example of the two societies of Mexico in conflict, the 
traditional, indigenous society and the urban, modern society. 
The Mexico City municipal government (GDF) did not show 
any interest in these towns and their struggle for survival, other 
than a concern for the land and forest which represent vital 
ecological reserves for the city. However, in 1997 the GDF 
decided to implement an official electoral mechanism based on 
indigenous traditional practices and customs. Sub-delegates 
emerged from the elections with the right to represent the 
communities in the city government. In 2000, the first delegates 
duly recognized by the Mexico City government and having a right 
to vote in the city government were elected. The process changed 
the political culture of control and the unilateral appointments the 
                                                 
160 Mexico City is divided into delegaciones. The delegaciones are independent administrative entities that 
are coordinated by the city government in terms of budgets and programs. The Tlalpan delegación is 
located in the south of Mexico City. This political unit includes five geographical areas, the fifth of which 
consists of eight rural towns which are located at the edge of the city limits of Mexico City. This latter area 
represents an important ecological resource for sustaining Mexico City. The names of the eight towns are 
San Pedro Mártir, San Andrés Totoltepec, San Miguel Xicalco, Magdalena Petlacalco, San Miguel Ajusco, 
San Miguel Topilejo, Parres el Guarda, and Chimalcoyotl.   
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state apparatus had exercised over leaders to gain control of votes 
and support.  
In 2002 during the “First Encounter of the Peoples”, an 
assembly for the residents of this region, residents and the 
governing bodies agreed to end the differences between the 
original inhabitants and new settlers, launching a sustainable joint 
economic project with the city government. Between 2001 and 
2003, with aid from the Department of Ecology and Sustainable 
Development, a sustainable program was implemented to protect 
the environment and to start and support productive projects. Both 
rural livelihoods and employment were actively supported by the 
city government. Through the dynamic interaction between the 
local and autonomous governing bodies and the city government, 
the regularization of land tenure became a reality. Land titles were 
issued to the original inhabitants and to those settlers that had 
arrived within the preceding five-year period and had conducted 
themselves in a peaceful and well-intentioned manner. In terms of 
access to services, impressive changes were made in a short period 
of time. Electric power, water, lighting of streets and roads were 
implemented. The autonomy of the towns and the good will of the 
government made it possible to have permanent access to 
consultation services on juridical, administrative, and political 
issues. The process however, was not free of tension, 
contradictions and setbacks. 
The following are some of the most valuable lessons to be 
learned from the COCEI in Oaxaca and the towns in the Tlalpan 
delegación. The path of development has to be made and built by 
the people. This path is not a clear, straight line forward. Due to 
the dominating structure of power and persisting anti-democratic 
practices, the existing democratic institutions and mechanisms in 
Mexico are not sufficient to bring about human development. Also, 
formal democracy expressed in the mere existence of elections will 
not stop the process of impoverishment, marginalization and 
exclusion. Above and beyond the electoral process, the 
transformational democratic process demands the full participation 
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of citizens from all levels of social structure. López y Rivas has 
noted that the practice of democracy involves the existence of three 
vital elements: democratic ideals and vision for the future, 
democratic institutions and the process of democratization. Of 
these three elements, the third seems to be the most challenging. 
As it advances, the process of democratization brings together 
opposite points of view in an environment of tension; with 
setbacks, losses, constant changes and instability. Social 
collectivities that participate and mobilize in order to transform 
their environment become the driving force in the democratic 
process. In Tlalpan more than 20,000 people actively participated 
and together forged a new political relationship with the 
government, making gains in the areas of recognition, protection of 
rights, human security; building capacities and gaining control 
over cultural elements. Making use of non-countable and countable 
resources, these towns improved their own living conditions, 
offering to the society at large the benefit of cleaning up and 
protecting the forests, which function as lungs for the city. Thanks 
to the good political will of the government in attempting to work 
with the political structure already in existence in the communities, 
and thanks to officials trained in a new way of dealing with social 
actors, Tlalpan is now an inspiring alternative model of how to 
protect human dignity while transforming a hostile environment.  
We have already asked the reader to conceive of our 
alternative scenario represented in Model 20 as the image of the 
top of a tree, and now ask that the analogy of a tree be extended to 
how the economy as a whole could function. Dutch economist Bob 
Goudzwaard (1995) has presented two ways of seeing ourselves as 
a society: a traffic tunnel image and a tree image. These analogies 
for two types of societies, two economic systems, are here 
juxtaposed to bring to the discussion important points to consider.  
The traffic tunnel society allows the entrance of only a 
limited number of vehicles. A minimum, steady speed is required 
for all vehicles and those not meeting the limitations of size, 
height, weight and speed are (for reasons of safety) consequently, 
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excluded. This image makes allusion to societal methods of raising 
productivity and efficiency in an effort to reach the other side of 
the tunnel. On the way, however, high levels of prosperity and high 
levels of production become necessary to fund the protection of the 
environment, welfare and foreign aid. This tunnel economy, 
therefore, requires sacrifices of the following types:  
a) Exclusion. This includes those who are unable to produce 
or fulfill the levels of productivity required--the unemployed, the 
uneducated, and the sick. 
b) Expulsion of externalities. Since high levels of 
productivity and efficiency are sought, the cost of environmental 
degradation and resulting social burdens are avoided and 
transferred onto other agents or sectors of the economy. This is 
seen as necessary because society considers it a priority to continue 
advancing in the tunnel. 
c) Extraction of resources. Businesses and actors in the 
market extract all possible benefits from the resources of 
production, (land, labor and capital), as they engage in 
competition. Meanwhile, the need to compensate for the effects of 
this extraction rises, but so do the costs of dealing with stresses 
from the work place, unemployment and environmental 
degradation. 
The traffic tunnel society is a post-care society, struggling to 
bear the costs created by its very nature. As the cycle increases its 
speed, higher levels of production are necessary to cover the 
increasing post-care costs. Moreover, the expectation of abundance 
and wealth remains continually in the future and scarcity becomes 
common place as the society speeds to higher levels of production. 
Goudzwaard proposes an alternative image of society and a 
corresponding alternative economy; (alternative that is, to the 
utilitarian, extracting and single-resource oriented system of the 
output economy). The tree analogy represents a society that grows 
with wisdom and the harmonious cooperation of its elements, 
pursuing growth to certain levels. It represents a pre-care society. 
Instead of the pursuit of endless levels of growth, this society 
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concentrates its efforts (as does a tree) on the bearing of fruit for 
the benefit of all. Restraining from constant growth, it gives 
instead of only extracting. The tree society is a model of 
responsibility and promotes the inclusion of people. It internalizes 
the costs of secondary effects while seeking the fulfillment of the 
basic needs of all its members.  
 
Inner Consistency and the Costs Involved in the Living 
Economy Scenario 
 
Finally, some clarification is needed regarding the tree 
economy. A society which chooses to reorient its economy inward 
faces an unavoidable sacrifice, given that resources which 
otherwise would be available for consumption will now be directed 
to the care of people and the environment. In this process then, 
society trades off potentially higher levels of consumption in order 
to pursue higher levels of “investment” in human, social and 
environmental capital. Such a society cannot honestly suggest to its 
own inhabitants that their consumption levels will grow 
indefinitely. As a civil society chooses to promote inner growth, to 
maintain consistency it must accept restraints on endless cycles of 
spiraling consumption.161 In consequence, levels of income and 
consumption will probably be lower than in output-oriented 
economies, which have been geared to constant increases in their 
level of output. Inner growth has its price. 
A sense of abundance may nonetheless serve as a reward for 
society’s option of restraining levels of consumption. This can 
occur due to the fact that a sense of abundance emerges as people 
choose to place a ceiling level on consumption. The persistent 
levels of poverty in industrialized economies, especially the U.S., 
                                                 
161 In standard economics the given level of output of any economy (usually identified with the letter Y), is 
equal to the level of consumption (C) plus the level of investment (I) in the economy; that is,  
Y=C+I 
 Consequently, in order to obtain higher levels of Y at any point, the level of consumption (C) or the level 
of investment (I), need to be increased. Therefore, if an economy wishes to increase the level of investment 
in human capital for instance, it will imply the redirection of resources from consumption (C) to investment 
(I).                
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may reside in the absence of this sense of “enough” to liberate 
resources for the provision of the fundamental needs of people.  
The internal consistency of the inner economy further 
requires that civil society prefer organic economic practices 
molded by the needs of the community rather than delegating 
economic processes and outcomes to mechanical devices such as 
the “free market” which promote growth at the exclusion of people 
in need.        
Though many may be quick to point out that an inner-
oriented economy is not feasible, this is not true. The crucial 
variable in an inner-oriented economy is the pre-determination by 
a society of a ceiling on the level of income and consumption. The 
essence of a tree economy resides in this—that it adopts and 
accepts a sense of “enoughness” regarding consumption and 
growth in order to protect and care for the environment and 
promote the well-being of all its citizens.162 
 
                                                 
 
162 The crucial issue, for any society that desires to invest in its inner economy lies in choosing and setting 
the initial levels of investment (I) as well as consumption (C) according to desired goals. However, in the 
end, the level of output (Y) may decrease for two reasons, the first is the reduction of the level of 
consumption (C) and second, because of the nature itself of new investments in social, human and 
environmental capital, which on one hand improves the quality of life of people but on the other, relativizes 
growth of the national product (Y). 
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APPENDIX 
Box 11 Civil Expansion of the Zapatista Uprising in 1994 
Level A 
1.EZLN 
 
Level B  
1. Comités de Consulta Popular del EZLN (EZLN’s Committee for Popular Participation),  
2. Comités Locales y Regionales de la Convención Nacional Democrática or CND (Local and Regional 
    Committees of the Democratic National Convention),  
3. Diócesis de San Cristóbal de las Casas (Dioceses of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico) 
4. DESMI A.C. (civil association) 
5. CHILTAC A.C (civil association), 
6. Comisión Nacional de Intermediación (National Commission of Mediation) 
7. Assamblea Estatal Democrática del Pueblo Chiapaneco or AEDPCH (State Democratic Assembly of the 
    Chiapaneco People) 
8. Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, (Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights  
    Center) 
9. Centro de Derechos Humanos Agustín Pro (Agustín Pro Human Rights Center) 
10. Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Francisco de Vitoria ( Fray Francisco de Vitoria Human Rights  
      Center) 
11. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Inter-American Human Rights  Commission), 
12. Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Xalapa (Xalapa Human Rights Commission) 
13. Asesores de EZLN (Advisors of the EZLN) 
14. Espacio Civil por la Paz/ ESPAZ  (Civil Space for Peace) 
15. Coordinadora Nacional por la Paz  or CONPAZ  (National Coordinator for Peace),\ 
16. Chihuahua para Todos  (Chihuahaua For Everyone) 
17. Movimiento Civil Zapatista/ MCZ, (Civil Zapatista Movement) 
18. Comits Civiles de Diálogo y Negociación (Civil Committees for Dialog and Negotiation) 
19. Comités Organizativos del Encuentro Nacional Anti-Neoliberal (Organizing Committees for the Anti- 
      Neoliberalism National Encounter)  
20. Movimiento Cristiano Comprometido con las Luchas Populares (Christian Movement Committed to  
      Popular Struggle 
21. Consejo Ecuménico de Iglesias, ( Ecumenical Council of Churches) 
22. Convención Nacional de Mujeres CNM ( National Convention of Women) 
23. Convención Nacional Indígena/ CNI (National Indigenous Convention) 
24. Conferencia Nacional por la Paz (National Conference for Peace) 
25. Foro Nacional Indígena Permanente (Permanent National Indigenous Forum) 
26. Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional/ FZLN (Zapatista Front of National Liberation) 
 
Level C 
1. Consejo Estatal de Organizaciones Indígenas y Campesinas (State Council of Indigenous and Peasant  
    Organizations)  
2. Alianza Cívica (Civic Coalition) 
3. Sindicato de Trabajadores Técnicos, Manuales y Administrativos del INAH (Workers Union of the 
    Institute of Anthropology)  
4. Taller Libre de Calzado de Tepito (Shoe Makers of Tepito) 
5. Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Urbanos de la Ruta 100, SUTAUR 100 (Labor Union of Urban Public  
    Transportation Workers in Mexico City) 
6. Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana/ SITUAM (Metropolitan  
    University Workers Union)  
7. Federación de Sindicatos Universitarios (Federation of University Labor Unions) 
8. Frente Auténtico de los Trabajadores FAT (Authentic Workers Front) 
9. UV y D 
10. ENOC 
11. Movimiento Navista (Navista Movement) 
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(Box 11, Level C, continued) 
 
12. Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia (Civil Movement for Democracy) 
13. OCSS 
14. Movimiento Unificado Nacional de Jubilados y Pensionados (Unified Movement of Retirees and  
      Pensioners)   
15. El Barzón 
16. Organización de Ex Petroleros de Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz (Organization of Ex Petroleum Workers of  
      Coatzacoalcos)  
17. Organización de Ex Petroleros de Minatitlán, Veracruz (Organization of Ex Petroleum Workers of  
      Minatitlán) 
18. Xi-Nich 
19. Codimuj 
20. Comité de Unidad Tepozteca (Tepozteca Committee of Unity) 
21. Frente Cívico Familiar de Mérida (Civic Front of Merida) 
22. Cooperativa Refrescos Pascual (Pascual Soft Drink Industry Cooperative)  
23. Sindicato de Limpieza de Tabasco (Public Maintence Workers of Tabasco)  
24. Coordinación de Damnificados de la Explosión de Guadalajara (Coordination of the Victims of the  
      Guadalajara Explosion 
25. Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (National Coordination of Education Workers) 
26. Asamblea de Barrios del D.F (Assembly of Neighborhoods in Mexico City) 
27. Frente Popular Francisco Villa (Francisco Villa Popular Front) 
28. MPI 
29. Consejo Guerrerense 500 años  (500 Year Council of Guerrero)  
30. Sindicato del IMSS (Social Security Institute’s Workers Union) 
31. Sindicato de Académicos del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (Labor Union of the  
     Academics of the Institute of Anthropology and History) 
32. CLETA 
33. Asociación Mexicana de Corresponsales en el Extranjero (Mexican Association of Reporters Abroad) 
34. Red de Comunicación Popular (Popular Network of Communication) 
35. Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (Mexican Labor Union of Electricians) 
36. Red Mexicana  de Acción Frente al Tratado de Libre Comercio (Mexican Network of Action Against 
      NAFTA)  
37. CCI-Universidad National Autónoma de México (CCI-National Autonomous University of Mexico)      
38. Fundación  Manuel Buendía (Manuel Buendía Foundation) 
39. Cruz Roja Nacional (Nacional Red Cross) 
 
Level D 
1. Comités Internacionales de la Consulta del EZLN realizada en 1995 (International Committees of the  
   Consultation of the EZLN carried out in 1995) 
2. Comités Internacionales de la Convención Internacional Anti-Neoliberalismo (International Committees  
    of the International Convention on Anti-Neoliberalism 
3. Comités de “Aguascalientes” de Ultramar (Aguascalientes Overseas Committees) 
4. Amnesty International 
5. Parlamento Europeo, Equipo Latinoamérica (European Parliament, Latin American Team) 
6. Grupos de Apoyo al Zapatismo en Londres, Barcelona, Noruega, Bélgica, Berlín, etc. (Zapatista Support  
    Groups in London, Barcelona, Norway, Belgium, Berlin, etc.) 
7. Comisión Internacional de Obispos (International Commission of Bishops) 
8. Foro Intercontinental por la Humanidad y en Contra del Neoliberalismo. (Intercontinental Forum for  
    Humanity and against Neo-Liberalism) 
 
Source: Xóchitl Leyva Solano, “De las Cañadas a Europa: niveles, actores y discursos del Nuevo Movimiento Zapatista (NMZ) (1994-
1997” in Desacatos Mexico CIESAS (Primavera 1999):56-88.  
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Chapter VI 
 
Synthesis: Persisting Vicious Cycles and 
the Common Search for a Living 
Economy Scenario 
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In the introduction to this work we suggested a central 
question. Our leading question concerned the conditions under 
which past rebellions have taken place in Chiapas. It further posed 
the question of what possible conditions would be necessary to 
achieve a different outcome other than violent uprisings. Chapters 
II through V have attempted to analyze the crucial issues present in 
past rebellions and the specific elements which, if addressed, could 
make feasible a different outcome. The case of the rebellion of 
1994 in Chiapas revealed an acute multiple-deprivation scenario 
for the people who rebelled, and we identified this as a 
disengagement process. Our proposed analysis took us in search of 
a possible specific alternative, presented as the living economy 
scenario. It has not been our intention to suggest a prescriptive 
model, but rather to address, in the most integral way possible, the 
essential elements, set forward by the voices in the region, to be 
included in a possible arrangement to reduce levels of tension and 
achieve change in the outcome of the ongoing latent conflict. 
Our suggested answer is centered in human dignity in 
relation to the achievement of recognition, protection of freedoms 
and entitlements, human security, and human development. Our 
argument has been based on the evidence of an existing latent 
conflict of a multidimensional nature which involves society, 
culture, polity, and the economy.  
In Chapter V we arrived at the conclusion that the pre-
conditions to the Zapatista rebellion, the different proposals that 
have emerged, the struggles from the inner-economy, and voices 
from different movements were all pointing to an alternative 
scenario. We attempted to articulate these various elements in a 
single proposal, calling it the living economy scenario. We made 
an analogy comparing this type of economy to a growing and 
blossoming tree. Yet in attempting to gain an even larger 
perspective, the image of a living tree can now be amplified to the 
metaphor of an orchard with a diversity of trees which need 
consistent and ongoing cultivation. As in an orchard, where people 
jointly commit to work together, protecting and caring for the trees 
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and sharing the fruits of their labor, so too our proposed living 
economy alternative scenario is one in which various economic 
expressions converge, and due to a compromise of honoring each 
economic and social expression, diverse initiatives are undertaken 
with serious consideration. This is the essential condition for an 
economy of care to emerge and grow. Such an inclusive economy 
reduces emphasis on outer growth and prioritizes self-reliance 
while uplifting human dignity. It is not difficult to link the image 
of an orchard in-the-making which is in need of protection and 
joint care, to the real economic activities of many indigenous and 
peasant groups in Mexico, given their great diversity, their 
connection to the land, creativity, and the variety of economic 
arrangements which were introduced in Chapter V. 
Also in Chapter V we reached the conclusion that the way to 
take solid steps toward improving the quality of life of the poor in 
southern Mexico was the removal of constraints (the obstacles 
manifesting themselves in processes of disengagement) that people 
experience daily. Armed movements and the intensive civil 
mobilization found in southern Mexico show evidence of being 
two sides of a single struggle for freedom. No discourse on 
economic development can avoid the need for higher levels of 
freedom, (as an essential tool in the process of development), prior 
to higher levels of productivity. We have argued all along that 
disengagement, failure of acquirement, exclusion, and rebellion 
appear to be strongly interconnected processes which are rooted in 
neo-colonial practices while reinforcing each other. This view is in 
opposition to the analytical studies which insist that the path par 
excellence to be followed by Mexico is the expansion of the 
economy, i.e., expansion of GNP/GDP or outer economic 
growth.163 We have identified this position in our previous chapter 
                                                 
163 Although this has been the position of the World Bank, in a more recent report the World Bank has 
suggested a wider consideration of factors for low growth and inequality. The report states that persisting 
low levels of economic growth and inequality can in fact be affected by historical reasons, such as 
exploitation of mineral wealth, the destruction of crops suited for the region’s climate, and the chronic 
exploitation of indigenous labor. See Guillermo E. Perry, Arias S. Omar, From Vicious to Virtuous Circles 
(New York: World Bank, 2006)   
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as the path followed by the so called pro-poor growth initiatives, 
which rely on outer growth first in order to improve the living 
conditions of the poor. In opposition to this view we have also 
arrived at the conclusion that growth cannot bring about 
meaningful sustainable benefits unless that growth is due to the 
initiatives of the poor; that is, unless the growth is growth by the 
poor.  
In conclusion, this work has argued for the need to address 
the roots (manifested in different aspects) of violent collective 
movements in the region. This work has further stated that the 
protection of human dignity and the search for human 
development, with a corresponding alternative economic process, 
are vital for a reduction in the levels of tension in the region and 
the avoidance of violent outcomes. Nevertheless, the current 
scenario may well continue and consequently actual conditions 
may persist or deteriorate. Consequently, our first task in this 
section is to summarize the possible implications of the economic 
policies currently implemented in Mexico. We suggest an 
interpretation of current scenarios through the illustration of two 
possible vicious cycles. The first cycle is suggested by the 
economic and political policies currently applied in the region. The 
second cycle however is drawn from our previous arguments on 
the connection between economics and violence. This connection 
is harder to see, as it runs deep below the surface at the inner level 
of society, revealing the possible sequence between economic 
policies, rebellion, and repression. We argue that both cycles point 
to possible outcomes if change does not take place. These cycles 
need to be taken only as an approximation of the complex 
dynamics of the economy and may be influenced by additional 
determinants that are here unmentioned, though worthy of analysis. 
There is no intention to suggest that the dynamics among variables 
illustrated by these cycles are rigidly fixed and applicable (neither 
in intensity nor in sequence) to economic circumstances of the 
Mexican economy at any specific point in time. 
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Second, we analyze how the indigenous movement has come 
about and draw three final premises regarding the possible 
implementation of the Living Economy Scenario, presented in 
Chapter V. Finally, we clarify the placement of the alternative 
scenario in relation to the main themes discussed in this work, 
(e.g., economic growth, conflict, recognition, the struggle for 
human rights, exclusion, and the protection of entitlements).  
 
The Pro-Stability-Impoverishing Cycle 
 
The first possible cycle which is expected to continue if no 
alternative is taken exists at a deep level and is reflected in the 
current common grievance of guerrilla organizations in southern 
Mexico; namely the economic program still in vogue in Mexico 
known as neo-liberalism.164 We call this cycle the pro-
stabilization-impoverishing cycle. This cycle begins by seeking 
economic stabilization. The pursuance of stabilization, as we have 
shown in Chapter III, defined the types of reforms and policies to 
be implemented after the crisis of 1982 and 1994, which have 
continued to the present. We have also pointed out the important 
role that economic growth has played during periods of 
industrialization and more recently as the sole means to reduce 
poverty. In consequence, this cycle addresses this twin objective 
goal of stabilization and growth, taking into consideration current 
observations made by various Mexican economists.165 Retaking 
concepts introduced in Chapter IV, this cycle attempts to illustrate 
how the global dynamics of enrichment and impoverishment (with 
its three forms of exclusion) are assimilated at a local level and 
                                                 
164 As presented previously, this concept identifies the economic ideology behind the economic policies 
implemented in Mexico after the crisis of 1982. It favors liberalization, market privileges, free trade, a 
shrinking government, the creation and maintenance of a financial paradise for investors and rigid 
monetary policies. Neo-liberalism has been perceived as the common enemy by all known rebel armed 
groups due to the threats that such an ideology represents for the poor in terms of the protection of rights 
over the land, participation in markets, an increase in poverty, food security, etc.  
165 Among the most well-known Mexican economists are Julio Boltvinik, a recognized authority in studies 
of poverty, Arturo Huerta Gonzales, an expert in economic development studies, and José Luis Calva, an 
authority on economic structure. 
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how these mutually reinforcing processes are translated into an 
internalization of exclusion and impoverishment.  
The cycle begins with a double objective on the part of policy 
makers (see the illustration of Cycle 1 below). On one hand we 
find economic and financial stability as an unquestioned long-term 
objective and on the other export-propelled economic growth as 
the pre-requisite to future stability and economic benefits for the 
Mexican people.166 
                                                 
166 It is important to note that the reason for the endurance of these objectives runs deep into the economic 
experience of post-1982 Mexico. After 1981, Mexico abandoned the option of maintaining the state as the 
leading actor in regulating and protecting internal markets and promoting the welfare of the Mexican 
majority, which had been the policy that was followed more or less from the mid-1930’s until the crisis in 
1982. Before 1981, the state fulfilled the expectations expressed in the Mexican Constitution of 1917. After 
1982 Mexico acted more as an executor of international financial policies in tune with the so-called 
“Washington Consensus”. The “Washington Consensus” concept was first introduced in 1989 by 
economist John Williamson. It attempted to summarize the commonly-shared themes among policy 
advisors of Washington-based institutions at the time, (such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the U.S. Treasury Department), for the economic recovery of Latin American countries from 
their crises of the 1980s. Among the recommended policies are found fiscal policy discipline, competitive 
exchange rates, deregulation, trade liberalization, openness to foreign direct investment, and privatization 
of state enterprises.  
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    Cycle 1 Pro-Stability Impoverishing Cycle                                  
 
 Pro-Stability and Outer Growth     
                                                                     
                                                            (a) Strict fiscal and monetary 
              (g) Need for more foreign investment                   policies 
             Scarcity-exclusion: struggle to retain                                                                  
                    foreign investment     
                                                                 (b) Relative high interest rates 
       (f) External dependency increases    
           Lack of solvency / debt services                                   (c) Low investment levels 
                                                                       Unemployment increases 
           (e) Lower levels of competitiveness                                        Real wages decline 
               Property exclusion / entry exclusion                                              
                                                                 
     (d)   Stagnation 
                                                                         Pressure on entitlements 
                                                                          
 
 
Once stability and export growth appear as the supreme 
goals, a second element, (a), finds its natural place within this 
trend. A rigid monetary policy is set in motion aiming both to 
sustain the exchange rate (avoiding the building up of uncertainty 
regarding inflation) and to support the peso from a possible 
devaluation. In tune with these strict monetary policies high 
interest rates are also set in order, (b), to maintain or attract foreign 
capital. Though high interest rates may indeed attract foreign 
capital and stimulate growth via exports, they can also hurt 
domestic markets via lower levels of investment, (high interest 
rates make loans expensive), and possibly lead to lower levels of 
employment, profits, and wages, (c). The unavailability of credit is 
reflected in domestic stagnation, (d), due to low levels of domestic 
investment by Mexican-owned companies. Consequently, the loss 
of competitiveness in the non-export sector becomes inevitable, 
(e).167 Local small and median investors eventually reduce their 
share of domestic markets. The process of enrichment allows 
foreign companies as well as powerful Mexican companies to 
                                                 
167 See Huerta Arturo. “Alternativas de política económica para el crecimiento sostenido” Economía 
Mexico- UNAM  3 no. 7, (January-April) 2006. 
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benefit in terms of expansion through acquiring more companies 
thanks to the process of privatization of state companies and 
through the acquisition of multiple sharing of the markets and 
profits. As national companies lose levels of competitiveness, 
trans-nationals find high levels of profits and large numbers of 
potential consumers through the creation of new scarcities (created 
needs). The cycle returns to the starting point as the economy lacks 
solvency to fix external deficits (foreign debt) and more foreign 
investment is needed, (f) and (g).  
At this stage of the cycle depressed domestic markets become 
evident, as does pressure on and failure of entitlements and an 
increasing dependency on the performance of other economies, 
(such as that of the United States). Also at this point, the dynamics 
of enrichment-impoverishment are visible through three types of 
exclusions. Mexico is excluded (monetary exclusion) from the 
creation of international liquidities by financial or governmental 
institutions. Moreover, the peso cannot gain status as a key 
currency in the international market. This property exclusion 
explains the persistent indebtedness, the urgency for foreign 
investment and the continuing dependency on exports. However, 
these solutions to the problem of the lack of foreign currency 
become in turn even greater problems. For instance, foreign 
investors are not only interested in stable markets, but are attracted 
to the possibility of obtaining high profits. These investors 
generally have no intention of placing their investments in the 
home sector of the economy, as their interests are limited to 
investments with quick financial returns. These investments can 
easily leave and move to a third country. Furthermore, the issues of 
foreign debt and the decreasing number of markets open to 
Mexican exports have become major problems in themselves, and 
are now greater than the initial problem of the need for foreign 
exchange.  
As exports are restricted (entry exclusion), an external 
disequilibrium is felt, the fear of instability appears and the need to 
be more competitive rises. Consequently, new technology and 
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qualified labor is incorporated into the process, excluding the non-
educated and maintaining wages low for those who are included in 
the process.168 The dynamics of enrichment and impoverishment 
become pervasive as exclusion widens. More benefits go to fewer 
hands and greater numbers of people are pushed into failure of 
acquirement. Poverty expands as the most dynamic sectors of the 
Mexican economy are used not to improve the lives of people but 
to cover external deficits.169 Additionally, as exports are restricted 
from entering wealthy countries or are paid at low prices, the idle 
time of home industries increases as do the number of part-time 
jobs, jobs with lower wages and unemployment rates.  
Finally the third type of exclusion (scarcity exclusion) is 
connected to the dynamics of impoverishment in three ways. The 
first occurs as highly competitive transnational companies enter 
domestic markets, “crowding out” established firms and other 
economic actors from existing scarce resources, such as land, 
energy, and input materials. This causes the prices of these scarce 
resources to rise as well as the level of market prices in the home 
markets. Second, newly-introduced products tend to contain new 
features and are launched through intense advertisement 
campaigns. Thanks to these new features and other claims, new 
products tend to dominate the market in terms of sales, as they 
succeed in creating customer preference over traditional domestic 
products. New products therefore create their own status as 
“needed” products, while traditional products, (which can be 
traditional satisfiers for a specific need), are crowded out. These 
processes constitute the essence of scarcity exclusion, which 
consequently reduces the possibilities of growth of home markets 
and the inner economy by the crowding effect of transnational 
companies. Finally, due to the dependency of the economy on 
                                                 
168 According to the 2006 report of the International Labor Organization (ILO), Mexico appears on a global 
scale as one of the countries with the most deteriorated level of wages; even below the level of Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. The report points out that 30 million Mexicans survive on two-
thirds of a minimum wage and another 10 million (in extreme poverty) survived on one-fourth of a 
minimum wage. La Jornada, 8 February, 2006 and OIT available from http://www.oit.org.mx/ 
169 According to the President of the National Bank of Mexico, in 2005 96% of reserves channeled to the 
payment of servicing the external debt came from oil revenues. La Jornada, 20 June, 2005.    
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foreign investment for revitalization, the Mexican economy 
engages in a constant striving to capture a portion of the foreign 
investment created in wealthy countries.   
Eventually, the cycle begins again in the search for stability 
and growth through the pressure to maintain liberalization, rigid 
monetary policies, high interest rates, low levels of credit, and high 
levels of foreign investment. Parallel to this process, local markets 
are depressed and the resulting lack of solvency haunts policy 
makers. Consequently, pressure begins to build in the direction of 
failure of entitlements, which leads to the second possible cycle. 
 
The Pro-Stability, Failure of Entitlements, and Violence Cycle 
 
The pro-stability, failure of entitlements, and violence cycle 
is characterized by the vogue of economic policies which overlook 
the pressures created on entitlements in terms of the rights of 
workers, communities, collectivities and other actors who hold a 
social contract protected by the state or institutions (see Cycle 2). 
As entitlements begin to fail, workers receive wages below 
expected levels, collectivities lose rights that are stipulated in 
social contracts, groups of people become excluded from social 
rights such as education, health, and access to water (a). Resources 
once understood as a right without restriction, (such as the right of 
access to clean water), become subject to privatization and the 
control of market forces. These types of rights are violated due to 
the powerful forces of enrichment and impoverishment. The 
effects of the process of impoverishment then spread throughout 
the countryside and the cities, as people who cannot carry out 
productive activities become subsistence workers, the unemployed 
or emigrants. Poverty sets in as the process of disengagement, 
stimulated by the failure of capacities and the process of 
impoverishment, is generalized among the most vulnerable.          
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Cycle 2 Pro-Stability, Failure of Entitlements, and Violence  
  Cycle 
 
 
                                         Pro-Stability / Assistance Programs 
                                        In the Midst of a Latent/Open Conflict 
                                                      
                   (l) Setbacks in human development                             (a) The process of enrichment and 
                        Economic security and physical security worsen          impoverishment causes others  
                        Lack of recognition                                                         to be susceptible to 
                        Protection of rights and entitlements fail                        failure of entitlements and violations  
                                                                                                                of rights 
                                                                                                       Inner-economy is disregarded                                        
                                           
                                                                                                          
 
(k) Emergence of paramilitary and gunmen                               (b) Failure of capacities, 
                                 capabilities, and activities 
                                     
       (j) Militarization                                                               (c) Acquirement failure                                   
                                                                                                                       
       (i) Loss of trust/de-legitimization                                                 (d) Grievances/social movements 
                                                                                                                      become armed movements  
    (h) Counter-insurgency/repression                                   due to disengagement from the 
                                                                                                                      legal system and its blockage,                       
     (g)  Denial of the existence of a real conflict     co-optation and repression                
  Denial of the validity of resisting collectivities           
         Physical elimination of rebels is called for                   (e) Failure of mediating mechanisms 
 
                                                                   (f) Attempts to protect entitlements  
                                                               by force from below 
                                                Open Conflict 
 
  
 
 
 
Failure of capacities and productive activities (b) leads to 
acquirement failure (c). These failures eventually affect the social 
and political actors who find themselves powerless to influence 
their environment due to their disengagement, official repression, 
fear or loss of trust (d). Meanwhile, the natural mechanisms for 
mediation and conflict resolution embedded in indigenous 
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communities or civil society are dismissed (e). Finally, the 
tendency to protect entitlements from below persists and will 
eventually emerge as an open conflict (f).  
The second phase of this possible scenario suggests that the 
different facets of a Mexican culture sensitive to the violation of 
fundamental rights will continue to emerge, with different types of 
rebels seeking to stop further humiliation and inspiring one another 
in the struggle for social justice. Under these the current 
circumstances it is expected that the government will continue to 
deny the existence of a real conflict and ignore accords made with 
indigenous peoples (g). It is also to be expected that repression and 
the process of militarization and paramilitary activities will follow 
the lack of recognition of the causes of rebellion and the legitimacy 
of rebel groups. Along with these processes, legitimacy and trust 
will be undermined (h, i, j, k). Additionally there is no evidence to 
lead us to believe that in time the armed movements will abate. On 
the contrary, the most current report on the incidence of armed 
groups gives evidence of increasing possibilities for these 
processes to occur. Reports indicate that a new stage of 
transformation and multiplication of guerrilla groups occurred 
between 1996 and 2001.170 By 2006 armed groups have been 
identified in three centers of power, representing at least 12 armed 
groups, (some of them new to the Mexican scenario), in addition to 
the Zapatista Front.171 The economic and political force of 
neoliberalism, a term that entails free market ideology as well as 
                                                 
170 See “La guerrilla mexicana: de la unidad a la ruptura”, December 2003 available from  
http://www.ciepac.org/  and “Los tres ejes de la guerrilla” available from http://usuarios.lycos.es/cedema/. 
Information about guerrilla activity is scarce and in many instances what we know is through communiqués 
from the armed groups themselves, public appearances or official reports. Nevertheless, Jorge Lofredo, a 
political scientist and columnist for La Hora newspaper in the city of Oaxaca, has closely followed 
guerrilla activity and has authored the most current reports. 
171 Unlike many clandestine armed groups, the Zapatistas have taken public political actions, such as the 
current political tour of Zapatistas throughout the country called “la otra campaña” (the other campaign), as 
mentioned previously la otra campaña aimed to unite grassroots struggles for social justice among the 
people of Mexico. La otra campaña does not promote political party affiliation as do the various candidates 
for the presidency. A complete coverage of  la otra campaña  can be found at 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/laotra/ 
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the economic agenda in vogue in Mexico since 1982, has become a 
central grievance and common enemy for all these armed groups.  
By the end of the cycle, previous efforts placed on economic 
or human development are lost, further aggravating regional 
economic inequalities. Southern Mexico with the lowest levels of 
human development will likely continue to be characterized by 
counter-insurgency activities (seeking stabilization) with frequent 
mobilization of the military, which has already built up in the 
region. These will be combined with periodic presidential 
assistance programs, which, carried out in the midst of latent or 
open conflict, will fall short of the needs of the people. Conflict 
escalation will tend to persist as indigenous communities, peasants, 
intellectuals, and students may choose the same tool used by the 
government or other dominant groups to achieve social goals--
violence. In the end, the true roots of the rebellion, the evidence of 
an existing latent conflict, and the open conflict will be under-
rated. Not pursuing a viable alternative is likely to mean the 
continuance of these official unfruitful practices.  
 
Culminating Premises 
 
We have pointed out that the two vicious cycles that were 
introduced are interlinked and connected at different levels. 
Regarding this interdependence, three important premises can be 
drawn. First, as we mentioned previously, it is important to state 
that we are not suggesting that the scenarios illustrated by these 
cycles are actually occurring with the same intensity and exact 
causation. For instance, the intensity of the effects of the economic 
policies of export-oriented growth was probably at its highest in 
the 1980s when the structural adjustment policies were radically 
adopted. In the 1990s, however, though the economic policies 
remained in essence the same, they were shaped by both a second 
crisis and the desire to achieve the signing of NAFTA with the 
U.S. and Canada. The difference between the intensity and the 
impact of these policies during the 1980s versus the 1990s on the 
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inner-economy will need to be analyzed in future research. In spite 
of these limitations, a case can be made that there is sufficient 
evidence that Cycle 1 is in actuality producing negative effects 
among the vulnerable population and unprotected collectivities. 
We argue, therefore, that as long as these types of policies are in 
effect, Cycle 1 will probably persist in the future.   
Regarding Cycle 2 it can be argued that elements such as the 
process of enrichment, which became pronounced during the 
process of privatization, have continued, with the emergence of 
more millionaires in Mexico. The increasingly higher levels of 
inequality and income concentration are evidence of this. 
Additionally, according to the evidence presented in previous 
chapters, higher levels of poverty and marginalization in the region 
have remained consistent in the past and may well persist in the 
future. In reality, the pressure on and failure of entitlements vary, 
as do the reactions by civil society to protect them. The existence 
of hundreds of different unresolved conflicts with a variety of 
features provides evidence of pressure on rights and entitlements 
and the lack of human security.   
It should be noted that the transformation of civil movements 
into armed fronts also appears to be occurring. Furthermore, 
though unusual, the reverse process also takes place. A prime 
example of this is the Zapatista armed front, which by the end of 
the 1990s had transformed itself into a strong civil movement with 
broad support that predominantly followed peaceful means. In 
conclusion we argue that although the intensity of open conflicts 
and counter-insurgence activities may vary, Cycle 2 is a fair 
description of what occurred in Chiapas in 1994; and, though it is 
occurring with less intensity, what is also happening currently in 
southern Mexico in particular.                
Second, as we have pointed out in our previous chapter, 
stabilization and export-oriented growth cannot of themselves 
solve the issue of a growing poverty and marginalization nor the 
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issue of armed rebellions in southern Mexico.172 As the reader has 
probably already inferred, various counter-cycle strategies may be 
necessary in order to alter the outcomes of these two possible 
cycles. Consequently, economic policies should target the 
solidifying of a strong inner-economy. Trickle down economic 
policies have, without doubt, the good intention and potential to 
benefit people. Nevertheless, these policies in themselves may not 
be suitable to address urgent and important issues which blockade 
the honoring of dignity and the possibility of building up 
sustainable livelihoods. Some of the needed economic strategies 
may include drastic policies, such as a re-negotiation of the 
external debt for the sake of giving priority to food security and 
self-reliance. These strategies may even imply temporary 
suspension of debt services. Such policies may indeed cause the 
Mexican administration to enter into a crisis with its international 
creditors, resulting in the loss of foreign investment. However, this 
could lead to a revitalization of local investments by lowering 
interest rates, and thus expanding credit for indigenous initiatives 
and farmers. Nevertheless, these policies may still be insufficient 
in terms of not meeting the fulfillment of fundamental needs of the 
majority of Mexicans.  
In essence, our second premise deals with a pattern drawn 
from our previous analysis and the direction that the indigenous 
struggle has followed. We can deduce from our work that the 
indigenous movement has in essence followed an upward process 
of movement (see side A of Model 18). This upward process 
synthesizes what we have discussed in previous chapters: the 
struggle for recognition, the protection of rights and entitlements, 
                                                 
172 One of the objectives of the Development Goals of the Millennium Agreement endorsed by Mexico and 
190 other countries at the United Nations in 2000 was to reduce by 50% the number of people living in 
poverty by the year 2015. Yet already in 2004 the World Bank stated that Mexico would not be able to 
achieve such a reduction. The World Bank calculated that at the rate of growth of the Mexican economy of 
about 3.5% annually, it was expected that of the existing 26 million poor in Mexico, there would be a 
reduction of 13% instead of 50%. According to the World Bank, in order to reach the millennium goal of 
reducing poverty levels by half, Mexico would have to sustain a 5% annual growth rate, though such a high 
rate of growth has not occurred in Mexico since the 1970’s. In addition, another unreachable goal became 
evident: the reduction of mortality rates by two thirds for children under the age of 5. La Jornada, 18 April 
2004.   
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the inner economy, autonomy, and capacities. It delineates these 
elements within the context of the general struggle of the 
indigenous movement for a plural and diverse state.  
Based on our analysis of governmental action, we can 
conclude also that government presence in the economic and 
political arena has followed a downward process (see side B of 
Model 18). This downward pattern reflects the approach that the 
government has taken in dealing with the conflict and other issues, 
such as the persisting poverty in southern Mexico. As we have 
argued, economic growth is set as a conditional goal and economic 
policies aimed to increase productivity therefore follow. Although 
the government had negotiations with the Zapatistas, a possible 
factor in the government’s decision to begin negotiations with the 
rebels shortly after the uprising was the importance of maintaining 
a stable and confident market for the signing of the NAFTA 
agreement. This may explain why the San Andrés Accords, signed 
by the government and the Zapatistas and discussed in our last 
chapter, have been disregarded, and although the Accords reached 
Congress, they were first modified in order to be considered for 
debate. 
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Model 18:  Two Flows of Change 
              
                   
     (A)                                                                                           (B) 
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                      an Inclusive System                                                       Economy Based on Market Values 
                                                                                                                      
                 Communal Autonomy       Regional Autonomy                                                                          
               Empowerment: language,    Empowerment: language, resources, religion,       
                   resources, religion,           economic command, wisdom     Centralized Power                
                  economic command                                                                                   Representative Democracy 
              
 
                     Sustainability                                                           Moving labor from non-productive 
Freedom Expressed in Levels of Empowerment                                       to productive sectors   
          Autonomy                                                        (Failure of Acquirement) 
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                  Direct Democracy                                                                                                                       
                                     (San Andrés Accords)                                                               
                   Unarmed                                Armed  
                   Resistance                             Resistance                                   Negotiation                         Counter-Insurgency 
                                                                                                          (San Andrés Accords)                 (National Security) 
                                 Ethno-Political Action                              Reforms/Assistance Programs 
                       for Entitlements/ Personal and  
               Collective Security 
                
 The Right to Conflict 
                                                                                                     Reduction of Poverty/End of Conflict 
 
           True-to-Culture Economics 
    Inner Economy Struggles to Continue 
              Sustaining Livelihoods  
                           Failure of Entitlements 
 
 
           Context of Disengagement                                              
 Security/Stability 
  
Upstream Flow of Change                      Downstream Flow of Change  
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The upward movement makes evident the nature of the struggle of 
indigenous people, which is in essence a struggle for rights, or in 
the words of the “rebels” “a dignity struggle”. This process arises 
out of a context of multiple disengagement and exclusion, followed 
by an exercise of “the right to conflict” which is concretized in 
ethno-political action. At this point two paths diverge—resistance 
can be either armed or unarmed. As we have argued here, the 
existing embedded insurgency, far from being a social anomaly 
which should be made to disappear, reveals a frustrated socio-
political movement. This movement stems from a deep sense of 
injustice propagated by, what Pablo Gonzales Casanova has called, 
internal colonialism (Gonzales Casanova 1965). As the upward 
flow continues, autonomy and empowerment are sought at 
communal and regional levels.  
Our third and final remark in this synthesis is related to the 
work of De Gaay Fortman (2006), which has shed light on the 
contrasting directions and implications of both the upstream and 
downstream flows, similar to those in Model 18.  In the following 
models (19 and 20), De Gaay Fortman illustrates the 
implementation of human rights in both downstream and upstream 
flows. The first case (Model 19) shows the process for the 
implementation of international standards on human rights based 
on the United Nations’ chart. This model shows the goals of the 
initiative flowing down and becoming an initiative of 
governments, which then engage in the elaboration of policies and 
programs that can reach the people.  
The second case (Model 20) suggests a contrasting 
perspective, showing the initiative of people seeking the protection 
of their own dignity to be the starting point. Eventually, people 
demand that main actors carry out their duties, honoring and 
implementing policies accordingly. Finally, this process brings 
about the formation of sound policies, with the content determined 
by the people. It is evident that the upstream process more closely 
resembles the dynamics of the indigenous movement in Mexico 
than does the downstream pattern. The upstream principle also 
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matches the expanding movement for the protection of dignity 
within our proposed Living Economy Scenario, introduced in the 
previous chapter.  
Regarding the upstream flow, we make two important 
observations from De Gaay Fortman’s analysis. In the process of 
appropriation of universal declarations of rights, confrontation may 
result as inevitable. Second, the policies and rights that can protect 
human life are not a static and completed articulation, but are 
indeed a diligent effort in process. According to De Gaay Fortman, 
the difficult process of law and the hard work of a true realization 
of rights are conditioned by people’s participation; otherwise, 
rights remain merely as formal statements or international 
declarations. The United Nations’ declaration on the right to 
education for instance, becomes a national reality thanks not to the 
international declaration, but to the society itself which makes this 
aspiration a reality for everyone.173 
                                                 
173 See Gonzales, Jorge Iván.  “El proceso de construcción de la ley” en Conservatorios: los derechos 
integrales, condición para el desarrollo (Bogotá: CINEP, September 2001)   
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Model 19     Human Rights in a Downstream Perspective 
 
 
 
 
Model 20    Human Rights in an Upstream Perspective  
 
 
Source: Bas de Gaay Fortman, “Safe Water” in J.W. dVisser and C. Mbazira eds., Water Delivery: Public 
or Private? (Utrecht: Institute of Constitutional and Administrative Law and Community Law Centre, 
2006), 3-12  
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 The fact that while the downstream practices have not borne 
fruit, the upstream pattern (as a social and political strategy within 
the Living Economy Scenario) represents a more people-centered 
pattern in which sustainable livelihoods are promoted, food 
security for the poor is protected and inequalities are reduced 
through the growth of the inner-economy. Unfortunately, if the 
current trend is followed, the search for growth alone will absorb 
creativity, resources and the sacrifice of clever initiatives of the 
poor. In the end, this type of disproportionate growth may not be 
sustainable nor reduce poverty.174   
Furthermore, the upstream movement in order to realize 
rights is accompanied by a political and economic decentralization 
to allow interest collectivities to achieve more control over their 
lives, to shape strategies to protect livelihoods, and to assure civil 
participation. To avoid these measures will mean a continuation of 
policies aimed at managing marginalization in the attempt to better 
govern people who perceive themselves as living without dignity.  
                  
The Placement of the Alternative Living Economy Scenario 
 
We finish our synthesis by presenting in a visible way the 
manner in which this proposal fits within the overall spectrum of 
poverty, growth and conflict. Illustration 21 places the Living 
Economy Scenario within the area of inner growth, (Area B). This 
illustration features the two opposite directions which are taken by 
the inner-oriented economy and the outer-oriented economy. 
The path of outer growth primarily seeks the maximum 
output of goods and services via increasing competition and 
productivity (A). This route of growth moves consistently and 
                                                 
174As the World Economic Situation and Prospects 2006 Report from the United Nations has pointed out, 
most developing countries on the planet have shown a strong annual rate of growth. The average growth 
rate is expected to remain above 5% for African countries and around 5.6% for non-African countries. 
However Latin America lagged behind with an average growth rate of 4%. Nevertheless, the report states 
that all of this growth is not expected to be sufficient to meet the Millennium Development Goals, due to 
the fact that the growth experienced may not be sustainable as it was mainly a result of high export 
commodity prices on the markets. See World Economic Situation and Prospects 2006 (New York: United 
Nations, 2006) available from  http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp.html. 
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rapidly toward a type of growth that hopefully will deliver the 
benefits of growth to the poor and disengaged in society, though 
the issue of distribution and empowerment is postponed. Although 
sustainability is included in this type of economic process, it is 
viewed from the perspective of the mainstream market economy. 
Consequently this type of sustainability tends to be consistent with 
the interests of powerful players in the market economy. 
Nevertheless, as this type of economy moves upward, disregarding 
a Mesoamerican type of economics, it lacks roots and fails to 
deliver a positive and sustainable impact on the daily struggles of 
the poor. Furthermore, poverty is not approached as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon nor seen as a matter of human rights and 
entitlements. Instead, the goal is limited to a mere increase in 
monetary gain of the poor. Additionally, a reactive conflict policy 
is set into motion and the likelihood of continuing armed rebellions 
increases. 
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Model 21    Placement of the Alternative Living Economy Scenario 
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                                                                                     Growth  
      Inner Growth & People-Centered Sustainability              by the Poor         
 
 
In contrast, the inner-oriented economy grows from below, 
building on existing economic arrangements and reflecting the 
current ongoing development initiatives by the poor and by civil 
(indigenous and non-indigenous) initiatives. The Living Economy 
Scenario (Side B), if free to flourish, may grow driven by the 
existing current joint efforts of the poor to transform their daily 
livelihoods. Nevertheless, these efforts for now remain ignored, 
unsupported, sabotaged or repressed.175 This type of economic 
                                                 
175 Examples of this are the Economics of Solidarity initiative in Chiapas and other economic initiatives 
presented in Chapter V. A more recent example is that of the striking teachers and civil organizations in 
Oaxaca during the summer of 2006 at the height of that ongoing conflict. The teachers and civil 
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growth also places care for people and the environment above the 
pursuit of endless higher levels of growth. The Living Economy 
Scenario can provide a meaningful benefit to the people living in 
disengagement thanks to the continuing upstream flow which leads 
to the protection of rights and entitlements. Finally, the approach to 
conflicts in this path is a pro-active one; that is, latent conflicts are 
dealt with at their roots by the convergent work of government and 
civil society initiatives, taking advantage of non-violent conflict-
resolution mechanisms currently in use within peasant and 
indigenous populations. This type of growth can indeed be 
facilitated and protected by the state due to its potential reduction 
of levels of poverty, improvements in human development etc. 
Though it is possible that this option may imply a slower rate of 
growth of the national product, and even a temporary deficit in the 
national accounts, yet qualitatively the achieved levels of growth 
will be a reflection of the level of self-reliance which the economy 
has reached. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
organizations attempted to promote local markets and reclaim traditional popular cultural festivities (which 
had become commercialized by the government) as festivities of the people and part of the local economy.  
 318
WORKS CITED 
 
 
Allport, Gordon W.   
 1954     The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, Mass: Addisson-Wesley. 
 
Banco Mundial, 
 2003     Estrategia de desarrollo de los estados del sur de México. México, D. F. 
                         Documentos del Banco Mundial available from http://portal.sre.  
                         gob.mx/ppp/pdf/ESTRATEGIADEDESARROLLODELOSESTADOSDELSURDEMEXICO.Pdf  
 
Barabas, Mabel and Bartolomé Miguel. 
 1999     La pluralidad en peligro. México D.F.,  Instituto Nacional de 
                     Antropología. 
 
 1986      Rebeliones e insurrecciones indígenas en Oaxaca: la trayectoria histórica 
                          de la resistencia étnica, in Etnicidad y pluralismo cultural: la dinámica 
                          étnica  en Oaxaca.  México D. F.: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e 
                          Historia. 
 
Bartra, Armando. 
 1996 Guerrero Bronco: Campesinos, ciudadanos y guerrilleros en la Costa 
            Grande.  Mexico D.F: Ediciones sinfiltro. 
 
Batalla Bonfil, Guillermo 
 1991     Pensar nuestra cultura. México, D.F.: Alianza Editorial. 
_______________ 
 1989     México profundo: una civilización negada: México D.F., Grijalbo. 
        
Benda-Beckmann, Franz Von. 
1993 Scapegoat and magic charm: law in development theory and practice. In 
            An Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance  
 London & New York: Routledge. 
 
Berkowitz, L. 
 1965 The concept of aggressive drive: Some additional considerations. In 
  Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2: New York: Academic Press. 
 
Besançon Marie,  
 2005  Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions and 
  Genocides. Journal   of Peace Research 42, no. 4: 393-415. 
 
Bernal Diaz del Castillo 
 1965 Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España. Mexico: 
   Fernández Editores. 
 
 319
Benjamin, Thomas 
 1996 A Rich Land a Poor People: Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas  
  Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 
 
Blauert, Jutta and Zadek Simon 
 1988 Mediación para la sustentabilidad construyendo políticas desde las bases. 
  México D.F.: Centros de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en 
  Antropología Social.  
 
Blum, William 
 1995 Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II. 
  Monroe,ME: Common Courage Press. 
 
Boltvinik, Julio 
 1995  Pobreza y pobreza extrema.  Distribución del ingreso y políticas sociales 
  Tomo I. Mexico D.F: Juan Pablos Editor S.A. 
____________ 
 1993  The Poverty in Mexico: Methodologies and Evolution. Salud Pública de 
   México. Vol. 37, No. 4,  288-eoa. 
           
Boff, Leonardo and Boof Clodovis 
 1986 Liberation Theology: From Confrontation to Dialogue.  San Francisco:        
  Harper & Row, Publishers. 
 
Brush, Stephen 
 1996  Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences. Journal of Conflict  
  Resolution, vol. 40 No. 4, (December): 523-545. 
 
Calva, José Luis 
 1995 El modelo neoliberal mexicano: costos, vulnerabilidad, alternativas. 
  Mexico D.F.: Juan Pablos Editor.  
 
Campbell, Howard 
 1994 Zapotec Renaissance: Ethnic Politics and Cultural Revivalism in Southern 
   Mexico. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 
 
Cancian, Frank and Peter Brown 
 1998 Who is Rebelling in Chiapas? In Whiteford, Michael and Whiteford, 
  Scott Crossing Currents: Continuity and Change in Latin America.Upper 
 Saddle River NJ: Simon & Schuster. 
____________          
  1965 Economics and Prestige in a Mayan Community: the Religious Cargo 
   System in Zinacantan. Stanford: Stanford University Press 
  Editorial Paidos. 
 
 
 320
Carrasco, Tania & Davis, Shelton 
 2003 Indigenous Peoples in the State of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca. 
  Documentos del Banco Mundial.  Mexico City: The World Bank 
  available from: 
  http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/ECADocbyUnid/ 
  541D538865DA825A85256DC5007A7BC8?Opendocument 
 
Castellanos, Alicia and López y Rivas 
 1997 Autonomías y movimiento indígena en México: debates y desafíos.  
  Alteridades 7, no. 13. 
 
Castells, Manuel 
 1997 The Power of Identity.  Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc.  
 
Castoriadis,  Cornelious 
 1980  Reflexiones sobre el desarrollo y la racionalidad. In  
  El mito del desarrollo. España: Kairos. 
 
Castro, G and Ledesma, E. 
 2000 Siempre cerca, siempre lejos: las fuerzas armadas en México.  Mexico: 
  Global Exchange, CIEPAC, CENCOS. 
 
Centro de Derechos Humanos Bartolomé de las Casas 
 2000 La guerra en Chiapas: ¿Incidente en la historia? San Cristóbal de la 
  Casas, Chiapas: Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las 
  Casas. 
CEPAL 
 2001 Panorama Social de América Latina 2000-2001. Santiago de Chile: Cepal 
  
Chiapas en Cifras & Centro de Información 
 1997 Para Entender Chiapas: Chiapas in cifras. Mexico City: Centro de 
  Información y Análisis de Chiapas, Coordinación de Organismos No- 
  Gubernamentales por la Paz de Chiapas. 
 
Chaliand, Gerald. 
 1977 Revolutions in the Third World. New York: The Viking Press.  
 
Chance, John K 
 1998  Changes in Twentieth-Century Mesoamerican Cargo Systems. In 
   Whitterford Michael B., edit. Crossing Currents: Continuity and Change 
   in Latin America. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
 
CIEPAC  A.C. 
 1999 La Estrategia de guerra en Chiapas. San Cristóbal de la Casas, Chiapas, 
  México: CIEPAC Project Counseling Service.   
 
 321
 
Clark, David Alexander 
 2006 The Elgar Companion to Development Studies. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
 Elgar Publishing. 
 
Clark, Colin. 
 2000 Peasant Markets, Commercialization, and Urban Capitalism. In Class, 
  Ethnicity and Community in Southern Mexico: Oaxaca Peasantries. New 
  York: Oxford University. 
 
Coastworth, John 
 1988 Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Latin America. In Riot, Rebellion, and 
  Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in Mexico. Princeton: Princeton 
  University Press. 
 
Cohen H. Jeffrey 
 1999 Cooperation and Community: Economy and Society in Oaxaca. Austin: 
  University of Texas Press. 
____________ 
 1990 The Challenge of Grassroots Development: Society, Economy and Change 
  in Southern Mexico. In Occasional Paper No. 26, December. Lecture 
  Series, Indiana: Center on Global Change and World Peace. 
 
Collier, George 
 2001 El nuevo movimiento indígena. In Lourdes de León Pasquel edit 
  Costumbres, leyes y movimiento en Oaxaca y Chiapas. México D.F.: 
  CIESAS. 
___________ 
 1999 ¡Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas. Oakland, California.   
 
 
Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO)  
 2001 Indices de Marginación 2000. México D.F. Conapo. 
 
 
Cook, Scott. 
 1995 La necesidad obliga: la pequeña industria rural en el capitalismo 
  mexicano. México D.F. Consejo Nacional de la Cultura y las Artes. 
 
Cook, Sherburne F. & Borah, Woodrow  
 1981 Enayos sobre la historia de la población, México y el Caribe. México 
D.F.: Siglo XXI.  
 
Cook, S.W. 
 1962 The Systematic Analysis of Social Significant Events: A Strategy for Social 
  Research. Journal of Social Studies, 18(2). 66-68. 
 322
 
Cruz, Gijón, Sylvia, Alicia, Rees W. Martha and Reyes Morales, Rafael 
 2000 Impacto de remesas internacionales en el ingreso y calidad de vida de las 
familias de los migrantes en el valle de Tlacolula, Oaxaca. Ciudades  47: 
34-42. 
 
Damián, Araceli and Julio Boltvinik 
 2003 Evolución y características de la pobreza en México. 
  Comercio Exterior 53, no. 6, Junio. 
 
Davenport, Christian  
 2000 Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious 
  Politics, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 
Davis, James 
 1972 Toward a Theory of Revolution. In Ivo K. Feierabend and Engewood  
  Cliffs, eds. Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research,  
  New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
 
DESMI, A.C. 
 2001 Si uno come, que coman todos: Economía Solidaria, México D.F.: 
  Desarrollo Económico y Social de los Mexicanos Indígenas A.C. 
 
Díaz-Polanco, Hector 
 2000 El viejo conflicto: autonomía y liberalismo. In Reina, Leticia  
  Coordinadora. Los retos de la etnicidad en los estados-nación del siglo  
  XXI, Mexico, D.F.: CIESAS, INI. 
____________ 
 1997 La Rebelión Zapatista y al Autonomía. México D. F.: Siglo XXI 
 
 
Dietz, James 
 1995 A Brief Economic History in Latin America’s Economic Development:  
  Confronting Crisis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
 
Dominguez, Marcelino 
 1998 Poder Cumunal: Instrumento de autodesarrollo, caso de Cacalotepec 
  Mixie, Oaxaca. In Medio Milenio, Revista Trimestral de Analisis y 
  Reflección Junio, 3. 
 
Durán Alcántara, Carlos. 
 1998  Derecho Nacional, Derechos Indios y Derecho Consuetudinario 
  Indígena: los Triquis de Oaxaca, un estudio de caso. México D.F.: 
  Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana. 
 
Ellemers, Naomi 
 2002  Social Identity and Relative Deprivation. In Relative Deprivation: 
 323
   Specification, Development, and Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge 
   University Press.   
____________ 
 1993 The Influence of Socio-Structural Variables on Identity Management 
  Strategies. In W. Stroebe and M. Hewstone (Eds.), European Review of  
  Social Psychology  4 (September):  27-57. 
 
Fazio, Carlos 
 1994     Samuel Ruiz: el caminante. Mexico D.F.: Espasa Calpe Mexicana S.A. 
 
Feierabend, K. Ivo 
 1972 Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research. New Jersey: 
  Prentice-Hall. 
 
Focault, Michael 
 1997 Geanología del Racismo. La Plata, Argentina: Editorial Altamira. 
 
Forbes, H.D. 
 1997 Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the Contact Hypothesis. New 
  Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
 
Foreign Affairs Canada 
 2005 Freedom from Fear: The Foreign Policy of Canada toward Human  
  Security. Official Documents available from: www.dfait_maeci.gc.ca. 
 
Flores, Ruiz.  
 1972 Sumidero. In Investigaciones históricas sobre Chiapas.  
  San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas. 91-103. 
 
Floyd, Charlene 
 1997 The Government Shall be Upon their Shoulders: The Catholic Church 
  and Democratization in Chiapas, Mexico.  New York: The 
  University of New York.  
Freire, Paulo 
 1971   Educación como práctica de la libertad. Montevideo: Terra Nueva. 
 
Frerks, Georg and Klein Goldewijk, Berma eds. 
 2006   Human Security and International Insecurity. The Netherlands: 
Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
 
Fromm 
 1975 Anatomía de la destrucción humana. México D.F.: Siglo XXI. 
 
Fuentes, Carlos 
1985 La muerte de Artemio Cruz. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
S. A.  
 324
 
Gaay Fortman, Bas de 
 2006 Safe Water. In J.W. de Visser and C. Mbazira eds., Water Delivery:  
  Public or Private? Utrecht: Institute of Constitutional and Administrative 
  Law and Community Law Centre. 
________________  
 2004 The Golden Triangle of Human Dignity: Human Security, Human 
  Development and Human Rights. In  Marie Muller, & Bas de Gaay, From  
Warfare to Welfare: Human Security in a Southern African Context. The 
Netherlands, Royal Van Gorcum, 2004. 
______________ 
 2002 Power and Protection, Productivism and the Poor. Valedictory Address. 
  The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. 
  
______________ 
 1999 “Beyond Income Distribution: An Entitlement System Approach to the 
  Acquirement Problem” in  Joep TJ.M. Van der Linden and Andre J.C. 
  Manders, The Economics of Income Distribution: Heterodox Approaches. 
  Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc. 
  
Galtung, Johan 
 1996 Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means. Sage: Trascendent. 
 
García de León 
 1985 Resistencia y utopía, memorial de agravios y crónica de revueltas y 
   profecías acaecidas en la provincia de Chiapas durante los últimos 
   quinientos años de su historia. Mexico City: Era. 
 
García Canclini, Nestor 
 2000 La globalización imaginada. Buenos Aires: Paidos. 
 
Gasper, Des 
   2005  Securing Humanity: Situating Human Security as a Concept and 
   Discourse. Journal of Human Development 6, no. 2 (July): 221-245.   
 
Garza, Mercedes de la 
 1993 Visión maya de la Conquista. In Glantz Margo, La Malinche, sus padres y 
   sus hijos. Mexico, D.F.: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM. 
 
Gilly, Adolfo 
 1998 Chiapas: La razón ardiente. Mexico D.F.: Ediciones Era. 
 
Giménez, Gilberto 
 1999 Identidades Étnicas. Estado de la cuestión. Los Retos de la etnicidad en 
 los estado-nación del siglo XXI. Mexico D.F.: Centro de Investigaciones 
 y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social. 
 
 325
Giugale, Marcelo M. 
 1999 A Comprehensive Development Agenda for the New Era: Synthesis. In 
  Marcelo Giugale, Edit., Mexico: A Comprehensive Development Agenda 
for the New Era. Washington D.C: The World Bank. 
 
Gómez, Marta 
 1993 Actividades económicas y estratégicas de reproducción en tres 
  comunidades hablantes de Zapoteco en los valles de Oaxaca. In 
  Globalización y deterioro ambiental y reorganización social en el campo 
  México D.F.: UNAM. 
 
González, Casanova 
 1979 La democracia en México. México D.F.: Serie Popular Era. 
 
González Gómez, Mauricio 
1988 Crisis and Economic Change in Mexico. In Susan Kaufman Purcel and 
  Luis Rubio, Mexico under Zedillo. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 
  Inc. 
 
González, Jorge Iván.   
           2001 El proceso de construcción de la ley. In Conservatorios: los derechos 
 integrales, condición para el desarrollo. Bogotá: CINEP, Septiembre. 
 
Gosner, Kevin 
 1996 Historical Perspectives on Maya Resistance: The Tzeltal Revolt. In 
Indigenous Revolts in Chiapas and the Andean Highlands. Amsterdam: 
Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericana, (CEDLA). 
 
 1992 Soldier of the Virgin: The Moral Economy of a Colonial Maya 
  Rebellion Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. 
 
Goudzwaard, Bob 
2003 Enrichment, Impoverishment and the Power of Exclusion. Buenos 
  Aires: CLAI consultation. 
_____________ 
2001 The Culture of Economics at the Turning of the Millennium: Christian 
  Perspectives. In Donald A. Hay and Alan Kreider, Christians and the 
  Culture  of Economics. University of Wales Press, 153-165. 
 
Goudzwaard, Bob & Lange, Harry de  
1995 Beyond Poverty and Affluence:Toward and Economy of Care. 
   Geneva: William E. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 
 
Green, Duncan 
 2003  Silent Revolution: The Rise of Market Economics in Latin America. New 
 York: Monthly Review Press. 
 326
 
Gurr, T. Robert 
2001 Marshall, Monty G. and Khosia Deepa.  Peace and Conflict 2001: A 
  Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination, Movements, and  
  Democracy. College Park: Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management, University of Maryland.   
_____________ 
2000 Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. 
Washington: United States of Peace Press. 
 
_____________ 
1970 Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
 
Gutierrez, Gustavo 
1988 A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation. 
  Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. 
 
Rajani, Kanh 
 1994 Paradigms in Economics Development: Classic Perspectives Critiques, 
                and Reflection. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Ruiz García, Samuel 
 1999 Carta Pastoral : En esta hora de gracia.  MexicoD. F.: Ediciones Dabar. 
 
Hardt and Negri     
2001  Empire Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Harvey, Neil 
 1998 The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy. Durham: 
  Duke University Press. 
 
Halstead Ted and Cobb, Clifford 
 1986 The New Measurements of Progress. In 
The Case against the Global Economy. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. 
 
Hann, Roelf 
1998 The Economics of Honor: Biblical Reflections on Money and Property  
 Switzerland: WCC Publications. 
 
Hennelly, Alfred 
1990 Liberation Theology: A Documentary History. Maryknoll, NY:  Orbis 
Books. 
 
Helmore, Kristin and Singh 
 2001 Sustainable Livelihoods: Building on the Wealth of the Poor. Bloomfield, 
 327
                        CT: Kumarian Press, Inc. 
 
Herman E. Daly and John E.Cobs 
 1994 For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, the 
Environment and a Sustainable Future. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Hernández  Díaz,  Jorge 
 1998 Las Organizaciones indígenas en Oaxaca. In Bartolomé Miguel and 
                       Barabas Alicia, Autonomías étnicas y estados nacionales. México D.F: 
                       CONACULTA. 
 
Holand Dorothy and Lachicotte William 
 2001 Identity and Agency in Cultural Worlds. Cambridge: Harvard University 
  Press. 
 
Holloway, John 
2002 Zapatismo and the Social Sciences. Capital & Class 78, 22 September 
  The H.W.Wilson Company. 
____________ 
1998 Reinventing Revolution in Mexico. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. 
____________ 
1996 The Concept of Power and the Zapatistas. Available from 
http://libcom.org/library /concept-power-zapatistas--john-holloway. 
 
Huerta, Arturo 
 2006 Alternativas de política económica para el crecimiento sostenido. 
  Economía Mexico- UNAM  3 no. 7, enero-abril. 
____________ 
1995 La Crisis del neoliberalismo mexicano. In Problemas del 
Desarrollo:Revista Latinoamericana de Economía. Mexico D.F.: 
  abril-junio. 
              
INEGI 
2000  Chiapas perfil sociodemográfico. Censo general de población y 
 vivienda, 2000. México D.F.: INEGI Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
 Geográfica e Informática. 
 
Johnson, Lyndon 
1977-1978   Growth and Equity in Mexico. Case Studies in Development 
Assistance, No 5 ,Washington, D.C.: Agency for International 
Development. 
 
Jesús, Urbina Nandayapa de 
1994     Las razones de Chiapas. Mexico: Editorial PAC. 
 
Katz, Friedrich   
1988 Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in Mexico 
 328
 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Keck and Sikkink 
 1988 Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. 
  New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
 
Kimbrell, Andrew 
 1996 Biocolonization: The Patenting of Life and the Global Market in Body 
Parts. The Case against the Global Economy. San Francisco: Sierra Club 
Books. 
 
 
King G. Paul, Woodyard. O. David 
 1999 Liberating Nature: Theology and Economics in a New Order. Cleveland: 
The Pilgrim Press. 
 
Kirk, Andrew 
 1979 Liberation Theology: An Evangelical View form the Third World  Atlanta: 
  John Knox Press. 
 
Klein Goldewijk, Berma and Gaay Fortman, B. de 
1999 Where Needs Meet Rights: Economic Social and Cultural Rights in a New 
Perspective.  Geneva: World Council of  Churches. 
 
Kymlicka, Will 
 1996 Ciudadanía multicultural: Una teoría liberal de los derechos de las 
 minorías. Barcelona: Paídos 
 
Las Casas, Bartolomé de 
 1974 The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account. Seabury Press, New York. 
 
 
Lederach, John Paul 
 1996 Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. 
Washington, D.C.: United Stated Institute of Peace. 
 
Leff, Enrique 
1998 Saber Ambiental. Mexico: Siglo XXI. 
 
Lofredo, Jorge 
 2005 Los tres ejes de la guerrilla. (Database on-line). 
                       available from http://usuarios.lycos.es/cedema/ 
____________ 
2004 La guerrilla mexicana: de la unidad a la ruptura. Memoria: Revista 
  mensual de política y cultura, february, 180. 
 329
                         available from http://www.ciepac.org/   
 
Lopez Eliseo Cortes 
 1991 Autonomía Campesina: ¿entre la agroecología o el agrocidio? Etnia y 
Sociedad. Mexico D.F.: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Iztapalapa. 
 
López y Rivas, Gilberto 
 2004 Autonomías: democracia o contrainsurgencia. México D. F.: Era. 
 
 
 
 
Leyva, Xóchitl  
 1996 De las Cañadas a Europa: niveles, actores y discursos del Nuevo 
Movimiento Zapatista (NMZ) (1994-1997). Desacatos CIESAS México, 
Primavera 1999: 56-88. 
 
 
Lustig. Nora and  Székely, Miguel 
 1997 México: Evolución económica, pobreza y desigualdad. Washington D.C. 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, IADB. 
  
Manso, Carlos  
           1996    Comercio y rebelión en el obispado de Oaxaca. Tehuantepec y Nexapa, 
                       1660-1661. In Hector Díaz-Polanco, El Fuego de la inobediencia: 
                        autonomía y rebelión india en el obispado de Oaxaca. CIESAS-OAXACA. 
 
Márquez Ayala, David 
 1994 El tratado de Libre Comercio de Norteamérica ¿Opción adecuada para 
México bajo su actual contenido?  In Problemas Macroeconómicos de 
México: Diagnóstico y Alternativas II.  México DF: Juan Pablos editor, 
S.A. 
 
Martín-Baró      
 2003 Poder, Ideología y Violencia. Madrid: Editorial Trotta  S.A. 
 
Martin Atherton and Couto Soares Maria Clara 
1993 The Oaxaca Initiative: A Framework for Equitable and Sustainable 
 Development in the Americas” available from: 
 http://www.developmentgap.org/americas/index.html 
 
Max-Neef, Manfred 
 1992 From the Outside Looking In: Experiences in Barefoot Economics.\ 
 London: Zed Books Ltd. 
____________ 
1991 Human Scale Development: Conception, Application and Further 
Reflections.  New York: The Apex Press. 
 330
 
Menéndez Fernández, Jorge 
 2001 El otro poder: Las redes de narcotráfico, la política y la violencia en 
  México. Mexico D.F.: Nuevo Siglo Aguilar. 
 
Molina, Virginia 
 1991 La Migracíon indígena y sus efectos al interior de la comunidad de 
origen. In Etnia y Sociedad.  México D.F: Universidad Autónoma 
Metropolitana-Iztapalapa. 
 
Monroy, Mario        
1994 ¿Qué pasó y que pasa en Chiapas? In Monroy Mario edit. Pensar Chiapas, 
  Repensar México: Reflexiones de las ONGs Mexicanas sobre el conflicto. 
  México D.F.: Impretei. 
   
Montemayor, Carlos 
 1998 Chiapas, la rebelión indígena de México. Madrid: Edic. Espasa Cálpe. 
________________ 
 1991 La Rebelión indígena Mexico D.F. La Jornada Semanal, 9 febrero. 
 
Martínez Navarro, Emilio 
 2000 Ética para el desarrollo de los pueblos. Madrid: Editorial Trotta, S.A. 
 
Mora, Juan Miguel de 
 1972 Las Guerrillas en México y Genaro Vázquez Rojas. México D.F.: Editora 
           Latino América S.A. 
 
Nelida Bonaccorsi 
 1990 El Trabajo indígena en Chiapas, siglo XVI. México City: UNAM- 
  CIHMECH. 
 
Newsome, Linda 
 1983 Indian Population Patterns in Colonial Spanish America.  Latin American 
  Research Review 20, no.3, 45-74. 
 
Ocampo Guzmán, Adolfo 
 1999 La economía Chiapaneca ante el Tratado de Libre Comercio. 
  San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Chiapas, México: Centro de Información y 
  Análisis, A.C. 1999. 
 
Oommen, T.K. 
 1997 Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity. Cambridge, Mass., Polity Press- 
  Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Oxfam International 
 2000 U.S. Corn Subsidies Said to Damage Mexico. New York Times. 27 
 331
   August available from http//www.mindfully.org/WTO/2003/US-Corn- 
   Subsidies27aug03.htm 
 
Paige, Jeffery M. 
1975 Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the  
Underdeveloped World. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Paz, Octavio 
 1997 El laberinto de la soledad y otras obras. New York: Penguin Books. 
 
Perry Guillermo E. & Arias Omar S,  
 2006    From Vicious to Virtuous Circles. New York: World Bank.   
 
Pineda, Vicente 
 1888 Historia de las sublevaciones indígenas habidas en el estado de 
  Chiapas.  Tipografía del Gobierno, Mexico. 
 
Polany, Karl 
 1944 The Great Transformation. New York, Farrar & Rinehart Inc. 
 
 
Prebish, Raul 
 1993 The Latin American Periphery in the Global System Capitalism. In 
Paradigms in Economic Development: Classic Perspective, Critiques, and  
Reflections. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 
Villoro, Luis 
 1998 Estado plural, pluralidad de cultura. Mexico, D.F.: Paídos, UNAM 
 
Ranis, Gustav & Stewart Frances 
2002 Economic Growth and Human Development in Latin America. Cepal 
 Review 75  (December). 
 
Rawls, Anne 
 2003 Conflict as a Foundation for Consensus: Contradictions of Industrial 
  Capitalism in Book III of Durkheim’s Division of Labor.   
  Critical Sociology 29, no. 3: 295-335.         
Rawls, John 
 1995 El liberalismo político. México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 
Recondo, David 
 2001 Usos y Costumbres, procesos electorales y autonomía indígena en Oaxaca. 
   In Lourdes de León Pasquel ed., Costumbres, leyes y movimiento en  
  Oaxaca y Chiapas. México D.F.: CIESAS. 
 
REMALC 
 1999 Alternativas para las Américas: Hacia la construcción de un acuerdo 
 332
   hemisférico de los pueblos. REMALC. Mexico DF. 1999. 
 
Reyes Heroles, Jesús 
 1982 Liberalismo Mexicano III. La integración de las ideas. México D.F: 
   Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 
Reygadas, Rafael 
 1991 Abriendo veredas: iniciativas públicas y sociales de las redes de 
 organizaciones civiles. Mexico D.F: Servicios Informativos Procesados, 
 A. C. 
_____________ 
1991 De cara al imaginario Zapatista. In Pensar Chiapas: repensar México: 
reflexiones de las ONGs mexicanas sobre el conflicto. Convergencia de 
Organismos Civiles por la Democracia. 
 
Rosenblat, Angel  
 1954 La Población indígena y el mestizaje en América, tomo 1. Buenos Aires: 
   Ed. Nova. 
 
Rostow, W. W. 
 1960 The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.  
  Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sachs, Wolfgang 
 1990 Progress and Development. In Paul Ekins and Manfred Max-Neef (eds), 
  Real-Life Economics:Understanding Wealth Creation.  London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Salemink, Oscar 
 2006 Changing Rights and Wrongs: The Transnational Construction of  
  Indigenous and Human Rights among Vietnam’s Central Highlanders. In 
European Journal of Anthropology 47: 32-47.  
_____________ 
 2004 Social Science Intervention: Moral versus political economy and the 
Vietnam War. In Philip Quarles van Ufford and Ananta Kumar Giri, eds. 
A Moral Critique of Development: In Search of Global Responsabilities. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Sánchez Albornoz, Nicolás 
 1968 La Población de América Latina. Buenos Aires: Ed.Paidos. 
 
Saxe- Fernandez.  John 
 1995 Plan de choque y la dialéctica entre macrorregionalización y 
                 Microrregionalizacón. In Problemas del desarrollo: Revista 
                 Latinoamericana de Economía Mexico D.F.: July-September 1995. 
 
Scott, James C. 
 333
 1976 The Moral Economy of the peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in 
   Southeast Asia.  New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Secretaria de Asuntos Indígenas 
 2001 Ley de Derechos de los Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas. Oaxaca Oax.: 
  Gobierno del Estado de Oaxaca.  
 
Sederberg, Peter  
1994 Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change. New York: 
HarperCollins College Publishers. 
 
Sen, Amartya 
1999 Development as Freedom. New York, Alfred A Knopf, Inc. 
_____________ 
1987 On Ethics and Economics. New York: Basil Blackwell. 
_____________ 
1981 Poverty and Famines: An Essay of Entitlement and Deprivation.  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
   
Sieder, Rachel 
 2002 Recognising Indigenous Law and the Politics of State Formation in 
Mesoamerica. In Sieder, Rachel ed. Multiculturalism in Latin America: 
Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy. Houndmills: Palgrave,  
Macmillian 
 
Skocpol, Theda 
 1991 Social Revolutions in the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
 
Smith, Christian 
 1990 The emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social 
Movement Theory Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Social Watch  
2005 Social Watch Report 2005: Roars and Whispers , Gender and Poverty: 
                        Promises vs. Action. (Database on-line) available from:  
http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informeImpreso/tablaDeContenidos2005.h
tm  
 
Soria, Victor 
 2000 Crecimiento económico, crisis estructural y evolución de la pobreza en 
México: Un enfoque regulacionista de largo plazo. Mexico D.F: 
                 Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana. 
 
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo 
 2002 The indigenous Peoples and the State in Latin America: An Ongoing 
 334
  Debate. In  Rachel Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous 
  Rights, Diversity and Democracy. Houndmills: Palgrave, Macmillian. 
____________ 
1995 Indigenous People: Emerging Actors in Latin America. In Ethnic Conflict 
 and Governance in Comparative Perspective.  The Woodrow Wilson 
Center. 
 
____________ 
 1990 The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights. Tokyo: 
  United Nations University Press. 
____________ 
 1991 Reflections on Some Theories of Ethnic Conflict. Journal of Ethno- 
  Development   4, no. 1:15. 
____________ 
 1978 Capitalism and Peasantry in Mexico. In Latin American Perspectives,  
  Vol 5, (3) pp. 27-37. 
 
Stephen, Lynn 
2002 Zapata Lives!: Histories and Cultural Politics in Southern Mexico. 
 Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Tajfel, Henri 
 1982 Social Identity in Intergroup Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press.  
 
Tavanti, Marco 
 1999 Las abejas: Pacifist Resistance and Syncretic Identities in a Globalizing 
  Chiapas. Routledge: Taylor & Francis Books. 
 
Taylor, Charles 
 1995 Cross-Purposes:  The Liberal Communitarian Debate. In Philosophical 
 Arguments. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press   
 
Taylor C. Marylee 
 2002 Fraternal Deprivation, Collective Treta, and Racial Resentment in  
  Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration. 
  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tello Dias, Carlos 
 2000 La Rebelión de las Cañadas: origen y ascenso del EZLN. 
  México D.F.: Cal y Arena. 
 
Thompson, Edward 
 1991 Customs in Common. London: The Merlin Press. 
 
Tilly, Charles. 
 335
 1986 Does Modernization Breed Revolution? In Revolutions: Theoretical, 
  Comparative and Historical Studies. San Diego: Harcourt Brace and 
  Jonanovich, Publishers. 
______________ 
 1974 Town and Country and Revolution. In John Wilson Lewis ed. Peasant  
 Revolution and Communist Revolution in Asia. Stanford: Stanford  
 University Press. 
 
  
Todorov, Tzevtan,  
      1987          La conquista de América: El problema del otro. México, Siglo XXI. 
 
Toledo, Alejandro 
 2000 La Paz en Chiapas. Mexico D.F.: UNAM-Quinto Sol. 
_____________ 
 1988 Como destruir el paraíso: el desastre ecológico del sureste. México D. F.: 
  Centro de Ecodesarrollo. 
             
Trejo, Guillermo 
 1992 Contra la pobreza: por una estratégia de política social. Mexico D.F 
  Ediciones Cal y Arena, Centro para el Desarrollo A.C. 
 
UNAM/ERA 
 1997 Chiapas 4. Mexico D.F. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas. 
  Ediciones Era. 
 
United Nations Development Programme 
 2005 Human Development Report 2005. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 2004 Human Development Report 2004. New York: United Nations 
  Development  Programme. 
  
 2002 Human Development Report 2002. New Cork: Oxford University Press. 
  
 1994 Human development Report 1994. New Cork: Oxford University Press. 
 
PNUD 
 2003 Informe sobre el desarrollo humano México 2002. D.F.: PNUD. 
 
Programa de las Naciones Unidas 
 2003 Human Development Report Mexico 2002. Mexico D.F.: Programa de 
  las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. 
 
Vel, Jacqueline 
 1994 The Uma-economy: Indigenous economics and development work in 
  Lawonda, Sumba (Eastern-Indonesia). The Netherlands: Grafisch bedrijf. 
 336
 
Vidales, Raúl 
 1998 Utopía y liberación el amanecer del indio. San José, Costa Rica: 
  Departamento Ecuménico de Investigaciones, 1998. 
 
Viqueira, Juan Pedro 
 2002 Las causas de una rebelión india: Chiapas 1712. In Rebeliones Indígenas 
   en Chiapas. San Cristóbal de las Casas: Ediciones Pirata. 
 
Voght, Evon  
 1990 The Zinacantecos of Mexico: A Modern Maya Way of Life. Forth Worth 
  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers. 
 
 Vos, Jan de 
 2002 Tierra y libertad: Panorama de cuatro rebeliones indígenas de Chiapas. In 
  In Rebeliones Indígenas  en Chiapas. San Cristóbal de las Casas: 
  Ediciones Pirata. 
_____________ 
 1996    The Battle of Sumidero: a history of the Chiapanecan rebellion 
  through Spanish and Indian testimonies (1524-34).  In Kevin Gosner and 
  Arij Ouweneel. Indigenous Revolts in Chiapas and Andean Highlands. 
  Amsterdam: The Center for Latin American Research (CEDLA). 
 
Walker, Iain 
 2002 Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel 
 1996 Después del liberalismo. Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores. 
 
Weinberg, Bill 
2000 Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico. 
Verso: London. 
 
Whitecotton, Joseph W. 
1977 The Zapotecs Princes, Priests and Peasants. University of Oklahoma 
 Press: Norman. 
 
Wodon, Quentin & López Acevedo, Gladis 
          2004      Poverty in Mexico’s Southern States. World Bank. 
available from               
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/ECADocbyUnid/541D5388
65DA825A85256DC5007A7BC8?Opendocument 
 
Wolf, Eric 
 1999 Peasant Rebellion and Revolution in Revolutions: Theoretical, 
 337
  Comparative, and Historical Studies San Diego: Harcout Brace 
  Jonanovich, Publishers. 
 
Womack, John 
1999       Rebellion in Chiapas: An Historical Reader. New York: The New Press. 
 
 
World Bank 
 2006    World Economic Situation and Prospects 2006.  New York: United 
                        Nations, available from: 
                        http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp.html 
 
2004 Poverty in Mexico: An Assessment of Conditions, Trends and Government  
  Strategy. Mexico City. 
 
2001    World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. New York:  
                        Oxford University Press. 
            . 
1991 The World Bank: Working Papers. Washington, WPS 679. 
 
1979 Special Study of the Mexican Economy: Mayor Policy Issues and 
Prospects, Vol. 1.  Main Report no. 230-ME (May). 
 
Wright, S. C. & Tropp, Linda R. 
 2002 Collective Action in Response to Disadvantage: Intergroup Perceptions, 
  Social Identification and Social Change. In Iain Walter, Heather J. Smith 
   eds. Relative Deprivation: Development, and Integration. Cambridge: 
   Cambridge University Press.   
 
Yashar, Deborah 
 2005 Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous 
 Movement and the Postliberal Challenge. Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge 
 University Press. 
 
Zurita, Alonso de 
1947 Breve relación de los señores de la Nueva España. Mexico City: 
Ediciones Chávez. 
 
 
 
 
 
